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ABSTRACT 
The study begins by examining the orthodox theory of 
discrimination as a possible model with which to evaluate 
the soolo-economic basis of race relations in Rhodesia. 
It is argued that it is inadequate because the theory is not 
grounded in the settler-colonial system, its historiography 
and the peripheral capitalist social formation in Rhodesia 
in which a complex articulation between modes of production 
Is found. 
A critique is then undertaken of the principal theories 
hitherto used to explain the course of Rhodesian economic 
development - namely, dualism and those termed neo-marxist. 
It is argued that Barber's modification of the dualistic model 
of W. A. Lewis is deficient particularly because of the 
absence of a theory of 'primitive accumulation' and also 
the lack of an analysis of the political economy of the 
'labour transfer', the basis of peripheral capitalist 
development. Arrighi's 'neo-maraist' analysis of Rhodesian 
development is also criticized for its inadequate theory of 
'primitive accumulation' and the lack of attention paid to 
the labour mobilization process. An analytical alternative 
is proposed, based on an explanation of 'primitive capital 
accumulation' and the specific forms of-labour utilization 
found in Rhodesia in association with particular modes of 
production existent during the period under review. An 
attempt is made to specify these modes and the social 
relations related thereto. 
The labour structures found in the economic system are 
then examined in the context of the income distribution 
pattern, the class structure of the social formation and 
the primary 'dynamic' of Rhodesian postwar development - 
industrialization. It is suggested that changes in labour 
policy in various modes of production were essentially 
concerned with ensuring the maintenance of a system of cheap 
labour whereby employers acquired labour-power below 
the cost of its own reproduction. The development of 
peripheral capitalism under conditions of settler colonialism 
required changes to labour policy. These modifications 
left the basic structures of the socio-economic system intact, 
although they gave rise to substantial pressures for change, 
e. g. from unions and African nationalism. The State has 
been particularly significant in containing these socio- 
economic and political pressures, especially in the field of 
labour policy. 
An attempt is made to identify the changes in labour 
mobilization that have taken place, to assess their impact 
on the nature of discrimination and underdevelopment, and to 
point out some of the more important features of the class 
formation process that have resulted from the development 
of capitalism in Rhodesia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISCRIMINATION AND 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SETTLER COLONIAL RHODESIA 
This study examines the political economy of discrimination 
and underdevelopment in postwar Rhodesia. The problem it 
poses - that of explaining the character of the former and 
relating it to the latter (in respect of African labour) - 
requires a critique of past theoretical and empirical analyses. 
It is important to explain the underlying socio-economic 
causes of discrimination, its historical manifestations and 
contemporary function in the Rhodesian political economy, as 
well as the economic dimensions and structural consequences 
of a variety of significant, often changing discriminatory 
policies and practices. An explanation of this nature 
cannot proceed properly in a conceptual vacuum. For this 
reason it will be necessary to identify the systemic nature 
of the Rhodesian economic structure, the changing character 
of the political economy and the roots of underdevelopment in 
the Rhodesian economic system. The interconnections between 
discrimination and this latter set of factors are of the 
essence in acts of discrimination whether those are individual 
or social in nature. 
The specific character of the Rhodesian social formation 
must therefore be examined in order to identify the 
relationships that have existed between class structures and 
the racial order. This requires a study of the (various) 
modes of production in the settler colonial system as well as 
Z 
their articulation with each other. Here it is necessary to 
identify the economic base (the productive forces and the 
social relations of production), the politico-juridical and 
ideological superstructures associated therewith, and the 
processes, institutions and policies which have functioned to 
help create and reproduce the structures of domination and 
discrimination. Discrimination must therefore be explained 
'within' the particular context of settler colonialism in 
Rhodesia and this social formation's incorporation into the 
world economic system as a specific form of dependent 
capitalism in the periphery. 
THE 'ECONOMIC THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION' 
The views advanced here are based upon a rejection of 
the 'economic theory of discrimination' as a framework of 
analysis. Representative models of orthodox theory can be 
identified with the work of Becker, Thurow and Arrow. 
1 
The 
inadequacies of these models lie in their abstracted formalist 
character and particularly in their rootedness (insofar as 
they directly relate to social reality) in social formations 
in which the capitalist mode of production Is exclusive* 
2 
In Rhodesia different structures prevail; and the capitalist 
mode is dominant not exclusive. 
The orthodox 'economic theory of discrimination' is 
rejected for additional reasons. Becker's model, for 
instance, is grounded in the unrestrained competitive market 
system, a world in which discrimination is narrowly conceived 
3 
in 'economistic' terms. As the historiography of Rhodesia 
has demonstrated, no such systemic conditions prevail; 
3 
nor 
would economistic conceptions - positing a dualism between 
'economic' and other forms of discrimination - be of much 
analytical use or historical relevance in describing the 
reality of settler colonialism. For Becker, discrimination 
is regarded as a 'restrictive practice' whereas in settler 
4 
colonial structures it has had an all pervasive character. 
Discrimination has been more than a simple 'interference' 
with the 'market' allocation of resources and an interruption 
to 'free trade' between 'independent' racial groupings. For 
Becker, discrimination is conceived on the individual 
behavioural level as a 'non-pecuniary motive' that expresses 
itself in a 'taste for discrimination'. There is no 
explanation offered on the crucial issue of the origins of 
the behaviour itself: it is simply assumed as given. Such 
an approach presumes the very phenomenon. -that has to 
be 
explained. Similarly, Becker's two key notions - 'non- 
pecuniary motive' and 'taste for discrimination' - are 
inadequate concepts for the task of analysing discrimination 
of a structural nature. They provide little assistance in 
identifying the socio-economic causes of particular patterns 
of discrimination. Instead they relate to the epi-phenomenal 
level of preferences. Indeed, it is in this context that an 
ideological element legitimating the status quo is to be found 
in Becker's model. Because discrimination is regarded as 
an exercise of consumer preferences, it can only be reduced 
by changes in tastes and preferences. In this world there 
y 
appears no need for the re-design of institutional structures 
because 'monopolies, political discrimination, and the like 
are, at most, secondary determinants of market discrimination 
... (while).. individual tastes for discrimination operating 
within a competitive framework constitute the primary 
determinant'. 
5 
The very stress on the 'competitive framework' 
relegates 'imperfections', be they 'economic' or 'political', 
to a secondary role and enables Becker to argue that 
discrimination involves costs for the discriminator and not 
primarily the person(s) discriminated-against. 
6 
Such a 
position is reached by the re-construction of 'reality' on a 
distorted theoretical plane, abstracted from specific 
socio-economic processes, outside of history, and in such a 
way as to provide a major source of confusion particularly if 
it is applied to the development of race relations under a 
settler colonial structure located in the periphery of 
Southern Africa. 
Becker's work, despite marginal criticisms, has been 
seminal for orthodox theoreticians who have generally 
operated within the limitations of the marginalist-cum- 
neoclassical paradigm. 
7 
Arrow, for instance, has elaborated 
upon the concept of the 'taste for discrimination' by 
combining it - broken down into positive and negative elements 
- with a neoclassical analysis of utility functions. Yet 
the same author himself admits to the inherent limitations 
of utility analysis because it offers no real explanation 
of discrimination but simply discards the problem to an 
8 
'unanalysed realm'. This is the crux of the matter. 
1 
i 
.i 
!ý 
5- 
Arrow's 'refinements' lead little further towards an 
explanation of social reality. 
9 
They are still within a 
mould that is ahistorical and non-structuralist stressing an 
orthodox dualism between so-called 'economic' and 'non-economic' 
factors. His analysis does not adequately specify the social 
formation to which the model relates and ignores the structural 
relationships between class formations and race relations 
except in the most superficial way (e. g. by talking of 
'capital' and 'labour' as aggregates and factors without social 
relations). These are not marginal 'imperfections', but 
fundamental limitations, particularly where an informed 
analysis of discrimination and underdevelopment in the settler 
colonial periphery requires a relevant correspondence between 
theory and socio-economic realities. 
Among Becker's critics, Thurow has done most to 
rehabilitate 'economic' explanations of discrimination, 
situating his analysis within the context of an 'imperfectly' 
competitive system whioh'is influenced by Institutional 
constraints and monopolistic/monopsonistic forces. Thurow 
contends that Becker's application of tariff theory to a 
world of perfect competition 'has serious limitations in a 
world where much of the impact of discrimination comes from 
the monopoly powers of the discriminator'. The notion of 
10 
racial economic power is given a prominence not catered for 
previously: 'The dominant group controls much more than its 
willingness to trade or not to trade with the minority group. 
Physical, social, or economic pressures may enable the 
dominant group to trade with the subservient group as a 
ýý 
6 
discriminating monopolist or monopsonist. ' 
11 
For Thurow 
the market place is not one where the advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups function in separate societies which 
enter into 'market determined' relationships solely in the 
economic field. ' Rather the weaker group operates in the 
same single society as the stronger group subject to the 
economic and sooio-political controls dictated by the dominant 
group. 
There is also the recognition in Thurow's model that 
'poverty' and discrimination are connected; that 
discriminators can and do gain from discrimination; that 
'non-market' factors can facilitate discriminatory practice; 
that collusion and monopoly power are crucial in the exercise 
of discrimination; that a multiplicity of forms and 
mechanisms of discrimination exists; that the operations of 
the State may be significant; and that there is a need to 
shift analysis from the psychological plane of preferences 
towards the structural determinants of the political economy. 
While Thurow's monopolistic model is more realistic, 
there are still serious deficiencies in applying it to a 
dependent capitalist periphery. Indeed, it is the lack of 
integration with a pertinent theory of underdevelopment that 
makes both Beaker's model and Thurow's variant redundant to 
the circumstances of the settler colonial economic system. 
Thurow's framework does not lend itself in application 
to the core issues, of discrimination under conditions, of 
underdevelopment. The stress on the importance of income 
distribution provides a partial explanation of the root causes 
-7 
of discrimination, but the pattern of income distribution 
itself is not explained, nor is its dynamics. Here the 
relationships between income distribution and structural 
transformation need to be identified. Thurow takes a wholly 
non-systemic view of the political economy by not identifying 
either its mode(s) of production or its processes of 
accumulation. Although Thurow acknowledges the relationship, 
he does not specifically investigate the connection between 
poverty (underdevelopment) and affluence (development). The 
former is seen as a 'state', not as a process with dynamic 
causal relationship to the latter; and, with an economistic 
and ahistorical bias, the origins and conditions for the 
maintenance and reproduction of poverty are not examined in a 
systematic fashion. The part (discrimination) is thus 
'explained' without reference to the system as a whole and 
its socio-economic and class structure. 
Criticisms of theories which do not analyse discrimination 
in terms of class are found implicit in Baran and Sweezy's 
12 
analysis of monopoly capitalism. Although this work 
locates discrimination in the structural character and 
historical development of the capitalist economic system, 
Baran and Sweezy do not provide an adequate framework for 
analysing discrimination under settler colonialism in a 
peripheral capitalist social formation. In this system the 
articulation between the dominant capitalist mode of production 
and non-capitalist, production structures provides the nexus 
around which the economic and social forces of class 
domination and racial discrimination interact. 
13 
A more 
8 
specific and pertinent theoretical framework is thus 
required in order to explain discrimination in Rhodesia. 
For this reason there is-. need for a critique of past analyses 
of discrimination and the economics of socio. political and 
race relations in Rhodesian society. 
RACIAL MODELS, OF AFRICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Two types of 'racial model' of African underdevelopment 
and racial discrimination are to be found in the literature 
on Rhodesia. 
One variant seeks to explain African underdevelopment 
in terms of the inabilities, particularly cultural 
incapacities, of Africans themselves. These models 
essentially comprise various notions and strands of Ideology 
which have sought in varying ways to explain and account for 
- on terms favourable to settler colonialism - the lowly 
socio-economic position of African peasants, workers and 
14 
capitalists. The 'theory' is cast in racial terms yet the 
rootedness of the ideology can be traced to the settler 
colonial class structure and the development of capitalism at 
various periods in the evolution of the Rhodesian social 
15 
formation. It thus serves the interests of settler 
colonialism and acts to legitimate the status quo, 
16 
Academic 'social science' has also been integrated into 
this settler ideology insofar as it has attempted to 
professionalize populist notions, and endeavoured to lend the 
latter theoretical respectability and pseudo-scientific 
9 
objectivity. This ideology can be said to constitute the 
dominant 'theory' inside Rhodesia - amongst settlers, managers, 
public officials, white (assimilated) immigrants and even 
'colonized' Africans who in various ways have articulated 
settler ideology about the inherited cultural roots of African 
17 
underdevelopment. It is a theory legitimating a dominance 
which appears as 'racial' though it is actually based on a 
complex class structure. 
Enke, for instance, has postulated a dualistic 
two-economies model of the Rhodesian economy -a subsistence 
economy based on indigenous structures and a market economy 
based on 'Western' structures. In applying the model, Enke 
puts forward the thesis that the penetration by the market 
economy into the subsistence economy has resulted in 
18 
remarkable-benefit for the 'participating natives'. 
Indigenous development in Rhodesia was for Enke 'inconceivable 
without the government, management, skills, capital and 
social values of Westerners'. 
19 
In Enke's view African 
'culture' has been a major barrier to development because, 
'despite rapid advancement, (Africans) are still only a few 
generations from cannibalism and slavery'. 
20 
The most 
significant structural and income distribution cleavage in 
Enke's analysis is that between black and white. The low 
level of African incomes, in absolute and comparative terms, 
is 'explained' by the bulk of the African -population 'being 
in the subsistence economy'. 
21 
Apart from its historical 
distortions, the thesis seeks to vindicate the 'civilizing 
role' of colonialism not simply by postulating a culturalist- 
j 
10 
racialist explanation of the origins of contemporary 
structures of African underdevelopment but also through an 
exaggeration of the benefits of colonialism and an implicit 
denial of the very existence of structures of discrimination. 
The dualism postulated is simplistic even in terms of the 
orthodox social theories of dualism. 
22 
The second type of 'racial model' commonly employed to 
explain the economic predicament of Africans in Rhodesia is 
rooted in the 'liberal' tradition. Essentially it suggests 
that discrimination has been the major form of social, 
economic and political domination but that it will be eroded 
by the forces of the market. The exploitation of blacks is 
equated simply with racial discrimination, the latter being. 
rooted, it is argued, in white exolusivism, racist attitudes 
and the exercise of various forms of racial supremacy. 
23 
Other variants of this model are expressed in pluralist 
theories which stress the progressively integrated nature 
24 
of racial group incorporation into the social system 
however, pluralist theories expand upon rather than deviate 
from the basic binary (black/white) liberal model. 
Many examples exist which indicate this (liberal) 
perception of socio-economic reality in Rhodesia. Williams' 
analysis"of inequality for instance centers around a racial 
comparison ofincomes, between the black majority and the 
25 
politically dominant white minority. Franck examines the 
'economics of racialism' in a similar vein, arguing that the 
'central problem of the... economy is the size of the gap 
between white and black incomes'. The racial cleavage 
26 
J 
I, 
and income gap can only be closed, in Franck's view, 'as part 
of a general political. redress' 
2? 
. More sophisticated 
approaches, like : Faber's, provide a greater degree of 
disaggregation of income classes. Likewise Pearson divides 
28 
the income structure into non-African, urban African and rural 
African groups. 
29 
While this refinement allows for more 
flexible' interpretation, it'still does not break with the 
tradition of the liberal 'racial model'. 
The weaknesses of this model can be identified. The 
stress on the racial income or wage gap only isolates one 
selected datum of socio-economic stratification, without 
explaining its origins and without relating it to the mode(s) 
of production and processes of class formation in the system. 
The stress on a 'political' solution to income inequalities 
more often than not merely means that elites should be 
'circulated' and blacks substituted for whites within the 
existing structures of production, consumption and exchange. 
It seldom implies any fundamental objection to those structures 
themselves. 'Racial' theories are also unable to come to 
grips with the institutional features of the class structure 
in Rhodesia - the objective differences between the African 
petty bourgeoisie in rural areas and the marginalized 
peasantry being, for instance, only one case in point. 
30 
The monolithic treatment of ethnic groups as uniform entities 
without significant internal division further helps provide 
an'ill-focussed and over-aggregated view of the system. As 
a result the liberal racial model presents no theory of 
articulation between modes of production, no theory of 
lý 
structural transformation of-the political economy and no 
adequate. theory of class and racial interaction. 
There are two other important schools of thought which 
must be dealt with in this critique, vir, dualism and 
neo-marxist theory. The former forms part or liberal 
analysis while the latter has developed as a critique of 
the ideological and structural forms of liberalism and settler 
colonialism. 
THE THEORY OF DUALISM IN RHODESIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Various forms of dualistic development are considered 
in the theoretical literature. 
31 
Most derive from the 
32 
_'classical' 
dual model formulated by Arthur Lewis. 
Although Lewis admits that the chief historical example on 
which the model was based was that of the United Kingdom, 
33 
it has been widely applied to 'Third World' economies. 
..,. These models of 
dualism do have some common properties. 
In Lewis' case the economy is regarded as being composed 
of 'a capitalist and a subsistence sector. The 'dynamic' is 
located in the capitalist sector and development proceeds 
primarily by means of the withdrawal of labour from the 
subsistence sector. In the first phase, development with 
'unlimited' labour, the supply curve is infinitely elastic 
in the sense that 'if capitalists offer adbitional employment 
at the existing wage, there will be far more candidates than 
-34 they require'. An essential condition for this is that 
/3 
the capitalist wage exceeded average earnings in the sub- 
sistence sector by a margin sufficient at least to cause 
a 'voluntary' transfer of labour from the latter sector. 
Lewis thus assumes that the capitalist and subsistence 
sectors 'compete' for workers. The accumulation of capital, 
assumed to have taken place within the capitalist sector, is 
sustained by the re-investment of profits derived from 
capitalist production. Ultimately, according to Lewis, 
the subsistence sector is 'absorbed' into an exclusive 
capitalist system. However, in the first phase wages do 
not rise unless, for example, productivity increases in 
the subsistence sector so pushing up the (average product) 
base upon which the capitalist 'market' wage is determined. 
In the second stage, characterized by 'limited' labour 
supplies, accumulation proceeds as wages rise, but now as 
a consequence of 'labour shortages'. 
35 
A number of criticisms have been levied against Lewis' 
model and its derivatives by scholars representing a variety 
36 
of perspectives. It has been argued that the theory of 
dualism is non-holist in that it attempts to explain parts 
of the economic system without systematically relating them 
to each other. There is a non-relational bias in dualistic 
theory in that it stresses sectoral independence when 
interdependence is of the essence. Lewis limits sectoral 
connections to a uni-directional flow of labour (and, in 
certain instances, trade). When applied in an historical 
context, this results in a simplification of the labour 
mobilization process. For instance, Lewis has argued that 
19 
'a domestic servant is in the capitalist sector when working 
37 
in a hotel but not when working in a private home'. 
Yet the original source of private domestic labour supplies 
in most underdeveloped countries has been the same as for 
labourers employed in 'capitalist' production. Lewis takes 
their existence, already in employment (as a labour 
'reservoir' not unlike the self-employed), as a given 
historical datum. No attempt is made to explain their 
evolution, function in production, socio-economic significance 
j- or unique experience of 'subsistence'. 
/ 
In part, this 
derives from the 'economism' of Lewis' model, its retreat 
from 'political economy' (despite claims for its 'classical' 
heritage), its lack of acknowledgement of the need to 
analyse class formations and patterns of stratification in 
development, and the absence of a theory of the State. These 
omissions make it possible for Lewis to conceive of the 
'labour transfer' as a purely 'market determined' phenomenon, 
a notion which the experience of colonialism and contemporary 
capitalist development in Rhodesia would seriously contradict. 
Far from (offers of employment) being over-supplied, the 
historiography of Rhodesia illustrates that in certain 
important sectors severe'labour shortages' prevailed at the 
'going' capitalist wage rate* 
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Paradoxically, this has 
continued to be so even while capitalist development has 
led to serious unemployment, an expectation contrary to the 
teleological determinism and 'beneficial' labour absorption 
expected fron the dual model. Lewis' explanation of 
accumulation may also be criticized since it suggests that 
/5- 
capital expands solely as a result of re-investment, the 
effect of which is necessarily to further the labour absorption 
process. However, the vital process of 'primitive accumula- 
tion', whereby capital expands in capitalist hands as a 
result of the transfer of value from non-capitalist modes of 
production, acquired as a result of the employment of labour 
below the cost of its reproduction, is omitted from the 
analysis. 
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It will be an objective of this study to show 
that 'primitive accumulation' has been and remains the basic 
form of accumulation in settler-colonial Rhodesia, viz, it 
is the form of accumulation upon which the socio-economic 
lr.. 
- 
system ultimately rests. Even though capital has derived 
from abroad, and capital has accumulated in some industries 
as a result of the re-investment of profits derived from 
production structures in which wages exceed labour's costs 
of reproduction, the economic system as a whole (and the 
integrated articulation of its various modes of production) 
has depended on the cheap labour system whereby the vast 
bulk of 'productive' wage-labourers have received wages lower 
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than the costs of reproduction of their labour. Finally, 
Lewis' notion 'about a single capitalist wage (whether constant, 
rising or falling) is too constraining a framework within 
which to analyse the wage structures of an underdeveloped 
country such as Rhodesia. Like his assumption regarding a 
uniform 'subsistence' sector, it does violence to social 
reality and imposes an analytical restriction that inhibits 
understanding. It neither helps to adequately explain the 
conditions of labour and production (e. g., the significance 
of the changing pattern of 'migrancy') nor is it of much use 
16 
in seeking an explanation of a situation in which the wages 
of some workers rise while those of others (whether 
relatively and/or absolutely) fall. 
The most Important specific application of the theory of 
dualism to Rhodesia is found in the work of Barber who, 
whilst providing some criticisms of the Lewis model in 
relation to Central African realities, made amendments to the 
orthodox model so that it would conform with certain 
institutional patterns deemed by Barber to be more typical 
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of Rhodesian circumstances. 
Barber eschewed the capitalist/subsistence dichotomy 
and replaced it with the dualism between a 'money' and 
'indigenous' economy designed to stress 'the contrasting 
modes of economic organization'. The central unit of 
production in the indigenous economy is the f amily# a social 
organization with its own rules governing the division of 
labour as a result of which 'individual members of its 
labour force are not homogenous factors of production... 
perfectly substitutable with one another'. According to 
Barber, the adult male is initially in demand in the money 
economy and, because he is periodically not in demand in 
the indigenous economy, his labour can be 'withdrawn' without 
affecting indigenous (agricultural) production. It is 
within this framework that Barber reformulates 'the problem 
of interaction, between the two economies'. For Barber the 
'money economy is the dynamic force in the system'. It 
sets up the production process with 'the capital which it 
provides with labour drawn from the indigenous economy'. 
/7 
The two economies are thus 'brought into contact with one 
another'. Barber defines the problem as a question of the 
teerrmg on which indigenous labour is prepared to ('volitionally') 
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accept employment in such a dualistic system. Contrary 
to Lewis, who suggested that the wage must exceed the 
average product of the subsistence sector by an 'incentive 
margin', Barber 'invokes a behaviouralist explanation: 
'the indigenous male will accept wage employment when it 
serves to maximize the real income of his family group'. 
For the African household situated In the reserves, the 
'maximization problem' becomes a question of allocating the 
labour-time of the household's adult male(s) between wage 
employment and agricultural production on-own-account (the 
proceeds of which could either be consumed or marketed). 
Successful African agricultural production would thus cause 
pressures for wages to rise. In reality, however, as 
Barber admits, this is only a genuine option for a small 
portion of the indigenous population. More generally then, 
within the limits of 'periodic disguised unemployment', 
migration results (the supply of labour being elastic in 
Lewis' sense) and both parties gain thereby. The African 
family increases its real income and (as Barber notes) the 
employer is freed from 'the responsibility to pay a wage 
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high enough to support both the worker and his family'. 
As the money economy expands, however, labour becomes scarce 
(as in Lewis' model) but for different reasons. The 
'turning point', or end of the phase of ', unlimited' labour, 
comes about when the withdrawal of able-bodied adult males 
is 
beyond the point at which 'periodic' disguised unemployment 
no longer exists results in a sharp reduction in the 
agricultural output of the indigenous family. To attract 
additional workers, a rise in the real wage rate is required. 
The 'market' thus serves to 'compensate' the worker and his 
family for losses sustained as a result of a higher allocation 
of labour-time to wage-labour. At this point, new conditions 
of 'quasi"&ll employment' arise, with implications of major 
importance for economic development: 'the economic system 
cannot expand output in one direction without a sacrifice 
in output in another... (although) the capacity of the system 
as a whole has not been fully extended'. Barber thus 
concludes that the dual structure 'blocks the allocation of 
resources' at this stage. This phase, in his opinion 
reached in the 1950's in the case of Rhodesia, sounds the 
death-knell for 'settler supremacy' (the objectives of which 
cannot be pursued any longer). 'Non-economic' restrictions 
must be lifted to allow continued (capitalist) expansion. 
This adjustment could be avoided in Barber's view, however, 
if unskilled African labour could be imported and supply 
elasticities maintained, or, if a decline in real Per ea ita 
income occurred in indigenous agriculture. In either case 
the volume of indigenous employment would increase 'without 
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a rise in its real wage rate'. That this seriously 
contradicted Barber's wage/labour-supply theory, of how a 
fall in agricultural output would lead to the need to 
compensate workers for their (household's) loss by means of 
higher wages, clearly demonstrates the inconsistencies and 
l9 
unsatisfactory nature of one of the central aspects of 
Barber's dualistic theory of Rhodesian economic development. 
The most substantial critique to date of Barber's dualistic 
analysis of Rhodesia has been provided by Arrighi, whose work 
also attempted to lay the foundations for an alternative 
45 
explanation of Rhodesian development. However, Arrighi 
has not provided a sufficient critique of the theory of 
dualism in the Rhodesian case. 
The central weaknesses of Barber's model derive from 
the reliance placed in it on Lewis' explanation of 
accumulation, even though (paradoxically) Barber explicitly 
admits that in the Rhodesian case labour is acquired below 
the cost of its own reproduction, a situation that could not 
come about through reliance on 'market forces', but was 
necessarily rooted in 'primitive accumulation' and divorce 
of the population from access to means of production 
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adequate for subsistence. Barber has also conceptualized 
'capital' in an ahistorical manner. The underlying essence 
of the process of accumulation is not explained (despite a 
pre-oocupation with the 'terms of exchange' of labour) but 
is euphemistically dismissed as consisting of the mere 
'bringing of economies into contact with one another'. Barber 
glosses over the essential class conflicts involved in this 
initial instance of imposition of the colonial order and the 
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subsequent development of a peripheral capitalist system. 
Indeed, even in respect of Barber's theory of 'labour 
transfer' and wage-determination, serious contradictions are 
to be found. Thus, while admitting that the African 
10 
household maximizing option (of 'choosing' to obtain 
subsistence by the sale of labour-power or the sale of 
commodities) is not a genuine option except for a few, 
Barber nonetheless continues to use this analytical device 
(one which he himself notes is not grounded in social 
reality) to 'explain' both the terms of exchange in the 
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'labour transfer' and the character of labour mobilization. 
The source of this confusion in Barber's model is to be 
traced to his inadequate specification of the nature of 
the capitalist mode of production in Rhodesia. 
Barber's model, based on Lewis' 'classical dualism' 
which the former amended to meet local conditions, is 
presented as a Modified 'Classical Model Appropriate To The 
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Central African Case, Yet, as Rasmussen has pointed out, 
while 'classical political economy was concerned to explain 
how the transition from feudalism to capitalism occurred 
under conditions in which the capitalist mode of production 
became exclusive, the modern dualists have argued on the basis 
of an assumed historical analogy and have neglected the fact 
that the capitalist mode of production when, via the world 
market, it becomes a global system of production, does not 
at the periphery tend to be exclusive in this way but merely 
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dominant'., Barber too adopts the position of the modern 
dualists. While his study lacks a class analysis, he is 
also unable to provide a coherent and comprehensive explanation 
of how labour mobilization has been organized to enable the 
'primitive accumulation' of capital and peripheral capitalist 
development to take place under settler colonial conditions. 
2/ 
This is not to say however that Barber was unaware of 
some of the differences in the processes of capital 
accumulation between the center and the periphery. In a 
most revealing passage Barber states: 'While change 
is under way within the indigenous economies of Central 
Africa, much that is familiar from the customary structure of 
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the days before European intervention still remains. ' 
Yet this recognition of the dissolution-conservation impact 
of capitalist penetration on the pre-capitalist social 
formation is not analytically followed through. 
Barber's analytical shortcomings become clear when it 
is noted that the primary modification which Barber makes 
to Lewis' model is at the terminological level where the 
categories of 'capitalist' and 'subsistence' sector used in 
the orthodox model are rejected in favour of the notions 
'money economy' and 'indigenous economy'. This need not 
have been a mere semantic substitution if the articulation 
between modes of pro duction were coherently analysed by 
Barber. However the analysis does not proceed with this 
distinction in mind; rather, by taking a static view of 
production structures, and stressing the independence of the 
two separate economies, Barber proceeds to analyse the 
behavioural patterns and 'terms of exchange' of labourers 
between the two 'discrete' components of the economic system. 
In this manner, an assessment of the behavioural rationality 
and regularity or otherwise of labour supplies from the 
'indigenous , econogqt is substituted for a critical inquiry 
into the social and historical forces determining the 
12 
processes and costs of reproduction of labour, the means 
of mobilization of labour-power qua commodity, the process 
of extraction of surpluses from the pre-capitalist social 
formations and the socio-economic and racial relationships 
that were conditioned by the very character and dynamic of 
settler colonialism and capitalist production in the 
peripheral social formation. 
The ahistorical 'cost-benefit' approach adopted by 
Barber is clear when he notes that management is compensated 
for the 'inconvenience' of transient migratory labour by the 
'ability to obtain labour at a lower wage rate than would be 
the case if the labourer and his family, not just the 
labourer himself, were dependent on money wages for their 
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livelihood', No differentiation is noted between the 
requirements of different classes of employer (or 'fractions' 
of capital); nor is it noted that 'single' adult migrant 
labour could be the primary mechanism for the extraction of 
surplus from the peasant economy and a necessary and cheap 
means of acquisition of labour-power for capitalist production. 
in another very revealing passage, Barber states: 'While many 
of the institutions of the money economy are reproductions of 
those developed in metropolitan countries, the Central African 
system also possesses important properties which differentiate 
its operations from those of more advanced economies. In 
part, these stem from the presence of the indigenous economy... 
the (conditioning) of the money economy ... by its direct 
dependence on external contacts... (the strategic role) of 
capital and labour from abroad (in expansion)... (and the 
23 
determining) force governing the generation of money incomes 
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... of foreign demand for... exports'. The inter- 
relationships of these structural properties which define 
the Rhodesian social formation are not systematically examined. 
Instead they are left merely to provide the situational 
'setting' for an analysis of the terms on which 'indigenous' 
labour will be prepared to 'accept' wage employment in a 
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'dualistic system'. Barber thus locates the analysttoal 
problem at the level of operational management and not in 
a discussion of the roots, origins and dynamics of the 
capitalist mode of production and its inter-rdations with 
other modes of production. It is the latter set of 
problems that must be explored and explained if the nature 
of discrimination and underdevelopment is to be understood 
and 'abstracted empiricism' avoided. 
There are also a number of secondary criticisms that 
can be made of Barber's work. For instance, it is possible 
to identify, as Marcussen has done for dualistic theory 
&enerally, the extent to which Barber's dualistic analysis 
constitutes a part of the 'theory of modernization' that 
understands the process of development as one in which the 
'modern' sector progressively 'modernizes' the 'traditional' 
sector. 
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Barber's discussion of the 'traditional sector' 
conceives of the society as a 'natural state$ in which very 
little has changed. Numerous ths concerning; the pre- 
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colonial econogv are presented. In certain instances 
these myths are carried over into the period dealing with 
capitalist development and the notion of 'traditionalism' is 
29 
preserved by Barber under the rubric 'indigenous'. It is 
relevant to note Samir Amin's comment that colonization 
'forced the "traditional" society to be a supplier. of 
temporary or permanent migrants on a vast scale, thus 
providing a cheap proletariat for the mines, the European 
farms, and later for the manufacturing industries of... 
Rhodesia.... Henceforth we can no longer speak of a 
traditional society in that region of the continent ("Africa 
of the 'labour reserves's the south, central and eastern 
regions")q since the labour reserve society had a function 
which had noth n to do with "tradition": that of supplying 
m rant uroletariat'. 
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Barber's analysis does not grasp 
this essential point. 
For Barber, modernization brings new, and more efficient 
techniques of production, new crops, new forms of division 
of labour, the removal of a 'considerable volume of concealed 
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unemployment', acreage expansion and new tastes. There 
is almost an in-built determinism to this view of the 
development process. As Arrighi comments: 'The development 
of capitalism thus emerges as an ultimately beneficial and 
rationalizing influence notwithstanding the fact (aoknomaedged 
by Barber) that, over long periods, African workers and 
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peasants derived little, if any, advantage from it. ' 
And, moreover, this occurred while labourers contributed 
directly to the massive accumulation of wealth that did take 
place. 
Whilst Lewis did not explicitly distinguish 'traditional' 
man from his 'modern' counterpart (a point on which Martin 
. is 
has criticciized Mafeje) this is not wholly true of Barber's 
analysis. For instance, Barber has noted that certain 
'relationships indicate a rationality in the economic 
behaviour of the African. But it would be mistaken to 
expect h to conform, in Central African conditions, to 6i 
European standards of rational economic behaviour'. This 
is not the social dualism of the Boekean kind; it is 
determined by the overfl social system which 'expects and 
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conditions different codes of conduct from the two races'. 
For Barber the overall settler-colonial system is not 
permitting 'modernization' fast enough and is resulting in 
various 'block¬ages* without which the indigenous sector would 63 
be retrieved from its debilitating 'traditionalism'. 
It is here too that Barber fails to relate settler 
colonialism to the world economic system as a whole. His 
analysis fails to appreciate that the 'traditional' social 
forms are not simply unproductive relics of the past, but 
have been necessaryry and integral to the development, maintenance 
and reproduction of peripheral capitalism. Development has 
not required the total trandbrmation of the peasantry and 
indigenous structures; indeed the system, through the 
mediation of the State, continues to support such 'traditional' 
structures, after re-creating them in the desired form. 
'Traditional' social formations have not therefore been 
'in transition' to modernity but, being shaped by the global 
system and settler colonialism, have been made thoroughly 
modern, poor and dependent. 
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In breaking down the Ndebele and Shona social formations 
and fashioning them to meet the requirements of the dominant 
mode of production, instruments of control and processes of 
mediation have been required. Those of prominence have been 
the State apparatus, appropriate ideologies and the quasi- 
juridical authority of employers. Barber's analytical 
recognition of these es senti 1 elements in the Rhodesian 
development process is decidedly muted: they are touched on 
but ultimately dismissed, for instance, in the observation 
that 'the policy of the governing minority has encouraged the 64 
preservation of traditional institutions'; and that 'the 
forms which the African's response (to the money economy) 
could assume have been limited and directed into particular 
channels'. 
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Barber therefore recognized the significance 
of government policy, but did not conceptualize it in terms 
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of a theory of the State. Furthermore, confusion between 
ideology and reality, in Barber's interpretation - in some 
instances conceiving of the State as a neutral arbitrator of 
competing interests and on other occasions identifying the 
State solely with the racist behaviour of 'settler supremaoyil 
- leads to an uncritical acceptance of the view that the 
capitalist 'reforms' of the 1950's (of pass laws, in social 
policy, - in land husbandry, in industrial conciliation and in 
African unionism) were designed. to 'remove irritating 
6 
disabilities under which the Africans have lived'. 
7 
Even 
so Barber accepts eventually that 'it would be rash to suppose 
that the essential props to the dualistic structure have yet 
been dismantled or that fundamental reforms must inevitably 
z7 
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follow from the promising changes that have been made'. 
However, his analysis is unable to explain why those 'reforms' 
were required, why they took the forms they did, how this 
enabled 'modernization' of the socio-economic system and did 
not cause the dissolution of settler-colonial structures. 
Similar failures of explanation occur at other equally 
critical punctures, for instance when it is recognized that 
Lewis' orthodox model is of dubious validity because of the 
considerable importance 'in the Central African case (off) 
the once of the money economy to labour movements'; 
and yet the character of this contract and foreign labour 
mobilization, its historical roots and interaction with 
indigenous labour supply mechanisms, is neither explained nor 
adequately dealt with in terms of its influence on wages, 
profits, the process of underdevelopment of the peasant 
economy, and the character of peripheral capitalism. Instead 
it is suggested euphemistically that 'the system has... been 
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recentive to the importation of unskilled African labour'. 
This deficiency in the treatment of external labour supplies 
is only symptomatic of the general adoption of a myopic view 
on 'migration' in which the periodicity of the labour 
migration process is aeon 'as having 'advantages for both 
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parties to the wage bargain'. That there occurred a 
transfer of value to employers, through the costs of 
reproduction of labour being met in large part by African 
households located In the peasant economy, is ignored., The 
fact that migration did not occur independent of explicit 
institutional arrangements (expressed for example in urban 
. 28 
labour policies), which were articulated through the actions 
of the State, is also left undiscussed in Barber's analysis. 
Reality thus seems to be at variance with the exposition 
of 'dualistic development'. The latter theory has taken 
little or no account of the imperatives of producer needs 
for both 'cheap labour' and rapid proletarianization, attended 
often by political and 'extra-economic' compulsion, in order 
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to permit primitive accumulation. Barber's preoccupation 
with the operational 'terms' of exchange of labour enables 
'the labour transfer' to be given a pseudo-technical and 
almost clinical ! history' which it never had and still does 
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not possess. 
The absence of certain soeio-economic dimensions is 
attributable not only to the ahistorical character of 
analysis, but also to the predeliction for abstracting from 
social relations. An evaluation of the political economy 
of the 'labour transfer' is an important element that is 
missing from Barber's study and a prime consideration of 
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this one. Only through this re-defined approach in method 
and focus can the essence of the development process be 
distilled and not ignored as occurs, for instance, where 
Barber neglects the proletarianization of African women and 
their overall essential role in production especially in the 
'households' of wage-labourers located in the reserves. He 
makes the naive assumption that the labour demands of the 
capitalist sector have 'generally been restricted to one 
component of (the indigenous sector's) productive unit - the 
. 
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adult male'. Similar neglect applies to the use of child 
29 
labour  - a 'factor' also reducible to labour-power and 
equally important and effective in production. 
Much of Barber's selective empiricism can be traced to 
the ideological element in The Economy of British central. 
Africa, The dualistic perspectives focus criticism on the 
lack of 'progressiveness' or deficient 'modernizing' 
influence of settler colonialism, not on the fundamental 
exploitation or Inequalities rooted in the system itself, 
nor on the reasons why the development of the peripheral 
capitalist system required these very inequalities to be 
wwý  w 
maintained. Because Barber assumes that capitalist 
development rationalizes the system and erodes discrimination, 
the very existence of 'settler supremacy' and the 'dualism' 
it creates is regarded as an impediment to development: 'The 
dual structure of the economic system has blocked the 
allocation of resources to their most productive uses and has 
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kept some of its resources from being utilized at all. ' 
Barber's argument, that by the late 1950's the system had` 
reached a stage of quasi-full employment, in which the 
objectives of settler supremacy could no longer prevail, presents 
a vision of an archaic settler colonialism, with its racist 
and 'irrational' superstructures, blocking the rationalizing 
influence of capitalist development in which 'modernization' 
would become widespread and the pre-capitalist formations 
77 
would be fully dissolved. 
This vision did not come to pass, nor should it have 
  been expected that it would. Racism was and has continued 
to be fundamentally compatible with the development of both 
30 
the capitalist mode of production and the specific economic 
bass of settler colonialism. Barber's lack of appreciation 
of this perception reaches its zenith in the observation 
that 'the proponents of settler supremacy in the Rhodesias 
have a stake in restrictinw the proportion of males in the 
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indigenous 'population employed for wages at any one time'. 
Yet,, historically, the very basis of the expansion of the 
settler-colonial economy has been to inch the volume of 
labour-poprar made available through local labour supply 
mechanisms enabling settler colonialism to 'internalize's 
and thus independently controls the structures upon which 
the rapid accumulation of capital was based. 
In The, Foonomz of British Centril Afrien a determining 
role is assigned to ideology. This is well summed up in 
the implioations of the following statement: 'The value 
preacisen around which the Rhodesian social structure was 
organized thus called for the preservation of a dual society 
and a dual economy. These divisions have generally been 
drawn along racial lines, although the separation has not 
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been complete'. Barber falls to see that these structures 
have been related to the process of accumulation. Further- 
more, he does not relate the specific ideology of settler 80 
colonialism to the requirements of the production system. 
The stress on the 'racial dualism' of the economic system is 
consistent with the claims of liberal criticism, an ideology 
which has emphasized the 'irrationality' and unprogressive 
nature of 'settler supremacy' and which has been closely 
connected with the interests of 'progressive' industrial 
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capitalism. The focus on racial domination masks the 
existence and nature of class conflicts in the economic system. 
Indeed, even though Barber attempts to produce a technical 
exercise of analysis attempting to show merely the operational 
'terms of exchange' involved In the 'labour transfer' under 
Rhodesian dualism, his very model is based on the implicit 
assumption of significant class differentiation and class 
conflict. The full implication of Barber's model - unacknow- 
ledged by Barber himself - is that the management of the 
class structure of African society is the key to capitalist 
development in Rhodesia, especially since cheap labour can 
only be obtained through African proletarianization and 
plantation development can only be ensured through under- 
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development of the peasant economy. 
Barber documents the existence of substantial foreign 
capital invostmont in Rhodesia and the alignment of the 
economic structure to meet the requirements of metropolitan 
capital for raw materials as well as to provide a field for 
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highly profitable investment. However, the analysis 
focuses on the 'growth' effects of this external domination 
and presences-not on its effects in helping maintain 
domestic underdevelopment and dependency. How international 
capital has interacted with domestic oapitalism under the 
direction of the settler-colonial State, and what the effects 
have been for both ideölogy and the changing economic base, 
are not examined. - Foreign capital has had a major , 
impact 
on labour mobilization and has been instrumental in maintaining 
meehanis®s of $primitive accumulation'. - The nature of 
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Rhodesia's trade and investment links with Britain, South 
Africa and the United States define Rhodesian settler 
colonialism as a specific form of twentieth century 
imperialism. Instead of recognizing these structural 
features, Barber is content to note that 'openness' has 
been beneficial since 'the money economy... has prospered'. 
This has been precisely bP, however, the exploitative 
nature of foreign connections with settler colonialism 
resulted in the wages of African workers and incomes of 
African peasants being kept low in the Rhodesian periphery 
while the value generated from their productive effort has 
been realized elsewhere. 'Externally-propelled' and 
dependent development has not therefore been fully 'self- 
centered'* 
The theoretical core of Barber's hictorical analysis 
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of dualistic development in Rhodesia is contained in a stage 
theory of capitalist transformation from the pre-colonial 
84 
times to the late 1958's" These explanations of the 
development pattern have been criticized by Arrighi as 
advancing 'a mystifying picture of capitalist development 
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In Rhodesia'. Barber's stage model has many of the 
defects oommon to stow theories, most noticeably its 
mechanistic, and non-analytical nature. Arrighi has effectively 
discredited the empirical evidence offered by Barber and 
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more recent work has added to this critique. Arrighi 
denonatratos that far from the early phase of capitalist 
expansion beim; characterised by labour surplus it was in 87 
fact a period of labour shortage. And ihr from the post-1940's 
33 
period being a period of labour scarcity, or 'quasi-full 
employment', it was a period of labour-surplus. In short, 
Arright inverts (successfully) the vision of economic 
transformation put forward by Barber. However, Arrighi does 
admit that 'the historical relevance of the Lewis model to 
the Rhodesian experience is limited to a period of roughly 
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20 years, Ise* from the mid-1920's to the mid-1940's'. 
But,. as has been pointed out, this is inadmissible if, as 
has been trgued, the Lewis model's explanation of accumulation 
is fundamentally inapplicable. Indeed, it would imply that 
the process of 'primitive accumulation' did not apply during 
these years. Arrighi does not provide evidence to support 
such a view. Indeed, on the contrary, his data illustrate 
that 'primary accumulation' (to Use his and Marx's term) was 
a fundamental element in capitalist development during this 
time, as it has been subsequently as well. Arrighi's notion 
about the 'limited applicability' of the Lewis model can 
be explained by his acceptance of an unrigorous concept of 
'primitive accumulation' (see later discussion). Unfortunately, 
it has led to some confusion in the analysis of Southern 
African political economy because some pluralist/dualist 
theorists in South Africa uncritically cite Arrighi's 
statement as evidence of validity of the theory of dualism 
89 
in the Rhodesian case. Arrighi'n concession to Lewis, in 
the light of theoretical and empirical considerations, must 
therefore be regarded as unestablished and indeed 'irrational' 
in terms of Arrighi's own analysis. 
0 
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Despite all these flaws the survival rate of dualistic 
theories remains extremely high, an example of which is the 
following typology put forward in 1972 by Maclellan Wilson: 
'Rhodesia a "dual" economy comprised of essentially two 
ethnically and economically different sectors. The advanced 
cector consists of coancrcial farina, mince, and various 
manufacturing and service industries, while the tribal sector 
In based on traditional tribal cultivation and handicrafts 
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with relatively few commercial enterprises. ' 
The weaknesses or dual models generally, as well as 
the development of a substantial neo-marxist critique of 
orthodox models of peripheral capitalism, have led to the 
search for more explanatory and relevant paradigms in both 91 
political economy and historiography. This analytical 
re-assessment has likewise been experienced in Rhodesian 
and Southern African studies. In this respect Arrighi's 
work has been seminal despite its starting point being a 
pill critique of its major theoretical competitor - the 
theory of dualism. 
AABIGEI AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RHODESIA 
Here an appraisal is made of the n©o-aarxist analysis 
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of the political economy of Rhodesia. It has only been 
in the 1970's that Arrighi's analysis has been appreciated by 
historians and economists in their studies on Rhodesia, 
although it has been ignored by some political scientists. 
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Arrighi'a work - contained in a trilogy, together with other 
s1 
relevant papers - has had a seminal effect in providing a 
re-definition of the framework of historiographical and 
political economy analysis in Rhodesia and elsewhere in 
94 
Africa. 
Arrighi's analysis falls squarely in the 'neo-marxist' 
tradition, by which is meant the post-1945 re-interpretation 
of maraian analysis in the light of the experience of the 
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underdeveloped countries. Whilst it is not possible here 
to distill a single set of views to represent the neo-marxist 
school (as there is existent a wide variety of theoretical 
positions within this tradition)' there are some methodological 
and theoretical aspects of approach commonly found. For 
instance, there is an attempt to return to an analysis 
grounded in 'political economy' terms, vi?, one abandoning 
the conventional academic division of labour found in 
orthodox social science whereby 'economics' is considered 
apart from politics, history and society. Neo-marxist 
scholars also try to locate their analyses in an historical 
context. Special attention is given to the socio-economic 
origins of ideas and the relation between ideology and social 
reality. The process of 'underdevelopment' in the periphery 
of the world economic system is thus explained in relation 
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to the global social system as a whole. Class conflicts 
are regarded as being central to the development process, 
a prime concern being the development of social relations as 
they have been determined by the forms and requirements of 
capitalist production and accumulation. Structural factors 
are given much prominence, especially in 'dependency theory', 
3b 
and the mediation of the State in the economy is highlighted, 
contrary to its assumed role in orthodox analysis whereby it 
is regarded as a neutral arbiter bringing about a harmony of 
interests In the market. A prime focus, as in the martian 
tradition, is the exploitation of labour and the source of 
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value. Many, though not all, of these elements are found 
in Arrighi's work and, although it is neither possible nor 
desirable to summarize all his views here, it will be useful 
to briefly outline some of his central tenets and findings. 
For the purposes of this study, his concepts of accumulation 
and labour supply/mobilization are of central importance. 
In respect of problems of labour supply, Arrighi's 
analysis demonstrates that, in the Rhodesian case, the Lewis- 
Barber conditions of 'unlimited' labour did not apply and that, 
on the contrary, capitalist development in Rhodesia began in 
conditions of 'labour scarcity' with relatively high wages 
which were progressively lowered as accumulation proceeded. 
The historical evolution of the socio-economic system led to 
the development of a 'labour surplus' (contrary both to the 
expectations of the theory of dualism and Barber's assertion 
that by the 1950's conditions of 'quasi-full employment' 
pertained). Arrighi advances reasons (other than 'market' 
determined ones) for the rise in African wages and the 
development/inducement of stratification in the labour force. 
Arrighi notes that the Rhodesian capitalist system had to 
undergo the process of 'primary accumulation' defined 'as a 
process in which nonmarket mechanisms predominate and through 
which the'gap between the productivity in the capitalist 
37 
sector and productivity in the noncapitalist sector is 
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widened'. The process, in Arrighi's view, is 'completed 
when the gap is so wide that producers in the latter sector 
are prepared to sell their labour time "spontaneously" at 
whatever"wage rate is consistent with steady accumulation 
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in the capitalist sector'. Once this was attained, the 
postulate made by Lewis, of the predominance of market 
mechanisms in the allocation of labour from the non-capitalist 
to the capitalist sector, 'becomes realistic, though political 
mechanisms may continue to play a subsidiary role'. This 
analytical perspective may be seriously questioned. 
This study does not dispute the argument that capitalist 
accumulation in Rhodesia could not originate and proceed in 
the orthodox Lewis manner. What is at issue, however, is 
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Arrighi's conception of the process of 'primary accumulation'. 
As presented in his definition of this process, Arrighi 
regards it as a manifestation of differential productivity 
between the capitalist sector and a non-capitalist one. 
This definition presupposes nothing about. a theory of 
accumulation, an issue central to any analysis of Rhodesian 
capitalist development. The historical 'moments' referred 
to by Arrighi, which give rise to 'primary accumulation' 
(e. g., land alienation, the creation of 'labour reserves', 
the confiscation of assets and squatter evictions by means 
of politico-economic mechanisms), had one common central 
effect, vom, the creation and maintenance of a cheap labour 
system, the basis of which was the supply of labour-power 
below the cost of its own reproduction and the objective 
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of which was to provide, through the transfer of value (e. g. 
as embodied in migrant proletarianization), for the 'primitive 
accumulation' of capital (a term reserved here to distinguish 
it from Arrighi's use of 'primary accumulation') under 
conditions of settler colonialism. It is undeniable that 
this process required politico-economic mechanisms for It 
to function effectively. Furthermore, because it has 
continued to be the basic form of accumulation even up to the 
mid-1970's (contrary to Arrighi's view that this process 
ceased in the mid-19201s), politico-economic measures have 
remained necessary for the maintenance of the viability of 
capitalist development within the settler-colonial social 
formation. If this were not so, there would be little 
satisfactory explanation of 'influx control' mechanisms, 
social controls over workers in the 'urban-industrial 
economy', and the host of 'extra-economic' forms of control 
found in policies of labour mobilization. 
Another weak area of Arrighi's analysis, especially in 
respect of its description of the process of labour mobiliza- 
tion which has accompanied the process of 'primitive 
accumulation', is the definition of the modes of production 
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found in the social formation. Apart from the capitalist 
mode (itself presented in a very unspecific and aggregate 
way), Arrighi consistently refers to a single non-capitalist 
mode. The analysis superficially describes this mode but, 
although implicitly recognizing the existence of various 
non-capitalist modes (as evidenced for instance in the 
diagnosis of changing class conflict), it never comes to 
3g 
terms with this problem. The petty commodity, peasant and 
African domestic household modes, as well as the settler 
colonial domestic household mode and other important 
distinctive forms of capitalist production, are left 
unspecified. As a consequence, the pertinent social 
relations central to these distinguishable production systems 
and their forma of labour mobilization are left unanalysed. 
On these questions of analysis Of the political economy of 
labour, Arrighi has thus (uncritically) adopted a non-marxist 
perspective. 
With these two central points in mind, the following 
critique deals with Arrighi's treatment of the post-1940 
period (especially in respect of labour mobilization). It 
will not detail criticisms of Arright's pre-colonial or 
pre-1940's analysis, except in so far as these would have 
direct bearing on interpretations of transformations in 
postwar Rhodesia. Nor will it deal with the interpretation 
of the major politico-economic 'events' of this period (e. g. 
the establishment and dissolution of the Central African 
Federation; the rise of African nationalism and its socio- 
economic and political implications; the re-establishment 
of settler-colonial hegemony over the interests of foreign 
monopoly capital; the politics of and consequences resulting 
from the emergence of the Rhodesian Front party and its 
unilateral declaration of independence; and the transforma- 
tions in the African nationalist struggle against the State). 
On many of these issues, in this writer's opinion, Arrighi's 
interpretations remain (as yet) substantially unchallenged. 
yo 
The thrust of this work is therefore directed at an 
exposition of the political economy of African labour in 
the postwar period, an analysis which, on the basis of the 
aforementioned criticisms, attempts to bring to light 
certain perspectives hitherto concealed or not found, 
either in dualist or in neo-marxist studies of the 
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historiography and political economy of Rhodesia. In 
respect of the latter school, it will be useful to evaluate 
some secondary criticisms of Arrighi's work, especially as 
they bear on interpretations of labour mobilization and the 
role of African workers in the process of accumulation. 
Over the whole period Arrighi provides little indication 
of the trends in income distribution and the socio-economic 
pattern which income concentration and stratification has 
taken. The analysis proceeds primarily at the level of 
qualitative relationships between classes and racial groups; 
this does not satisfactorily convey the dimensions of economic 
power, nor the extent to which these patterns have changed. 
It is not implied that quantitative specifications of the 
income structure are superior to qualitative analysis: rather 
they complement each other and help to eliminate errors and 
distortions which may be made in qualitative assessments. 
For instance, it is possible to show that wages for the rural 
African proletariat in white agrarian enterprise were more or 
less stagnant' for the period 1948-1972 -a fact which, 
when combined with an analysis of the origins and design of 
urban labour policies and a study of the foreign/contract 
labour system, provides important evidence against Arrighi's 
yl 
assertion that, for the post-1940's, 'it is probable that 
political mechanisms were progressively losing their dominant 
role... in strengthening the competitive position of European 
103 
agriculture'. It is thus implausible to suggest that 
during this period market forces were dominantly responsible 
for the continued and heightened predominance of the 
plantation system over. the peasant economy. It would be 
denying the expanded role of the State and the lobbying power 
of plantation producers as of primary significance, especially 
in securing cheap labour supplies during a period when real 
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wages in all other sectors rose from higher base levels. 
Quantitative income distribution data also enable the 
identification of some of the important characteristics in 
the formation of a class of African petty bourgeoisie, a 
group that does not enter significantly enough into Arrighi's 
analysis although still a class of substantial socio-political 
importance in State policies of 'systems maintenance'. 
Although the numerical size of this group has been considered 
small, data indicating its substantial .ro th in economic 
power in the 1960's and 1970's would suggest there is need 
for closer examination of the alliances between the black 
bourgeoisie and other classes in the political economy. This 
would provide a basis for re-assessing the extent to which 
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settler colonialism has 'come to terms' with such a group. 
Finally, inter-temporal comparisons of income 
distribution data help to isolate the 'skewness' of income 
structures and so broadly indicate the limits to and 
potential patterns of domestic industrialization which has 
In 
been the major internal postwar transformation of production 
and a process which has come under increasing internal State 
direction. Arrighi discounts, on the basis of decreasing 
peasant productivity, the possibility of an expanding internal 
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demand being realizable under settler colonialism. Not 
only does this ignore the expanding demand of the black 
proletariat, a phenomenon clearly identifiable in income 
distribution data, it also understresses the prospects - in 
the long term - for Rhodesian manufacturing capitalism to 
find external markets, an industrial strategy discernible 
during the Federal period and afterwards in economic and 
political relationships with Malawi and South Africa. The 
causes and impact of the emergence of an industrial capitalist 
mode of production are central to any analysis of development 
in the postwar era: and differences in interpretation of 
this phenomenon are of prime importance. 
For Arrighi, 'the rise of manufacturing capitalism 
(induced by a series of exogenous "shocks")... was hampered 
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by the decreasing productivity of the African peasantry'. 
He argues that industrialization was constrained by the lack 
of internal demand, the lack of interest shown by the white 
agrarian bourgeoisie and foreign capital engaged in primary 
production a0ndd 'underlying inconsistencies in the institutional 
framework'; it was assisted by the outflow of 
'international' capital from South Africa after 1948, 
Federal government demand for Southern Rhodesian industrial 
output, some governmental assistance through import 
substitution and European immigration, and increases in 
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African wage employment. 
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There are problems unaccounted for in this interpretation. 
It would be misleading to regard peasant underdevelopment as 
the 'secs-permanent' constraint on industrialization in the 
way that Arrighi does. The process created and enabled the 
reproduction of cheap labour supplies for the 'industrial 
complex' and was thus a necessary pre-condition for 'primitive 
accumulation' and industrialization based upon it. It 
represented a way for employers to obtain a cheap proletariat, 
rooted in the reserves, and it denied the vast bulk of 
African households the opportunity to establish themselves 
independently as peasant producers who were 'free' of 
dependence on the sale of labour-power. Foreign exchange 
earnings as well as commodities necessary to provide the 
means of subsistence for the labour force, which could have 
been provided through successful peasant development, and 
on which industrial producers depended, were supplied by 
plantation production, Further, stagnant peasant incomes 
did not themselves constitute a major brake on internal 
demand, since the development process led to increasing 
proletarianization and subsequent increased demand for 
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commodities from wage-labourers. 
The increasing wage stratification of the industrial 
proletariat served two useful functions: first it enabled 
the stabilization of an element of the African working class; 
and secondly it helped provide the pattern of consumer demand 
that supported industries producing consumer durables as well 
as consumer necessities, so giving domestic market stability 
to industrial diversification. The African (urban and rural) 
yl 
bourgeoisie provided a market prop to an industrial capitalism 
that would otherwice be solely dependent on white household 
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expenditures. The upsurge of interest in the 'African 
market' (especially in the poverty stricken Tribal Trust 
Lands), in the 'Africanization' of the marketing functions 
of Industrial corporations, and the greater willingness of 
firms in the industrial sector to concede wage awards at the 
top of the African wage structure, are all symptoms of this 
general process. International or South African based 112 
corporations have taken the lead in this direction. This 
should not be interpreted as an underemphasis of the growth 
and social significance of a resident-settler industrial 
capitalist class, especially in the post-UDI period. 
However in the 1970's the bulk of the ms or industrial 
concerns are characterized by three phenomena - the 
preponderance of externally controlled shareholdings, a 
monopolistic concentration in the share ownership pattern and 
a relatively high degree of interpenetration of capital 
amongst industrial corporations themselves and between 
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Industrial producers and other sectors. This latter 
factor has been accentuated in the 1970'c with vertical 
integration strategies of investment being pursued by 
plantation producers and (to a lesser extent) large inter- 
national mining corporations. 
Three other aspect of the configuration of 'peripheral 
Industrialization' deserve mention, all being underemphasized 
in Arrighi's exposition. Firstly, Federation was cri 
to the establishment of and expansion of industrial production 
q5 
in Southern Rhodesia, not simply in terms of access to 
markets but as a means of acquisition of surpluses from the 
weaker peripheral States of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
for re-allocation to the Southern Rhodesian 'industrial 
complex'. This enabled Rhodesia to perform the role of a 
'peripheral industrial center' within the Southern African 
periphery. Secondly, manufacturing capitalism has not been 
substnntially constrained, as Arrighi tends to imply, by the 
inherited 'institutional framework' of settler colonialism. 
Indeed, like other producers, manufacturers have depended on 
the primitive accumulation of capital based on the transfer 
of value from the non-capitalist modes of production. Indeed, 
manufacturing capitalists have been able to secure the 
necessary adjustments to institutional structures desired by 
them - see for example, policy changes introduced in the 
post-1950's on African unions, housing, apprenticeship and 
education - although these requirements have been met only 
cautiously in order that the structures of settler colonialism 
and the hegemonie character of the national setter bourgeoisie 
should not be impaired, Finally, the role of the State in 
settler colonial industrialization has been pivotal, not only 
as an instrument for the re-allocation of surplus and in 
restraining wage increases, but also in the form of loan 
assistance to private capital and in maintaining the basic 
framework necessary for the continued accumulation of capital 
by 'primitive' means. 
Concerning the processes of capital accumulation (here 
including its organization, operation and the distribution 
II' 
of surplus through price and tax structures - matters 
ultimately dependent on functions and responsibilities 
assumed by the State), there has existed a greater complexity 
than Arrighi allows for through his rely lack of emphasis 
on the importance of the State apparatus. Because the 
'fractions' of capital in Rhodesia have been diverse, with 
various and competing vested interests, as Murray has shown, 
the mediation of the State has become the lynchpin in the 
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system's Integrated functioning. On the one side of the 
process of accumulation, the claims of mercantile, manufacturing 
and mining capital compete among themselves and against the 
claims of the white and black agrarian bourgeoisie, the 
labour ariutocracy, the African petty bourgeoisie, the 
bureaucratic 'salariat' and petty bureaucracy of the public 
sector and small-scale Asian trading capitalists. On the 
other side, confronting these chanting ruling-cl ass interests, 
there are, among others, the constantly re-aligning pressures 
of the industrial proletariat, the foreign migrant 
proletariat, petty commodity producers, various strata of 
peasantry, the sub-proletariat working under the domestic 
mode of production, 'squatters', 'vagrants', the landless 
labourers, the 'semi-serfs' on plantations, and the rural 
'proletariat', On each of these groups the impact of the 
State has been profound and often crucial in allocating the 
benefits, or distributing the burdens, of the processes of 
primitive (including both private and State capitalist) 
accumulation. Thus, while Arrighi has noted that 'external 
stimulants' - the war, white immigration, foreign capital, 
y7 
and the postwar commodity boom - were important to Rhodesian 
industrialization and economic development, there is also 
the need to account specifically for the growth and maintenance 
of political and economic power by the dominant classes whilst 
providing the basis for rapid accumulation. Furthermore 
this has taken place in an international environment of 
(apparently) growing antagonism, the relevant inference being 
that development has become increasingly subject to domestic 
processes. The high returns to foreign capital, the 
profitability of investments maintained by domestic capitalism 
and the welfare, let alone the political power, of the classes 
composing the 'ruling bloc' of settler colonialism in Rhodesia 
have not been founded simply on 'fortuitousness'; neither have 
they followed from 'external factors' or undefined 'market 
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forces'. Rather they have depended on the realization, 
exercise and reproduction interim of the conditions that 
have secured and sustained discrimination and underdevelopment 
in a situation appropriately described (while referring to 
similar circumstances), by Barrington Moore, as 'labour- 
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repression'. In 'Africa of the labour reserves', this 
has been and continues to be one of the defining features of 
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peripheral capitalism. It is the control of the process 
by the dominant classes of settler colonialism that 
determines the form of underdevelopment and 'discriminatory' 
configurations peculiar to Rhodesia. 
The dominant classes of the settler colonial order have 
been dependent in two ways which, though inter-related, are 
distinguishable: firstly, in their international dependence; 
7a 
and secondly, in their internal dependence on soeio-economic 
processes that integrate and provide the cohesion for the 
dominant groups in the settler class structure enabling it 
to constitute and re-constitute itself, absorbing other 
classes, or 'fragments' of these, as the politico-economic 
need arises. These processes interact to allow substantial 
independence to settler colonial interests in directing the 
patterns to be followed in the domestic social formation. 
However Arrighi is probably correct to stress that up until 
the 1930's the system lacked an Internal force sufficient to 
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start industrial development', and this resulted in the 
establishment of a 'typical colonial economy'. This 
situation cannot be regarded as holding true for the post 
1962 period after the ascendance to control (there already 
existed a realized settler political power by 1923) over the 
political economy by the class coalition of the national 
settler bourgeoisie (plantation producers, the bureaucratic- 
balariat', white workers, petty traders, petty mining 
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capitalists and small-scale manufacturers). Since the 
1930's, the ability of this settler colonialism - atypical 
in instance from the 'typical British colony' - to provide 
the politico-economic conditions for effective industrialization 
under conditions of dependent capitalism has made Rhodesia 
the peripheral ceetiter of Central Africa performing functions 
not only on behalf of ex-imperial interests, but also for 
South African capitalism and (to a lesser extent) American 
interests. 
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The ties of dependence on foreign interests are thus 
complex but nonetheless allow for settlers themselves to 
exercise considerable independent social and political 
choice* 
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In general these choices have been in harmony 
with those preferred by international capital, the failure 
of sanctions (largely because of the collusion between the 
settler-colonial State and international business, South 
African firms, EEC capital, American corporations and 
Rhodesian-settler or 'foreign' owned enterprises) being a 
good example of the basic 'non-antagonistic' nature of 
these relationships. 
These mutually dependent relationships are mirrored in 
the internal relationships that unify the various elements 
of the settler-colonial class structure. As the system and 
its complexity has grown, the dominant classes have expanded 
to absorb selected fragments of other classes into the 
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hierarchy of privilege and opportunity. With this 
strengthening of the relations of internal (mutual) 
dependence have arisen opportunities for consolidation and 
stabilization of political power by means outside the 'normal' 
reservation of electoral privileges for settlers. Extension 
of the vote to an expanded elite of Asians, Coloureds and 
elements of the African bourgeoisie was also accompanied by 
substantial material improvements in the socio-economic 
conditions of these groups, in which the State - the principal 
mediating instrument of settler colonialism - played a 
prominent part. Arrighi almost entirely ignores these 
socio-economic groups and. thus obscures, important structural 
S-6 
characteristics in the dynamic of settler-colonial development 
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in postwar Rhodesia. 
In the process of class formation in Rhodesia, 
'proletarianization of the African peasantry' has been 
central; and Arrighi more than anyone has brought this to 
the fore. There iss however, some simplification, a 
partiality in focus and even confusion in his analysis. 
One important consideration - seemingly theoretical, but in 
practice not so - has to do with his notion of the formation 
of the proletariat. In The Political Economy of Rhodesia 
Arrighi adopts a static and, it is argued here, a malformed 
concept of the African proletariat-in-formation. Thus, at 
one point, he notes that 'we cannot, strictly speaking, refer 
to the African wage-workers of the 1930's as a proletariat'. 
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Similar views were taken by non-marxist historiographers who 
had other objectives in mind (particularly the desire to 
deny the existence of an advanced class formation process In 
a society which to them presented its major cleavages in 
racial terms). The ambiguity introduced by Arrighi is 
further instanced by a later reference to the 'proletariat' 
(here 'objectively' defined as a whole, not as individuals) 
as having 'traditional rights' in the 'subsistence econocºy', 
and, because of this 'peasant connection', a potentially 
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limited 'class consciousness'. And the interstitial 
class position of the 'migrant' worker-peasant is almost 
denied by making its location depend not on objective grounds 
but in part on an asse 3tion about collective migrant 
consciousness: 'The migrant workers... oonsidered themselves 
I-I 
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part of the peasantry. ' 
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The objective condition for 
this, in Arrighi's opinion, was to be found in the need for 
long term security or for unemployment support during crisest 
'Thus security is the reason why they neither were, nor 
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considered themselves to be proletarians. ' But there 
were other equally, if not more, important considerations 
which 'tied' various Ltrata to the labour market as a necessary 
means of obtaining subsistence. When seen in dynamic 
historical perspective these processes of proletarianization 
-a word used in the title of Arrighi's 1970' : work but not 
rigorously employed as a concept throughout the analysis - 
can be seen as the consequence of capitalist domination of 
the African pre-capitalist mode of production, the prime goal 
and realized impact being the extraction of labour-power in 
the form of a cheap, mobile and rural dependent proletariat 
for the mines, plantations, industries and kitchens of 
settler colonialism and capitalist enterprise. 
It is therefore unnecessary and historically distorting 
to describe the emergence of a proletariat in Rhodesia as 
though it were an 'event'. This Arrighi tends to do when 
he stresses the 1920's as the period in which peasant 
dependence on wage-labour shifted from being 
, 
'discretionary, '', 
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to being a matter of 'necessity'. Momentous events, 
like the 1929 slump, were merely accelerated moments of an 
on-going and pre-defined process of proletarianization, 
rooted in the domination of the pre-capitalist mode of 
production, the articulation between the unevenly developed 
productive forces within this reorganized mode and the 
Sz 
requirements for diverse categories of labour (in terms of 
sex, age, duration of employment, and skill) for different 
tasks in capitalist production. Proletarianization should 
thus be understood as a u` which gains momentum as 
capitalist development proceeds alongside peasant 
underdevelopment. The birth of the 'wage-relation' marks 
the moment of origin of the proletariat while the subsequent 
and various intensifications of this wage-labour dependency - 
initially through 'migranoy' - give form to the substantive/ 
objective existence of a class of proletarians. The idea 
that there was lacking an objective basis for working-class 
consciousness amongst African migrants even before the 19301x, 
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is thus false, as Van Onselen has shown. Through rooting 
African working-dass consciousness in the objective conditions 
of the situation, as they prevailed under different modes 
of production, it is possible to help remove some of the 
serious weaknesses in Arrighi's views about working-class 
action as having begun in the postwar period as a result of 
newfound awareness of proletarian status (a subjective 
reality). In fact, more complex objective conditions 
account for the strikes and explosion of action in the late 
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191+0's and thereafter. 
A further important weakness in Arrighi's treatment 
of the formation of a proletariat for the settler colonial 
system of peripheral capitalism in Rhodesia arises from an 
almost complete' analytical neglect of the importance and 
relevance of the foreign migrant proletarianization process 
and the contract labour system in promoting and maintaining 
53 
both peasant underdevelopment and the cheap labour system 
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in the Rhodesian economy. Here Arrighi"s conceptual 
and analytical framework, tied to the boundaries of the 
formal national State, does not account for the reality of 
Southern Rhodesia's dual status as both a peripheral center 
within the Central African region and a dependent capitalist 
periphery in the wider context at the world economic system. 
The extraction of labour power from its own 'regional' 
periphery, less developed than Southern Rhodesia, was thus 
a major consideration in labour supply strategy from national 
level to that of the individual settler/capitalist. 
Competition amongst workers was vigorously encouraged; and 
it was crucial to the process of forcing 'rapid' internal 
proletarianization in Rhodesia without jeopardizing stability 
in the political economy and the profitability of capitalist 
enterprises. 
In The Political Economy of Rhodesia Arrighi's sum 
concern with these processes is found in a (footnote) 
reference to the impact of foreign labour on the volume of 
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African employment and its seotoral distribution. However, 
foreign and contract labourers have been essential in 
undermining the labour-supply price of the Rhodesian peasantry 
as well as providing a restraint on wage growth for African 
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labour. With diminished income earning opportunities 
In the labour market, fixed limitations imposed on the means 
Of peasant production, the monopolization of product markets 
by State subsidized plantation producers, and a labour-supply 
price constantly geared to the opportunity-cost of labourers 
ý/ 
from the most marginal strata of Central African peasant 
sootetyp the rate of growth in wage-labour dependency 
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accelerated amongst peasants from 'inside Rhodesia. By 
the mid-1950's peasant marginalization was far advanced 
and it was possible to ensure the gradual replacement of the 
foreign and contract labour supply mechanisms by internal 
labour supply systems without precipitating wage growth. 
Underdevelopment thus became internalized and more directly 
under the hegemony and control of the State and the social 
forces of settler colonialism. This major shift to a 
domestic labour supply dependence by capitalist producers 
has had significant implications for class formation in 
Rhodesia which are not dealt with either in Arrighi's 
analysis or in a more recent work by Loney, the latter's 
2theif strongly derivative from the formers. 
The switch to dependence on internal labour supplies, 
however, has not brought about the complete dissolution of 
the pre-capitalist social formation; instead Its structures 
have been harnessed or preserved in the service of peripheral 
capitalism by being forced to bear a substantial part of the 
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cost of labour's reproduction. Too little of this 
'conservation-dissolution' impact of peripheral capitalism 
is identified in Arrighi's analysis; nor is the importance 
of its principal effects in accentuating uneven rural 
development and promoting stratification within the peasantry 
fully grasped. '- Both these inter-related processes have 
accentuated proletarianization - the former because one 
strand of 'conservation', promoted through State sponsorship 
py 
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of African agrarian capitalism, helped make selected 
producers/communities viable as an 'independent' producer 
class and the latter because the further marginalization of 
the peasantry forced more rural communities to lose their 
'self-subsistence' autonomy and become wage-labour dependent 
for subsistence. 
Arrighi assumes a lack of stratification within the 
peasantry and so is unable to identify the relationships 
between stratification in the transformed pre-capitalist 
car 
social formation and the requirements of low-wage producers 
(plantations and domestic households) whose additional labour 
supplies, increasingly satisfied from within Rhodesia, have 
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been drawn from these marginalized strata. African 
agrarian capitalism has likewise been 'built upon squatter 
evictions, land alienation and low wage policies. 
The analytical treatment of 'white agrarian enterprise t 
(which Arrighi depicts simply as a brRnc_h of capitalist 
production) is also problematical. Because of the social 
relations of this production structure, the historical process 
of establishment of the plantation system in Southern Rhodesia 
and the mode of extraction of surplus from the labour force; ) 
there exist grounds for re-considering this conventional 
assumption. Plantation enterprise is not a monolithic type 
but is differentiated in various types, many of which 
indicate that a 'quasi-feudal' form of labour mobilization 
has characterized production. 
136 This perspective enables 
the relations of dependence of the plantation economy - an 
essential economic structure of settler colonialism - to be 
seen as conditioning, and conditioned by, the dominance of 
.ý Y 
st 
the industrial capitalist mode of production in the postwar 
period. The fact that plantation production is dependent 
and tied to world market exchanges is not itself evidence of 
the (purely) capitalist nature of production, as Laclau has 
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pointed out in another context. or is it inconsistent 
for participation and expansion of the quasi-feudal plantation 
sector to occur within the capitalist }ss=. There is no 
'dualism' contained in this theoretical vier, the i` 
rr latlionss with both the pre-capitalist and capitalist 
production structures being of the essence in defining the 
nature of plantation production. Further, the 'quasi- 
feudal' nature of plantation production does not preclude 
the existence of the (white) rural bourgeoisie (a class 
defined and used by Arrighi but without the necessary 
distinctions being drawn between absentee landlords, the 
'landed aristocracy', settler owners, foreign capital and 
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other fragments in the ownership structure). 
This agrarian bourgeoisie, who originally accumulated 
capital from a process of 'primitive accumulation' has been 
an essential element, root and instrument of settler 
colonialism. Its insertion into the Rhodesian social 
formation as a producer class (preferred to the peasantry by 
international capital), arose from the need to monopolize 
effectively the means of rural production as well as to 
reduce the cost of labour-power in capitalist production by 
the provision of low-cost commodities required for labour's 
subsistence and 'rations' consumption. - This 'feudalization'. 
of the colonial periphery served other important functions 
S7 
apart from these two: for instance, the process of 
colonization through dispossession required, If it was to be 
successful in creating a cheap proletariat, the maximum 
utilization of confiscated assets and the employment of 
'oztr&-economic' means in order to produce commodities at 
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low cost for both the domestic and export markets. The 
semi-feudal conditions of plantation production allowed 
those forms of labour mobilization to be fully utilized. 
Arrighi's own study draws attention to the early 
'feudal' nature of plantation production systems, the 
imposition of 'rents' upon the peasantry or the introduction 
of 'forced' labour as 'rent', the 'serf-like' conditions of 
farm employment, as well as some of the conflicts between 
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plantation owners and mining and industrial capital. 
But the persistence of these social relations of production, 
the continuation of the almost unaltered farm compound system 
of labour möbilization and other means of an 'extra-economic' 
nature are not stressed. Furthermore the transformations 
that have occurred in the relations of the plantation owner 
class to the political economy are nowhere treated otherwise 
than as a re-organization of equal branches of capitalist 
enterprise. 
In terms of this study's interpretation, it is difficult 
to accept Arrighi's argument that the shift towards export 
markets by the" plantation producer group should be sufficient 
to lead to 'the agrarian bourgeoisie's (reduced) dependence 
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on, and interest in, the industrialization of the country'. 
Other factors suggest the opposite, despite the fact that 
ss 
there has always existed competition over resources between 
plantation owners and other components of the ruling class 
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coalition. It was the Rhodesian Front government -a 
white agrarian based political party In terms of dominant 
internal influences - which promoted domestic industrialization 
under protected conditions in Rhodesia. The participation 
of plantation capital in industrial ventures - especially 
those affecting the cost structure of input supplies to 
13 
mechanized farming - has grown over the years. Large 
multi-nationals engaged in primary production have also tended 
to expand their industrial holdings; and the interpenetration 
of capital found in the 1970's makes implausible the thesis 
that white agrarian interests have any fundamental objection 
to industrialization, though they do express preferences over 
the form of industrial strategy and regularly attempt to 
support production in manufacturing in order to improve or 
support plantation profit margins. 
While it is important to reconsider the 'feudal' nature 
of plantation Rhodesia as one of the foundations of settler 
colonialism, the forces leading to its absorption as an 
increasingly dependent production structure ought to be noted. 
Rural settler society still commands a large measure of 
political control -a reflection in part of its economic 
significance - but it is tending to be a diminishing share 
as systemic development under the industrial capitalist mode 
makes the politico-economic power of new socio-economic 
144 
groups stronger. Finally, it is clear that the 
Proletarianization process has indeed been a differentiating 
0 
onc. The lowly position of the (semi-serf) rural 
'proletariat' is evidence of this. Some specific 
consideration of rural proletarianization is required. 
The macro-aggregative approach Arrighi adopts is inadequate 
as an explanation of this process. 
Though domestic workers have been proletarianized by 
the same overall conditioning process of development, their 
specific location in production (in the kitchens and gardens 
of the settler-colonial domestic household) has beery', under 
different mechanisms of social control and for different 
'productive' purposes and so requires a particular analysis. 
This labouring group is also aggregated into Arrighi's 
'homogenizing' model. Yet the model does not, have adequate 
conceptual elasticity to explain fully the different 
experiences of these 'proletarians' - who together with 
farm workers constitute half the wage-labour force. In 
particular, the macro model fails to explain the essential 
character of the 'Masters and Servants' syndrome - its social 
features, dependency relationships, 'extra-economic' forms, 
juridico-political configurations and institutions - which 
in many ways has been the 'basic model' around which labour 
structures and policy have been moulded. It retains its 
'ancient' characteristics despite 'modernization' in 
capitalist production structures, industrial unionism amongst 
black workers, collective bargaining and other juridico- 
political differences found in the 'industrial complex'. 
It is in this web of 'master-servant' relationships that 
African participation in the privileges of settler colonialism 
Co 
is made visible. The co-option of selected Africans as a 
nascent capitalist class or a bourgeoisie is made internally 
consistent and complete when blacks contributes both as 
master and as servant, to the reproduction of the essential 
social relations upon which settler colonialism has 
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traditionally depended. Settler colonialism thus 
persists as a mechanism of domination in a dependent capitalist 
periphery. The seemingly racial nature of this domination 
merely masks a more fundamental class-based pattern of 
exploitation. Further, production is not 'production for 
exchange' under the domestic mode of production but 
production of 'use values', only one component of which 
provides a basis for productive accumulation. Nonetheless, 
labour mobilization depends on the same processes typical 
of 'primitive accumulation'. For this reason as well as 
that of the differing social relations of production, the 
domestic household needs a specific analysis not found in 
Arrighi's overall approach, 
Even where Arrighi foouses most strongly on the 
Industrial working class, there are important deficiencies 
in analysis. In particular, the categorizing of a large 
portion of the black industrial working class as a 'labour 
aristocracy' exaggerates the position. and ignores the dire 
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poverty of most of these households. It also conceals 
the forced rural dependence of most workers and the nature of 
these dependency links which are necessary to ensure family 
subsistence. Here Arrighi is premature in suggesting that 
the Practice of the labour stabilization reforms in the 
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immediate postwar period 'implied the sivering of the ties 
linking the peasantry and proletariat'. The very 
rationale behind the policy of maintaining the pre-capitalist 
economic formation was based on the need for a cheap 
proletariat ultimately dependent on the rural areas for 
income supplementation, family subsistence and social security. 
The 'severing' of ties apparent in 'labour stabilization' 
rhetoric did not manifest itself in r; relations of 
structural independence. The vast majority of industrial 
workers has continued to be paid below the Poverty Datum 
Line (even that for a small family size). They have 
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therefore remained 'rurally rooted'. 
The impoverishment of the industrial proletariat -a 
necessary condition for industrial capitalist development - 149 
created the socio-economic conditions for union formation. 
This aspect of class formation requires a specific treatment 
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not provided in Arrighi's conjectural speculations. The 
systematic restraints placed on unionization, the nature of 
the tactics open to unionists, together with their complex 
alliances with 'progressive' elements of the African nationalist 
political parties, have all moulded the African labour 
movement. These developments have been patterned by the 
requirements of settler colonialism and are central to an 
analysis of the political economy of Rhodesia. For instance, 
it is important to identify African unionism as a social 
force which has been significant not only for its presence, 
but also for its absence in certain sectors (for instance in 
plantation and domestic household production)., Thus the 
bz 
particular formation of 'African unionism' in the mining 
. industry must be seen as related to the privileged unionism 
of the (white) labour aristocracy exercised through the 
industry's 'multi-racial' union; and, too, these restraints 
need to be related to the specific conditions of mining 
production - especially the domination by monopolistic 
international capital and the leverage of this class together 
with that of small workers in influencing the State's labour 
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policies. 
More attention should be paid to urban influx 
control mechanisms and the 'repressive-permissive' character 
152 
of restraints on petty commodity producers. Arrighi only 
makes cursory reference to these institutional structures, 
despite the viability of plantation production becoming 
increasingly dependent in the post 1940's 'Apon the directing 
of 'surplus' labour away from the towns. It was partly 
through these urban policies that the low cost means of 
subsistence and presence of an urban-industrial 'reserve army' 
was secured. 
Of some importance in the analysis of discrimination 
and class formation is the position of the Asian and Coloured 
minorities, soeto-economic groups not considered in Arrighi's 
framework. Not only has their interstitial socio-economic 
position been conditioned by the African presence and 
configuration in the social formation but, as instruments 
and beneficiaries of the ruling class's coalition of interests, 
Asians and Coloureds have performed important tasks for 
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settler colonialism. The class structure of these 
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minorities and their incorporation into the peripheral 
capitalist system are relevant and important socio-economic 
factors despite their relatively small numerical size. 
Similarly, the role of the African petty bourgeoisie 
needs to be accounted for in terms other than as a dependent 
lumen-bourgeoisie. The State has certainly been 
instrumental in fostering stratification in this quarter; 
but even so accumulation requires direct action also. 
Arrighi accepts rather too easily the argument by Gray that 
this class 'had practically no opportunities to develop... 
the material interests which might have distinguished (it) 
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from the mass'. Just how extensively the African petty 
bourgeoisie has identified with the proletariat and the 
peasantry (as Arrighi suggests) is not made clear. Indeed, 
there is evidence that, especially since the late 1960's, 
the African bourgeoisie has not been too small in size and 
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significance to be above pursuing its self interests. 
Its influence on African political parties illustrates this, 
evidenced by the considerable differences between the 
'constitutionalist' African National Council and the more 
radical nationalist groups whose class base has been situated 
more broadly in the proletariat and peasantry. 
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Arrighi's explanation for the formation of the white 
labour aristocracy is also problematical, in theory as well 
157 
as empirical analysis; and not only in the case of Rhodesia. 
, Arrighi sees this class emerging from a mild class struggle 
with capital, the consequence being a deal concluded with 
other fractions of the national bourgeoisie to the effect 
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that they all would coalesce to resist the pressures of 
international capitalism. Their political power, eventually 
expressed in legislation, was aimed at improving their 
socio-econonio position and at perpetuating scarcity in the 
supply of skills which white workers eomzarded. However this 
does not account for the full experience of labour aristocracy 
class formation. Omitted is the long history of struggle to 
establish and have recognized trade unions with collective 
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bargaining rights. - Employers were not simply or so 
easily persuaded to collude with the labour aristocracy 
because of racial affinity with white employees. Furthermore, 
changos in the occupational structure of white labour have 
brought for them a progressive upliftment over time into 
the ranks of supervisors. In this sense, then, the white. 
'working class': defined in terms of productive labourers, 
has been diminished although elements of it still exist. 
Different strata have emerged -a large 'aristocratic' 
component, a 'productive' worker group as well an a large 
bureaucratic elite, employed mostly by the State. The role 
of the State In regulating the conditions of employment as 
well as the social security of the white labour aristocracy 
has not been acknowledged sufficiently by Arrighi. White 
labour has always formed an important element of settler 
colonialism and should not be regarded as a homogenous 
category.. Its age,, sex, - nationality and occupational 
composition make it a complex social grouping, each component 
being subject to different degrees and sets of coeio-eeonosie 
pressurew Arrighi glosses over those internal dimensions 
6s 
and as a result tends to develop a mechanistic understanding 
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of the 'white worker as exploiter'. Social conditions 
have been and remain a lot more complex than that, the 
emerging position being made more complicated by the changing 
occupational position of Coloured and Asian workers and a 
shall but growing number of skilled and/or certificated 
black workers segmented from the black industrial 
proletariat. Whether or not the white labour aristocracy 
remains, as Leys has suggested and as Arrighi accepts, the 
'center of gravity' of settler colonialism is less 
problematical if by this is meant the objective basis of 
polit ical power of the political parties of settler colonialism. 
But there is more to the reproduction of the settler colonial 
political economy than simply the maintenance of dominance 
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in the white electorate itself changing. 
The class structure of settler colonialism has always 
been and in the 1970's is certainly more complicated. Thus 
the rather etatio and generalized reference by Arrighi to 
the Ideal' between white workers and the national bourgeoisie 
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may de scribe a reality: but it does not explain it. 
Recent events in the 1970's have also illustrated that the 
parties to the 'deal', especially employers, have been 
inclined to seek further advantage than that originally 
'contracted'. In this case, white labour has regarded 
employer manoeuvres as a severe threat to the basic security 
of employment, despite the lack of a white labour 'reserve 
army' of unemployed and the proximity of more-protected 
South African labour markets. Again, the mediation of the 
State has been critical in ensuring class stabilization. 
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Finally, there are important problems concerning white 
labour which are not raised by Arrighi but which have to be 
dealt with analytically: for instance the fact that the 
bulk of the white labour aristocracy are also 'employers' - 
in two de acto ways, directly under the domestic mode of 
production, and. indirectly on-the-job, exercising effective 
cocial control over African workers, in close conjunction 
with management. While white workers are, like other workers, 
'dependent' on management and capital, their relationships 
with capital are those of mutual dependence insofar as the 
white labour aristocracy really maintains the essential 
command positions of the system within which capitalist 
profits are derived. Upon them the system has always 
depended despite the fact that individual capitalists have 
had incentive to break the 'rules of the game' by attempting 
to increase individual profits through substituting lower- 
cost black labour for high-cost white labour in production. 
It has been the State's role to reduce this risk which has 
endangered the class coalition of settler colonialism. 
CO1V'CLUSION: A S3 r'OPSIS OF AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYTIC;, AL FRAMEWORK 
Some of the above criticisms have been directed at what 
dualistic and neo-marxist analyses of Rhodesia failed to do 
while others have suggested contrary interpretations of the 
political economy, especially the treatment accorded the 
process of accumulation and labour mobilization in the postwar 
historiography. In general it has been argued that the 
neo-marxist paradigm and analysis of the Rhodesian social 
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formation provides a better explanation of the nature of 
discrimination and its relationship to the process of 
underdevelopment, as well as the labour mobilization process, 
than either the orthodox 'economic theory' of discrimination 
or the theory and analysis of dualistic development in 
Rhodesia. Other approaches which have stressed 'racial' 
divisions in the economic system have also been found to be 
inadequate as they have oversimplified the complexity of the 
socio-economic syystea, its historical development and the 
relationships that have existed between classes and races 
under the settler-colonial system of peripheral capitalism 
in Rhodesia. 
These criticisms have suggested an alternative 
formulation of the problem of comprehending historical and 
contemporary developments in Rhodesia. In this study, it 
is argued that capitalist development is based essentially 
on a specific process of accumulation, @primitive* in 
nature, a fundamental aspect of which concerns the mobilization 
of cheap labour supplies (cheap here denoting labour-'power 
acquired below the cost of its reproduction) under different 
modes of production in a settler-colonial social formation. 
In this socio-economic system, the capitalist mode (itself 
composite of various forms of capitalist production, each 
with certain unique problems of labour mobilization) is 
dominant and the articulation between modes of production 
has been strongly dependent on the complexion and policies 
of the settler-colonial State at' any particular historical 
juncture. In this scheme attention is given to the 
0 
configuration of the social structure and the class and 
racial characteristics of the income distribution pattern 
(see Chapter 2). The transformation of the 'core areas' 
of the economic system, by the, primary 'dynamic' of the 
postwar period -a dependent capitalist industrialization 
process - is regarded as posing new problems of labour 
supply and social control for employers and the State. 
New initiatives in labour policy, primarily located in this 
process, are considered as being geared towards ensuring 
the reproduction of 'cheap labour under changing conditions 
in which industrial capitalism becomes hegemonie in the 
capitalist mode of production (see Chapter 3). A key 
revision in State labour policy concerns the mobilization 
of foreign 'migrant' and contract labour in the economy, 
especially the need to gradually diminish dependence on 
foreign-derived cheap labour-power whilst developing 
internal mechanisms to supplant these 'traditional' sources. 
State labour policy becomes essential especially to regulate 
the allocation of labour supplies between competing producers. 
One important means for ensuring the provision of adequate 
cheap labour supplies, especially in the 'primary sectors' 
is the management of a contract labour system (see Chapter 4). 
The development of peripheral capitalism in Rhodesia is made 
more 'secure' (though this too contains its own contradictions) 
by the rel1nce on local sources of cheap labour-power. This 
pattern of labour mobilization relies on peasant under- 
development and the 're-creation' of the African rural areas 
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an 'labour reserves' for employers. Policies designed to 
further capitalist interests under the settler-colonial 
order result in a growing dependence of African households 
in the reserves on subsistence acquired through wage-labour 
(see Chapter 5). The need for a degree of viability in 
the peasant economy, in order to sustain the costs of 
reproduction of labour, cause the peasant mode (and the 
remnants of the pre-capitalist social formation) to be 
conserved. However, systemic dependence on. plantation 
development and the accumulation of capital in the 'industrial 
complex' cause the reserves to 'dissolve' and lose their 
self-subsistence autonomy. It is argued that the labour 
mobilization process is unique to each specific mode of 7 
production and requires different labour policies even 
within the capitalist mode itself so as to meet the 
requirements of particular forms of capitalist production. 
In plantation production, extensive reliance on 'quasi-feudal' 
labour policies is found (see Chapter 6). Rural 
proletarianization in this production system takes a 
particular form distinguishable from the experience of 
workers under other kinds of capitalist production. 
Similarly, in the settler colonial domestic household mode 
of 'production', 'extra-cheap' labour is made possible only 
as a result of processes of 'primitive accumulation' and 
'extra-economic' forms of social control (see Chapter 7). 
The superstructure governing labour conditions in these two 
sectors differs from that found in the 'industrial complex', 
this being a reflection of the underlying differences in 
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production requirements (see Chapter We It is in the 
'industrial complex' that the conflict between the labour 
aristocracy and the (African) working class is most pronounced. 
State policies provide an essential support for the former. 
In the 'urban-industrial economy' a number of forms of 
social control apply and regulate conflict, in particular 
to ensure the subordination of petty commodity production 
to the requirements of the dominant, mode. The special 
needs and form of capitalist production in the mining industry 
lead to a specific process of proletarianization and a complex 
pattern of labour mobilization which, as for all lother forms 
of capitalist production, is based too on 'primitive 
accumulation', in this case, however, primarily for foreign 
monopoly capital (see Chapter 9). 
This following analysis of the political economy of 
the 'labour transfer' and capitalist accumulation provides 
an exposition of the basic characteristics of the significant 
modes of production (i. e., their economic base, and juridico- 
political and ideological superstructures) in Rhodesia. 
This is a necessary step for the understanding of social 
conflict in Rhodesian society. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND CLASS STRUCTURE 
IN POSTWAR RHODESIA 
Both the dualist and neo-maraist analyses of Rhodesian 
development have employed either implicit or explicit schemes 
of socio-economic stratification to explain the transformations 
that have occurred in the political economy. Despite this 
there has been no satisfactory or systematic analysis of the 
income distribution pattern within racial groups and social 
classes found in Rhodesia. Barber's analysis of income 
distribution was concerned with the Federal economy as a 
1 
whole. Where it focussed on Southern Rhodesia the stress 
was on consumption and savings and not the income structure 
of socio-economic classes or racial groups; and in analysing 
the labour market the approach adopted was highly aggregative. 
Arrighi's explicit class analysis proceeds primarily on a 
qualitative level and little emphasis is placed on the 
dimensions of internal stratification within these classes. 
As a result the complexities of the Rhodesian class structure 
2 
have been concealed. 
Studies explicitly directed at investigating income 
distribution in Rhodesia have generally stressed racial wage 
and income stratification. 
3 
The most sophisticated of these 
studies dealing with the 1946-1968 period is Sutcliffe's. 
His model isolated three basic strata: one group of whites, 
Asians and Coloureds; and two groups of Africans, one rural 
4 
and the Other designated as 'urban'. 
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Sutcliffe's major conclusions are as follows: (1) that 
whites have gained substantially from the process of growth; 
(2) 'urban' black incomes per head have risen steadily over 
time though the 'black working class... are in no meaningful 
sense a privileged class, being directly subject to an 
extremely high degree of exploitation'; (3) that 'in spite 
of some growing dispersion black ('urban') earnings remain 
fairly undifferentiated'; (4) there has been 'a devastating 
kedistribution against the blacks of the countryside - that 
is against the vast poverty striken majority of the 
population's (5) inequality has therefore grown between 
rural Africans and other groups in the economy; (6) further 
that this Income distribution structure and the racialist 
nature of Rhodesian society are inconsistent with sustained 
industrialization; (7) finally, that the policies which have 
led to a more unequal income distribution have resulted in 
long-term economic stagnation and have derived directly from 
'the racialist nature of the Rhodesian political system'. 
The first two conclusions are broadly confirmed in this 
analysis, although important qualifications must be made 
concerning the pattern of stratification and the class 
formation processes associated with them. All the others 
are contradicted: black 'urban' earnings are shown to be 
markedly differentiated with increasing dispersion being of 
great importance In the class formation process; greater care 
must be exercised in interpreting 'rural-urban' earnings 
differentials and proletarianization has advanced further 
than Sutcliffe assumed; the income distribution structure 
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and racism have not been inconsistent with domestic 
industrialization, nor has the distribution pattern emerged 
primarily from the racialist origins of the Rhodesian political 
system; rather the production and class structure has 
required these racial forms and distributional patterns as 
necessary components of the political economy during the 
phase of ascendence of the industrial capitalist mode of 
production. The conclusions of this study, which differ 
substantially from Sutcliffe's, are based on the use of a 
more adequate conceptual framework as well as an appreciation 
of-some serious methodological problems encountered in 
Sutcliffe's empirical analysis. 
5 
Data on the pattern of income distribution in Rhodesia 
for 1946-70 is provided in Tables 1-6. Details on the 
origin of the data can be found in the accompanying Sources 
and Notes to the Tables in which there is also comment on the 
nature and reliability of the data used. The Tables are 
organized to highlight various aspects of the race-class 
relationships that have characterized postwar Rhodesia. 
Various strata are isolated and trends in the level and 
structural composition of their incomes are specified in 
quantitative terms. These groups are the following: 
6 
'Europeans', here including Whites, Asians and Coloureds; 
the African population, divided into the rural household 
sector and the working-crass, the latter group comprised of 
'sub-proletarians' (farm and domestic workers) and the 
industrial proletariat; in addition, the income of the 
African capitalist class is estimated though it has not been 
possible to compute the precise size of this group. 
7y 
The above stratification providesa first approximation 
to the basic socio-economic divisions within the political 
economy. The data (collected on a racial basis) imperfectly 
indicate certain important dimensions of the class structure. 
The overall perspective is hence limited by data inadequacies 
leading to methodological complications. However, with 
sufficient qualification and careful interpretation, it does 
provide a basis for identifying important elements and 
changes in the pattern of stratification and class structure. 
EUROPEAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL CLASS 
Estimates of European population, earnings and income 
per head are shown for 1946-1970 in Table 1. The European 
population increased rapidly in the immediate postwar period, 
more than doubling in size between 1946 and 1956, mainly as 
a result of large scale immigration into SouthernRhodesia. 
Immigration and settlement schemes were promoted extensively 
by the -, State. During the 1960's the rate of increase in 
population was much reduced by fluctuations in migration. 
However, over the 25 year period (1946-1970) the European 
population had almost tripled even though the birth rate 
and the rate of natural increase for whites (who comprised 
more than 87 percent of the European population) had decreased 
7 
markedly. 
European personal incomes derivedfrom a wide range of 
sources: wages and salaries; property ownership; 
unincorporated enterprise; interest,, dividends and profits 
7S- 
paid by Companies, public sector agencies or sources abroad; 
rents; workmen's compensation claims; and transfers from 
both the private and public sector , 
(see cols. 2-12). 
Because of the varying quality of the data it is not possible 
to obtain a complete and consistent statement on all these 
income sources for the 1946-1970 period. Caution must 
therefore be exercised in interpreting the trends. 
Taking wages and salaries, personal Income from property 
and gross income from unincorporated enterprise (cola. 2,3 
and 4 respectively - the only income data available for the 
whole period), it is shown that, after deflating for price 
increases in the intervening years, European personal incomes 
per head (as measured in col. 5) rose from $1,103 to $1,285 
(all in 1964 prices). It would appear then that European 
incomes have increased on a per capita basis over the period. 
Indeed, in current prices, wages and salaries have risen 
more than tenfold (see col. 2). 
A more comprehensive estimate of European income per 
head is Pound in co1.13. Here the data for 1946-51 is not 
as reliable as for 1965-70 and hence comparison between the 
8 
two periods must be undertaken with some caution. Nonetheless, 
per capita incomes have grown as measured in constant 1964 
prices between these two periods by approximately 20 percent. ' 
For 1965-70 the rate of growth of income per head is much 0 
higher than for the period from 1946-65. In this more recent 
period, most of the growth of income has come from employment 
earnings. The reduction in income per head for 1966 - 
attributable to the aftermath of the declaration of 
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independence in November 1965 - was mainly the result of 
smaller dividend and profit receipts from companies (see 
col. 9) and the stagnation in receipts of personaltincome 
from property (col. 3). Apart from this single instance, 
and the likelihood that there could also have been a staghation 
of European aR_ e income earnings in the 1958-64 period, 
there is reason to believe that European incomes per head 
have risen steadily since 1946. The post-1957 stagnation 
need not imply the same in respect of the European 'standard 
of living', as Sutcliffe has pointed out. 
9 
White public 
consumption of social services (health and education, for 
example) are recorded as having risen for this period. 
l0 
Federal public expenditures tended to benefit both non- 
Africans and particularly Southern Rhodesia* 
11 
The overall 
effect of stagnant incomes per head need not necessarily 
imply an even impact on household incomes. Further, 
stagnation could only have been a short-term phase especially 
since, in the post-1962 period under the Rhodesian Front 
government, European disposable incomes were boosted by 
reductions in income taxation, abolition of supertax, greater 
reliance on indirect taxation by the State, and other 
regressive tax and expenditure shifts in the Rhodesian fiscal 
12 
system. 
European society has therefore been developed as an 
affluent stratum of the Rhodesian social formation, becoming 
steadily richer over time. -" It has been in this increasing 
appropriation of income and wealth, not the racism of settler 
colonial society, that roots of conflict with the underclasses 
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are founded. This conflict cannot simply be understood in 
aggregate terms as white-vs-black. The nature and sources 
of inequality, stratification and class formation within 
European society have been crucial to the process of class 
formation throughout the socioeconomic system. 
Firstly, consider certain inequalities among the ethnic 
groups of the European population (as constitutionally 
defined). For the period under review, Asians and Coloureds 
have comprised between 10-12 percent of this population. 
13 
Their material standards of living have differed from those 
of whites; and indeed even between Asians and Coloureds 
14 
themselves. The inclusion of these minorities in the data 
on European incomes per head means that white incomes per 
head have been higher than the data shown in col. 13. 
Inadequacies of available data do not permit the calculation 
of separate inter-temporal income trends for whites, Asians 
and Coloureds. The most comprehensive data available - from 
the 1961 Census of Employees - show that the working-class 
of these minorities (taken together) were substantially worse 
off than white workers in terms of average earnings from 
employment in all sectors (see Table 7). The lowest earnings 
differential enjoyed by whites was 30 percent' more (in rail 
transport employment) whilst the highest was 270 percent (in 
chemical manufacturing industries) with the average 
differential ranging around 100 percent. However, the sources 
of Asian and Coloured incomes have not been confined to the 
labour market., The class differentiation within these 
minority structures should be recognized. 
7S 
The Coloured minority, have been more disadvantaged than 
14 
Asians, the class composition of Asians differing significantly 
from that of Coloureds. Yet both these groups have been in 
a more advantaged position vis-a-vis the African working-class 
(see col. 57). Coloureds have been overwhelmingly dependent 
on income from employment whereas by contrast a high 
proportion of Asian incomes (38 percent in 1970) have accrued 
from sources other than employment. Whilst Coloured earnings 
have compared unfavourably with whites and their occupational 
structure has been biased towards less skilled jobs, the 
standard of living of the Coloured minority has improved 
markedly since the 1940"s and the working-class stratum-of 
this minority has come to form a dependent and protected 
component of the labour aristocracy. Coloured capitalism 
has been small scale and even until 1975 remained structurally 
Insignificant. Average Asian incomes, however, have been 
much closer to average white incomes and have increased 
significantly in the post-1946 period, especially as Asian 
capital has diversified into the higher stages of manufacturing 
production, Asian workers have shifted upwards in the 
occupational structure of the private and State sectors and 
Asian women have increasingly entered the labour market. 
The data on European incomes per head in Table 1 must 
therefore be understood to reflect superficially these 
underlying class structures and tendencies in the political 
economy and can only be useful if related to 80010-economic 
inequalities (as opposed to racial inequalities) within 
European society. 
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Similarly, white society must be 
7q 
understood in terms that reflect the nature and sources of 
inequality within the white community. Despite the fact that 
these inequalities are dwarfed by inequalities between the 
dominant classes and the peasantry and African working-class, 
they are nonetheless of some significance in political 
and social conflicts. 
The most reliable and detailed source of income 
differences are taxation statistics which cover the period 
1953-54 - 1966-67 (see Table 8). The degree of income 
inequality among whites can be gauged from these data. If 
the proportion of income accruing to the top 1 percent and 
5 percent of income taxpayers (who may be equated with the 
white population, in proximate terms) is compared at four 
intervals, the following impression emerges. 
16 In 1955-56 
the top 1 percent of income taxpayers received 7.92 percent 
of all individual taxable income, while the top 5 percent 
received 25.15 percent. By 1966-67 the proportionsof 
individual taxable incomes accruing to these respective groups 
were 6.86 percent and 14.4 percent. Thus, the level of 
white income inequality appears to have decreased over the 
1954-67 period. This may be accounted for in part by the 
bargaining power of important political components in the 
settler colonial society, especially white workers. No 
firm conclusion is possible however because of deficiencies 
in the income tax data and its usefulness for income 
distribution analysis. 
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Another approach - stressing household income differences 
- is to examine the relative distribution of monthly family 
1 
c' ) 
income, using the household unit as the relevant consumption 
unit. In 1968 only 4.8 percent of white urban households 
received a monthly income of less than 0160 (current prices); 
some 8.3 percent of households fell under $200; at the upper 
end of the spectrum 34 percent of households received a monthly 
income in excess of $400 while the bulk of households (49.8 
percent) received between $240 and $400 monthly* 
18 Another 
urban-based sample survey in 1970 indicated that 8 percent 
of white households received in excess of $700 monthly, 
while 20 percent received more than $500. 
i9 
Not insignificant income inequalities have therefore 
existed within white society, though this should not be taken 
to infer real material deprivation in any significant number 
of white households. This judgement would be confirmed by 
data on asset-holding or urban white households which show 
that only 8 percent of households had no car in 1970,97 
percent had refrigerators, 76 percent had telephones, 68 
percent had television, while 52 percent lived in owner 
20 
occupied premises. 
The most important divisions and inequalities within 
white society, however, have related to the division of 
labour and the relationship of white households to production 
in the various branches of the economy. The wage share of 
European personal incomes was 49 percent in 1946,59 percent 
in 1951,71 percent in 1960 and 74 percent in 1964. The 
estimates of these shares are based, however, on the- 
incomplete data of the pre-1965 period. The post 1965 data 
show that the European wage share of personal incomes was 
Il 
66 percent in 1965 and the same in 1970" There is 
evidence then to suggest that the importance of the 'labour 
market' as a source of earnings for Europeans has grown 
since the 19440's. Indeed, the 190 percent increase in 
European population over the 1946-70 period has been matched 
by a 361 percent growth in the value of real wage income 
(1946 prices) accruing to Europeans. The impact of this 
trend in the political economy has led to the embourgeoisement 
of the white stratum of the labour aristocracy in terms of 
consumption standards and conditions of full employment, even 
in those categories of skill where there has existed 
competition from lower cost supplies of Asian, Coloured or 
African labour. Affluence has also been associated with 
substantial political power particularly as, under the 
minority electorate system, no governing party has been able 
to jeopardize white labour interests. White workers have 
therefore formed an essential class in the settler colonial 
system. Without them the maintenance of the settler 
colonial State would have been impossible. 
21 / 
It is also worth noting certain features of the changing 
structural position of the white labour aristocracy. In 
1958 some 49.2 percent of all Europeans were in wage 
employment. By 1970 this proportion had fallen to 39.2 
percent. However, as noted earlier, European incomes 
derived from the labour market have increased markedly. The 
bulk of the growth in white income gains from employment has 
arisen from rising wages. From 1958-70 there has been a 
43 percent current price increase in white workers' average 
R2 
earnings from employment. 
22'. 
The growth in the white wage 
bill in current prices was 73 percent in the same period 
whilst numbers in employment only grew 21 percent. White 
labour has therefore Increasingly assumed the position of an 
affluent labour aristocracy privileged in bargaining strength, 
status, wages and in access to political power and the State. 
Unfortunately, there existr very little quantitative 
data on the income structure of white workers by occupation 
or position in the hierarchy of skills. However, data on 
wage employment and earnings amongst Europeans by industrial 
23 
sector are available in published statistics. In Tables 
10 and 11 comparisons are made with the wage and employment 
position of African workers in various industrial sectors. 
In the European employment structure a significant amount of 
earnings differentiation can be identified. For instance, 
in 1970 the average earnings of Europeans in the Mining and 
quarrying industry were more than 70 percent higher than in 
Agriculture and Forestry, the other principal primary 
industry. Earnings in the Manufacturing, Electricity and 
Water, Construction, Transport and Communications, Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate sectors were above the average 
of $3,114 per annum for all sectors. Employees in Public 
Administration stood just marginally above average in terms 
of earnings. In all sectors European earnings have grown 
consistently during the period under review. 
However, a sectoral_ classification obscures the 
inequalities amongst the white labour aristocracy, rooted in 
the relations to production of the various rstrata. At the 
f 
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apex are those in highly remunerative bureaucratic or 
executive-type 'employment' within the State and large-scale 
corporate sector. This 'upper bureaucracy' in the Civil 
Service, Local Government, Public Corporations and large 
firms has not owned the means of production, but has 
significantly influenced the pattern of income distribution. 
Skilled production workers have likewise received substantial 
remuneration, have been effectively unionized and have tended 
to be in an equivalent position to the middle and lower 
bureaucracy. Other strata of the white labour aristocracy, 
apart from skilled workers, have been unionized; for 
Instance clerical and service workers. White women have 
24 
formed an important element of this latter stratum, The 
effect of their relatively high participation rate in the 
upper wage brackets of the formal labour market has been 
25 
crucial in raising the level of white household incomes. 
Finally, there has existed a stratum of semi-skilled whites 
in protected occupations, principally in State employment, 
whose wages have fallen below those of the upper bureaucracy, 
skilled workers and even those of the lower bureaucracy. 
The social composition of this group has been heavily 
weighted with semi-retired personnel, persons with low 
educational attainment, women and the elderly. Because 
unions have been vertically integrated in Rhodesia, it has 
been found that skilled unions often provide 
bargaining and negotiating strength for the 
of the white labour aristocracy. Familial 
and an objective socio-economic interest in 
have provided a basis for uniting disparate 
various grades. 
Da means of proxy 
lower echelons 
and social bonds, 
systems maintenance, 
workers in these 
PY 
While the white labour aristocracy has always been an 
I 
Important factor in the production structures of settler 
colonialism, it has not represented the only large stratum 
of persons in the white class structure. In 1968 It was 
reported that Professional and Technical and Administrative, 
Executive and Managerial employees represented 46 percent of 
all heads of urban white households in Rhodesia. 
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Although 
many of these persons could be classified as constituting the 
'upper stratum' of the white labour aristocracy, many would 
also be in the managerial or professional class proper, a 
group that has been growing in importance as the economy has 
expanded and as white employees have shifted upwards through 
the occupational hierarchy. This stratification is reflected 
in part in terms of the structure of white urban household 
earnings in that the proportion of earnings from sources 
other than employment has increased from 4.7 percent to 
8.3 percent between 1960 and 1968.27 Here too it is relevant 
to note that for the 1965-70 period the value of non-wage 
sources of personal income (excluding workmen's compensation 
claims) increased from $79.7 million to $160.0 million (see 
Table 1). 
Other important strata of the white class structure 
outside of the white labour aristocracy and the lower echelons 
of the managerial and professional classes need to be 
identified. The principal strata are: rentiers and 
landlords in both the urban and rural property markets; 
plantation owners in various branches of agricultural 
production; small-working mine owners, some self-employed 
9s, 
and others with larger sums of accumulated capital invested 
in various branches of production; resident domestic 
manufacturing capitalists; petty and large-scale merchant 
capitalists, the former being found extensively in both the 
urban and rural areas; investor-reentiers and other elements 
of the settler bourgeoisie whose shareholdings of claims to 
capital have been distributed through the Stock Exchange and 
other investment institutions into most branches of 
production; the itinerant managerial and professional staff 
of large foreign firms most of whom have never been 
permanently resident in Rhodesia; and a small and fragmented 
class of (relatively) 'poor whites', some of whom obtained 
State assistance. 
It is therefore necessary to go beyond an assessment of 
aggregate white incomes represented in available official 
data, in order to evaluate the economic power and influence 
of whites in the political economy. Changes in patterns of 
discrimination against Africans, Asians and Coloureds, and 
changes in the development of the various branches of 
capitalist enterprise in Rhodesia, do not affect all these 
strata in the same manner or to the same degree. 
AFRICAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND CLASS STRUCTURE 
(Data on African income distribution, employment and class 
structure for 1946-70 are given in Tables 2-7 and 10-11. 
African society can be broken down into a structure composed 
of four primary classes as defined by broad relationships to 
the capitalist mode of production: the working-class 
ýt 
dependent on wage-labour; petty commodity producers who own 
their own means of production and are self-employed; various 
strata of peasantry related to factor and product markets in 
differential ways; and various factions of an expanding 
African petty and 'auxiliary' bourgeoisie. Relevant 
features of the income distribution structure of these classes 
are considered in turn. 
THE AFRICAN WORKING-CLASS 
The African working-class may be defined objectively as 
those social groups with a wage-labour dependence on capitalist 
production structures. The extent to which structural 
transformations in the Rhodesian economy since 1945 have 
created a sizeable African working-class has often been 
underestimated as a result of a misplaced pre-occupation with 
migrancy, ethnicity and traditionalism, leading to the 
persistence of the unrealistic perception of the African as a 
form of deelasse 'tribal man'. 
23 Yet of the total African 
population in 1972,15 percent were in wage employment. 
However, this measure significantly understates the importance 
of wage-labour to Africans, as Harris has aptly pointed out: 
'When it is remembered that nearly one half of... the 
population are under the age of seventeen, and that only 
cJRcýe. 
ten percent of th working force are female, it becomes 
apparent that between 50 and 60 percent of all black households 
are dependent on income from employment as a main source of 
family Income. ' 29 And it should be noted that Harris' 
g7 
estimate does not account for the Africans employed in black 
capitalist enterprises in the urban areas, employees of private 
landowners in Purchase Areas as well as wage workers in 
peasant production and those employed by petty commodity 
producers, 
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These latter groups are not enumerated in 
the Census of Employment and so do not appear in the data 
in the Tables. ' 
The extent to which this proletarianization process has 
occurred is also indicated by the data in col. 49 of Table 6 
which show: 3 rural household sector incomes as a percentage of 
total African Incomes. In the late 1940's rural household 
income constituted well over 40 percent of total African 
Incomes* By the late 1960's this portion had fallen to 
approximately 25 percent during a period when African personal 
incomes had grown from 042.6 million to $317.7 million 
(1946-70 in current prices). 
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Those workers classified here as constituting the 
industrial proletariat include. all wage-labourers outside 
agricultural production and the domestic household sector, 
i; e. mine workers, persons employed in services, distribution, 
education, health, commerce, as well as in manufacturing and 
secondary industries. The term 'industrial' is thus used in 
a particular sense. The data gathered under this rubric 
are therefore highly aggregative and must be carefully 
appraised. - More especially, the various strata within this 
grouping must be identified. Whilst this approach is not 
ideal, and is partly forced on the analysis by the imperfections 
in available data, it does represent a more specific approach 
than provided for by Barber, Sutoliffe, Arrighi and Loney. 
t 
y 
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The number of workers comprising the industrial 
proletariat has nearly doubled in the 25 years following 
1946 (col. 20). Rapid growth occurred in the post-1963 
period under State promoted substitutive industrialization 
programmes. The wage bill accruing to this stratum of 
the working class has also grown markedly (see col. 31), 
increasing 18-fold in current prices from 1946-70. From 
1948-70 average earnings in current prices grew nearly 
seven-fold. In constant 1964 prices these earnings rose 
318 percent over the 23 year period. This relatively high 
rate of earnings growth sets the industrial proletariat 
off from the 'sub-proletariat' employed on plantations and 
in domestic households. 
However# average earnings growth rates obscure important 
differences between sectors and between 
within the industrial proletariat. It 
misleading to follow the view expressed 
and regard the whole of this stratum as 
'labour aristocracy'. 
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The extent to 
industrial workers fall into this latter 
different strata 
would therefore be 
by some observers 
constituting a 
which some black 
r category must be 
assessed by studying wage levels in relation to the costs 
of minimum subsistence consumption needs of African 
households. Where wages are less than the costs of 
reproduction of labour in the environment of employment of 
a defined household, it would not be justified to conclude 
that such a household enjoyed 'aristocratic' consumption 
patterns. And, even where the wage exceeded the cost of 
minimum consumption requirements, the question of the social 
class character of the strata being examined would need to 
?I 
be judged against the total employment and wage structure. 
Simple comparisons of rural-urban African wages are not 
sufficient evidence upon which to base claims that urban- 
industrial w ^kers form a labour aristocracy. 
It is pertinent here to assess two facets of the nature 
of industrial proletarianization for the post-1940 period: 
the extent of wage differentiation within this stratum and the 
relationship between wage structures and the costs of 
subsistence. 
Data on wage stratification within the industrial 
proletariat are difficult to collect and to assess since 
a certain portion of the earnings accruing to black workers 
has been in the form of 'payments in kind'. In addition, 
payment practices have changed over time. Wage data 
should thus be assessed with these qualifications in mind. 
The first comprehensive study of the African wage 
structure was conducted in 1943 by Ibbotson whose task was 
to identify both inequalities in wages and the general 
relationship of wages to minimum consumption needs. 
33 
Ibbotson's survey focussed on urban African wages and 
conditions and it dealt primarily with adult male workers. 
The mining industry as well as pert-urban areas were omitted 
from Ibbdbson's statistical analyses. 
Data were obtained on the wages of 26,553 urban Africans 
or 45 percent of the adult male workers employed in the areas 
included in the survey. The majority (about 65 percent) 
received payments in cash, food and accommodation. Less 
than 22 percent were paid in cash only. About 13,000,, or 
go 
50 percent of workers received cash wages below £1.9.11 
monthly. Approximately 85 percent of workers were paid a 
cash wage of less than £3.0.0 monthly and less than 1 percent 
received cash payments in excess of £6.0.0 monthly. The 
bulk of workers were therefore low-wage proletarians. 
Ibbotson found that in 1943 the highest average monthly 
cash wage for any major urban centre was 92.14.6 (for 
workers paid In cash only). This figure was below the 1944 
urban Poverty Datum Line for a single male between the age 
of 16 and 64 which Batson estimated at £3.1.0 (excluding any 
4 
allowance for rents or transport). 
3 
For a married couple 
with two children -a small family dependency level for `: 
urban Africans in this period - the P. D. L. was calculated 
at a minimum of £8.16.4 monthly (again excluding any 
allowance for rents and transport and assuming that the 
children were under the age of 5). The P. D. L. for a married 
couple with no children, calculated on the same basis, was 
16.5.0. It is significant that 23,563 of Ibbotson's 
sample, which included a portion of 
\arried 
Africans, or 
894percent, received wages below the P0D. L. for a single 
adult male. Indeed, 13,513 workers, or 50 percent of the 
sample, received cash remunerations at a level below one- 
half of the estimated Poverty Datum Line for single adult 
workers. Thus, in the 1940'c there is no evidence that 
many of the industrial proletariat were able to depend 
solely on wages for subsistence. However, a very small 
number of African workers did receive relatively high wages 
in this periods these being the 191 workers, or 0.7 percent 
of the sample, whose monthly cash wages were above £6.0.0 
per month. 
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The African wage structure was also hardly aristocratic 
at the time as is shown by Ibbotson's record of the monthly 
cash wages of 18 different skilled occupational groups. 
The top wage rate of E14 monthly was only 23 percent above 
the P. D. L. (1944) for a married couple and 3 children (rent 
and transport excluded). Nonetheless, Ibbotson's data on 
the occupational structure indicate that important wage 
differentials existed between the various classes of 
labourer. Hotel Chefs received cash wages 11 to 12 times 
higher than gardeners. Unskilled hotel workers were paid 
slightly better than general workers in domestic households. 
Lorry drivers received more than twice the cash wage of 
general factory labourers. And store workers were slightly 
better off than the latter. These earnings differentials 
were reflected in de factor institutionalized minimum wage 
policy under the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act which set 
wage rates for unskilled workers in various trades. 
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In 
the building industry, for example, the urban wage rate was 
1i pence per hour in Salisbury, Umtals and the Midlands. 
Iron, Steel Manufacturing and Engineering workers in semi- 
skilled grades received a minimum rate of 3.25 pence per 
hour while unskilled labourers in the same industry were 
wholly unprotected. The bulk of black workers, however, 
were not covered by minimum wage policies. 
The pattern of stratification should also be considered 
6 
in terms of the wages paid to juvenile and female workers. 
3 
In urban commerce and industry, for instance, cash wages 
for juveniles were substantially lower than for adult workers. 
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And wage payments differed even within the juvenile category 
of employment. Thus in 1948 some 84 percent of juveniles 
employed in commerce and industry in the seven main urban 
areas were reported by the Central African Statistical 
Office to be receiving a cash wage of less than 25/- monthly. 
In most of these towns at least 25 percent of adult males 
received below 25/- cash monthly. A number of juveniles 
received less than 10/- monthly while others received cash 
wages in excess of 30/-. 
Unevenness in the wage structure was equally matched by 
inequality in conditions of employmente This In reflected 
in employer wage policies In commerce and industry In the 
late 1940's as recorded by a Statistical Office survey: 
47 percent of employers paid different wage rates to 
different grades of labour; a similar percentage did not 
pay long service Increments; 69 percent did not provide 
a cost of living allowance (here It was claimed that 
*natives (could) not distinguish wages from allowaneesl)t 
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21 percent operated the *ticket' system of remuneration; 
65 percent paid *rational to employeesl only 20 percent 
paid allowances In lieu of Irations". 75 percent did not 
pay any extra 'rational to married workersl less than 10 
percent of enterprises required employees to work less than 
44 hours per week; 29 percent provided for overtime 
payment at normal rates of payl 52 percent did not grant 
leave payl 44 percent did not grant sick leave with payl 
78 percent did not pay either pensions or gratuities; and 
only 2 percent admitted giving recognition to African trade 
q3 
unions while 70 percent did not give any recognition and 28 
percent gave no answer to the question. 
All this evidence on inequalities within the African 
industrial working-class in the 1940's should be interpreted 
in the light of relative deprivation within a class that 
In toto was forced to endure a large measure of the eaploi- 
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tation associated with settler colonial underdevelopment. 
Even so, in the very gradations of this common experience 
were rooted the seeds of stratification that were to be made 
more explicit under the institutionalized wage determination 
machinery of the Native Labour Boards Act (1947) and the 
Industrial Conciliation Act (1959). The creation of these 
inequalities, their institutionalization, and eventual 
widening through the 1950's and 1960'sß was only a new 
variation on an older theme of working-cbäss division that 
had been inherent in the strategies of capitalist and State 
labour policies in Southern Rhodesia. 
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Another P. D. L. study, together with an income survey, 
was carried out- for Africans in Southern Rhodesia in 1958, this 
time by Bettison on behalf of a Southern Rhodesian government 
Commission of Inquiry into urban African affairs and general 
social conditions, 
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Of the sample of households Bettison 
investigated 57.1 percent fell into the category "extremely 
impoverished"9 vi_Zo they were in receipt of incomes more 
than 35 percent below the P. D. L. In the case of 'single 
men' (not necessarily unmarried or without familial 
obligations) only 36 percent received incomes above the 
P. D. L. for i in le individuals. 
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By Betticon's criteria, 
1y 
13 percent of 'single' males were 'affluent' in that they 
received incomes of more than 30 percent above the 
individual's P. D. L. As expected, family households were 
found to be subject to a much higher degree of poverty. 
Only 8 percent in Bettison's sample were in receipt of 
incomes in excess of 17 percent above the P. D. L. for the 
relevant family size. 
Although the data of Bsttison and Batson are not 
directly comparable, the former's study indicates that there 
existed a greater degree of stratification than was to be 
found in 1943-44.42 However, those relatively few workers 
and households who were in receipt of wages and incomes 
well above the P. D. L. for urban areas were still relatively 
deprived compared to the labour aristocracy proper. 
Further, the basis of calculation of Bettison's P. D. L. 
was relatively austere and it omitted numerous important 
items from its components that families and individuals 
themselves would have regarded as objectively necessary 
for subsistence. 
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The above estimates of inequality within the African 
industrial proletariat are essentially static in nature and 
give little insight into the change in patterns of 
stratification within this important working class. 
Fortunately, comprehensive data on cash wage distributions 
for African workers for 1961 and 1971 are available and 
enable an assessment of distributional change. Because of 
the problems of using the published data in a form enabling 
direct comparison between the 1961 and 1971 data, adjustments 
I 
1s 
have had to be made. Details on these necessary 
adjustments and a detailed comment on the cash wage 
distributions for 1961-71 are to be found in a note on 
African Working Class Cash Wage Inequalities 1961-71 
(Appendix A). Reference will not be made here to the 
procedures of adjustment, or the principal qualifications 
attached to the data$ but only to the major findings that 
can be drawn fron the quantitative analysis. 
The major conclusion reached is that a shift in the 
cash wage distribution within the industrial proletariat 
class occurred between 1961 and 1971. In 1961 it was 
found that only 2.03 percent of the industrial proletariat 
earned cash wages in excess of $85.88 (1971 prices) while 
in 1971 this proportion had increased to 7.98 percent. 
Whilst this does not unambiguously permit the conclusion 
that incomes or earnings have grown more concentrated 
towards the upper end of incomes - because payments in kind 
are not accounted for - allowance for all considerations 
would permit this as a qualitative judgement that would be 
strongly grounded in the .. quantitative evidence. 
At the 
lower income end of the cash wage distribution there is also 
strong evidence of an upward shift in cash wage incomes 
because the proportion of workers in receipt of cash wages 
in excess of 0. `%36.60 (1971 prices), had increased from 12.75 
percent in 1961 to 31.72 percent in 1971. Thus in 1961 a 
total of 266,000 workers received cash wages below $36.80 
(1971 prices) out of a total industrial proletariat of 
294,000. In 1971 there were still 250,000 who received 
r 
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cash wages below this level, though 116,000 received higher 
cash wages, vi ?.. nearly three times as many as in 1961. 
In 197+ a further study of the P. D. L. for urban African 
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workers was conducted. It reported that the monthly 
P. D. L. for an unmarried man in Salisbury (in single 
accommodation) was $17.85 (January, 1974 prices); for a 
man and woman it came to $34,94; for a family with two 
childrenr, it was 053.98; families with four children had a 
P. D. L. of $73.52; while a family with six children required 
$93.59 in order to obtain basic minimum consumption needs 
4 
and maintain basic physical health and social decency. 
5 
This situation, compared with the cash wage structure 
of the industrial sectors, demonstrates unambiguously that 
most workers received wages far below the P. D. L. for an 
46 
average-sized family (of say 4 children). In June, 1973 
the Central Statistical Office reported that 102,000 out of 
121#000 African workers in manufacturing reoeiv63 cash wages 
of less than $50 per month. This figure closely reflects 
the earnings pattern since leas than 7 percent of earnings 
in this sector was. paid in kind in 1971.47 In Electricity 
and Water enterprises the respective figures were 49510 out 
of 4,830 workers with 6.5 percent of wages paid in kind= in 
Construction 49,500 out of 60,000 workers with 7 percent of 
wages paid in kind; in Distribution, Restaurants and Hotels 
52,500 out of 639800 workers with 8 percent of wages paid 
in kind, Indeed, in the case of all industries excluding 
agriculture and domestic households, the relevant, figures 
were 328,000 out of a total of 420,000. Furthermore, 185,000 
48 
workers received under $30 in cash wages monthly. 
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There is therefore evidence of great poverty and also 
substantial stratification within the African Industrial 
proletariat* And Ptate labour policies have had much to 
do with the situationg as Riddell has reported in noting the 
following for 19741 twages set under the Industrial 
Conciliation Aeto*. for the lowest grades (have been set) 
between $30 and $50 less than the P. D. L, for an average 
family of six persons. Out of fourteen agreements published 
up to the end of April 19749 eleven had minimum monthly 
wages set at less than $35 a month, one being $20.48 a 
month. Of those with minimum monthly wages net higher than 
49 
$35 all were less than $40 a month'. And, too, whilst 
it is possible that non-wage income might have been obtained 
to supplemont family income, available data indicate that 
for 1969-72, in the main urban areas of Rhodesia, 92-93 percent 
of black household incomes were derived directly from wage 
employment. 
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If important, but subtle, features of the class structure 
are not to be concealed# stratification In the 'industrial 
complex' must be considered In the light of social relations 
found In the various Industrial capitalist production 
structures, Various, forms of capital have dominated African 
labourers In these sectors and It Is worth distinguishing 
several briefly* The 54*470 workers In the mining and 
quarrying Industry In 1973 were mostly under the control of 
large-scale International capital connected to South African 
mining capitalg American Interests and the more Itraditionall 
sources of foreign capital based In Britain, These groups 
70 
formed a markedly different controlling class from those 
employers in the small-scale resident-capitalist fraction of 
the mining Industry, 
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Foreign capital in the manufacturing 
industry has also been better able and more willing to adjust 
wage policies to meet P. D. L. requirements than domestic 
capitalists. 
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These actions have not resulted from 
philanthropy but have reflected the rationalization of 
international Investments, the need to create a popular 
corporate image (often to meet criticisms levied inside the 
U. K. and the U. S. A. ), the conscious attempt to pre-empt 
unionist and strike action, and a desire to re-direct union 
and working-class action towards lower paying competitors, 
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Merchant capital by contrast has been for the most part 
domestically located and it has tended to resist strongly the 
wage pressures exerted by some of the larger employers. 
The State in particular has been a major resisting force to 
revisions in the wage structure applicable to black workers, 
partly to keep down the State wage bill itself and to avoid 
pressures from income taxpayers and urban ratepayers (both 
predominantly representative of white settler and voter 
interests), and also to enable both high profits for capital 
and high wages for the settler colonial labour aristocracy 
under prevailing production arrangements. 
Two other important strata of the African working-class , 
(farm and domestic workers) which have been related to 
production structures that have differed significantly from 
the capitalist enterprises of the 'industrial complex' must 
C 
be accounted for in an analysis of stratification and class 
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formation in Rhodesia. In this study these two groups have 
been termed a 'sub-proletariat! to indicate that the relations 
binding employers and workers have not been simply those 
determined in the wage-relation, but have included a complex 
of dependency relationships and 'extra-economic' forms of 
social control that have been subject to direct determination 
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by the employer in respect of his workei4. Failure to 
grasp fully these essential elements in the social relations 
of plantation and domestic household production has led to 
an illegitimate aggregation of these strata into various 
aggregate groupings by both Sutcliffe and Arrighi. As a 
result theoretical and empirical distortions have : emerged 
in their analyses. 
Data on the wages of domestic and farm workers for the 
1946-70 period are found in Table 3. The specific conditions 
of production and stratifications within these strata are 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively. Here the 
primary purpose Is to note the distinctive patterns that wage 
trends for these strata have taken vis-a-vis the Industrial 
proletariat in postwar Rhodesia (see cols. 23 to 30)* 
While the 'sub-proletariat' has constituted more than 50 
percent of wage-employed Africans In Rhodesia throughout the 
periodp their wages have not grown as rapidly as those of 
the Industrial proletariat. Indeedl their wages have lagged 
further and further behindg especially since 1934, the first 
date of Institutionalized de facto separation of the wage 
determination machinery setting up minimum wage Policies for 
some of the Industrial proletariatq but wholly excluding 
a 1 
a 
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plantation and domestic workers* Thus while In 1946-47 
the share of the African wage bill accruing to the Isub- 
proletariat' was more than 50 percentp this share has fallen 
steadily In the postwar period to 28*5 percent In 1970 (see 
col, 30), Even so, because of expansion in the volume of 
employment# the wage bill itself has ris6n more than six-fold 
In current prices (col, 25). The rise In real average 
earnings for these two strata taken together has been 
marginalo 
The number of farm workers has more than doubled from 
1429000 to 2909000 from 1946-70 (see col. 17). The current 
and constant price trends In farm workerse earnings Indicate 
that In all likelihood real earnings were no better In 1970 
than In 1948 (see oolso 26 and 28), Although the pre- 
and Post1954 data are hot directly comparable$ It is clear 
that farm workers' earnings dropped from 1948 to 1953, fell 
also from 1954 to 19629'rose sharply In 1962-63 (because 
of supply shortages)q and have fallen steadily from 1963 to 
1970 *55 
This distributional shift against a major portion of 
the black working-class is obscured In both Suteliffes and 
Arrighils qxalyses, The shift In Income distribution against 
farm labour Is highlighted by the fact that In 1948 some 
i0l, ' ' 
35 percent of the African wage bill accrued to farm workersq 
'I '' 
I then 38 percent of all African workers. In 1970 these two 
proportions were 16 percent and 39 percent respectively, In 
the light of this trends as well as the different legislative 
and Institutional pressures functioning on agricultural 
%r 
labourg there can be no legitimacy In simply aggregating 
this group with the Industrial proletariat, A specific 
analycls# grounded In the Particular socio-economic 
characteristics of the mode of production relevant to 
plantation employmentp is required. The specific 
articulation found between the plantation production structure 
and the peasant mode(s) of production also needs to be 
noted# especially since It has been In this Interaction that 
the various forms of labour-power have been conditioned and 
stratification within the rural proletariat has been rooted, 
In the plantation economy Various forms of wage labour 
have been found: permanent farm laboureral seasonal workers; 
a smaller number of employees In agricultural services; 
casual workers; locally contracted labourerB and contractees 
who have come under conditions stipulated in their contracts 
with the Rhodesian African Labour Supply Commission, 
Permanent labourers were rewarded with annual payment In 
cash and kind valued at 0124 In 19711 
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workers In 
agricultural services received an average of $1729 and 
locally contracted workers $96. Foreign contract labour at 
this time obtained a monthly cash wage of approximately 
05,20, though this rate went up to 06*50 In 1972,57 This 
latter group must be regarded as one of the most deprived 
elements of the rural proletariat because: (a) of the very 
low wage receivedt and (b) the fact that under labour 
contracts 26 percent of the 07-50 ticket rate has been taken 
off the worker's cash wage and remitted to the workerts 
country of origin under Inter-governmental deferred pay 
X02 
agreementq thereby leaving a very small sum available for 
the worker's consumption needs. Amongst casual labourers - 
for exampleg cotton pickers - differentials In wages have 
also been foundq justified by employers on various grounds 
(age, sex or degree of permanence In employment). Juveniles 
have obtained lesser amounts than adultag and females less 
than malesq while casual or seasonal cotton pickers have 
traditionally been put on wage rates that have been lower 
than for permanently employed laboure This pattern of 
stratification therefore has been closely connected to the 
nature of relations to production and farm-specific 
employment policies as well as the character of domination 
by capital. 
The constancy of conditions of farm labourersq In a 
period In which wage structures have changed markedly In all 
other sectorsq has been one of the most prominent features 
of the settler colonial social formation In postwar Rhodesia. 
Evidence of this 'structural stagnation' for 1961-71 Is 
provided In Table 10 of Appendix A where It Is shown that 
the proportion of permanent farm workers who received a 
cash wage below $12,26 (1971 prices) In 1961 and 1971 was 
89.4 percent and 84.6 percent respectivelyg while the 
proportion so remunerated below $24-54 was 98.4 percent 
and 97.1 percent respectively. 
Domestic workers have fared a little better than the 
rural Bub-proletariats though in long term historical 
perspective their gains have been relatively small. 
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Nonethelessq domestic worker wages have risen in real terms 
/6)3 
since 1954 (see col. 29)o From 1948-53 real earnings rose 
in excess of 4 percent per annumq from 1954-57 In excess of 
5 percent per annums while In the period of reduced white 
Immigration - one of the principal determinants of the 
level of employer demand for domestic labour (as in the 
1957-67 era) - the rate of earnings growth was under 3 
percent annually. Whilst domestic workers earned 
approximately 10.6 percent core than farm workers In 19489 
by 1970 this differential had widened to 140 percent (as 
measured In constant 1964 prices). Hence within the Isub- 
proletariat' class of workers still falling under the 
Masters and Servants Act In 19709 farm workers have been the 
most significantly depressed groups Amongst domestic 
workers too stratification has been noticeableg occupational 
wage differentials being a pri. me determinant of socio- 
economic cleavageo Cooks have generally earned significantly 
more than gardenersq for example. The Institutional 
structure within this labour market and the experience and 
$extra-wage' operations of the master-servant relationship, 
together with the mode of production In domestic householdss 
has had a marked bearing on wage policy. There is also 
evidence (Appendix A. Table 9) that structural Inequalities 
within the domestic worker stratum of the African working- 
class have increased between 1961 and 1971. This process 
of stratification and the general structural discontinuity 
in the Income distribution system between domestic workers 
and other strata of the African working-class need to be 
both Identified and analysed. Againg previous analyses 
by Barberg Arrighig Sutcliffe and Faber have hardly noted 
let alone attempted this task, 
goy 
PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCERS AND STRATA OF THE LUMPEN-PROLETARIAT 
Not all groups of Africans directly involved in the 
production of commodities are constituted In the working- 
class# the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie and 
capitalist classes, The complex articulation of modes of 
production found In Rhodeslas the uneven dissolution of the 
pre-capitalist social formationg the generalization of 
commodity production and exchangel the limitations on formal 
employment and the policies of the State have all been 
factors that have led to the formation of a class of petty 
commodity producers and various strata comprising a 
lumDen-Proletarint, This class has grown In size in the 
post-war period as petty commodity production has become an 
important source of income for many black households. 
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Unfortunatelyq no macro-economie distribution data are 
available on the Income structure of these households and 
thus qualitative analyses of their importance must be 
based on micro studies of Individual producers, small townsg 
samples of limited areas and Investigation of a small range 
of occupational categories found In this production system* 
These studies have been partial but have nonetheless 
captured valuable perspectives not provided in previous 
studies. 
6o 
Incomes of petty commodity producers have been 
shown to vary from extremely low levels of $7-8 monthly to 
Incomes in excess of $200 monthly. The stratification found 
within this class is thus highly important. So tools the 
relationship of the various strata to the dominant capitalist 
0 
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mode of production as a low cost Rabour-force-in-waiting' and 
as a form of small-scale petty capital accumulation within 
African society. 
The structures, institutions and policies that have 
affected petty commodity producers have differed from the 
specific pressures that have shaped the working-class even 
though both have been constituted as part of the underclass 
of settler colonialism. (This is not to Ignore the existence 
of wage-labourers who are to be found within enterprises that 
are constituted as petty commodity production structures, 
The essence of these workers' relationship to production 
has been 'as an 'extra-cheap' labouring class of Irightless' 
and wholly unorganized workers*) In terms of socio-economic 
origins and relations to produetiong there has existed a 
complex of strata making up this component of the social 
formation - e, g, squattersq traderslillegall and *Megitimate$ 
producers of commodities and services, the landless# the 
unemployedg and skilled craftsmen and unskilled manual 
workers in both urban and rural areas, Previous analyses 
have not sought to ppecifically Identify these gradationss 
nor to infer even that their existence has been of any 
socio-economic or structural Importance. Insteadq the 
various strata have been 'lumped' together as a residual, 
category with all other African workers or else (more often) 
simply forgotten because they did not #fit# the datas the 
quantitative bias of the analysis. or the official categories 
of Census' enumeration. 
0 
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THE AFRICAN PEASANTRY 
Attempts to Identify the Income ofq and the Income 
distribution within$ the peasantrY9 an Important social and 
producer classq have been problematic* While exercising care 
In this Interpretationg an approximation of the position 
can be obtained by an assessment of the Income trends of the 
Rural Household Sector In Table 5, 
Incomes from production have been of two principal 
types: production for own consumption, an estimate based 
on Imputed valuations by the Central Statistical Officeg 
and income from marketed sales (see Sources and Notes to the 
Tables)* In current prices# Rural Household Sector incomes 
are recorded as having risen 178 percent between 1948 and 1970. 
Howevert the rural population has grown 186 percent In the 
same period (see col. 15) and# after allowing for price 
inoreasesg the real Incomes of the rural population are 
shown as having fallen by approximately 41 percent over the 
22 year period (see col. 40), Whilst these calculations 
are subject to statistical and conceptual shortoomingst there 
nonetheless exists strongly suggestive evidence that a 
process of absolute and relative underdevelopments or long- 
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run rural Impoverishmentg has taken place. To a large 
extentl the underdevelopment In the peasant economy has been 
related to the inability of rural households to market and 
thereby 'realize* a surplus (see col. 42). Thus In 1948 and 
1954 the proportion of rural household Incomes coming from 
sales - v1z*q the cash surplus in the rural sector derived 
/o7 
from production - was 15-3 percent and 21.6 percent 
respectivelyl while In 1970 the proportion was only 10,9 
percent and had on occasions fallen to 8.0 percent (1968). 
This structural weakness in the peasant economy, is further 
highlighted by the extent to which cash surpluses per head 
have remained at so low a levelq have fluctuated 
significantly and have generally tended to fall in real value 
terms (col. 41). Furthermoreq it is also worth recording 
that the process of peasant underdevelopment has been 
particularly advanced In the post-1956 period. Peasant 
marginality and structural dependency on Incomes earned 
outside peasant production can thus be said to have much 
Increased in the 1957-70 - era. 
In historical terms peasant underdevelopment has been 
tied to and has become more conditioned by working-class 
poverty* But at the same time peasant production structures 
have served a fundamentally significant role In providing 
social security for the unemployedg the agedq the sick and 
those who have not been able to obtain the means of 
subsistence from employment earnings# especially females 
and children of wage-labourers who have been forced to 
4, 
maintain a rural dependency in order to ensure the sustained 
reproduction of their labour, , As a result of 
this structural 
relationshipq Barber's statementg that 'indigenous agriculture' 
has supplied only a fraction of the food requirements of 
Africans employed for wagesq wholly misdireets analysis 
away from the substantial contribution made by 'peasant' 
/6i 
production to the reproduction of labour-power for capitalist 
producers - and not only in terms of food production for 62 
direct consumption by workers' dependents. 
The data in Table 5 do not strictly relate to actual 
rural household Income levels because they do not account for 
the full ranse of rural household Income receipts - par- 
ticularly remittances In cash and kind from household 
dependents who have become partly or wholly proletarianized, 
This difficulty cannot be resolved effectively by juggling 
the Income and population data around. 
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Care must thus be 
exercised In Interpreting the 'differentials' between rural 
household Incomes and 'others* as reflented by the results 
derived from the crude models that might be forced on the 
analysis by the limitations of the statistics* The effect 
of a whole host of peasant household relationships with 
wage-labourers and working-class household relationships 
with peasant production makes simplistic comparisons 
redundant* Peasant stratification and class structure 
have been essentially complex* Equally so, Important 
divisions within peasant society need to be explicity 
recognizedl especially since the unevenness of capitalist 
penetration and development In Rhodesia has produced a , wide 
range of variations and relationships of rural social 
strata to an assortment of modes of productiono 
A two-way flow of remittances In cash and kind can be 
Identified between (urban and rural) workers and dependents 
located In the peasant or 'reserve' economy* Essentially 
these remittances have been transfers within the same r 
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households. The dominant relationship expressed in these 
'transactions' In the political economy has been the 
specific extent and nature of household- dependency upon 
wage-labour for-subsistence. Unfortunatelyq howeverg 
available data on these transfers are extremely limited. 
The nature of remittances can be identified howevero 
Typically, 'single' migrant workers, or even heads of 
households who have only infrequently returned to the domestic 
, ýý 
household in the rural areas# send cash 'back home'. 
Remittances have also taken the form of food parcelst 
ciothinst other consumer goods and even capital Investments 
in fertilizer# ploughsl and other agricultural Inputs 
required In the rural economy., In additiong the value of 
wage-free labour Inputs from the non-; rural side of the 
household In peak seasonal periods has been a valuable and 
essential component of the labour power used in the peasant 
production system* 
Weinrich, for instance, has argued (on the basis of 
a study of a small Rhodesian town in the 1960's: Ft. Victoria) 
that Africans have remitted a high prpportion (over 10 
percent) of their incomes to the rural economy for a variety 
64 
of reasons. In a study on the rural (recipient) end of 
, the transfer, Hughes has shown that in Gutu Tribal Trust 
Land, an area from which there was a relatively high 
proportion of adult males absent (20 percent), homesteads 
obtained 56 percent of their total cash incomes In 1965 from 
migrant labour. 
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This does not Imply that all these funds 
were remitted to the rural sector, however, because the 
//o 
Hughes study included the total earnings of absentee workers 
within the homestead's income. No data were available on 
the actunl remittances* A difficulty here Is the problem 
of measurements finding out the full range of transfers that 
have taken place# since remittances have typically been made 
In cash and In kinds or even by means of paying off the 
debts of rural relatives or meeting part of the costs of 
66 
their childrens' education. 
More recent studies of the income and expenditure, as 
well as the socio-economic rural-urban links of hostel 
dwellers in Salisbury in 1973 have shown that rural dependence 
amongst lower paid workers remains very high, 
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Moller's 
sample of the 249000 single and married workers 
in hostel 
accommodation was both randomly selected and sufficiently 
large to provide good results on this point. About 9 percent 
of these workers were under 20 years of age and less than 
one fifth were over 40 years of ageg the average age being 
29 years* only 8.4 percent were non-Rhodesians and two- 
thirds of these foreigners came from Malawi. Over '90 percent 
r7-7 
were first-generation urban and most were employed in 
unskilled jobs in the 'industrial complex'. Only 2 percent 
earned more than 054 monthly and the mean income was %32 
monthly. Over 55 percent were married men with dependents. 
Only 2 percent of these persons had more than one wife. The 
mean number of children for married Persons was 3 with some 
workersq however# having as many as 9, Significantly, only 
a few children were resident in the town Itself 9 although 
the, mean urban experience of all workers was 9*2 years. 
On average these Individuals had obtained their first jobs 
in town 8.4 years previously. On losing employment (the 
N 
average number of jobs held was 2-3) 20 percent did not 
return to their 'homes' and 40 percent returned only on one 
occasion; the rest returned slightly more often. 
Remittances formed a substitute for social links that were 
necessartly severed by the requirements Of employment. 
Over 87 percent of the hostel-dwellers sent funds back to 
dependents In the rural areas. The modal frequency of 
remittances was once monthly. Of the groups actually 
remitting funds In casht 70 percent did so monthly or more 
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often. The mean value of each remittance was calculated 
at $9.6. , The 
Implication here was that one quarter of the 
average wage was remitted* 
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This was a level similar to 
that found In respect of Korekore migrants employed In 
70 
low-wage urban labour markets. It Is likely that# with 
the stagnation and low level of output typical of peasant 
productinn In 1973t these remittances formed an Important 
source of Income for the acquisition of means of subsistence 
for the workers' dependents. Nlonethelessg the peasant 
economy has had to bear the burden of meeting the balance 
between workers' remittances from wages and the costs of 
subsistence of dependents of the African working-class who 
have been required to reside In these areas as a result of' 
low-wage policies and other social controls on the pace and 
71 
pattern of African urbanization. 
The stratification existent in peasant society has in 
part been directly attributable to the unevenness of the 
If? 
wage structure In the dominant capitalist mode of production 
as well as the distorting effects of settler colonial rural 
72 
development policies. These forces have been Imposed upon 
Inequalities that have arisen from other sources related to 
the stratification found In non-capitalist mode(s) of 
production. 
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The result has been the development of a 
complex class structure within peasant society itself. 
Income Inequality In the rural economy has tended to Increase 
in postwar Rhodesia where the marginalization of various 
strata of peasantry has come about. The number of 
'squatters' has Inereasedg the number of landless people has 
growng forms of Individual land ownership have been 
introducedg government credit and rural extension policies 
have differentiated between classes of producerl 'traditional' 
elite groups have obtained greater legal powers and control 
over land allocationg and market and wage-relations have 
Increasingly penetrated the peasant economy. 
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ConsequentlY9 
the data on aggregate Income distribution trends must be 
related to a specific analysis of rural socio-economic 
changes of the above sort and should not be regarded as a 
full and final verdict on the 'event' of peasant under- 
development since the 19404sq as Sutcliffe has tended to do 
in his abstracted and quantitative Interpretation of the 
Income structure of rural African society. 
THE AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE 
The other major class found within African society is 
comprised of various strata of the African bourgeoisie. 
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Here too the Income distribution data Is Imperfect* In 
Table 6 data on African Incomes from unincorporated enter- 
prises are found (see cols. 439 44 and 48). 
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These data 
provide only an approximate measure of the Incomes accruing 
?6 
to this element of the African bourgeoisie Despite data 
shortcomingsq there are Indications that the Importance of 
the African capitalist class Is growing. Incomes accruing 
to African capitalists (as measured by col. 44) have grown 
360 percent In real terms from 1948-70. Taking the 
1954-? 0 periodg the growth rate has been in the vicinity of 
410 percent (as measured In constant 1964 prices). 
Unfortunatelyq there are no long term trends on the size of 
the population dependent on this capitalist 'fraction'. In 
1969, howeverg the Census recorded 18,920 Africans as being 
$self emr3oyed persons excluding farmers'. 
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If this number 
of persons could be attached to the receipts shown as ', 
African capitalist Incomes under col. 43 then the average 
Income received would have been $512 per annum, in 1969 
(current prices). This latter estimate must be regarded as 
highly tentative and likely to conceal a wide range Of 
Internal variation, 
/The growing significance of African 
capitalism may nonetheless be highlighted by the moderate 
but'steady Increase In the proportion of total African 
Incomes earned by capitalist producers (col. 48). / Since 
1962 more than 3 percent of all Incomes derived by Africans 
have accrued to this embryonic, capitalist class* This 
measure Is almost certainly too lowq especially since any 
assessment of African capitalism ought also to Include at 
lIH 
least the Incomes of African agrarian capitalist producers 
In the Purchase Areas (9fOOO In total) - many of whom have 
been In receipt of relatively high Incomes especially if 
comparison Is made with the African working-class* 
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Indeed# many of the successful African businessmen In 
Rhodesia have maintained both rural and urban 1nvestmentsq 
especially In land and fixed property. 
/Furthermoreq 
Africans have exerted a noticeable effect as an. employer 
class and In 1969 the number of hired workers employed by 
African farmers was recorded as 15,120 and for African 
businessmen 159180- 
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The small number of affluent 
African capitalists Is indicated by the fact that only 136 
Africans were Income tax payers in 1967- At this time 
they were recorded as having earned a total taxable Income 
from sources other than employment of $70,470, or $6,179 
1 80 each* It thus, appears that there Is a wide range of 
Income variation within this capitalist groupq a fact of 
81 
stratification that ought not to be underemphasized. 
Recognition that the rural African capitalist class - 
African 'master farmersIq Purchase Area farmers and successful 
'tribal' cultivators - have been differentiated from the 
peasantry properg and th at they have received Incomes 
substantially in excess of the average accruing to peasants, 
Implies that care must be taken in using data on Rural 
Household Sector Incomest especially income from sales of 
marketed surpluses. Throughout the postwar period there 
has been a relatively marked degree of concentration in the 
production and sale of marketed surpluses6 
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The effect 
113 
that this inequality within the Rural Household Sector has 
had on the conclusions about stratification thus far drawn 
cannot be easily measured. But the qualitative implications 
would be: firstlyg that peasant surpluses and actual peasant 
Incomes have been lower than recorded; secondlY9 that 
peasant marginality and the Increase In peasant dependence 
on labour markets has grown more than has been Indicated at 
first sight by Table 5; and thirdlyg that the inequalities 
between peasants and others have been greater than measured* 
There are other Important strata of the African 
bourgeoisie, one group with significant social Importance 
(which can be termed an- 'auxiliary' bourgeoisie) has really 
been In the nature of a dependent politteRl groupj or an 
oligarchical administrative/bureauoratic establishment of 
politiclanss Senatorsq Chiefs$ Headmens sub-ChIefsq Council 
secretaries and executives and other petty dignitaries who 
have performed a critioal roleAn the lower echelons of the 
settler-colonial administrative and political structures 
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As an appendage to the dominant power structure, this group 
has had a dependency relationship not only for Its position, 
but for wagesq and other financial privilegess that has 
rested almost exclusively on the policy of the settler- 
colonial States The size of this group has been 
substantially increased In the 1970's by the expansion of 
African Councils in 'African Areas' and the 'Provineializa- 
tion' programme of the Rhodesian Front party, As the 
effective African control of local government agencies has 
Increaseds the visibility of this elite has become more 
llb 
pronouncedg especially since It has Itself been In a strong 
position to gain greater control over its own economic 
welfare through direct involvement In the decision-making 
process that has effectively determined rewardsp privileges 
and conditions of employment. 
Finally* there has existed a stratum of the African 
bourgeoisie which has had strong alliances with and 
dependence upon International capital and larger resident 
capitalist enterprises, Many of the persons In this 
stratum have been formally employedg but In socio-economic 
terms have constituted an embourgeolsed stratum and not 
simply a Ilabour aristocracy$ of upgraded or skilled 
production workers. However this stratum has been small 
In numerical terms. Nonetheless their importance In terms 
of social and political significance has growng partly In 
anticipation of the future when foreign firmsj under a 
71mbRbEPan oovernmentg will Inevitably be required to 
*Africanizet their managerial establishment, 
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This 
element of the African bourgeoisie possesses a substantial 
latent comnrador status therefore In 'Its relations to the 
changing production and social system. 
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Data on this 
group are difficult to obtaing although Its small size 
could be Indicated by the number of blacks who received cash 
wages over $250 and $300 monthly, 
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In 1973 the number of 
Africans who received between $250 and $300 In cash wages 
monthly was 880 and those who received more than this 
numbered only 550* Of these totalsq howevert 370 and 
280 respectively were accounted for by the Educational and 
117 
Public Administration sectors, a factor which further 
suggests that an important bureaucratic/eduoational stratum 
of the African bourge o1sle can also be clearly Identifiede 
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND STRUCTURAL COMPARISONS 
In the light of substantial income inequalities within 
African and European societyg a comparison of black-white 
Incomes Is not a very meaningful exercise, Even so, It may 
be useful from the point of view of providing quantitative 
evidence on the simple racial dbmension of Inequality and 
class differences In Rhodesia. 
Firstly, consider African personal incomes per head in 
constant 1964 prices compared with the equivalent 
European measure (see col. 47), The data show that from 
1946-70 African personal incomes per head rose from $36,1 to 
$56.0# an Increase of 55*5 percent in real terms in the 24- 
year period. This Income Increase Is distorted by the non- 
comparability of data between the pre- and post-1954 Income 
series* Allowing for this however, It can still be 
concluded that African personal Incomes rose In real Per 
aal terms over the period. It is also worth recording 
the low rate of growth - more typloallyg stagnation - which 
was relevant for the 1956-68 period. The ratio Of 
European to African personal Incomes per head however can 
only be properly recorded for two periods - 1946-51 and 
1965-70, Data for the later period are more reliable and 
comprehensive and Indicate that the European/African per 
anpita Income differential In 1965 was 29: 1, In 1970 this 
Itg 
differential was still In the 29: 1 range (Col- 50), More 
significantl as an Indicator of structural Inequalitiess is 
the ratio between European and Rural Household Sector average 
Dpr calotta incomes. Here In the 1965-70 period the ratio 
was In the 72: 1 range (Col- 51)- There is also evidence# 
though It in incomplete (given In col. 51)9to show that 
Inequalities between these top and bottom tiers of the 
income distribution structure have widened from 40sl In the 
late 1940's to over 70: 1 In the late 19609s. Ands although 
obvious, this widening of the relative Income gap has also 
been accompanied by substantial widening In the absolute 
Income gap. Development amongst the upper income classes 
can thus be said to have been associated with relative and 
absolute underdevelopment amongst the lower income classes. 
In 1948 the Rural Household Sector populationg estimated 
at 47 percent of the total Rhodesian population (black and 
white)s received approximately 27 percent of total personal 
Incomes. In 1970 the Rural Household Sector was estimated 
at 60 percent of the Rhodesian population and received- 
approximately 11 percent of total personal Incomes* By 
contrast the European population comprised 4.4 percent of the 
total population In 1948 and received 64 percent of total 
personal Incomes. In 1970 the European share of population 
was still less than 5 percent and Its share of personal 
Incomes was 67 percent. The process of growth has thus 
concentrated Incomes and has not worked to distribute 
Incomes to the periphery of the social formation, Indeedq 
In striking fashiong the opposite has occurredg and 
IIl 
Inequality In distribution# particularly against the 
peasantry and farm workersq has increased considerably, 
This conclusion Is reinforced by a consideration of the 
relationships between the latter classes and the upper 
88 
strata of the dominant classes. 
PROFITS, WAGES AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
No account of stratification and class formation in 
the Rhodesian cocial formation would be complete without a 
recognition of the high profit levels that have accrued to 
capital under the settler-colonial regime of peripheral 
capitalism. The data on profits are not as comprehensive 
In the pre-1954*period as after Itj and the 19$4-64 data 
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are not as complete as for 1965-72. Nor are the data for 
these three periods directly comparable. This makes It 
Impossible to obtain a trend of gross operating profits 
of enterprises In Rhodesia from 1946-72* For this reasong 
attention Is directed at the more reliable and comprehensive 
data for 1965-72* 
Gross operating profits for 1965-72 (excluding the 
African Rural Household Sector) rose from $336.1 million to 
$639-3 million while Gross Domestic Product (at factor cost) 
rose from 0696 million to $1,272 million ('all In current 
prices). 
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Thus not only have profit levels been high 
(over 50 percent of GDP In 1972) but the profit share of 
gross Income has risen over the period* By contrast African 
wageo have only risen from $163.5 million in 1965 to 
IZo 
9286.1 million In 19729 thereby growing more slowly than 
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profits and falling as a share of gross operating profits* 
European wages rose from $231.4 million to 0408-5 million 
In the same period# at a higher rate than African wages 
but slower than gross profitse Total wages thus rose from 
$395.0 million to 0694.6 million; again this was at a 
slower rate than profits, The *profitable$ macro-economic 
situation reflects the dominance of capital In the political 
economy as well as the high degree of social control over 
African labour's demands for higher wages. Of great 
Importance for the structural transformation of the 
system since 1940 however has been the rise of a dominant 
industrial capitalist mode of production* 
In 1965 manufacturing profits were 062.5 million or 
18#5 percent of total gro-ss operating profits* By 1972 
manufacturing G, O. P. had risen to 0150.6 million or 23*5 
percent of total G, O, P, Meanwhile African wages In the 
manufacturing sector only rose from $28*8 million to 
$59*3 million between 1965 and 1972. Thus while 
manufacturing G. O. P, were 217 percent greater than African 
wages in 19659 they were 254 percent larger in 1972o 
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Thic rising share of profits has reflected a long term 
trend since manufacturing G. O. P, have risen as a share of 
output since 1955 when It was only 41,4 percent* BY 1972 
this fraction had reached 50.4 percent of total output. 
And as Ramsay has notedt 'It may be argued that profits 
need to be high If capital Ic to be replaced and new capital 
goods made available but the evidence Is that gross capital 
formation as a percentage of net output has declined from 
I' 
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32.7 in 1958 to 13.8 in 1972. '93 Even so, since 1965 gross 
fixed capital formation In manufacturing has risen 
substantially by comparison with other sectors, In that 
year gross fixed capital formation In marufacturing amounted 
(in 1965 constant prices) to $13-8 million and 13*8 percent 
of the total* By 1972 It amounted to $30.7 million and 
15,9 percent of the total# which was the most significant 
level of fixed Investment In any sector* 
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The high level of profits received by capitalist 
enterprises In Rhodesia have not been accidental or 
fortuitous, They have resulted from the successful 
pursuit of objectives by the State and employers to 
minimize and control African labour costsq to shift a large 
measure of the burden of labour's costs of reproduction 
onto the peasant economyq to provide the social and economic 
conditions necessary for rapid Industrialization on the basis 
Of cheap labour suppliesq while at the same time ensuring 
the $stability' of the political economy of settler- 
colonialir, mg a stability challenged by working-class action 
against the system of low wages* These policies have 
brought a heightening of contradictions howeverg most 
noticeable in the mobilization of the 'Mrican working-class 
through union formation and nationalist political 
organizationsp the breakdown of the reproductive forces and 
self-autonomous subsistence capacities of peasant 
communitiesp growing Inequalities In the Income and wage 
structure leading to a heightening of class conflicts$ and 
most significantly the widening of a radical guerrilla 
/Z2 
struggle against the Political control ? -f the settler- 
colonial State and the socio-economic interests It has 
represented* 
STATE INCOME DISTRIBUTION POLICIES 
Throughout the period under review the policy of the 
State on Income distribution has been consistently directed 
towards systemic reproduction on the basis of primitive 
accumulation and reliance on a private property economy where 
a mixture of (steadily Increasing) State control has been 
combined with 'market forces' to favour profit recipients 
and the dominant classes against wage recipients and the 
underclaseens 'Economic growth' has been sought but no 
serious attempt has been made to eradicate or seriously 
reform the structures of underdevelopment that have 'looked' 
the)POlitical economy Into a situation of peripheral 
capitalist underdevelopment. 
The two 4-year capital Investment plans of the public 
sector prior to the Federal era (the 1948-53 and 1951-55 
plans) were in no way Seared to correct the malformations 
In the production system or the income distribution structure* 
Inequalities were accentuated by State policies In the 
fields of taxationg wageog rural developmentg educationg 
social welfare$ and general economic policyg especially in 
the-Federal period when the #non-raciall policies of 
liberal capitalism served as the means whereby class divisions 
within African society were accentuated and select groups 
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of blaelz were co-opted Into the dominant classes. The 
Southern Rhodesian National Development Plan of 1965 again 
confirmed the lack of priority that distributional 
Inequalities would receive. 
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Subsequent Public Sector 
Investment Programmes since 1966 have reiterated this 
consistent element of State policy. The Sadie Report of 
1967 - accepted In many respects by the architects of State 
economic Policy - suggested that a more equal distribution 
of Income should 'be Ignored (as) ... likely to be at variance 
with and impose harmful restraint on (optimum economic 
development)f, 
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The Minister of Finance's response to 
the income distribution issues given in the parliamentary 
debate on the Sadie Report In 1968, was equally explicit 
and noted the following: IThe nim of stimulating economic 
growth for the greatest common benefit could possibly be 
Interpreted as an advance towards an egalitarian societyg 
and I should perhaps make It clear that an artificLal 
redistribution of Income is not one of the government's 
obJectives, It may well be that there Is too large a gap 
between average incomes for Europeans and Africans# There 
Is a whole complex of reasons accounting for this position 
which it Is unnecessary for me to dwell on here# It would 
be desirable to narrow the gap for social and economic 
reasons, but this should be done through the process of 
economic growth rather than through an artificial 
redistribution of incomeaq which would drive away the 
enterprise and expertise on which growth depends. ' 
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By 
1975 this was still the essence of distribution policy. 
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CO? VLUDI! G PERSPECTIVES 
State income distribution policies have not been 
anything other than reflections of the underlying 
requirements of the production and class structures to 
which they have been related* The analysis of Income 
distribution patterns should therefore be Integrated with 
a comprehension of the structural changes In both modes 
of production and the political economy, This Is a task 
that did not occupy Sutcliffe# Barberg Loney or Arrighl 
98 
In their analyses of Rhodesian economic development* 
State economic Dolicles have also been of great significance 
In establishing the conditions for capitalist development in 
a settler-colonial political economy, These too must be 
Integrated into an analysis of the concrete forms that the 
development of peripheral capitalism has taken In postwar 
Rhodesia. The following historieo-specific analysis of 
the Political economy of labour attempts to undertake the 
task of examining these concrete forms of production and 
distributiong relating them to patterns of discrimination 
and underdevelopment# and giving special attention to the 
'primary dynamic" In postwar development In Rhodesia - the 
expansion and acceleration of a dependent capitalist 
industrialization process In a peripheral area of the world 
economic system under condttions of settler-oolonialisme 
/ 
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CHAPTER 3 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF 
CHEAP LABOUR 
Thelprimary dynamic' In post-1940 Rhodesian development 
has been accelerated domestic industrialization. The 
process has brought about major changes in structures of 
production and In conditions necessary for the reproduction 
of labour. This Chapter attempts to Identify the 
significance of these transformations for African work ers 
under the political economy of settler colonialism. 
THE TRANSITION TO A DOMINANT INDUSTRIAL CAPITALIST 140DE 
OF PRODUCTION 
The Southern Rhodesian economy of the 1920's and early 
1930's was founded upon four 
_primary 
branches of production: 
extractive mining for exportj plantation agriculture for 
the domestic market and for export; ancillary and Infra- 
struetkural services and domestic trade; and peasant 
1 
production. It was a production structure of the 
'classic peripheral' type. Its specificity arose from , 
the dominance of entrenched settler-colonial Interests In 
agriculture and the labour market. The capacity of local 
Industry was limited and most manufactured commodities were 
Imported, The industrial mode of production was also 
dependent on and constrained by the limitations of the 
dompstic market and an Inability to compete on International 
marketsl particularly against South African Industry. 
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In 1926, for Instanceq only 14 percent of the 'gainfully 
occupied' white Population which numbered 16,510 (29418 
females) were employed In 'industries' (broadly defined) 02 
Many of these workers Performed service tabks ancillary 
to export production - such as those In railway employment. 
White workers and unions controlled the skilled and semi- 
skilled industrial labour markets and under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (1934) had obtained Inter alia: 
Institutionalized protection against black competition; 
legally recognized unions; a functioning collective 
bargaining apparatus; minimum wage legislation; and some 
control over the wage and occupational advance of black 
3 
workers* At this stage the State's direct involvement 
In Industry, was marginal. Most State resources were still 
directed towards metropolitan Import requirements and 
support for plantation producers. International capital 
was at this stage of Imperial dominance neither Involved 
nor Interested In substantial or 'independent' 
Industrialization of this part of the Southern African 
periphery. 
Important politico-economic changes occurred In this 
4 
period# as Murray has reported. Manufacturers demanded 
State protection, Industrialists separated themselves from 
anti-industry merchant capital Interests and their lobbying 
Institutions in order to press their own demands. After 
the 19 300s depression manufacturers formed themselves Into 
a separate chamber of Industry and sought alignments with' 
plantation producers who favoured the domestic processing 
X27 
of farm output. They were joined by representatives of 
the (white) Labour Partyq a strong opposition group In 
settler politics. This coalition formed a powerful 
internal pressure for domestic Industrialization. 
By 1938 the Industrial production structure was not 
unimpressive In size and scope. 
5 
It Included the processing 
of rural produce for consumptiong chemicals and fertIlIzersq 
clothing and textilesq metal manufacturing, furniture 
making and the production of building materials. A, total 
of 149794 workers were employed In productiong 129318 
of whom were Zricans. The Industrial wage bill totalled 
near1r, Ll million. Of this amount only Z211,648 went to 
African workers. By contrastq Building and Construction 
and Public Utility Services (including Government 
departments and Railways) - the other major 'industries' 
of the Colony - employed double this number of persons for 
a wage bill of Z1*5 million. 
The Second World War had a major Impact on the Rhodesian 
6 
manufacturing Industryo In 1940 the State established 
an Industrial Development Advisory Committee. Merchant 
capital Interestsp now out off from Import sourcesq aligned 
themselves with Industrialists In lobbying for State 
protection and sponsorship of domestic Industry. The 
Salisbury and Bulawayo Chambers of Industries united as one 
body, Pressures for domestic industrialization Increased. 
The State eventually acted In 19429 taking over three basic 
industries on a 'public ownership' basis. Subsidies were 
also providedg prices and supplies regulatedq and direction 
I ZR 
given to local Industrial polIcyq particularly by the 
establishment of the Industrial Development Commission In 
1944 which was set up to promote and assist Private 
industry. By the end of the Warg international capital 
was flowing into Southern Rhodesian Industry and the prospect 
of a Central African Federation boosted the status of 
Southern Rhodesia as a 'peripheral Industrial center'. The 
'flight' of British capital from South Africa In 1948 and 
Immediately afterwards -a reaction to. an III-conceived 
threat of 'nationalization' and Instability following the 
coming to power of the Afrikaaner Nationalist government - 
reinforced Internal pressures for Industrialization. 
Industrialization had proceeded rapidly during, the War. 
The numbers employed In 'Factory and Workshop Industries' 
rose by 70 percent from 1938-44 whilst the numbers employed 
In *Other Industries' (Building and Contracting and-Public 
7 
Utility Services) actually fell by 15 percent. The wage 
bill for *Factory and Workshop Industries* rose by 75 percent 
and for 'Other Industries' by only 22 percent* Although 
the number of Industrial establishments only rose from 
294 to 330 In this periodo the value of gross output more 
than doubled to LIM million, Net output rose by 280 
percent and *net output per L100 of wages' Increased from 
L216 to L284. ý 
These changes Implied a decisive-shift In the overall 
scale and emphasis on Industrial'produetion, State 
assistance to industry Increased throughout the War, After 
1945 industrialists put renewed pressures on the Southern 
I29 
Rhodesian Government to move towards Federation. Numerous 
links were set up between State agencies and private 
Industrialists to rapidly expand Industrial production,, 
The Huggins government of the late 1940's sought both to 
amalgamftte the Rhodeslas and to ensure that Southern Rhodesia 
would be the industrial focus of the new Federal State while 
remaining the 'peripheral Industrial center' possessing some 
8 
measure of autonomy-from traditional South African dominance* 
The proposals for Federation were nothing new in Rhodesian 
hIstoryq and when the settler-colonial State was finally 
attracted to Federation In the early 1950's It was as a 
$second best' alternative to 'Amalgamation*. Federalization, 
howeverg was a matter of International deoisiong heavily 
dependent on British sanotiong and not simply a $domestic' 
Issue between settlers and Africans. Indeed# Federation 
came about without meaningful African participation In the 
negotiating, prooess and with African political organizations 
9 
and trade unions in ppen opposition to It. Hazlewood has 
argued that the ideological. rationale offered for Federation 
(viz* that It would 'solve' the race problem and provide 
for 'African advancement') was the prime focus of attention 
and that $the economic aase for federation ... was also greatly 
overstated'* 
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From the 'abstract' Federal perspective 
the justification seemed true, However, In the Interests of 
settler colonialism and the expansion of the Industrial 
capitalist mode of production In Southern Rhodesia, It did 
not have this effectl as Hazlewood's record of the period 
bears out. Tariff barriers In the other territories were 
I3c 
removed to assist (Rhodesian) Industryq though this aid was 
In itself modest because before 1953 the region had effectively 
been a free trade area. The Federal Tariff that was 
substitutedg howeverg protected 'Federalt Industry and this 
meant principally Southern Rhodesian producers* Fiscal 
re-distribution also disproportionately aided the latter 
group# and the allocation of Federal borrowings wýlch were 
distributed on the basis of territorial Income tax receipts 
had a similar effect. Investment patternsq economic policy 
and export revenues benefited Southern Rhodesiaq and Industrial 
producers In particular, Federal State Investments as well 
as privatecapital accumulated In Rhodesia. Federal 
government economic policy also had Industrial expansion 
(in Sotithern Rhodesia) as a prime objective. As a result very 
few large manufacturing enterprises were located on the 
Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt during the 1953-63 periodg, 
and even fewer in wyasaland. Furtherv the break-up of the 
Federation did not leave Southern Rhodesian Industry In a 
weak position, - It was able to expand Its domestic markets 
as well as expand production for export to South Africap 
11 
Malawl and Mocambique.. Substitutive Industrialization 
policies were steadily Introduced from 1964 onwards and State 
control over industrial development Increased In the post-1965 
panctions economy*- By ; 1974 the State and Industrial capital 
functioned In close harmony,. 
The transition to an industrial capitalist mode of 
production was rapid from the War up until the end of the 
Federal periodl and even accelerated thereafter,,. From 
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1938-62 Pearson has shown that gross and net output 
(compounded annually in constant prices) grew by 10-3 percent 
and 9.6 percent respectively. 
12 
Salaries and wages grew by 
11*7 percent annually (compound) and Industrial employment 
rose by 6-7 percent per annum, The number of production 
units increased from 299 to 1,034 In the same period and 
net output Increased 25-fold. In 1962 there were nearly 
24 times as many, persons in manufacturing employment than 
In 1938, From 1962-71 net output rose from $122 million to 
$303 million# wages and salaries more than doubled to 
$131 milliong and numbers employed rose by more than 50 
percent to 125,641, As against Gross Domestic Productq 
manufacturing's share rose from 14.7 percent In 1954 to 
23.4 percent In 19729 and this during a period of rapid 
economic growthq especially In the 1964-72 period. when G. D. P. 
rose from'$646 million to $1,418 million (current prices). 
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By 1972 th" the manufacturing sector was dominant in 
the Capitalist production structure. In terms of 
contribution to G, D*P*q plantation and peasant production 
(taken together) accounted for only two-thirds the value 
of manufaeturing output* Mining output stood at a quarter 
of the value of manufaeturing produotione If the 
supplementary sectors, to manufacturing# which with the latter 
made up the 'industrial complext, are included (lee* 
Electricity and WaterqýConstructlonq etc, ) this dominancels 
even more marked* 
Since the 19400ac thens-the nature of capitalst 
production In Rhodesia has changed decisively,,, Extractive 
Iý 
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mining and plantation agriculture have become more dependent 
on the new forces of Industrial production for Input 
suppliesl more subordinate in terms of the lobbying power 
of Industrialists in the State apparatual and have a 
diminished ability to compete for labour supplies. This 
state of affairs btood In sharp contrast to 1924 when 
Frankel's estimates of the 'National Income' showed that 
'Manufacturingtol share Of output was no larger than 10' 
percent and Industrial production was not even regarded as 
14 
a primary branch of productiom 
TRANSFORMATION WITHIN THE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION STRUCTURE 
The overall trend towards industrial capital accumulation 
conceals the processes that have occurred within the 
Industrial structure during the post. 1940 period, These 
internal structural changes have caused a re-organization-of 
labour mobilization policies and the shift from dependence 
on (foreign) migrant labour towards the development of a 
class of semi-skilled labourers under a more complex pattern 
of working-class stratification* 
FIrstlyq the structure of industrial production has 
become more complex as the industrial seotor-has 'Matured's 
the product range has expanded and a small capital goods 
Industry has developed* One result has been the growing 
dependence on skilled and semi-skilled labour in production 
and a greater need for co6plex labour supply systems to cope 
with the varied needs of a wider range of Industrles. ý Since 
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1938 rapid growth has occurredg particularly In textilesq 
metal produots9 chemicals# clothing and footwear Industries. 
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A large proportion of industrial production in the past has 
been In food productog although this portion fell from 26 
percent in 1938 to 17 percent In 1965 as Investment goods and 
16 
non-foot consumer goods production Inoreasedo The range 
of products has also widened oonsiderablyg especially In the 
phase of substitutive industrializatione In 1963 a total 
of 602 manufactured commodities were produced in Rhodesia; 
by 1970 this figure had : risen to 3037- 
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'Maturation' and 
sophistication in Industrial production has required a 
greater division of labour and specialization, This develop- 
ment has in turn necessitated a more complex labour supply 
and training system within the economy as well as a careful 
orchestration by the State of immigration policies with 
high level manpower needs In order to ensure both profitability 
and the position of the labour aristocracy In production, 
Pressures from some Industrialists to employ and train lower- 
cost black workers have made closer labour regulation more 
necessary under these conditions. 
Secondly# as industrial capital accumulation has 
acceleratedl methods of production have been transformed, 
Reliance on small-scale workshops dependent on low capital- 
labour ratios has given way to large-scale production under 
mechanized conditions with higher eapital-labour ratios. ', ý-In 
1938 the value of gross output of the average producti on 
18 
unit was 0339300* By 1971 It, had reached approximately 
Anon. In 1938 less than 60 persons were employed''on 
)3q 
average per produetion unit, 
approximately 100 persons* 
In 1971 this figure was 
Betweein 1954 and 1972 there has 
been a doubling in capital per head employed In production 
(as measured in constant 1964 prices). 
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These transforma. 
tions in the Production structure have necessitated changes 
In the division of labourg the principal effect being the 
development of a class of semi-skilled operatives under 
'fragmentation' policies and the continuous re-organization 
of 'conventional' job demarcations by both management and 
unions* Changes in wage structures and stratification 
amongst the African Industrial proletariat have resulted from 
this changed requirement of production, The structural 
position of the labour aristocracy In production has also 
altered, No longerwas their task predominantly skilled 
production work In combination with unskilled labourers. 
Rather it has assumed the form of providing Iome labour-time 
In the productive processl while a large and growing 
element of supervision has entered Into their actual tasks* 
In effect# skilled workers have Increasingly come to function 
as supervisors and have been required to organize both 
semi-skilled and unskilled labourers on behalf of management. 
Thlrdlyq Increasing meohanisation has had a dual Impact 
on the mobilization of, cheav labour supplies, on the one 
handp It has discharged labour from production as a result of 
qualitative changel but on the other hands through the 
quantitative extension of the Industrial production systemg 
It has absorbed workers Into production In redefined job 
hierarchies. A dual process of Irepulsionand attraction' 
13 S 
has therefore been established, 
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This has led to a 'flux' 
of labour both within the capitalist mode of production - 
between enterprises and 'fractions' of capital - as well as 
between modes of production, Varying degrees of 
IstAbilization' of the labour force have thus been compatible 
with Industrialization, The extent of complete stabilization 
has been dependent upon the structure of production in 
enterprisess the composition of the industry, the degree of 
mechanization and the extent of the division of labour 
required for profit maximization as the concentration of 
capital has proceeded* The underdevelopment of the peasant 
economy has intensified the process of 'repulsion and 
attraction' especially as African women - the dominant form 
of labour-power in peasant production - have been steadily 
proletarianized and black households have become more, 
dependent on wage-labour for subsistence* As a reaultp 
more extensive systems of labour supply regulation have 
become necessary to allocate labour-power and channel it to 
low-wage Industries# especially plantation and mining 
enterprises* In order to maintain systemic viabili. ty and 
productivity* In this process of labour direction# the 
mediation of State policies has been crucial* 
Finally$ the rise of an Industrial capitalist mode of 
production in Rhodesia has been typified by uneven regional 
and urban-industrial location; and concentration on consumer 
goods industries to the detriment of the development of an 
autonomous Industrialization based on a more appropriate 
balance with capital goods Industries* The labour migration 
I 
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process has been determined by the specific regional pattern 
of uneven distribution and the level of development of the 
peasant economy has also been conditioned by the 
concentration of markets and production, 
21 
The concentration 
on consumer goods has led to a general dependence on imports 
22 
of capital goods and technology from metropolitan producerso ' 
This has tended to bias the choice of technique towards 
capital-intensive production with the result that problems 
of unemployment have become more accentuatedg especially 
amongst the unskilled and those with non-industrial skills. 
The transformations within the production structure have 
occurred under a particular regime of Industrialization that 
has re-Inforced and effectively reproduced the structures of 
settler colonialism. An analysis of labourls conditions of 
reproduction must account for the structure of this capitalist 
Industrialization process in the 'peripheral center' of 
Rhodeslas particularly since these structural considerations 
have affected the new processes of labour mobilization and 
patterns of discrimination and underdevelopment In the 
political economy, 
THE STRUCTURE OF CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION IN RHOMMIA, 
The most notable structural feature of the political 
r. 
economy of industrialization has been its consistency with 
expanded capitalist production and the systemic reproduction 
of settler colonialism, In 1960 Barber argued that the 
*value system' of settler colonialism Inhibited manufacturing 
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expansion even though (he believed) Industrial production 
was less inhibited by 'non-economW factors than 
agriculture. 
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Yet the evidence. of 
. 
Industrial development 
under settler-colonial conditions provides the basis for 
refuting Barber*s claimt and so too those arguments of 
Suteliffeg Arrighiq Loney and Good which were similarly 
24 
Inclined. The high degree of wage and labour control 
provided by the settler-colonial State has formed the basis 
for high profits In manufacturing enterprises (for both 
domestic and foreign capital) and the means whereby the full 
costs of labour's reproduction could be avoided by Industrial 
producers* 
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Other Indications of the harmonious existence of settler 
colonialism with capitalist Industrialization exist. As 
Hazlewood has pointed out for the Federal periodg ýhe presence 
and political power of Southern Rhodesian settlers in the 
Federal State was one of the faetors that led to the 
channelling of Industry and foreign capital investment away 
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from the other territories. Foreign and domestic 
manufacturing capital has also existed In a mutually Inter- 
dependent relationship with plantation produeers and the 
labour arlstocracyq two major support groups of the settler- 
colonial State. The former has provided the objective 
conditions for separation of peasant producers from the means 
of production and so ensuring the continuous replenishment of 
cheap labour to all producers. Outputs from plantation 
production have been increasingly used as'Inputs of raw 
27 
materials Into manufacturing production. Industrialists 
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have had an objective Interest In low-cost supplies of 
domestic raw materials which have been ultimately dependent 
upon 'extra-cheap' labour supplies being directed to 
plantation producers. Industrial workers' costs of subsistence 
have also been kept low by the availability of cheap domestic 
food supplies. The costs of labour's reproduction outside 
of the peasant economy has thereby been reduced and full 
proletarianization has advanced at lower cost to Industrial 
producers than otherwise would have been the case. Further- 
morep Industrialization has remained dependent for foreign 
exchange upon both mining and agricultural export revenuesq 
Manufacturers have been net users of foreign exchange 
28 
resourcesq especially for Imported capital goods. 
Finallyq plantation expenditures have formed an increasingly 
Important element of the domestic market for certain 
manufacturing Industries* This market has been expanded by 
the development of rural African capitalist enterprise. 
The labour aristocracy has also existed In mutual 
interdependence with (foreign and domestic) manufacturing 
capital. In part this has arisen from the Inability of 
manufacturing Industrialists to translate economic power Into 
de facto and de jure political power. 
29 
coalitions with 
other socio-economic classes have thus become essential for 
Industrial capital. Dependence on white labour has not only 
been limited to this facet of the political economy. Market 
demand has been dependent on the Income distribution pattern 
and the class struetureo State assistance to Industry has 
been conditional upon the 'reasonable' maintenance of 
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government labour polielesg designed to safeguard the existant 
labour aristocracy. 
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For example employers have willingly 
utilized State sponsored Immigration schemes designed to 
provide the bulk of skilled labour supplies. In the 1930's 
most white Immigrants arrived with assured employment and 
without substantial sums of capital. Similar circumstances 
prevailed in the early 1970's. 
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Employers were thus 
adequately supplied with$ and remained willingly dependent 
upon# Imported labour for strategic productive skillse 
Policies designed to reduce dependence on high-cost Imported 
workers have only been sponsored In moderation by Industrial 
employers. 
Varlaus 'fractions$ of capital have supported a collective 
interest In the controlled but expanded reproduction of the 
dominant Industrial capitalist mode* For Instanceg 
plantation producers have been Interested In low cost Input 
supplies from domestic Industry to replace high cost Imports, 
especially since 1965 when sanctions have raised the landed 
price of Intermediate and capital goods' Imports. 
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Commercial capital's pre-war opposition to Industry has 
wilted as domestic Industrial markets have grown and a 
reduced dependence on Imports has been forced onto consumers 
by import controlq sanctions* scarcities of foreign exchange 
and the rising cost of Imported commodities. The Secretary 
of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia articulated 
the position clearly by stating in 1969 that 'Organized 
commerce (was) ... strongly In favour of industrialization on 
an economic basis'. 
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Likewiseq foreign mining capital has 
ILo 
exhibited an Interest In Industrializationg especially the 
processing of mineral ores in order to raise the value-added 
component of exports, The futures of the two branches of 
production have been regarded by mining executives an Inter- 
dependent: 'Growth In one stimulates growth In the other. ' 
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Furthermoreq capital Interpenetration between the two sectors 
has Increased since Industrialization begang a phenomenon 
that has also held for manufacturing's relationships with 
commercial capital and plantation producers, 
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These 
Identifiable areas of capitalist collusion provide the 
objective basis for employer cooperatinn (under State 
direction) in respect of labour mobilization policies. 
Another important structural feature of manufacturing 
has been the extent of foreign ownership and control over 
the means of Industrial production, Rhodesian Industrial 
expansion has taken the form of a dependent capitalist 
Industrialization$ although the actions and policies of 
various Internal forces - especially the State - must be 
explicitly acknowledged In order to explain the full process 
of Industrial development. 
Central Statistical Office analyses for 1963 show for 
example that 147 out of 420 manufacturing companies (in a 
go percent sample of sources of gross operating profits) were 
subject to external control either as branches or 
subsidiaries. Their profits accounted for 69 percent of the 
sample total. 
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Half of the foreign controlled companies were 
controlled from South Africa (72 out of 147) though these 
firms accounted for only 31 percent of total gross operating 
ljI 
profits indicatingg as Pearson has correctly notedg that 
'the largest firms In the Rhodesian manufacturing sector 
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(were) subject to control from outside Southern Africa*. 
Substantial foreign control of industry has also existed 
In conjunction with a high level of foreign corporate owner- 
ship In other sectors. Thus foreign companies accounted 
for Z21,8 million of total industrial gross operating 
profits of Z32.2 million In 1963- A sum of L8.9 million 
was attributable to foreign owned manufacturing firms whereas 
Inhodesian$ manufacturers only earned L4,1 miMion. Further- 
moreq gross fixed capital formation in foreign firms (in 
all sectors) accounted for '. 1.9.7 million out of a total of 
1.14.2 million In 1963; and in manufacturing the respective 38 
figures were Z6,2 million out of L9,0 million, 
Pearson has reported that 127 of the 323 respondents to 
a 1965 survey of industrial enterprises were controlled from 
outside the country but that of these 38 had half their 
assets In foreign ownership,, Rhodesian capital was therefore 
not unimportant though It was found to be located In the 
smaller firms* 
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Foreign firms were especially concentrated 
in sectors In which economies of scale were Important (e. g. 
chemicalss metal Industriesq engineeringp,, ete. ). Foreign 
capital's Influence over employer labour policies has 
therefore been of great Importance In Rhodesia, * 
More recent data (for 1972) confirm that dependent 
capitalist Industrialization remains an Important structural 
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feature of Rhodesian manufacturing development, - In 1972 
the market capitalization of all quoted Industrial companies 
)1j2 
(44 in total) amounted to 0331 milliong $250 million of which 
was externally controlled* Internal labour mobilization 
policies In Rhodesia have therefore had to take into account 
this external dependence and foreign control in the economyq 
especially since the State has been heavily dependent on Its 
partnership with foreign companies (particularly In mining 
and manufacturing)* 
Industrial production has also been highly monopolistic 
in character, a condition that has influenced employer labour 
policies. Two aspects of monopoly capital In Industry can 
be Identified: the control pf production by a few owners and 
monopolies in product markets which enable firms to influence 
prices and pass on wage increases to consumers* 
In 1970 1,518 'different' firms made 39837 separately 
Identifiable manufactured products while in 1966-7 a total 
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of 1059 products were produced by 882 firm There has 
thus been 'a clear trend towards Increasing monopoly 
production, The extent of monopoly is highlighted when It 
Is realized that in 1970 2,472, or 65 percent of, products 
were monopoly, produets, 
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Control of industry by large 
producersq especially foreign corporationsl typifies this 
monopoly situation, Concentration In production has also 
occurred* In 1938 only 5 percent of firms had a gross output 
of more than E509000 per annumq these producers accounting 
for 60 percent of output, 
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By 1957 fully one-third of 
producers were producing In excess of this level. These 
producers accounted for 90 percent of production, By 1971 
concentration had advanced still furtherg with 55 percent of 
M 
. 
producers exceeding a gross output level of $100,000, These 
producers employed more than go percent of the total Industrial 
labour force while 161 units produced more than $1 million 
each and employed 55 percent of the industrial labour force. 
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The power of industrial capital over labour has thus been 
highly centralized with 282 producers employing 899000 
workers out of the total industrial labour force of 1259000 In 
197141, 
Concentration of production and market monopolies have 
been re-Inforced at the level of ownership and control In 
the large Industrial corporations. In all guoted Industrial 
and mining corporations# numbering only 51 In 19729 with net 
assets valued at $148 milliong there were 48,666 'share. 
holdingall 279786 of which were in foreign corporations, 
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These separate shareholdings represented 250,8 million 
shares# 190*3 million of which were In externally-controlled 
companies, Howeverg'379384 (or 76.8 percent) of all 
shareholdings were In holdings of less than 19000 shares, 
55.4 percent of these being shareholdings In foreign firms. 
The total number of shares held by the top 10 shareholders 
in all companies (leeog the top 510 shareholdings) accounted 
for 188*8 million shares 01* 75.2 percent of all shareholdings. 
In some Industrial companies the top 10 shareholders held In 
excess of ý90 percent of all sharess" In 22 of the 51 
companies the largest single shareholder owned more than'50 
percent of all shares, And In only 9 companies did the 
largest single shareholder own less than 20 percent of total 
shareholdings, 
lye 
Labour policýes of employers have therefore been over- 
whelminglY conditioned within an Industrial structure of 
foreign ownership and deelsion-makingg under concentrated 
conditions of production# with firms able to exercise monopoly 
power In product markets and with a high degree of monopoly 
capital control found amongst large Industrial producers, " 
Foreign monopoly has not operated in a'vacuumg howeverg 
but has depended heavily on the State for establishing 
appropriate conditions of production and supporting high 
profits policies* On behalf of the dominant social classes 
in settler-colonial socIetyq Including resident manufacturing 
capitalistsq the State has been in partnership with foreign 
manufacturing capital with the purpose of controlling the 
industrialization process and ensuring domestic expansion 
and stability in the political economy. 
Since the 1940's State assistance to industry has 
increased greatly* All political parties in control of 
the State since 1945 have had high priorities for 
industrializationg even though this prooess has been externally 
Influenced* Initiallyg howevers support through protection 
policies was restrained. In 1946 the Margolis Commission 
of Inquiry Into the Protection of Secondary Industries 46 
recommedded against protection on a widespread scalee The 
policy during Federation became more protectionist and the 
47 
criteria for obtaining protection were relaxedeý Higher 
tariffs provided protection against South African producem, 
Substitutive Industrialization policies have been extensively 
promoted since 1965 under close State control through the 
19s 
Industrial Projects Committee and the Industrial Tariff 
Committee of the Ministry,, of Commerce and Industry, 
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In 
1964 a National Export Council was established to stimulate 
Industrial exports* 
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Private capital has also been 
assisted by the State-controlled Industrial Development 
Corporation (set up In 1963), Import control has played 
a central part In this regulatory process, Infrastructural 
Investments by the State have facilitated a lowering of 
costs to Industrial producers, 
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Incentives have been 
provided for industrial expansion - notably for exports - by 
tax abatement policies and# in the case of new venturest by 
the Industrial Promotions Corporation of Central Africa (an 
organization strongly influenced by the central Reserve 
Bank of Rhodesia), 
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The State has thus alwayB worked 
closely with domestic and foreign manufacturing capitalg 
principally through the Association of Rhodesian Industries, 
despite some differences over political strategiesq eego 
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U*D. I* In 19 5* 
The i3rime contradiction In Rhodesia has been between 
capital and labour and not settler colonialism and 
International capital, Manufacturing capitalists have 
always been mutedg or at test reformistq in their criticism 
of State policies, Certainly,, capital has never challenged 
the legitimacy of the settler-colonial order as have the 
soolo-political forces of the African working-class and 
peasantry* Indeed in working closely with the State - in 
order to evade and avoid sanctions - business interests have 
directly supported the government of the day*. Moreoverg 
IN6 
business support has been provided despite a steady growth 
In State control over labour policleag priceaq foreign 
exchangeg new Investmentsq the domestic re-Investment of 
profitsq as well as the imposition of a non-residents' 
shareholders' tax in 1972,53 
It has been within these struetures (under a settler 
colonialism conditioned by a powerful State and by foreign 
monopoly capitalist Influence) that the dominance of capitalist 
development In Rhodesia has been Instanced and the internal- 
structure of the capitalist mode has been transformed into 
a hegemonic industrial order, This has been the most 
Important structural change In postwar Rhodesia which has 
had ramifications not only for labour mobilization In the 
$industrial complex$ but also for subordinate modes of 
production, 
ACCUMULATION AND LABOUR MOBILIZATION UNDER A DOMINANT. ', 
INDUSTRIAL CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION SINCE THE 1940's 
Labour mobilization policies have changed markedly since 
the 1940's, The changing pattern-of capitalist production 
has necessitated a re-organization of labour supplY and 
utilization policies in order to reproduce the required 
soold-economic conditions for production as well. as 
a high rate of capital accumulation* The, changing political 
economy of labour mobilization examined here provides the 
systemic context within which to analyse labour's reproduction 
and relations to production under various modes of production 
in the Chapters to f ollow. In this way# an appreciation of 
a 
1117 
the nature and function of discrimination against African 
workers may be obtained In the appropriate structural and 
historical context.. 
It-is also analytically necessary to distinguish IdeologY 
from concrete reality In respect of labour policies. 
Settler ideoLogy concerning African labour has been Important 
as a distinctive component of the peripheral capitalist system# 
as a means of legitimation of the status cuo and as a form of 
social control, An examination of this Ideology is 
therefore necessary for a full understanding of the political 
economy of labour. A critique of the dominant themes In the 
Ideologies of the State and employers is provided In 
Appendix B, These : Ideologies reflected policies designed 
to reproduce cheap labour-power through the maximization of 
Internal and external supplies and the minimization of the 
share of employers and the State In meeting the costs of 
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labour's reproduction. 
THE MAXIMIZATION OF CHEAP LABOUR SUPPLIES 
The 611mination of flabour shortages' has been a major 
concern of State policy In the postwar periods especially 
in respect of the low-wage primary Industries, It Is 
important to note that 'shortages' were conceived of at the 
'going wage rate' and not In terms of an adjustable wage 
policy used to attract labour supplies through reliance on 
market mechanisms* The objective was to Increase supplies 
of labour without any adjustment in subsistence oriented 
Mo 
wagess Various manifestations of how tlabour shortages' 
were experienced by employers can be identified for the 
post-1940ts* 
Regional shortages of labour existed In certain parts 
of Southern Rhodeslas In 1944, for Instancep the Chief 
Native Commissioner (C. M. C. ) reported that the worst shortages 
were felt by mines In the south-western parts of the country, 
55 
These were less populated areas# less accessible to free-flow 
labour migrants and so the labour problem was less amenable 
to solution through 'traditional' pblicy maasureso On the 
other handq regions in the North and East were amply supplied 
with labour even to the extent of surpluses being hoarded 
by farmers, this being a function of an extensive foreign 
'migratory labour system and the low supply-, 4price of labour 
In these areas* 
Although Rhodesia was a net recipient of foreign migrant 
labours to the extent that in 1941 some 56 percent of African 
workers were non-indigenouag the settler-colonial economy 
also experienced a labour drain of Indigenous workers 
(referred to by policy-makers as $clandestine labourO) who 
found their way to the more attractive labour markets of the 
Union of South Africa,, 
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Hence Southern Rhodesia was In a 
subordinate relationship to the Band and other centers In 
South Afrioag thereby fulfilling the role of a Peripheral 
cente in the regional economic complex.,. 
Clandestine labour could have been recruited locally If 
wage policies had not been so Inflexible. Instead, ý 
institutional means were resorted to to stem the labour 
iq 
outflowo In 1944 it was estimated that 149000 workers left 
Rhodesia for South Africas this number being a highly 
significant labour exodus If judged at the margin, 
57 
The 
cause of migration was clearly economic and strongly-influeneed 
by low wages In Southern Rhodesia as well as employer wage 
policy in the post-1906 period when African wage rates 
experienced a secular decline. 
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Nor was the exodus 
confined to indigenous labour. In 1945 an estimated 209000 
non-indigenous workers fell into the category Officially 
estimated to consist of 'clandestine labourl, 
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The labour 
drain worried officials and employers who feared that the 
economic structure of Southern Rhodesia would be jeopardized 
6o 
both during the period of migration and in the future* 
This was a simple rationalization of economic Interest, 
Government response to the Ilabour shortage' created through 
the exodas of clandestine labour was to approach the Union 
government to halt It, Attempts were also made to police 
the border areas in the southern_part of the country* Both 
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methods proved abortive, The Pretoria government was 
unwilling to jeopardize its own supplies and thousands Of 
square miles could not be easily or cheaply controlled* 
Only reluctantly was it recognized that 'A further remedy 
(suggested) Itself in Improved conditions of service In the 
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Colony'. But enlightened and basically subservient 
officials could not as easily persuade employers to cut their 
profits or to alter wage policies which were deeply embedded 
In the colonial psychology after five decades of unencumbered 
practice. Consequently# shortages persisted and a mooted 
15b 
suggestion that Olabour direction' and 'rationing$ be 
introduced was only rejected because It would prove to be 
counter-produetive and 'result In an increased flow to the 
Union (which) would also have repercussions on the non- 
indigenous flow of labour to (the) Colonyt, 
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*Shortages* also arose out of Inefficiencts and short- 
term policies of labour utilization. So serious was the 
problem that it caused the authorities In 1946 to call for 
$every means (to) be taken to stop the wasteful use of 64 
native labourl* Mal-allocation had been promoted 
through short-term policies of not providing sufficient 
attraotioneg particularly on farms and mines (in the form of 
housing# eduoationt welfare, health facilities and,,, 
amenities)v that would lead to greater stabilization and a 
larger labour supplye, Rural-urban oscillation was thereby 
promoted because employers were unwilling to bear the full 
costs of, employment of labours- preferring to shift part of 
the burden onto the peasant economy in the Interests of 
accumulation and profit maximization., The tradition of 
wage-setting which geared pay towards the requirements of 
the single male migrant endorsed and perpetuated these 
praotioesp causing the authorities in 1948 to report that 
Me fallacious Idea that a Native's wages - where he in 
fed - are merely pocket money takes a lot of killing', 
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Wage policy thus forced migrants to maximize their security 
through the maintenance of land and cultivation rights as 
well as a viable rural homestead for security In old age* 
l. Sl 
In relying on low-wage policies# the worst offenders were 
the largest employers of labour - farmers - who thereby 
created and contributed to their own so-called Ilabour 
shortage', In practice# the cost of a labour shortage at 
'going* wg3e rates was a cheaper option than satisfied demand 
at a higher price which Involved adjustment to the totRI wage 
structures The overall Inefficiency of the labour utilization 
system prompted the behaviour amongst individual employers of 
'hoarding' labour supplies. Thus there were many Industries 
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'carrying more labour than they should$* Lack of 
supervision and managerial Ineffielences amongst employers In 
all sectors contributed to these ineffiolences of labour 
utilization, 
Wage policies thus oreateds In partq an artifieLal 
labour shortage* The effect of farm wage policies was 
fundamental here. The agriculturalIndustry was the single 
most important employer of labour at the timep as well as 
being the most unwilling to alter Itradition4l wage policies, 
Instead, of using market mechanisms to adjust supply to demand, 
farmers formed a corporate contract labour recruiting. bodvg 
Africultural Native Labour Lim Ited (see Appendix C)q lobbied 
through the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union (R, N. F. Us) to 
establish the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission 
(R@N*L, S, C, ) and obtained preferred treatment In the allocation 
of labour supplies to food producers, 
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Through Agricultural 
Native Labour LImItedq farmers negotiated with the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association to obtain extra- 
territorial labour and even managed to obtain subsidies from 
/sz 
the Southern Rhodesian government to finance their corporate 
68 
recruiting venture* Wage adjustments were anathema to 
farmers as well as damaging to profits as long as the farm 
lobby could use its centralized monopeonistic power to set 
wages unilaterally and ensure supplies through Institutional 
means* 
Perhaps the best available evidenoe on the farm Ilabour 
shortage* In the 19401s is contained In WadsworthIs succinct 
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analysis Mative Labour In-Arriculturet The studv followed 
r-oon after a Select Committee report on the country's labour 
shortage in 1949 had found that 'there icas no real shortage 
of labour Insofar as actual numbers were coneerned9- but the 
70 
apparent shortage was due primarily to Inefficient use** 
Wadsworth's survey embraced all types Of farms# had a wide 
sample base and was aimed at testing, In respect of farm labour 
utilizationg, the often repeated statement that-there was more 
Inefficiency than sourolty*, Wadsworth confirmed'the thesis 
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of there being 'extensive evidence of labour waste$, On 
63 percent of tobacco farmss 52 percent of maize farms and 
50 pereent of mixed farms investigated In the study there was 
a labour surplus found $on the basis of generous, standard 
requirementsp-allowanoes which would be regarded as wildly 
, 72 extravagant in any of the Western European countriesP. 
Labour was neither easily attracted nor readily retained by 
farm employment policiesc- 
Farmers commonly granted credits or advancesq, 'often in 
large amountog rather than offer higher wages, to attract a 
continuous supply of labour, -- These 'undesirable and illegal 
/5"3 
praotices' were widely praotised on farms and served to 
re-Inforce the semi-feudal relationship between Masters and 
Servants that had begun to be established in the early years 
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of the twentieth century* This relationship adequately 
expressed the separation of tasks between black and white 
In Rhodesia's plantation economy, Thus Wadsworth found 
that there existed 'little tendency on the part of farmers 
to regard the native as anything other than a gang-workeri- 
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and a poor one at that's The workerf, was 'Neither required 
nor eneouraged to do anything more than obey Instruetions - 
like the serfs of old'* 
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Under these conditionsg It is 
not surprising that farm labour was reluotant to enter farm -,? 
work as a permanent o0oupatione The consequent constraints 
on IE_Lbour sup2liedg as distinat from labour jquppllg--s, q was at 
the base of the Ilabour shortage' In the agricultural 
industry* 
Added to these artifloal pressures promoting a labour 
shortage was the Influence of a widening rural-urban wage gap 
which created additional *shortages' in the primary sector. 
The development of manufacturing industry after World War 119 
the effects of wage regulation under the Native Labour Boards 
Act and the structural adjustment to urban wýges, promoted 
by militant African unionism and Industrial strike action 
throughout the Post-19401at-caused the gap to widen 
progressively., The urban Opull"grew commensurately with the 
passage of time and the continuance of traditional subsistence 
wage policies in the farming industry. - Together with the 
other factors mentioned abovegýthese pressures created strong 
lSzi 
Incentive for workers to avoid farm work and hence the Ilabour 
shortage' was re-Inforced by powerful structural changes In 
the economy* The dependency on a foreign and contract labour 
system became more Imperative In order to maintain chean 
labour supplies for plantation producersp at least until 
other measures and policies hdd resulted in a sufficient 
degree of marginblization amongst the indigenous peasantry 
such that they too would supply labour-power at low wage 
rates. To a lesser extent these considerations also applied 
to the foreign-controMed mining industry where similar com- 
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plaints of Olabour shortage' were common* By the 19701st 
however# plantation and mining producers (who depended upon 
ýextra-cheapllabo, 4r-power) were exerting a *special demand* 
for the institutional direction of labour In contradistinction 
to Industrial producers who were better able to compete In 
domestic markets for labour supplies* It has been in 
the interests of both primary and secondary industries that 
these #special demands* have been met, State labour policies 
have been crucial in ensuring this requirement and 
maintaining harmonization in the aMocation of labour to 
competing producersc 
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Various labour supply mechanisms have been used to 
expand the availability of cheap labour-power to Southern 
Rhodesian employers since 1940,. The two most significant 
sources of cheap labour have been the foreign and contract 
labour system.,; (see Chapter 4) and policies promoting the 
persistent structural underdevelopment of the peasant 
economy (see Chapter 5)e By the 197006 the latter process 
/sS 
had reached such an advanced stage that reliance on the 
foreign labour supply mechanism was being steadily reduced. 
Other short-term and longer-term supply policies have also 
been Important in meeting particular employer needs for the 
cheapening of labour's supply-price through an Increase In 
competition for employment. 
One short-term measure was forced labour during the 
1942-46 period. The war economy of Southern Rhodesia 
generated a high level of demand for labour. Essential 
undertakings had to be kept operative and. food supplies 
maintained. In July 1942 the Compulsory Native Labour Act 
was brought Into operation for the purposes of ensuring 
adequate cheap labour supplies. Large numbers of workers 
were recruited under the terms of the Act. In 19439 for 
Instanceg the first full year of the Act# 10,245 adult 
African males were conscripted for labour. And as the 
C*N. C* reported In 1943t 'On the average the labourers 
worked 31 30'day tickets at current rates of pay. ' 
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In 
the next year 11,495 workers were recruited to work 4 tickets 
In food production. 
?9 
In 1945 another 119000 labourers were 
conscripted. Foreign workers were exempted from the 
prOvielons of the Act, In 1946, after the end of the warl 
the formal justificatlon for the legislation fell away and 
the Act was repealed. Forced labour was permissible during 
war as an emergencymeasure though It would not be so In 
peace time, Other means had to be found to obtain adequate 
supplies of cheap labdur. In 1946 the foreign contract 
labour system was re-established, 13 years after It had been 
dismantled and made redundant during the 1930's depression, 
/a '6 
Greater efforts were also made to extract African 
female labour-power from peasant production structures wherein 
It provided the backbone of the labour supply. The demand 
for wage-labour on minesq farms and In the towns of Southern 
Rhodesia had been largely satisfied by male workers up until 
1940. As Industrial employer demands grew In the 19400s, 
attracting large numbers of adult male workers and leaving 
primary sector employers at a competitive disadvantageg 
employers began Increasingly to turn to female labour supplies 
to supplement 'traditional' forms of cheap labour. These 
pressures added to the Interest In creating an adequate 
female labour supply which had been present since the 1930*8. 
In 1932 the government commissioned a Report on 
Employment of Native Female Domestic Labour In EurODean 
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flouspholds In southern Rhodesia. The concern at the time 
was two-fold: firstlyg with the $suitability$ of females In 
domestic employment and 'the effects upon the young European 
of Intimate association with native adults or adolescents of 
either sex1j 
81 
and secondlys the economic Issues Involved In 
82 
Introducing 'the native girl Into domestic services* 
The new policy was to have the effect of 'setting free a 
large proportion of the available native males for primary 
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production'. Objections. to females In domestic employment 
were overridden. The Commission's problem was largely 
geared to providing policy guidelines for the State to adopt 
which would allay the fears of $traditionalist' peasant 
elders who strongly resisted allowing African women to flock 
84 
to the towns. Nonethelessq a small rural-urban Inflow had 
/S7 
begun and the Commission felt that 'Government should take 
some responsibility for directing It Into safe channels'* 
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A host of provisions were put forward designed *to overcome 
the native prejudice against allowing girls to leave kraal 
86 
life for the towns In search of work', It was Intended 
that ýIa largely Increased supply of native female domestic 
labour (would) be assured'. 
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The gains from the successful 
Implementation of the policy for employers were weighed 
against the 'problems' of racial contact between domestic 
female workers and white children. Racial Ideology easily 
gave way to economic expediency. The Commission even 
carefully considered but rejected the 1possibility of 
substitution# on a large scales of European girls for native 
girls in all forms of domestic work*. 
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It pointed out. 
the f act that there was a limited supply of Coloured girls, 
who were In settler ideology 'believed to be generally 
superior to natives In adaptability to the-requirements of 
European household'* 
89 
In conclusion the Commission argued 
against 'the counsel of perfection that only European or 
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Coloured girls should be employed In European households'* 
It therefore recommended additional steps to be taken to 
attract an African female labour supply for domestic works 
a policy which would 'release' additional male labour for 
industries. 
Employer Interest In female labour supplies increased 
in the 1940's. In 1921 only 629 African females were In 
wage employment, In 1941 this figure had crept up to 3,778, 
Within another 5 years the numbers of African female workers 
15-5 
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had risen sharplY to 13,524. These workers were 
distributed between Agriculture (8#267)9 Domestic Service 
(3,638) and 'other occupational (1,619). In f arm employment 
few women were In permanent employ, Most were farm labourers' 
wives who undertook casual work by 'assisting at rush periods# 
such as harvestings and In keeping lands clean when male 
92 
labour (was) Insufficient to cope with such tasks'. 
Nearly all farmers In the 1940's made use of labourers' 
wives for labour services at rates of pay ranging 'from 6d 
to Is per day$. 
93 
Female labour thereby acted as a force 
keeping down farm wage ratesq though for lowly paid farm 
i workers it was necessary to compensate for poor wages paid 
to permanent labour, In domestic employment there was a 
, ýraditlon of sex segregation In the occupational structure. 
In the 1940's few women were employed as maids and cooks, 
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9'rhe overwhelming majority (were) *nannies" In other 
occupations, 470 women were found in 'Commerce and 
I Industry' with 1,149 In 'Government and Municipal Services% 
Even Industrial employers were responsive to the low cost 
of African female labour and as 
ýhe 
demand for cheap labour 
supplies increased more attention was paid to the, employment 
of African womene 
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By 1950 the female labour supplY 
meohanIE; m was beeoming well establishedg especiallY on farms 
and In domestic householdsq though 'the big obstacle to the 
employment of (single) femaless In towns and villagess(was) 
lack of suitable accommodation** 
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The maximizing of 
female labour supplies was aetively promoted by the State: 
'The department (of labour) contrived to advocate the 
iss 
replacement of male African labour with female labour wherever 
97 praeticableg especially In domestic services$ a Under 
conditions of rapidly Increasing demand for cheap labourg 
the sanction of government policy and the low opportunity cost 
of female labour (a consequence of dissolution of the peasant 
mode of production)g the African female labour force grew 
rapidly. Between*-11946 and 1951 the number of African women 
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In wage employment nearly tripled from 139524 to 419748# 
Thirty percent of these workers were non-indigenousg a trend 
encouraged by the revised Migrant Labour Agreement of 1948 
which provided incentive for migrants to bring their families 
with them; and most workers were still in Agriculture- 
(289932) and Domestic Services (79263). As one official 
noteds 'The large numbers of males wastefully employed in 
domestic service which are thus lost to Industry have n1ways 
been a subject of adverse comment'. 
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Employers In 
Industries could keep wages down If adequate substitution of 
female for male labour was facilitated at littleg or better 
still lowerg cost to domestic employers* Industrial 
employers also had Ineentive, before 1953 to attract female 
labour for tasks for which such labour was suitable becauseg 
whileti, regulations existed to cover the minimum conditions 
of employment of African males In various Industrial under. 
takings, no similar provisions were made for the African 
100 
females. Thiss In parts accounted for the ten-fold growth 
In African female emplOyment In Manufacturing between 1946 
and 1951, 
lbo 
So significant was the employment of African women In 
Industry becoming that in 19529 under pressure from the 
African Women Workers' Union# and desirous of Increasing 
cheap labour suppliesq a National Native Labour Board 
was appointed to Investigate conditions of employment 
pertaining to African women, 
/ 
The prime focus was once 
againg as It was twonty years earlierg the promotion of 
additional supplies of cheap labour. / The Report acknowledged 
the problems Involved under customary marriage practice for 
African women seeking to contract for employment. it 
therefore recommended steps be taken 'to codify the law 
relating to African women Inrespect of contracts between them 101 
and their African and non-Afrioan employers'* The 
sexually segregated environment of urban society was also 
regarded as an obstacle to female labour supplies coming 
forward. Housing availability remained a major problem* 
Many women lived 'illegally* with single men In the townships. 
Hostel accommodation was available but African women objected 
to the rules# discipline and limitations as well as the rents 
that hostel life imposed on residents., Hostels remained 
half empty while many females were without *legal' aecommoda- 
tions Despite the obviously difficult conditions faced by 
female workersq the Board refused to recommend the 
establishment of minimum wages for women: 'we are of the 
opinion that the establishment of compulsory minimum rates of 
pay'on a level of those African men would discourage the 
employment of African women at a time when encouragement Is 
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of great Importance'* For Industrial employers this would 
I', 
have been a costly step as well as one that could have 
jeopardized the stability of the female labour supply to 
domestic households and plantation produeersq the basis of 
male/female substitution policies In these two branches of 
production* 
Although African women made up only a small proportion 
of wage labourers their labour participation grew 
significantly up until 1958p especially In farm employment. 
In plantation agricultures African females comprised over 
8 percent of the labour force In 1954 and by 1957 this 
proportion had risen to close on 10 percent. 
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Even sos 
much female labour remained casualg demand being mostly 
concentrated In the Ist and 4th quarters of the year. 
For the economy as a whole# African females only comprised 
7 percent of the African wage-labour force. This 
contrasted sharply with white female labourg amongst whom 
40 percent of adults were In wage employment* Two-thirds 
of African women were employed on,, ýplantatlons and 16 percent 
in domestic households$ both low-wage sectors* Of all, 
theseq 25 percent were foreign women*. And nearly 80 percent 
of this foreign female labour supply was engaged in farm 
work* The availability of low cost casual labour in 
agriculture# particularly at peak periodsq. tended to act 
as a downward pressure on farm wage rates; In addition, It 
provided one reason why farm employers were reluctant to 
adopt any form of minimum wage for workers In Industry. 
By 1961 African female wage employment had slackened off 
In terms of numerical growth, This trend reflected the 
/42- 
stagnation In employment experienced after 1958. Yany 
more women had to turn to petty commodity production as a 
source of livelihood and as a means of supplementing 
Inadequate family incomes, By 1969 the proportion of African 
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females In wage employment was still less than 11 percent, 
Howeverg their occupational distribution was morevaried, 
Just over one-half of the 659456 African women In employment 
were In plantation jobs while 16s474 worked in domestic 
households, Nearly 49000 were In Manufacturingg most being 
concentrated In textiles and clothing enterprises* 
105 
Another 59000 were in skilled and semi-skilled jobs In the 
health and educational services. By the 19700s about 
one-third of African female workers were urban based* 
Juvenile workers (under the age of 16 years) were also 
used extensively as a source of cheap labour in production, 
especially In the primary sector and In domestic employment. 
The breakdown of the peasant economy, coupled with limited 
opportunities for schooling and low household inoomesq 
combined to throw many juveniles onto the labour market. 
By 1951 there were already 65,676 juveniles In wage 
employment In Southern Rhodesia. They formed 12 percent 
of the total African labour supply. From this date onwardss 
however# their numbers decreased and by 1961 only 419042 
were In employmento A large pvrtion of the-juvenile work 
force were foreign (38 percent In 1956) though this source 
became less Important over time as dependence on foreign 
labour supplies was reducedq domestic unemployment grew and 
Internal labour supply mechanisms replaced external ones* 
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Againg as with women# many juveniles were In farm jobs and 
domestic employment and were earning wages to supplement 
family Income In households already tied to low wage 
Industries* ( Farmers appreciated this source of cheap labours 
especially In meeting peak period demands and undercutting 
the wage rate of permanent workers, 
' At the R*N*F,, Uo Annual 
Conference In 1958v for Instance# one motion suggested that 
the school term be altered In order to increase juvenile 
labour supplies. 
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More often than not this was 
unnecessary because farmers themselves controlled the 
provision of education on their farms (with aid from the 
State) and were easily able to extract a quid pro quo In the 
form of labour supply from the children of farm labourers, 
After the wars prompted by the boom In the labour-intensive 
tobacco industryg labourers were Increasingly encouraged by 
employers to settle on the farms and to bring their women 
and children with them, 
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Farmers applied this policy to 
OaliensO especially and passed resolutions through the 
ReNsFoUs calling on the State to allow Indefinite residence 
to foreign workers* 
'Squatters' on f armss Including women and childreng also 
formed a valuable source of cheap labour to farmers throughout 
the period* 
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Where *squatters' were not 'tied' to 
employment they were often made vulnerable and eventually 
evicted* 
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Finallyp prison labour provided farmers with 
labour at low cost though this labour was supplied primarily 
by adult male workers* 
I' it 
LABOUR SURPLUS AND UNEMPLOWENT 
The measures designed to Increase the supply of cheap 
labour to Southern Rhodesian employers quickly contributed 
to the development of a labour surplus situation* The 
effect of recession In Rhodesia in 19579 and thereafter until 
19639 accentuated this structural imbMance and caused 
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African unetployment to grow substantially* This crisis 
had a major effect on labour mobilization policies* 
Unemployment In Southern Rhodesia was related to a 
variety of factors# especially the labour policy of the 
1940-1957 period which had attracted a large foreign labour 
component which In turn contributed to the underdevelopment 
of the peasant economy. These structural forces, were 
re-inforced by the dynamics of Internal population growth: 
death rates had been falling since 1948 while birth rates 
had remained relatively constant at a high levelo 
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In 
1948 the annual net natural rate of African population 
increase was 2*81 percento By 1969 It had risen to 3o6 
percent per, annumo Additions to labour supply from this 
source# which could not be absorbed into a steadily 
circumscribed pe asant economy# turned to wage employment as 
an alternative source of subsistence* Capital Intensifica- 
tion reduced the employment growth effects of Industriali- 
zation. The unwillingness of farm employers to recruit 
locally by altering wage structures added to the problem, 
Finally, the fall off In demand and a sharp reduction In 
capital inflows Into Southern Rhodesia slowed emPloyment 
I6. ) 
growth markedly. In 1958 total African employment was 
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6289000 and non-agricultural employment 3999000- By 
1960 total employment had grown by only 0.6 percent per 
annum to 6409000 and the latter by 6.25 percent per annum 
to 401tooo. By 1964, after the loss of confidence In the 
Federal enterprisej employment had fallen to 353,000 In the 
non-agricultural sectorg and for the economy as a whole was 
at a level (627#000) still below the 1958 level* The 
Implications of these trends for the growth of unemployment 
in this period were serious$ especially since the RoNsLoSoC. 
continued to contract foreign labour and the gross Immigra- 
tion of $free flow' foreign African men entering Southern 
Rhodesia between 1950 and 1964 amounted to 4809250t despite 
the removal of subsidized 'Ulerel (free) transport services 
for migrants after 1958- 
The seriousness of the depression was indicated by the 
effect that it had on the slowing of growth In white 
employment. From 1957-58 the rate of growth of 'European' 
employment was 7.4 percent; for 1958-59 the rate had fallen 
to 2e5 percent and for 1959-60 to 0.7 percent. In the 
period 1960-61 employment actually fell by 1*1 percent, 
Indeedg It was not until 1965 that the 'European' employment 
level reached Its 1960 level. In the Construction Industryq 
a sector sensitive to bhanges In confidence and capital 
investment shifts#-the employment level fell steadily from 
1957-65 until the 1965 level was only 57 percent of the 1957. 
The first signs of unemployment among whites caused 
predictable responsest 'Employment In the building industry 
I" 
adjusted itself by numbers of artisans leaving to find 
employment In other occupations or In other countries, * 
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By late 1959 the labour market *remained hard against 
employment In the "clerical" and "miscellaneous" categories 
(in which (were) to be found married women and a high 
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proportion of unqualified persons such as handymen)'* 
Even so# at thin stage the overall incidence of European 
unemployment remained at about I percent of the populations 
Nonetheless$ this was regarded by whites as an Intolerable 
situation, Despite the comparatively low level of unemploy- 
ments an 'Association of the Unemployed' formed and pursued 
an active press campaignp particularly for unemployed whites 
over 40 years of age. Many whites emigrated, The level 
of gross emigration rose from 4,600 In 1959 to 15,410 in 
1964* Met white emigration was recorded from 1961 to 1964, 
White unemployment also had an Impaot on job opportunities 
for blacks* Not only was It the case that lower skilled 
workers experienced a higher percentage level of 
unemployment In the white labour foreeg but the creation of 
a mild degree of white unemployment acted as an additional 
barrier to blacks obtaining jobs In semi-skilled gradeso 
This added to the large number of blacks who became unemployed 
as a result of the disproportionate dis-employment effect 
that the recession had on unskilled labour. - By 1960 the 
unemployment problem had become extremely seriouse To make 
matters worse for the settler-colonial Stateg-unemployment 
coincided with a rising wave of African nationalism In 
Southern Rhodeslao The State was forced to act to reduce 
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unemployment to more manageable proportions* To do this it 
Instituted a wide range of measuresl Initially concentrated 
on the Inflow of external labourers. 
The Foreign Migratory Labour Act was passed In 1958. 
Under It the Minister of Labour was given powers to exclude 
'foreign' workseekers from designat6d $closed labour areas', 
Initially $foreigners' were defined as non-Federal Africans. 
In March$ 1959 the Act was applied and extended to the main 
urban areas. International labour agreements covering 
migration from neighbouring territories were also terminated, 
Nonetheleseq the urban unemployment problem continued to 
crow as both local and foreign workers-were attracted to the 
towns* Even R, 11*L, SoC* Contractees continued to 'desert' 
their jobsq taking the risk of severe financial penalty and 
repatriation,, under the Masters and Servants legislations 
with the hope of obtaining urban employment, In this 
situation the foreign migratory system was proving a 
liability; domestic labour supplies were plentifulg jobs 
were scarce and local sources were now as cheap or cheaper 
than foreign sources of 14bour supply. The one exceptional 
employer group In this general situation was Agriculture and 
Forestry; Indeed# as the Secretary for Labour oommentedt 
'If this influx could have been confined to the needs of 
primary industry in the-rural areasq the system might have 
remained tolerable: but the attractions of work In 
Secondary industry and the magnet of the towns themselves 
were resulting in an uncontrollable Invasion Into the towns 
of unskilled migrant labourers In search of work, ' 
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Unemployment# highly visible and socially volatile, was the 
result. These thousands of unskilled work-seekers were 
Ill-disposed to the choice or farm work or other rural 
occupations with their low pay, poor conditions and Inferior 
status. The probability of obtaining an urban job may have 
been low for the average work-seeker but the rewards If 
successfulq was highs and the rural opportunity cost was an 
unattractive option. 
During this phase employers In the primary seetor 
st. *Vbbornly refused either to use market mechanisms to attract 
adequate labour supplies or to forgo their traditional 
reliance on Institutional means for obtaining cheap labouro 
In 1959 the B. N. '. F, U. urged the R. N. L. SX, to recruit more 
labour for the farming Industry, 
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similarly In 1960 
there uere requests expressed at the R*N*F*Uo Congress for 
the State to provide 'cheaper labourl, 
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In 1962 the 
farm lobby acted to support the maintenance of the B. N*L. S*C* 
contract'labour system, At the 1962 Annual Congress of the 
R*N,, F*U. t Mr C-, G* Traceyq Chairman of the R. R. F*U* National 
Labour Committeeg noted thatt 'We had talks recently with the 
R, N, LeSsC. They came to us and asked for our support in the 
event of the Government trying to close them down***# Of 
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course we gave them our full and complete support. ' The 
$special demands' of primary sector employers were well summed 
up In a resulution which requested the government to repeal 
the ZI monthly tax on foreign labour on the grounds that It 
was Idiscriminatoryl* 
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Employers In the south-western area 
of Rhodesiag within the boundaries of the 'closed' labour 
Al 
areasp complained bitterly of not being allowed to pay the 
11 tax on foreign labour which they would gladly pay In 
order to obtain cheap labour supplies. 
Heanwhileg in urban areasq unemployment continued to 
rise* In 1962 the Chief Administrative Assistant (Department 
I 
of Labour) estimated that there were 509000 unemployed 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia. 122 This was over 8 percent 
of all African wage employees in the economy and close to 13 
percent of non-agricultural employees* A structural 
unemployment problem was In the making and work-seekers from 
the Federation6s rural areas together with Internal work- 
seekers continued to enter the urban areas In numbers large 
enought to aggravate the problem. As the 'Closed Areas' 
policy remained in operationg many employersq some for the 
first timet began to rely on Southern Rhodesian laboure 
Despite forecasts to the contraryg these workers were 
generally found to be at least as productive as non-indigenous 
workers, The recession had enabled the creation of a 
large internally. generated labour surplus* Employers now 
relied on this source rather than externally located labour 
surpluses, The exception here was farmers who continued to 
lobby for the abolition of the Foreign Migratory Labour Acto 
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By 1963 these measureag coupled with an intensification 
of Influx control, were beginning to have some effect in 
urban arease The growth In visible urban unemployment had 
begun to be curbed* A mild upward swing In employment in 
1964, helped slow the growth In unemployment and the Seeretary 
for Labour was able to report thatp while there had been 
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unemployment on a large seale In the urban areasq due to 
Influx control 'the position remained much the same as 
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in the previous year'. Nonethelessq the drought of 
that year caused a clamour amongst peasants for work and in 
Matabeleland *there was a tendency on the part of farmers to 
retrench labour on account of the drought** 
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The numbers 
of unemployed Africans grew steadily. Despite this employers 
who traditionally were unable to attract labour because of low 
wage policies received only marginal relief: 'The sugar 
companies and contracting companies In the lowveld areas of 
the Victoria Province experienced some difficulty In keeping 
their labour gangs up to strengthq In spite of extending their 
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recruiting activities over a large area. ' These 
plantations even attempted (unsuccessfullY) to recruit through 
the BoN., L*S, C, In various areas of Southern Rhodesia* 
The growth In domestic unemployment and the creation of 
a surplus of cheap labour within Southern Rhodesia on a 
large scale required a re-organization of labour mobilization 
policies. Stability had to be maintained If capital 
accumulation was to proceed rapidly* It was therefore 
necessary not only to reduce dependence on foreign labour 
supplies but also to reinforce the existing structures of 
control over African labour In order to allocate labour 
supplies to those employers outside the Industrial capitalist 
mode of production who by the beginning of the 19601s were 
unable to compete on domestic markets for all their required 
supplies of cheap labour, Institutional controls were thus 
needed to bring about the re-direction of labour towards 
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plantations, small mines and other rural employers. At the 
same time# secondary Industry required new policies to cope 
with its specific needs$ especially for a stabilized and 
semi-skilled class of workers who would be. less transient 
and more 'productive* as a result of training and progress 
upwards In the occupational structure* In shortg these 
diverse pressures called for a 'new$ economic and labour 
policya - 
THE ZMW ECONOMIC AND LABOUR POLICY 
Most of the Important changes In labour policy 
Introduced after 1958 were directed at urban-inaustrial 
employment*and urban In-migration amongst African work-seekers, 
The growth and concentration of secondary industry and 
ancillary services Industries In urban areas acted as a 
powerful magnet attracting labour to the towns of Southern 
Rhodesia, In the seven largest towns the numbers of adult 
African males In employment rose from 45,638 In 1936 to 
16o$W in 1951, From 1951-56 a 24 percent increase in this 
figure was recorded* And after 1956 the size of the urban 
African Population rose rapidly until In 1973 It was close 
on 9000000* 
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The composition of the African urban 
population also altered markedly* As the Plewman Commission 
of 1958 noted$ it no longer eonsisted solely of adult males 
in, employmento 
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More females and ehildren were now found 
In urban areas. Many of them too had been born In urban 
looclety, 
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Prior to 19589 in terms of the lawg an African had no 
right to permanency of residence In the towns even though he 
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or she had been born In town and lived there since birth, 
In-migration was regulated under the Native Registration Act 4 
(197416) which had been designed to secure labour control In 
the urban areas by requiring all Africans to be in possession 
of a 'pass' before seeking work In the towns. 
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Government 
policy required that If an African work-seeker could not find 
employment In the town within a few weeksg or If he lost his 
employment# he must forfeit his right to accommodation and 
return to 'his native reserve'. Those provisions were more 
or less suitable for a system where African labour was largely 
unskilled and migrancy was the basis of cheap labour. 
However* under industrial production, where employers 
required a large semi-skilled labour forceg the migratory 
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system was Inefficiento Change In the pattern of control 
was therefore necessary. Consequently measures were 
Implemented to enable a limited, number of Africans to acquire 
residence Orights' In urban areas and labour stabilization 
policies were graduallypromoted by employers and the State. 
By 1960 official policy was persuasively arguing against 
the need to continue to operate an extensive foreig migratory 
labour system. Until 1960 the pass system had been In 
operation to keep out of the town those who did not obtain 
employment, This was a basic Instrument of urban economic 
policies aimed at minimizing the non-wage costs of African 
urban employment. However It conflicted In part with 
productivity requirements. From an employer's point of view 
I3 
nothing was 'more wasteful than having to replace a migrant 
worker every year because the worker wants to return home to 
his family'. 
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Stabilization and productivity growth 
operated to cause a reduction in labour oscillation. Foreign 
migration was reduced and Internal labour migration offset 
by steps taken to stabilize DRrt Of the industrial labour 
force. However, it was still necessary to have various 
controls over unskilled workers. In Octoberq 1960 the 
Vagrancy Act was passed. Designed to deal with 1lOafers1q 
It had the advantage that It could be used to remove the 
'unemployed' from the towns as well as embrace dissident 
union officials under its definition of 'vagrants'. 
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As Industrial production Increasedo employers became 
more dependent on low-cost African labour In semi-skilled 
employmentg and less willing to use high-cost supplies of 
white labour. Some employers thus had a direct Interest In 
African urbanizationg occupational advancement and 
stabilization. Equally# they sought to avoid the costs of 
financingg training and stabilization policies. Wage 
levels had to rise to enable workers to sever their 
dependence on the rural areas. State directed minimum wage 
legislation was necessary for this purpose since no single 
employer would Gain If all attempted to obtain the benefits 
of labour stabilization while avoiding the costs thereof. 
In additiong African trade unions had been--lpushing employers 
and the State to concede higher wages since the end of the 
war. Bigher wages thus had both a cost and a benefit 
element, the latter outweighing the former where productivity 
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gains from stabilization more than compensated for the 
marginal costs of shifting from dependence on a migrant labour 
supply system to one more oriented towards a permanently 
urbanized labour force. 
Productivity growth through occupational advance and 
labour stabilization necessarily Implied the need to alter 
the tendency In past employment practice of hiring single 
male workers. Minimum wage policies and higher wages 
assisted in allowing more households to be residentially 
uniteds The Services Levy Act of 1960 was Introduced so as 
to enable a greater preponderance of married men to become 
urban workers, 
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Prior to the Act economic rentals for 
housing were chargedv the rental on the smallest house in the 
townships being 1.4,10.0 monthly. Charges for family 
accommodation were too high for a married man to meet at the 
existent wage levels. The Services Levy enabled the 
subsidization of the cost of housing for married men by 
placing a levy on all employersq thereby giving each employer 
equal Incentive to employ marrted men and not to discriminate 
In favour of single workers. Linked to the provision of 
cheaper housing for married workers was the provision of 
opportunities for married African workers to obtain 
accommodation underlhome ownership* schemes. This Involved 
the cession of 99 year leases to Africans and not proper 
ownership as the land was European Crown Land which could 
not legallY be alienated to an African. Nonetheless, It 
had close to the same effect as a true home ownership scheme 
in Its Impact on stratificationg adding to housing supply 4 
and helping to otabilize labour. Later on In 1960 the Land 
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Apportionment Act was amended to allow some Africans to 
obtain freehold title to urban land* Associated with this 
policy Initiative were pressures applied to Local Authorities 
to Increase the supply of African housing. Up to 1960 
African'housing had been designed for single migrants and 
chiefly took the form# In the municipal townshipsg of 
barraok-like hostels each containing as many as 500 single 
men* Many restrictions on housing supply still remained 
however as the individual's ability to obtain accommodation 
was linked to his having firstly secured employment# The 
change In legal statute which enabled some Africans to 
obtain freehbld title could not cope with the problems of 
the bulk of low income workers. For employers to maximize 
labour productivity and minimize labour circulation adequate 
housing had to be available. Industrialists wanted housing 
f or workers but did not want to pay for Its while Local 
Authorities wanted neither. This wan a constraint on -I, ' 
productivity growthq the root cause of which was to be found 
In municipal financial policy and the unwillingness of white 
ratepayers to fund African housing development. As a 
result these restraints were a source of much political 
conflict between Industrialists and white-controlled local 
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authorities throughout the 1960's and even into the 1970's- 
Other Initiatives accompanied these changes In labour 
policy. ' The Apprenticeship Act of 1959 made the system of 
apprenticeship 'non-raciallg at least in do--Jure terms, 
, 
African apprenticeship previously had been nominally provided 
, for under the Masters and Servants Act. The Ode-segregation' 
-I, 
of apprenticeship was necessary because of changing 
qualitative and quantitative manpower demands. White 
apprenticeship supply would not be sufficient to meet total 
demand; nor was It the cheapest source of supply given 
black and white labour's differential opportunity costs 
and, respective union strength. The new statute was 
moderately effective and by the end of 1961 there were 30 
Indentured African apprentices out of a total of 473 
indentured under the new law. Also necessary for the new 
industrial situation were changes In social security 
legislatiom Social welfare measures for Africans were now 
made-the new responsibility of the Social Welfare division 
of' the Department of Labour and Social Welfare. The 
Workmen's Compensation Act was amended $to give Africans 
the same rateS of compensation as had up to that time been 
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available, to non-Af ricans 
The *new' economic ard labour policy was thus essential 
for'the expansion of domestic Induqtrial productione Its 
-.. Introduction brought a greater complexity to labour and 
social polleyq a complexity that reflected the diversity 
I-7 
,,, 
and, sophistication found In the production structures or 
the dominant capitalist mode. Up to the date of 
introduction of. the policy In the 1958-61 periods the State 
so ught'primarily to maximize the supply of cheap African 
labour-power for producers. After this period the spPelfic 
form of'labour-power and management of the Supply Of skills 
became Increasingly Important. 
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MINIMIZATION OF TUB COST OF LABOUR'S REPRODUCTION BOR17E BY 
EMPLOYERS AND THE STATE 
Employers and the State sought both to maximize the 
supply of African labour (subject to stability constraints) 
and to minimize their share of the costs of labour's 
reproduction* This latter objective required the Implemen. 
tation of two simultaneously pursued policies: firstly, 
ensuring that the peasant economy absorbed as much as 
possible of the costs of family subsistence; and secondly, 
systematic control over wage and non-wage costs associated 
with employment In order to ensure as high a rate of 
Industrial capital accumulation as possible* New labour 
control pollcle4 moreoeverl were made necessary In Rhodesia 
by the extent and seriousness of the challenge to both wage 
structures and settler colonialism by African unionist and 
working-class action after 1945* The displacement and 
subordination of the pre-capitalist mode of production In 
Southern Rhodesia was achieved not simply as a result 
of underdevelopment of the peasant economy or the crippling 
of the political order of Ndebele and Shona societiess as 
Arrighl amongst others has suggested, 
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It was also a 
consequence of sustained proletarian Poverty whereby not 
only were a large portion of the Costs of labour's 
reproduction borne by the pre-capitalist societyg but 
working-class threats to the capitalist production System 
were absorbedg thwarteds repressed or Incorporated within 
the institutional structures that were associated 'with 
/-7ý 
particular modes of production# The processes of minimiza- 
tion of labour costs must therefore be understood at two 
inter-related levels - firstlyq the systemic andq secondlYt 
the level relevant to the particular social controls 
pertaining to specific modes and forms of production. 
Under the conditions relevant to the extractive 
capitalist mining Industry, control over workers has tra- 
ditionally been pervasive* It coveredt the regulation 
of the compound; the extensive use of a dependent foreign 
migrant proletariat In production; the use of compound 
police and collaborators of various kinds. the Insulation 
of the compound fr9m progressive political and unionist 
mobilization; the regulation of Orations' In the service 
of productivity; and the manipulation of social life In 
various ways through the control of sexq drugsq religiong 
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education and other activities* In more recent yearsq 
these controls have taken different forms: the inducement 
of socio-economic-stratification amongst the African working- 
class; the exercise of threats of dismissal against foreign 
workers In accordance with government, policyl the exclusion 
of workers on smaller mines from the regulated provisions 
of the Industrial Council and bargaining agreements 
negotiated by the Associated Mineworkers Union; and the 
control of African union members and workers under the aegis 
of the white-controlled $multi-racial' trade union for the 
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mining Industry., 
Under the 'quasl-f eudal IX orm of production that has 
typified the plantation eoonomy of rural settler societyg 
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similar controls have applied: labour discipline has 
been austere; the penal provisions of the Masters and 
Servants Act havebeen regularly applied; the Industry has 
been specifically excluded from the Industrial Conciliation 
Act; workers have been *tied* to the plantation by a variety 
of trationslo credIt9 tenancyg 'squatter' and welfare 
policies; dependence on employers has been carefully 
nurtured and family subsistence has been closely geared to 
discretionary and paternalist options exercised by the 
owners of the means of production, 
In the domestic household production sYstem - an 
important but neglected component of the economic system 
a similar plethora of controls have applied Includingt 
the unrestrained and regular exercise of employer Power in 
firing and disciplining labourl the regulation of workers 
under urban areas legislationj the exclusion of the sector 
from the collective bargaining processes or even minimum 
wage-regulating machinerY; the control of the labour force 
through employer ownership and regulation of the Okiall the 
structural underdevelopment of labour's bargaining power 
through the enforcement of the tenancy system and Masters 
and Servants Act; the creation and maintenance of worker 
dependence on household charity and non-contractual transfers 
under an all-embracing and psychologically demeaning set of 
paternalist labour policies, 
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In all of the above-mentioned production struett%res, 
refined techniques existed - and (largely) continue to exist 
- to control the working-class# Furthermorej before 1945 
Igo 
these social and economic controls were mainlyg though not 
exclusively# under manappment direction and hence the 
requirements for State regulation$ though cruclaig were 
supplementarye It has been the rapid expansion of Industrial 
capitalism since the late 1930189 through the Second World 
Warg durins the Federation and in the Post-U*D*I, period, 
that has required the implementation and re-formulation of 
new mechanisms of State organized social control over trade 
unions an&: polltical movements that have represented 
working-class aspirations. This re-definition of the 
contextual character of capitalist enterprise In Rhodesia 
has given rise to the need for Institutionalizing a new set 
of regulatory devices over labour through the State 
apparatus In a sufficiently flexible way. 
opportunities for organized and collective working-class 
action have arisen through both unions and Political Parties, 
These two sets of Institutions and social forces have been 
the principal channels for working-class dissent and 
challenge to the framework of the system# Their Importance 
- collectively - has been In their sustained confrontation 
with the settler-colonial State and the Interests It 
represents as well as their ability to organize effectively 
on a mass scale* These elements of working-class action 
have not been found amongst workers In miningt Plantation and 
domestic household production structures where social 
controls over labour by individual managers have been more 
rigorously entrenched and fewer Opportunities for collective 
organization and mobilization have existed, Thug worker 
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actions In these latter structures - In the form of 
IdesertionsIq strikesq overt Iloafing1v local boycotts, 
cultivated Inefficiency and wage-compensation through 
theft - have exhibited class consciousness of a kind, but 
have not had the capacity to pose serious alternatives to 
the capitalist system nor provide the basis for political 
challenge to the settler-colonial States It has been this 
threat of working-class action In the 'industrial complex' 
that has led to State and employer repression of unionism# 
the divorcing of union activity from 9progressivel 
political mobilization and attempts to systematically 
incorporate the industrial working-class under conditions 
of re-defined dependence, 
Complexity in, -ýproduetion and new 
labour requirements 
have resulted In the need for various Instruments of wage 
control (ranging from the existence or non-existence of 
Industrial Boards and Industrial Councils to management- 
labour committees and Staff Associations)* The mechanization 
of production and resultant stratification of the labour 
force have brought about new hierarchies of labour within and 
between unions and Industries and the need for various 
forms of wage-determination and bargaining applicable to 
different groups of workers, The monopolistic nature of 
the Industrial sector has also added to the unevenness of 
wage structures$ so necessitating the employment of a wide 
range of Instruments of wage control to satisfY diverse 
producer interestas, The extensive dependence on foreign 
; apitals has also required that the interests of settler 
I 12- 
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colonialism and International firms (in respect of labour 
policies) be mediated and conflicts resolved In a 
stabilizing manner. The lynohpin In regulating social 
order and maintaining stability In the political economy 
hah been the Stateg the-,. primary Instrument through which 
employer nnd settler Interests have been served under 
rapidly changing conditions of production. It has been 
the State's primary function and policy not only to 
reproduce the social controls and relations that have been 
designed to create stability but also to modernize these 
Instruments of control in order to control systematically 
African trade unions and the African working-class. These 
issues are examined In Chapter 8. 
C OM L US I ON 
Industrialization has transformed the production 
structure of the Rhodesian settler-colonial system. * This 
transformation has necessitated Important changes In labour 
mobilization Policies both within the *industrial complex' 
and between It and other modes and forms of production in 
the economyo The State has per; ormed the essential task 
of reproducing the appropriate social relations and cheap 
supplies of labour that have been required by capitalist 
producers* Accumulation has been dependent upon the 
maximization of cheap labour supplies subject to stability 
constraints at the Systemic level* The 'new' economic 
Policies that have been adopted have sought to rationalize 
production arrangements and minimize the cost of 
IY3 
reproduction of labotr býrne by employers and the State* 
The most Important changes which have taken place occurred 
In the 'industrial complex'* The following Chapters seek 
to identify the specific changes which have resulted from 
transformation of the production system* 
#n 
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THE POMIGII '11IGRAN"rl AND CO%iTIlAt,, T LABOUR '3SYSTEM 
Any critical analysis of the contract and foreign labour 
system that has been operated In postwar Southern Bhodesia 
must take explicit account of the historical roots of the 
economyts foreign labour dependencyg the Institutional 
structure within which foreign and contract workers have 
been employed and the socio-economic function which has been, 
and today Is still beingg performed by the thousands of 
m1prant-Proletnrinnn who have been imported Intop and 
I 
employed Int capitalist production struettren in Rhodes a* 
A number of studies by historians$ economists and 
geographers have documented aspects of the foreign and contract 
labour system that has functioned from the 1890's to the 
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1940's In the Southern Rhodesian bconomye it-will not 
be the purpoce of this analysis to re-Iterate these findings, 
However$ it will be useful to mention briefly some of their 
more prominent aspects, 
Firstlyg the contract labour systemg together with other 
attempts, to attract foreign African labour supplies to 
Southern Rhodesiat was an essential foundation stone of 
colonial labour policy. Local labour supplies were not 
forthcoming In sufficient quantities at the (then) existing 
wage rates offered In the nascent settler economy of the 
1890's. Yetq the very existence and profitability of the 
small-scale mining and commerbial enterprises depended on 
a guaranteed and continuous supply of chpan labour from the 
---i 
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surrounding peasant communities whether located within or 
without the formal geographical boundaries of the Incipient 
settler state* 
Indigenous labour supplies were scarce at the ruling 
wage rates because of the relatively high opportunity-cost 
of Shona and Ndebele peasant labour at this time and the 
relative ease with which local labour could meet necessary 
subsistence as well as 'discretionary' consumption needs, 
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Hence the State and employers resorted to contracting foreign 
workers whose supply-price was lower than that of local 
labour. They came from the more marginal areas and strata 
of poor peasant-communities and did not have the opportunities 
for fully participating and benefitting from commercial 
transactions In the agricultural products market In their 
areas of origin. 
Expansion thus required cheap foreign labour Supplies 
at least sufficient to meet the shortfall on domestically- 
Induced labour supplies at the 'going' capitalist wage - set 
for the single adult migrant worker* One Of the principal 
means used to secure this objective was through the 
Institutionalir, ation of the foreign labour Supply mechanism, 
viz., the setting up and operationrlof contract labour bureaux 
designed to recruit* transportg finance and *distribute' 
labour to employers who had previously paid the purchase 
price. To this end the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau 
(H. N. L, B, ) was set up In 19039 The R, N. L. B. 's functions 
were various - to achieve economies of scale In recrultmentl 
to supplant private arrangements In labour recrultmentl- to 
IS6 
ensure continuous labour supplies to mines and plantations 
and other low-wage employers; to help reduce the labour 
supply-price or wage ratel to compete against the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WN. L*A. ) which 
supplied labour to capitalists on the Hand; to -influence the 
'market" forces of supply and demand; to act as a monopsonist 
for Southern Rhodesian employers in foreign labour markets and 
use collective bargaining power and the minimization of 
competition amongstemployers to the greatest advantagel to 
Increase the degree of competition against local labourers by 
substituting cheap foreign labour for Indigenous workers In 
production, 
In the early phases of the R*N, L, B, ls operations# 
contraetees were channelled mainly to the mining Industry 
where desperate attempts were made to both secure and - 
stabilize labour within the confines of a low-wage policy* 
Inatitutionalg administrative and political measures were 
necessary to ensure the desired supply of labour at the 
desired low-wage rate. 'Deserters' - and there were many - 
were severely dealt with, the Masters and Servants Act being 
ideally suited to this purpose, Forced labour 'contracts' 
were secured for the purpose of Illegally Indenturing workersq 
and administrative agencies of the company government were 
complicit In these practices, 
Subsequentlyg the RoNoL, Bo came to serve the needs of 
the State-subsidized plantation economyq thereby adding 
another dimension to pressures on the peasant economyto 
competitive position in product markets. Whoever the actual 
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'purchaser' of labour wasq the Impact of the R. N. L. B. remained 
structurally unaltered. Peasant underdevelopment within 
Southern Rhodesia was fosteredq thereby creating local 
mechanisms which would provide supplies of cheap labour-power, 
All branches of Industry depended on foreign 'migrant' 
labour In the first instanceg and only later was It possible 
to restructure the labour supply mechanism to make It less 
dependent on markets outside the Immediate control of the 
settler4colonial State. Since 1958 the State has taken 
measures to bring about this transformationg although even 
until 1975 there existed a profound dependence on 'foreign- 
derived' cheap labour in primary productiom It is 
surprising therefore that these aspects of changing economic 
structure In Rhodesia have been largely Ignored In the other- 
wise path-breaking analysis by Arrighl on the proletarianization 
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of the African peasantry In Rhodesia. 
Since the proletarianization process cannot be 
legitimately regarded as finternall to the Rhodesian State - 
and thereby not conditioned solely by domestic peasant 
underdevelopment - analysis must take account of both foreign 
and domestic sources of labour supply as well as seek to 
understand-thei; r inter-relationships and Impact on-one another* 
Only in this way can the theoretical and empirical Imbalance 
(arising from undue concentration on the proletarianization 
of the Rhodesian African peasantry) be corrected* 
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THE CONrRACT LABOUR SYSTEM AND CHEAP LABOUR IN THE POST-19408 
A detailed Investigation of the originsg naturep 
functioning and institutional economics of the post-1946 
contract labour system can be found in Contract Workers and 6 
Underdevelopment-in Rhodesia. This latter study examines 
inter alias the establishment of the Rhodesian Native 
(African) Labour Supply Commission the 
competition with WeNoL., A, over obtaining recruitment permits 
in foreign labour markets in Central Africa; the various 
problems of maximizing the supply of contract workers for 
employers in Southern Rhodesial the pricing policies of 
the Ro. N*L*S*Ce In respect of the sale of contract labour- 
power to producersl the factors that Influenced cost 
structures and enabled the Commission to supply labour at 
low cost to producers; the 'special demandst met by the 
Commission on behalf of large-scale International capital 
and the State; the assistance given by the State to 
employers using contract labour; and the domestic and 
international pressures which led to the de-escalation of 
the contract system in Rhodesia after 1958- 
Whilat all these factors need to be consideredg this 
section will be concerned with the following aspectss the 
establishment of the R*N, L, S, C, and the Identification of 
the Interests It servedt the changing significance of the 
contract system In the postwar political economyl the 
labour policies pursued through the Commission; and the 
effect of these policies on employersq the migrant proletariatq 
the African peasantry Inside Rhodeslaq and the rural 
proletariat on the plantations. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RHODESIAN NATIVE LABOUR SUPPLY 
COMMISSION 
The B, N, LS, Ce was established by Act No- 36 of 1946 and 
came into operation on December 27th, 1946. On 10th January,, 
1947s eleven members were appointed to take charge of the 
Commission In terms of Section 4(1) of the Act* The 
Interests represented on the Commission were allq with one 
exceptiong directlY associated with organized employer 
groups* The statute provided for representation of the 
Associated Chamber of Commeroeq the Chamber of Industriess 
the Rhodesian Mining Federatibnq the newly established 
Rhodesia National Farmers' Uniong Rhodesia Railways Ltd. o 
and the Municipalitiesq togbther with a member appointed 
by the Federatian of Native Welfare Societlese The 
Commission was put under the Chairmanship of an appointee of 
the Minister of Native Afflarse The composition of the 
Commission therefore represented a collusion between the 
organized and large-scale capitalist Interests which had 
for some time lobbied for the establishment of a monopsonistic 
structure in the foreign contract labour market. 
The principal objects of the Commission as specified 
In the Act were $to recruit and supply native labour to 
employers of labour within the Colony... (and) to promote 
satisfactory conditions of employment for native employees 
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In the Colony* It was also given power $to assist 
employers of native labour In the Colony to obtain native 
labour-andq for this purposes to assist In the distribution 
of native labour to those areas In the Colony where It is 
19c 
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required'. These two clauses enabled the Commission to 
recruit labour both within and outside Southern Rhodesia, 
To secure these objectives the Commission was given a 
variety of powers* It was given authority $to supply native 
employees to employers ... on terms and conditions of employment 
as it may arrange (and) to prescribe the remuneration to be 
9 
paido the rations and accommodation to be supplied'. This 
enabled the R. N. L. S. C. to set the proportion of wages to 
be set aside as deferred pay to be paid to the employee or 
dependants outside Southern Rhodesia, In respect of 
employersq the R, N, L, S&C. had the power to 'terminate any 
contract of employment between an employer and a native - 
if such employer (had) not in Its opinion satisfactorily 
complied with any terms and conditions prescribed by the 
10 
commission',, The Commission was enabled *to fix the 
fees# deposits and charges to be paid to the Commission by 
any employer for the supply of native employees to him by 
11 
the commission', To facilitate recrultmentg the 
R. N. L. S. C. was empowered to operate a transport serviceg to 
organize labour bureaux andmost Importantly9 *to enter Into 
any arrangement with any Government administration or 
authority to apply for purchase or otherwise obtain all 
rightsv privileges and concessions that may seem conducive 
12 
to the objects of the commission', 
The overriding economic principle laid downg upon which 
the R, N, L, SC, policy was to be based, was the objective of 
Isupplying employers of labour with native labour at 13 
reasonable cost'. This objective of cost minimization 
iv 
had Important repercussions for contract labourers supplied 
by the R, N#L, S, C. to employers, for African workers In those 
sectors to which recruits were draftedg for employers In 
agriculture and mining# and thereby indirectly for all other 
employers. The R. N. L. SX. aimed at maximizing the number 
of extra-territorial recruits at the lowest cost both to 
itself (as an Institution representing employer and State 
Interests) and to those employers to whom It supplied labour. 
Its own attempts at cost minimization largely centred around 
the securement of permits of recruitments the acquisition 
of concessions and policies designed to thwart Its 
competitorsq parti cularly the W. ML. I. 
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The R. N*L*S. C*9s 
policies of cost minimization on behalf of employers were 
aimed at obtaining economies of scale In setting up a 
centralized recruitment agencyg at obtaining the best 
available supply of labour at the contract prices at 
maintaining the 'capitation, fee 19 or capital cost of 
recruitments at the lowest possible level# and at fixing the 
wages and conditions of employment of contract workers 
supplied to employers, so as to aMow employers a high return 
on contract labour, 
The establishment of the Commission was a straightforward 
. attempt to Institutionalize a set of private recruiting 
arrangements that were being practised In Rhodesia at the 
time and to re-establish a centraliced recruiting bureau 
which had not existed since the RhodesianNative Labour Bureau 
had terminated its operations In 1933, Similar to the 
R. N. L., B, q the Commission0s composition was overwhelmingly 
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representative of employer Interests* The employer groups 
which secured membership through the statutes were dominant 
In the economic structure of the time and had been Influential 
throughout Rhodesia's economic history in the post-1890's, 
The appointment of a representative from the Federation of 
Native Welfare Societies was a concession to liberal 
capitalism and to the paternalistic nature of white opposition 
polities of the day, For Africans# the Welfare Societies 
at that time 'provided the main point of access to those who 
controlled government power'. Although various black 
trade unionists and politiciansg such as J, Savanhu of the 
African National Congress and African Workerst Trade Unions 
were active In the welfare movements the Native Welfare 
Societies' representative on the R. N, L, S*Ce was 
characteristically a white liberals the first appointee being 
the Rev* PerW Ibbotsonq a leading liberal figure of the period* 
The rationale for the establishment of a defined role 
for the Federation of Native Welfare Societies in the 
R*N, L4, S,, C, can be. found In its function of providing a 
controlled channel of communication between the Native 
Affairs Department anA urban Africans, The Societies were 
regularly consulted prior to changes In *native policy' and 
when legislation was to be Introduced which would affect 
Africans, Yets as Murray has reportedq the Federation had 
'few weapons to use In the struggle to secure benefits for 
AfricansO, Indeedq Oit could do little more than make 
representationO, And this on matters*of Interest to Itself 
and those persons it asiumed to be under its charge, 
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Soon after the establishment of the R. N. L. S. C, q 
dissatisfaction grew with the role of the Federation and the 
type of system which it represented. Its achievements were 
limited and 'the Society came under repeated criticism from 
African members for Its failure to present sufficiently 
far.. rreaching claimsg Its Inability to secure action on the 
representations It did makes and for its weakness In 
presenting demands*. From 1949 the Federation attempted 
to gain strength by increasing Its basis of power within 
European society while moulding Africans Into a more 
'saleable product'. Although the Federation was a member 
of the R*N*L. S, C. for the appointed purpose of Indirectly 
'representing' blacksq Its role and Its other activitiest 
principally Its support for the establishment of the Central 
African Federations brought It into conflict with black 
workersp urbanites and its other African political supporters* 
Indeedy by the 1950ts the Federation's role had become 
redundant In respect of the aspirations of the African working 
classs especially In respect of Its participation In the widely 
disliked Chibaro (forced labour) system. The Federation 
thus 'moved out of line with what the majority of urban 
Africans understood to be their interests (and) ceased to 
serve as a body for co-ordinating and articulating the 
demands of other African organizations'. Hencet by the 
beginning of the 19501sq effective Indirect representation 
of black labour Interests had waned. The R*N*L*S, C, thereby 
became a de facto grouping of employer interests, The 
nominee of the Welfare Societies was part and parcel of this 
/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groupingg the role of the Federation In African politics 
having been superseded by the growth and Influence Of African 
n ationalism and active African unionism* 
The R. NaL. S. C. therefore represented the dominant classes 
In the Rhodesian social formationg while Its activities also 
served the needs of the 'absent class' of the settlerO 
colonial periphery foreign capital and the metropolitan 
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bourgeoisie* Contract labour was not only allocated to 
small-scale settler plantation ownereq though this group 
did obtain preference (as food producers and exporters) In the 
period up to 1953, Foreign mining capital - notably the 
multi-nationalag like Anglo-America Corporation based In 
South Africa - also obtained a large allocation of labour 
from the Commissiom Since the late 19501sq howevers 
large-scale mining producers have become less dependent on 
contract labour though they have remained heavily dependent 
on foreign labour* Use of. contract labour by the State - 
on Rhodesian Railways and the Kariba project - has primarily 
been to the benefit of agrarian exporters and manufacturing 
producers both of whom depended on low cost transport for 
Imports and exports as well as cheap supplies of electricity. 
The large-scale plantation users of labour (local and 
foreign owned enterprises) have mainly been sugarg citrus 
and tea estates producing commodities for the export market, 
The R,. N*L*S,, C. was thus able to serve directly a wide variety 
of 'fractions' of capital# as well as the settler-colonial 
State whichg at least In this exercise In labour mobilization, 
worked In harmony with international economic Interests* 
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THE CHANGING STRUCTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE R*NoL. S. C. 
The ReNsLoSeCo, functioned explicitly as an Instrument 
of State labour policy, Its changing structural significance 
and function In the State's overall policy of meeting the 
labour supply requirements of capitalist producers resulted 
from the transformed socio-economie situation brought about 
by the development of industrial capitalism In Rhodesia 
and the need to re-organize contract and foreign labour 
policies as part of the 'new* economic policy of the POst-1958 
period., This re-adjustment entailed two aspects - firstly, 
the rapid expansion and then gradual running down of the 
contract systemo In accordance with the general Policy shift 
towards satisfying employer labour demands from domestic 
sourceal and secondlyt the gradual but systematic 
orientation of the R. N, L. S. Ce's activities towards 
plantation producers and away from other Industries, 
The first few years of the Commission's operations 
were diffioults Neighbouring colonial administrations were 
resistant to allowing 'their' labour supplies to be siphoned 
off towards the expanding southern Rhodesian economy, 
Negotiations for recruiting permits were protracted and only 
after a number of years of Inter-governmental neg-Clul-lon 
was the RN*L*S. C. able to secure Its principal objective - 
a large unrestricted recruiting permit for Southern Nyasaland, 
the largest proximate source of cheap labour. Here the 
R. N. L. S. C. encountered strong competition from South African 
mlnimg capital* W, N, L. A. was able to offer higher wages 
to Nyasaland oontractees and the Rhodesian ChIbFIZO system 
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had an inferior itanding amongst the Nyasaland peasantry* 
Furthermoreq the Moeambique government refused in practice to 
honour the 1934 Tete Agreement. Domestic recruitment at the 
R. N. L., S. C. 's wage rates proved to be hopeless* Nonethelesss 
the Commission still brought 279191 workers to Southern 
Rhodesia In the first 6 years of operation (see Table 1)9 an 
annual average of 4,531 from 1947-52,, 
Undoubtedly the climax of the contract system was the 
1953-58 period# the first half of the life of the Federal 
State and the last phase of the policy of creating a *foreign- 
derived' cheap labour surplus before the 'new' economic 
policy was introduced and controls first applied to further 
Inflows of foreign workers. From 1953-58 a total of 86,791 
workers were contracted by the R. NeL. S. Ceq an average of 
140456 per annumg a level three times greater than In the 
previous six years* Various factors contributed to this 
expansiong among them the rise in money and real wages for 
oontraoteesg and an Oeasier* political climate under 
the Federal State In which Nyasaland's Interests were 
subordinate to Southern Rhodesia's and 'Federal' projects 
like Kariba enabled the Commission to stress 'Inter- 
terretorial interdependence# as a means to obtaining better 
recruiting conditions In Nyasaland. By 1958 however, 
stagnation In the Federal economy was apparent* Unemployment 
in Southern Rhodesia had reached a serious level* One major 
objective of the $new* economic policy was to re-assert 
socio-economic stability by giving considered preference In 
the distribution of 3obs to the large numbers of Indigenous 
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peasants In Southern Rhodesia whose marginalized conditions 
forced them to become dependent on wage-labour for oubsiatence. 
Despite thisq and although general economic policy took 
a new turn In the Post-1958 periodg there was no attempt to 
recognize seriously the existence of excess labour supply In 
Southern Rhodesia and to close down the contract labour 
system. The R. N. L. S. C. continued to be encouraged by 
official policyg and It received continued political support 
from farm employers because contract labour supply was well 
suited to the Isnecial demandn' of this employer group. 
Whilst the 1959-72 period really represents one phaseq 
In analytical termsq In both labour policy and the history 
of the R*N. L, SoC., It Is worthwhile treating the period In 
two parts: firstly, up to 1964, during which time the 
RoNoL, SoCols recruitment policies attempted to take a 
stronger Internal focus; andq secondlyg the post-1965 
period# during which time Rhodesia's International policies 
have become Increasingly Isolationist, 
The level of contract labour supply through the 1959-64 
period was considerably lower than In the 1953-58 era. A 
total of 339515 recruits were supplied to employersq an 
average level of 59502 per annumq or 38 percent of the level 
for 1953-58* Againg problems of recrultmentg uncompetitive 
wage rates# high desertion ratest and labour unrest plagued 
the R. N., L. S,, C* and employers recruiting from itq as had 
occurred throughout the Commission's postwar history. 
Other factors also contributed to the diminishing role 
of the R. N. L. S. C. By 1961 it had become apparent .-- 
that tI herbiihk-uýý'ofFtlieTFed6rationzwasý-close,. atýhand. The 
Ro'N*L. SýC. I were aware Vthat-. thl swouldhbri ng Cnew problemstin 
ieciulting litbour': supplies-, fromý: thennewlylindependentýýAfrican 
state'bf ! -Malaiwia W1962nrecrultmentzpolicyrhad torbe-4, --1-,, y 
drastloally7atered'*'O cThevNyasaland! Government, ýstopped 
iietive'-, re6rultment. t', *, tAlli-workeratfrom 1962 - onwards- had-. to. --n. -I 
ber, 9volunteersf; 1,1ý1 1Thusrthe; )j1, N, L; S', C; Abecame more of. -, 'an 
Employment'Agencyle't tAs a-consequencerthe supplyoofiýlabour 
fell. shgLrplyý, to', 2i9l5'9'4", 57, 'ýpercent of the--ý 196 In. level'.. r. The 
bontractýlabour'supply--was alootadverselyrinfluenced byz. 
certain announcements", regarding,. the -icessation: oft the 
activities', of, 'the'ýCommission. -, ý-,.. -tRumour: was i rif e'-. 1w Nyasaland 
thýat", the lltýwas known i In-, the! ý ýtrj. - R-N., LS*Cet or, 14thnd1zV;,, as- 
verhacul'ar; had been closedý- downýnl: l The ', rumours - were-1 widely 
belle; wid'by. 'headminq villagers ,, and even-- African local, -, T! - tic n 
authorities, , and f ewerý -persons' volunteered to3contraet#,, =, I: ý 
-The-- Commi'ssion'Itself began-to prepare if or-, -, anti cipated 
political! changes It! wast f eared', that:, the 'newly, tindependent 
'African gove'rnment,,,. l n:! Vyasal and$-, underi, the, -, then ý,, seemlnglY 
radical Mrs 'Hastl ngw Bandag"t'would-, fje opard1ze. ý, l abour.: supplies 
"to 'the '-'settlers of, ýRhode'slaý) !, ý-, Howeverv`_ý even, - after, ,, an,,,. -! 
. ixtensive, policy ýof, 'Af ricanizationg*. - ýIt, -was ýsoon'oorrootly- 
'estimate d'-that ý Wasaland, would inot *belable, tto , provide -. Jobs.,! 
'f or': alL'Its *-labourl-f orce i and,. heno e, wouldlatill have, to ý rely 
, on its-"Itraditionallý,, labour, ýexport:: policy,, Iniorder, toireduce- 
-domeati-e-l, unemployment.!, ý7At, thisý-stageiNyasaland exported 
*ýiia'-Iiibour'-surplus'. 'atoý. theiýtwo., Rhodealas as well-'as, South, 
'Afilo6oh "I nd6ed, % ý more o NyasAl and. workers, had f ormal- jobs (. -, f 
Outside the country than within It, 
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Meanwhileg the R. N. L. S. C. policy on recruitment 
reflected the structural changes which had been Inaugurated 
in 1958- Attempts were made to recruit1locally on an 
extensive scale. This new avenue of recruitment was partly 
seen as an attempt to alleviate local unemployment In 
Southern Rhodeslaq but also an attempt to create Internal and 
hence more secure labour supply mechanisms to meet the 
'special demands' of the primary sector. In ig6o the 
Minister of Native Affairs agreed to allow the R*N, L. S, C. 
to recruit in the Reserves for a trial period of one yaar, 
j; o time was lost In the Introduction of a recruiting campaign 
and a successful application was made to the City of 
Salisbury to allow a recruiting depot to be opened In Hararl. 
In 1961 the Chairman noted that only 94 labourers (in 1961) 
were taken from Salisbury 'despite a great deal of attention 
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to this considerable source of supply#. Urban Africans 
were simply not Interested In either work on farms at going 
wage rates or working on contract for the RN. L, SC, The 
efforts In the rural areas were equally unsuccessful. 
In the following year the local recruiting efforts 
inside Southern Rhodesia were pursued vigorously but only, 
23 workers were contracted, Efforts to secure labour for 
seasonal employment also met with little success, Southern 
Rhodesian sources of labour supply were simply not forth- 
coming at contract wage rates. Only 25 labourers volunteered 
at the Salisbury depot for employment on farms and estates 
which by now were almost the 80le client Of the HoN. L. S. C. 
although 'applications for clerical posteg or employment of 
an Indoor natureq were In the vicinity of 8 or 10 a week 
throughout the whole year'. This did not help alleviate 
the shortage on pl antations which continued to be Induced 
by an upward Inflexibility of fam wage policy. The 
R. N. F*U., at this time was becoming increasingly interested 
In sustaining the R*NLS, C, In order to meet members' 
demands for contract labour supplies. Resolutions were 
passed at the Annual Congress of the R, N, F*Uo calling for 
further contract supplies to be obtained for farmers; and 
the R. N. F*U. agreed in 1962 to support the R*N*L*S. Ce In 
its operations by bringing pressure to bear on the authorities 
not to close down the Commission. 
Attestation of labour from 1965-71 was on a lower level 
than In the 1959-64 period. A total of 25,687 workers 
were supplied to employersq averaging 3,669 per annum. 
During this time the conditions of the 1946-52 period 
reasserted themselves: contract labour supplies were 
difficult to maintainj wage rates did not attract labour; 
desertion rates were highl and attempts at local 
recruitment yielded disappointing results. The 1965-71 
period was one of reduced activity and slightly reducdd 
demand. The fall in demand was a result of a variety of 
factors: a trend towards recruiting short-term seasonal 
labour In the Lowveldt the effect of no orders being 
placed by sectors other than agriculturej the result of 
a series of droughts after 19651 a response to the growth 
of Internal supply mechanisms; and the consequence of a 
dampening effect of sanotions on the demand for agricultural 
labour, On the supply side pressures built up to restrict 
recruitment* Thin was particularly encouraging to the 
supply of labour from Malawi to South Africaq and Jendered 
the R*A. L, S. C. less competitive in the field of labour 
recruitment In Malawi* 
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Throughout the periodg as In 
earlier periodeq the R. A, L. S*C, contract terms continued to 
be wholly unattractive and Incapable of luring many 
unemployed African workers In Rhodesia to take up their 
offer of employment* 
CONTRACT WAGE STRUCTURES AND CON. MTIONS OF E14PLOYMENT 
The basic conditions of contract were unfavourable to 
workers* Initially Nyasaland recruits were contracted for" 
18 calendar months and recruits from Mocambique for 12 
months* Wage rates were set In accordance with a rate per 
tic completed -a ticket consisting Of 30 working days, 
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This practice was still applied in 1975. 
In 1948 the wage rate struetureg which was to operate 
until 1954# was designed on the following basis. The 
Initial rate offered was 25/- per ticket for the first six 
ticketso with an Increment of 2/6 for each subsequent Period 
of six tickets worked* In a few special casesq for skilled 
labourersp the wages offered were slightly higher and were 
agreed upon between employer and employee, For the vast 
majority of workers recrulte 
' 
d9 the R. N. L. s. c. laid down the 
wages and conditions with little or no variation between 
employees irrespective of whether they differed In skill, 
_104 
ages occupational ability or productivity. The basic 
criterion for wage setting was kept simple and Inflexible, 
and made independent of job classification# work performance 
or f amily requirements, 
In addition to cash wageog contract workers received 
Orations'# usually similar to those prevailing in the sectors 
to which their labour was supplied* In the early Years 
of the Commission's operationsg food producers had priority In 
acquiring contract labour, The demands of other employers 
were not met until it was 'clear that food producers... 
received a quota sufficient to ensure food supplies for the 
19 
Colony'. Thus most of the early recruits were drafted 
Into farm work and their 'rational were set in accordance 
with the conventions of payment of $wages in kind' to local 
African f arm labour. 
Under the contract between the employer and the 
14N. LeSeCe 'the employer (was) under an obligation to furnish 
free quarters of a satisfactory nature to Natives supplied 
by the Commissiont, Few employers apparently upheld this 
aspect of their oontractq as the Chairman of the n, N. L. S*C* 
rePortedt 'It Is a regrettable fact-. that very few employers 
carry out this side of their contract - the majority appear 
to give new employees three days In which to build 
'%coommodationfl. Adequate housing as laid down In the 
contract quite obviously cannot be built In three days, $ 
Deferred pay arrangements were also part of the contract, 
Their net effect was to reduce the real consumption level of 
the worker during his period of contract# to act as an 
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Insurance for employers against $desertion' and to ensure a 
lump sum on arrival home after the contract had been 
completed* Thusl whilst deferred pay arrangements served 
as an attraction to the home country government to enable It 
to earn foreign exohangeg the'deferred payments system also 
operated as a security for the R, N, L. S, C. and the employer. 
Should an employee break contract he would lose his deferred 
pay which normally was kept by the R, N*L*S. Co until the 
contract was completed* These funds would then be used 
to reimburse employers for the cost of acquisition of the 
labourerg ieee to refund the 'capitation fee19 through 
rebateaq or a part of the cost thereofq dependent on the 
proportion of the contract which had been completed* 
The regulations regarding deferred payment conditions 
were governed by the Migrant Workerle Act Noe 9 of 1948 which 
Inter alia obliged employers to deduct the sum of five 
shillings per month from the wage of a $deferred pay worker$ 
provided that no deductions be made in 'the first four months 
of residence In the Colony** In practiceg there were 
difficulties encountered in collecting the deferred Pay and 
family remittances from employers on the due date* 
If the conditions of contract were unattractiveg the 
actual conditions of employment were even more sog such that 
the Commission recorded that 'It in a complete fallacy to 
imagine that the present conditions of Native eoplOYment In 
Southern Rhodesia are such as to be a very Potent Inducement 
to people to migrate to this Colony', The treatment given 
labourers by employers caused concern amongst the Commission 
and It was correctly believed to be 'a great influence in 
respect of Native labour supplies'. 
The R*N*L*SoCo concern was well founded. Out of 344 
labourers supplied to employers In 1947s 044 men left their 
employment and came to the Depot of the Commission to lodge 
complaints against their employers. Twenty three of these 
workers returned to work with the employeral 21 flatly 
refused to continue In the service of the original employeraq 
and were transferred to other employers', All the complaints 
were inventigatedp and were found to have good bases* Indeedg 
the Chairman observedq 'most of them (the complaints) showed 
that certain employers have not yet adopted a reasonable 
attitude toward their African employeesl, In stronger 
termsq the Commission concluded at the time that 'employers 
cannot hope to maintain their labour supplies unless there 
in a radical change In their attitude towards their 
employeest. 
The results of harsh treatment seriously militated 
against the success of the Commission as a recruiting agencyt 
'the Native (was) quick to advise his friends at home of any 
form of harsh treatment he (received) In the Colony'* 
Indeed# the record was one of relatively high 'rates of 
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desertion'* The abandonment of contract is Indicative 
of the diasatisfaetian amongst workers with their conditions 
of contract and employment. At root the objections of 
workers were founded upon economic grievanceBs Indicating 
a degreo of working-class consciousness that led to the only 
forms of opposition open - desertion and strikes, There Is 
IZ6 
ý 
therefore a case to be made out for the thesis that contract 
workers were both objectively and subjectively migrant 
proletarians* 
By 1949 the B*N, L. S, C, Annual Reports, show a marked 
change in attitude to complaints by employees which reflected 
either genuine change In employer attitudes and in 
conditions of employment* or a desire on behalf of the 
R,, N. L, S*Ce to donnplay the Issue. The former case cannot 
really be validated by the experience of the period with high 
rates of desertion being recorded from year to year* On 
the other hands the latter explanation appears to be the more 
likely and cant in parts be substantiated by the growing 
ambivalence of attitude of the R#N, L. S*Co to employee 
21 
complaintso Other evidences from Wadsworthq bears out this 
conclusion since conditions on farms were still most severe 
22 
and Impoverished at the turn of the 195018* 
The poor recruiting performance in those early years 
could only be remedied effectively by the R. N, L, S. Co through 
adjustments to contract wage rateso In 1949 the wage rates 
were improved slightly in an attempt to close the margin of 
competitive advantage enjoyed by WoN, L*A, and also to make 
employment more attractive to Africans In Nyasaland, Farm 
labourers now received 30/- per ticket with an increase of 
2/6 after the completion of the sixth and the twelfth ticket, 
The wage rates for surface mine labour were the same,;, 
Underground mineworkers started at 35/- per ticket with an 
Increase of 51- after the completion of twelve tickets. In 
comparison to the original rates set down In 1947 these-were 
II 
)o ý 
moderate advances* Thust whilst a farm labourer under 
contract with R, N, L, S, Co would receive an average cash wage 
of 28*75 shillings per ticket in 19479 In 1949 the wage per 
ticket stood at 33,12 shillings. 
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The Increase in cash 
wage rates was thus 1592 percent,, The new wage rates for 
contract farm labour compared with the estimated earnings 
of Africans In the plantation economy of. Z28 per annumg or 
46.6 shillings monthly in 1949. In mining and quarrying 
the average monthlZ earnings were 63-3 shillings in 1949 
compared with 37*5 shillings for cash wages per ticket for 
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R, 11. L*S*C* recruits for underground work In the same year* 
The wage revision had the desired effect and recruitment 
levels Increased. The increased supply'vas still nott 
howeverg sufficient to meet demand for oontraetees at the net 
price (wage plus capitation fee)* In partq this was 
related to the pricing policy of the R, NoL*S, Ce which had 
provided employers with a two-fold cost saving - In terms of 
low contracted minimum rates of pay and in terms of 
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subsidization of capitation costs* 
The wage rate ptructuret set for B. N*L, S*C. labour In 
19499 remained in force until 1958* The basic rates for 
farm labourt howeverg improved In current prices from 30/- 
per ticket in 1949 to 501- per ticket In 1954, Wages 
continued to be an important Influence on the rate of labour 
supply* The wage rates for Kariba were In excess of wage 
rates offered for other work provided through the RoRoL. S. C. 
and the number of contraotees attracted to this project was 
considerably greater* The starting wage at Kariba was 80/- 
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monthlys but working conditions and summer temperatures were 
trying and the *desertion rate' was accordingly high, 
In 1958o the wage structure was radically revised* 
Four 'medical* categories (As B9 C and D) were Introducedg 
based on the arrivnl weight of the recrulto This crude 
grading arbitrarily dictated 'the type of work that the 
recruit was physically able to perform** And the contractee0a 
wage rate varied aeeordinglyg Irrespective of skills 
experiences productivityg ages marital status or personal 
requirements* The cold calculus of bureaucratic expediency 
dictated the level of subsistence. Category ILI workers$ 
being over 5150 and weighing not less than 130 lbseg were 
considered'sultable for underground works Kariba or other 
heavy work0e They received a minimum of 651- per ticket 
worked* Category OBI workerep weighing not lose than" 
120 lbs, were regarded as *suitable for mine surface works 
Kariba and general heavy work on farms', These workers 
were to receive a minimum of 60/. per ticket workedý', -, - 
Category ICI workers$ being not less than 115 lbel were 
regarded as *suitable for farm workg sugar estateaq tea 
estateep etool. These workers received 551- per ticket 
worked* Category $DO workers were usually *undernourished 
persons or those In younger age groups'*, In height 59 and 
not weighing less than 100 lbs, q these workers were regarded 
as 'suitable for light work', They received 501- per ticket 
worked, 
These wage rates came into effect from list January, 1958 
and were to remain the basic structure of wage rates for 
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contracted labour up to 1963 when new minimum wage conditions 
were introduced, Although the Ro%LoSoCo provided for some 
differentiation in wage ratesq this was based simply on the 
weight of recruits on arrival at depoto In practice most 
recruits fell Into the lower categories and hence received 
the less favourable wage rates* The system of wage 
determination used In the R. N, L., S, C, during this period 
contrasts markedly In reality with the rhetorical 
pronouncements made at this time about 'racial partnership's 
the $new deal' In Central Africa, the *reformist nature' 
of liberal capitalism and about 'African advancement'. 
The revised wage structure also created the Illusion of 
raising the real wage level in 1958 over that which had 
prevailed In 1954, * The 1954 ticket rate was 53*12 shillings 
monthly* Under the revised scheme the basic level was 50 
shillings and the top wage was 65 shillings, ' When examined 
In real termsy after allowing for the change in prices in 
the 1954-58 period and for the effects of the wage policy of 
payment in accordance with the recruits' arrival weightg the 
average wage for recruits in 1958 was 64.4 shillings (in 1964 
prices# see Table 3) as compared to the real 1954 wage of 
68.9 shillings (1964 prices). - wage policy had in fact been 
so designed as to out the real wages of contraoteego' 
In 1959o out of 89080 recruits examineds 004 11*7 
percent fell in category 'A$ while 51.6'pereent fellAnto 
the two lowest categories*, Many recruits arrived In poor 
physical health and tended to leave as repatriates with a 
gain in average weight. Neverthelesep many recruits 
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arriving were in need of medical attention or were 
Itemporarily unfit's In particular this applied to recruits 
from Nyasaland. Many had to be repatriated at high cost 
to the R*ffL*S*C-, 
The low wages received and poor conditions of emPloYment 
encountered by R*N,, L*SC, contract workers had much to do with 
the high $rates of desertion' recorded and the continual 
labour unrest experienced amongst contradt workers, the Period 
1956-59 being a particularly turbulent era. In 19569 for 
Instance, an estimated 11.7 percent of recruits deserted* 
The following year saw this rate rise to 17.4 percentt as 
29043 workers broke their contracts which required them to 
remain In employment for two years* Of these 1358 deserted 
within the first sevon days and 409 within the first forty 
days'*. A total of 10259 deserted prior to 120 days of 
employment had been completed* This# together with 
medical repatriatesq cost the R*N. L. S, C, 9209124 in 1956 
alone* Iligh desertion rates worried the B*N*L, S*C, who 
noted that *the tendency of the Africans to desert (appeared) 
to be on the Im reaselt In 1958 the high desertion rate of 
16.6 percent gave little cause for satisfactions Thisq 
after all#' was the year In which 'improved' wages became 
operativee 
Desertion did not only take place during the Period of 
employment* In 1958 the number twho deserted on the way 
down from Nyasaland was disappointingly high at 269, In 
addition to which desertion from Depot before attestation 
was 1331. Many of these workers were believed to be destined 
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for the towns of Southern Rhodeslaq the Union of South Africa 
or the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. As the Chairman's 
Report noted: 'These Africans (were) unable to get out of 
Nyasaland because they (had) no money with which to pay their 
taxes and so they (made) use of the Commission to pay the 
tax dueq provide them with free clothing, advance them 
spending money and pay their fares to Salisbury* As a 
result the Commission's losses were substantial at about L5 
a head* 
The high rate of desertion In 1958 was closely associated 
with labour unrest at Kariba, Of the 29258 desertions In 
1958s 754 were from Kariba$ these contraotees being 23 percent 
of the total number of contract labourers supplied by the 
R., N*L*S, C, to Kariba* Again a high proportion of deserters 
abandoned their contracts within the first few months of 
their employment. Very few of those who deserted were 
founds despite extensive cooperation and efforts by the 
authorities, The Hasteisand Servants legislations which 
governed R*N*L*S, Ce contracts of employments did not prove 
effective In restraining contract labourers who wished to 
break their contracts prematurely. 
Labour unrest was not only indicated by desertions. 
The R, N,, L#S*C., continuously had workers submitting grievances 
against employers and insisting on Ire-allocation' to 
different employers, UP to 1955 there Is no published data 
on these Ore-allocations'. For thepperiod 1956-60 there are 
details on the re-allocations in terms of both numbers and 
ý1/ 
seotors, In 1956 alone 29731 workers were re-alloeatedg 
this being equivalent to 16.8 percent of all contract labour 
supplied In that year, For 1956-60 the rate of Ore-aMocation' 
remained above the 10 percent level. Typleallyg most of the 
Ire-alloeations' were associated with farm employments those 
of smaller farms being In excess of 45 percent of total 
re-allocations for the period, If re-allocations from 
$plantations and estates* are Includedg this figure exceeds 
70 percent of all re-alloeations. Thesedata adequately 
reflect the considerable dissatisfaction with working 
conditions In agriculture and the labour unrest In the 
plantation economyg as well as the unsatisfactory conditions 
under which contract workers found they had to work. 
The R. N. L. So= also took action to reduce unrest by 
sending back 'trouble-makers',, In 1960 over 3 percent of all 
recruited workers were so returned to their country of origin 
and the Chairman complained that this type of worker was 
on the increaset 1whIlst It Is no direct Indication--that 
they are politically influeneedg the bossy types are mimicking 
their contemporaries at home and Influencing the quieter 
labourers to go slow# strikel walk-out, desertg complain 
and generally to be a nuisance'. The R*N*L, S, C, regarded 
such persons as 'a menace and a dangerous element In an 
otherwise peaceful society'* And the R,, N*L., S, C, acted 
swiftly In troublesome'situations. Thus a strike of 1,634 
contract workers In Kariba in February, 1959 ended In the 
disoharge of the workers and Immediate repatriation at the 
instance of the Government. DesPite these stern measures. 
complaints kept coming into the R, N,, L*S., Co from employees* 
in 1960 alone there were 4,616 complaints submitted to the 
R*N*L9S, C,, from workers about conditions of contract either 
at the receiving depot or at their place of employment. 
It can be l6gitimately said therefore that the contract 
labour system resulted in almost everything that a model set 
of contractual arrangements should attempt to avoid* The 
method of fixing remuneration was crudely Insulting to the 
individual; the conditions of employment were harsh; 
contractees wereq from all reeords9 badly catered for and 
were unable to articulate their complaints effectively except 
to a relatively unsympathetic bureaucracyl labour unrest# 
a logical consequence# was rife* It was this set of 
conditions favouring employers which made the contract labour 
system a cheap source of labour supply worthy of outlaying 
substantial capital sums and obtaining a share thereim The 
lengths to which employers were willing to go In order to 
avoid adjustment to wage structures is adequately indicated 
by their willingness to pay both high 'capitation fees' and 
to bear the Indirect costs of losses in productivity 
which resulted from an extraordinarily high level of labour 
conflioto 
THE UIMERDEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF THE CONTRACT SYSTEM 
Various policies have been used by employers and the 
State to help create and struoture underdevelopment in 
Rhodesia, The contraot system has been (and still is) one 
Zl3 
of these determinants* It has been an Institutional Influence$ 
a mechanism to regulate and control #market forcesso. as well 
as a State and employer attempt to reproduce cheap labour 
supplies for the $peripheral center* of Rhodesia, Employers 
have used the contract system as a means of profit maximization, 
They have sought to recruit 'secured' supplies of cheap labour 
at rates below the price of local supplies, This has required 
the absorption of $migrant' labour-power from depressed 
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peasant communities outside the settler-colonial Stateo 
of major importance to the capitalist system in Rhodesia has 
been the effect of $foreign-derived* contract labour in 
forestalling ntructural wage adjustments in the primary 
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sectoro Without contract supplies greater pressures 
would have built up to cause mine and farm wages to rise for 
all workers# the cost being borne by capital Int, terms of 
reduced profits andýor metropolitan consumers In terms 6f 
higher commodity prices from the Rhodesian Periphery, 
A quantitative assessment of the. R*A*L*S, C, ls Impact 
can be gauged from the data In Tables 1.6, In terms of 
the numbers of labourers suppliedg the n*A#L, S. C. has Imported 
labour equivalent to 3389204 workers each working one year, 
or an average annual flow of 139528 workerps over the 25 28 
years of the R. A*L*S*Ce operations since 1946. The largest 
proportion of this labour was supplied in the 1951-61 period, 
a time of stagnant real wages for African farm workers (see 
Table Vo The absence of Imported labour would have further 
pushed up wages and ceteris -varibus 
lowered the rates of 
return to profit recipients In the agriculture and mining 
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sectors*: --, I1ore, -importantly, -, TAt would,,, have allowed', wigesm 
in, the agriculturallsector tO'follov wagelinereasedg in'the 
secondary and tertiary sectors; thusvffiactlngýasi "ro 6 9a roe, 
making the agricultural, ýsector,. a, more, ýkttractive-OPtion"'forý, 
local workers'whog whilstýbeing; unimp'loyid in the urban 
areas or-f orced, to, subsist An ItWrural'ýareasq i'; had" been 
reluctant to, seek-employment4oh7farms', underýthe'odepresgied 
wage rates andýpoor conditiongrof-ýimploymint, opei-atlie in 
the agricultural 
It has only been during, 1962-72'that thelneedýfoilthe 
RoA*L*S*CoIs policy, "ofý'importing'largirnumbers'ýof-. eontract 
lcondltloýsýin workers has diminished*, " A-series ofý'droughV 
a number of, years and economic san6tions-have significantly 
reduced the, growth. in, the demand, for agricultural". 1aboui'l 
Wage rates, and earnings-in-, the,. -oeotor, have fallen accordingly, 
These levels of remuneration havee(ini'atmaorokeontext). 'bien 
carefully controMedo ý'Indeeogý'itlwwohlylin the 1962-63" 
periodp when rupplies"from Malaii wereradically'reduoeds' that 
realýwages rose substantially! aal-a direct function of internal 
ma: rketforcps (see Table'-? ),; ý z- "', " ' ', --' , "%, ' ý -. ' '- "- "'117 
#- With the removal of-ýmuoh of--thelupwardý'pressure on wage 
ratesp the special demandtforiimported contraot'labour has 
been,. slowlY'reduosdý', ý, L*n, iout oftnecessit7p, partly the'result 
of'domeatio peasant'linderdevelopmentg an increasing supply 
of indigenous ýblaok labour-has been f orthooming; 
%AeLoSeCOsAmpaot as an agency for compensating -f oj t 
the reduced, "f ree 'flow#, of - black'labour'l nto 'Rhode at R'c'an'bi 
assessed from. Tablel, ` In the period., uVto, 1962Afree'flowl 
labour readily entered Southern Bhodesia. Since 1962 the 
black Immigration flow has decreased significantly. In 
contrasts R, A*L*S#C. 's share of Immigrants entering the 
country Increased from an average level of 20 percent of the 
flow In 1955-62 to 40 percent for 1963-71- 
In those sectors to which the R. A. L. S. C. has supplied 
large numbers of workersp the long-run impact of contract 
labour has been greatest. For 1954-59 the supply of 
contract labour to the primary sector has been above a level 
of 7 percent of total black employment. It Is not the 
simple proportion of contract labour In the plantation 
economy that Is important here* Ratherg It Is the extent 
to which wage rates would have had to rise to kttract 
necessary labour supplies Internally in the absence of the 
foreign and contract labour component. 
From 1961-71 the vast majority of workers supplied by 
R. A. L. S. C. have been to the agricultural sector. In this 
period the annual contract supply has exceeded the growth 
in employment demand In six of the eleven years, In those 
years In which the growth In agricultural employment has 
exceeded the contract supply# the minimum proportion of 
demand met through contract labour has been 35 percent 
(1969) and In most years has been in excess of 00 percent 
(19639 1964 and 1968). 
Adjustments to wage rates would necessarilY have followed 
from a growing inelasticity In the supply of labour were it not 
for agricultural Interests and State policy having prevented 
this from occurring* Indeedq In actually Importing labour 
alýl 
well in excess of labour demandi LM-P-n in, Years oftýdeclinlngy', i- 
demand# the B&A, L, SC, can be regarded-. as, beIng,, oneofLthe- 
major contributory influences to theýfalllngivage., rates! and 
real earnings of black labour in the, agrlculturalýseetor after 
1963o The effect on Indigenous black employmentf-ý-though, not 
easily measurable at the higher wage-rates that-might-have,. z0! 
prevailed if imported contract labour were not avallableg 
cannot be considered insignificantg especiallytin, the'-light 
of a growing labour surplus in the economy and-the"ý ttv 
marginblization of the peasantry* 
The overall underdevelopment Impact of the contract 
system can be disaggregated into its effeots, on varicuslý,, 
strata and classes In the Rhodesian social formation--r-, 1 
Particularly the migratit proletariatt plantation, workergg', l-r, 
the Rhodesian peasantry and employers (including domestiovAnd 
foreign capital), r, * "4' 
IP ,- lll'ý t ý111 . 101 f! 0tII lrý 
THE RETURNS TO CONTRACT WORKERS f0 
From 1947-1972 there were five adjustments to basic 
A 1!, 4 
wage rates at irregular intervals over the 25-year period, 
In current prices contraotee wages have risen from 28*75 
shillings per ticket In 1947 to 75-0 shillings per ticket In 
19729 As shown by theindex of wages this reflects a growth 
of 161 pereento Howeverg if allowance Is made for price 
changeog and the wage data are expressed In constant 1964 
prices# the wage growth is'anly In, the order or 17-6 percent 
for the 25-year period$ v1r*p an annual rate of growth of real 
cash wages of considerably less than I Percent annually,, 
29 
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It should further be noted that the data show reasonably 
clearly that contract worker wage rates In 1972 were below 
those which prevailed In 1954, And that for the whole of 
the 1963-71 period the contract wage wan well below the 1954 
level in real terms. Thus the last three wage revisions by 
the R, A, LoS*C* (19589 1963 and 1972) have not had the effect 
of improving on the 1954 level In real terms, 
It is argued above that the contract wage rate as set 
by the R. A. L. SoCe was equivalentg or nearly so, to the actual 
wage rate received by contraotees, There to no easy war, 
in which to test this argument for the total duration of the 
period under review* Howevers in an Interview with the 
General manager of the R. A. L. S. C. In 1972# the author was 
informedg though no data were advanced to support the point, 
that-some contractees may In fact have received a wage, rate 
marginally in excess of the wage rate set by the 
R,. A*LeS, C, If this is the case, In general, then the 
argument advanced above ought to be qualified accordingly. 
Howeverg in the only Independent evidence available to the 
author# found In the returns analysed In Chavunduka's farm 
labour studYs the contractees were being paid the (1971) 
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so-called R. A. L. S. Co. 'minimum wage' rate. It may thus 
be argued that there Is no unambiguous evidence to Validate 
the R. A, L, S. C-18 official argument that actual wages 
marginally exceed stipulated minimum rates* Indeedq In 
theoretical and practical termsq employers paying in excess 
of the minimum would be acting on 'irrational$ grounds. In 
ý19 
additiong the real PArnings of contract labourers can be 
assumed to have been close to or below those of agricultural 
workers on average since It can be reasonably assumed that 
contract worker $wages In kind* did not exceed those received 
by local workers. 
Furthermoreq the 'wages In kind' received by contract 
labourers do not appear to have markedly Improved over the 
period. A comparison of 'wages in kind' on contracts of 
the Agricultural Native Labour Limited (A. W. L., L. ) In 1943 
and 'wages in kind' provided for In the R. A. L. SX. contracts 
in 1972 bears out this supposition. 
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The differences for 
the worker between the two contracts would amount to an 
'improvement' In the stipulated weekly 'ration' equivalent to 
2 lbs, of beans less the value of j lb. of meat. Whether or 
not this represents any real gain depends on the relative 
price ratio of beans/meat over the period for the quantities 
mentioned above. Indeedg the small amount involved here 
makes It a frivolous Issue for serious discussion and unlikely 
to influence the conclusions of the analysis, It could be 
said then that 'wages In kind'. as far as Orations# were 
concernedg have been relatively constant In real terms 
throughout the period; andq since the major vati-able In 
the real income of contract workers has been the wage rate, 
it can be legitimately argued that real earnings too must 
have declined from 1948-70, particularly so In the 1963-70 
period, 
,, -, 
The real consumDtion level, of contract,, workers during 
their period of employment has been even more depressedg since 
21 ? 
contracts of employmentq both with R. N. L. S. C. and A. N. L. L., 
have always provided for a deduction from wages to be made 
to satisfy the deferred payments conditions Imposed on 
labour contracts by Interterritorial government agreement. 
The Migrant Workers Act No. 9 of 1948 laid down the minimum 
conditions for deferred payments by providing that contract 
workers' wages have the sum of 51- deducted from them for 
every ticket worked. On a monthly basis this amounted to 
3/4d, or approximately 13 percent of the monthly wage rate 
In 1949. As wage rates improved in current pricesq from 
the upward revisions of 1954 and 19589 the nominal sum of 
3/4d deducted monthly represented a declining proportion of 
wages and thus permitted a higher level of worker consumption 
whilst in employment. The 1972 R. A. L. S, C, contract provided 
for a minimum deduction of $2.00 for deferred pay in respect 
of each completed ticket. At a monthly rate this deduction 
represented 21 percent of the (low) cash wage earned. 
Thus a complete picture of the contract worker's monthly 
earnings, wage rate and maximum feasible consumption can only 
be gauged from a consideration of all these factors. In 
1964 pricesq the 19? 2 monthly wage rate was worth $5.62 and 
after allowance for deferred payments the worker could only 
feasibly consumel out of current earningst a sum of 03-89, 
this amounting to 69 percent of the average black agricultural 
wage of 1971- This was relatively high In relation to 
previous years and was the result of a recent Upward adjust- 
ment to the contract wage rate. Without doubt theng this 
group of workers' level of consumption and Standard of living 
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wm one of the lowestq if not the lowest, In the Rhodesian 
economy* Whatever the merits of the 'forced' savings on 
the worker's long-run welfares there Is reason to agree 
with the argument that the contract worker has represented 
one of the most exploited of the working class In Rhodesia, 
The other elements of the contract worker's real 
Incomeg housing and medical care, both the contractual 
responsibility of employersq cannot be assessed In easily 
comparable terms between the starting and terminal Period 
of this Inquiry. Early reports confirm the unsatisfactory 
nature of accommodation provided by employers who negotiated 
B. A. L, S. C, contractsl as was typical for the agricultural 
industry in general. Complaints about housing have been 
a cause of much concern amongst farm labourers. 
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Even the 
conditions of 1972 R*A, L. S, C, contracts provided little 
incentive or obligation upon employers to provide suitable 
housing since contracts allowed for $wattle and daubs 
structures with watertight roofs and 'floors of beaten down 
earth' to be regarded as 'adequate accommodation$, 
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Workers have been virtually powerless under the law to bargain 
for Improvements to these conditionst this being true not 
only for contractees but for all farm workersq over 3509000 
In a119 whose employment contracts have been governed by 
the Masters and Servants Act and who have had no legal right 
to Institutionalized collective bargaining* 
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THE EFFECT Oll THE RURAL PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY 
The contract system had serious repurcussions for the 
Rhodesian peasantry and plantation workerst two large groups 
at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid* Indigenous 
labour was 'traded-off' against imported contract workers who 
were willing to accept both lower wage rates than local workers 
and a continuous decline In real wage ratesq especially In 
the period 1963-71 (see Tables 3 and 4)* Governmental 
labour policy thus discriminated against local plantation 
workers who were denied the full effect of ; rising wages, 
and further employment opportunities* 
The wage rate In agriculture showed little Improvement 
during the period of operation of the policy andq In the 
1963-71 periods wages and earnings declined significantly 
from an already low level (see Table 7). From 1954-61 
the total Af rican f arm wage bill rose by 27.6 percent when 
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measured In current prices. Real, average'earnings for 
the 1954-62 periodg however# fell bY 7.7 percent. Farm 
workers gained very little from this boom period In which 
total profits from the farming Industry rose rapidly. The 
wage depressing Impact of external labour supplyq through 
both the 'free flow* and the contract systemg Is Indicated 
by the effect that the fall In the gross level of immigration 
(free flow) of foreign African adult males of 259500 (or 
25 percent) for 1962-64 had on wage rates in the agricultural 
industry, In the 1962-64 period earnings rose M percent 
for farm labour when measured In current prices# most of the 
212 
rise coming about as a result of structural adjustment in 
the 1962-63 period in which It is reported by the Central 
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Statistical Office that average earnings rose 8.9 percent. 
Since 1964 economic sanctionst the decline of the labour- 
Intensive tobacco Industryq droughts and capital-intensifica- 
tion arising from diversification programmes have reduced 
farm labour demand which for the 1964-71 period only grew by 
a total of 3.4 percent. 
In this period real farm earnings have fallen 16.3 
pereentl yetg as Duncangthe Chief Economist of the Rhodesian 
National Farmers' Unionghas reportedg the output per dollar 
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of labour cost has Increased 43-5 percent. It will be 
recalled that in this same period 123,366 labour years have 
been provided under the contract labour system alone. This 
amounts to 5-36 percent of all labour supplied to the 
agricultural Industry in the 196"71 periodl and# If the 
casual labour component used In agriculture Is excluded from 
the calculation$ it amounts to 7-3 percent of all-permanent 
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labour utilized in the agricultural Industry for 1964-71o 
These calculations are based on the period for which the 
contract labour system has been least significant. It can 
be concluded therefore that contract labour supplies have 
been# and still remain, a major influence In depressing 
farm wage rates. 
The above analysis considers the overall macro-economic 
effect on the labour market. The 'wage depressing' Impact 
for particular groups of employees In selected regions could 
have been far worse because there has existed a degree of 
2Z 
regional concentration In those areas to which foreign and 
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contract labour has been channelled. Thuag for exampleg 
In recent years the 'wage depressingO Impact has been 
significant In the north-eastern parts of the countryq on 
mines and large plantations and estates In the Lowveld which 
have consistently relied on foreign labour supplies. 
It was not only Indigenous employees In agriculture who 
were adversely affected. The decline in real earnings 
prospects In the economy's most labour-intensive sectorl 
falling to the point where the real Incomes of the 'subsis- 
tence' sector were a competitive and preferred choice# has 
also had the effect of reducing the flow of persons out of 
the Increasingly depressed and land pressured peasant economy. 
This has contributed to the trend of galling real incomes in 
the African rural sectort reduced the advantageous options 
for prospective local workers and added to the problems of 
domestic unemployment and low productivity employment* 
EMPLOYERS AND THE PROFITS FROM cONTRACT LABOUR 
A continuous supply of contract labour has been highly 
beneficial to employerag particularly those In the agricul- 
tural sector, The availability of contract labour at a 
net cost close to the price of local labour, or at least 
only marginally above It , 
(see Table 5), has meant that 
extra-territorial labour supplies could be used as one of 
the means of regulating wage rates for Internal supplies of 
agricultural labour and of helping forestalling an upward 
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structural adjustment to wages. Since It is reasonable to 
assume that foreign and local workers have exhibited equal 
productivitYs clear profit gains have accrued to employers 
from the operation of the contract labour system, However, 
while at the systemic level all employers have been able to 
gain directly or Indirectly by the Increases In cheap labour 
suppliesq certain 'fractions' of capital have been particu- 
larly enriched by the contract system. The following 
employers and classes have gained notably: settler (food) 
producers in the 1946-63 Periodl State owned undertakings 
on behalf of Industrial capital; South African multi- 
nationals (like Anglo-American Corporation whose Wankle 
coal mine made great use of the R*M*L, S, C. )t and large 
commercial plantations and estates selling In export markets. 
A necessary condition for Producer benefits has been 
for non-wage costs of contract labour to be kept as low as 
possible. tCapitation fees' have fluctuated during the 
period (see Table 6)9 reaching an all time high In 1953 of 
052*00 (current prices) or 069.1 (constant 1964 prices), 
Employers have exhibited a remarkable but explicable 
willingness to recruit extra-territorially through the 
B, A, Los*C. rather than bid Internally for additional labour, 
The large capital outlays Involved In 'capitation fees' have 
not deterred this practice since the net cost Of contract 
labour (capitation Plus wages) has not greatly exceeded the 
Internal supply price (see Table 5)- Hence emPlOyers were 
able to satisfy demand at a net cost lower than the 
alternative of having to bid up wages for all workers In their 
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enterprises This can be estimated from consideration of 
the data in Tables 4 and 5# Contract wage rates stipulated 
by the R, ALoSeCe have been In the vicinity of 80 percent of V 
the farm cash wage rate* Adding to this the monthly 
capitation costs per workerg and Indexing the SUM over the 
average monthly farm wage rates It is found thatq for the 
period 1963-71s for which reasonably comprehensive and 
accurate data are avallableg the net cost of contraotees 
closely approximated the average cost of locally supplied 
laboun, It Is no wonder then that employers greatly 
preferred this employment strategy as against one of promoting 
internal employment and wage growth, 
While real farm wage rates probably fell from 1948-62, 
rose marginally for 1962-64 and have fallen for 1964-71, 
profits In the agricultural Industry have experienced, -a 
different trends From 1954-61 gross operating profits in 
agriculture grew from 021 million to $48.4 million# a growth 4o 
of 89 percent in constant prices. In the case of,, -- 
incorporated enterprises - private farming companies, 
plantations and large estates - profits rose from $2.6 million 
to $7.6 million In the same period. It was In this Period 
that the postwar contract system was at its Peak and during 
which 'free flow$ labour supplies were also at a high level, 
Foreign labour supplies were thus a major Influence In keeping 
down the aggregate wage bill and maximising profits for 
employers* In the 1962-64 period when structural wage 
adjustment, became an employment policy forced on farm 
employers by constraints on foreign labour 8UPPIIesq there 
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was recorded a fall of 08 million In profitat being 8 percent 
of total gross operating surplus for this period. 
Structural wage adjustment therefore exacted Its price from 
employer profits* For the post-1964 (sanctions) Period, 
during which time both profits and wages fell and the contract 
labour supply mechanism became less strategic to agricultural 
employers$ it can be argued that profits would have been 
significantly less had there been no contract labour Supplies 
available to farm employers* 
Indeed# both the evidence on contract labour prices and 
the history of the B. A. L. S*C*ls operations Indicate that 
demand was not the major constraint in determining the flow 
of contract labour to Rhodesia, The principal determinants 
were on the supply side* This Is not to suggest that 
so-MRonal variations In demand did not dictate the rate of 
growth In employment opportunities in the agricultural sector 
to which most contractees were allocated. Howeverg there 
Is clear evidence that the competitive standing of R*A. L, S. C, 
contract rates wasq and today let too low to induce a large 
flow of labour into Rhodeslaq even from Malawi, For this 
reason plantation employers have had increasingly to rely on 
domestically generated supplies of cheap labour. 
The centralliation of the contract sYstem has also 
benefitled. capital* Prior to 1946, private contract 
recrultment'bure'aux were operating throughout the Central 
African region* Indeedq even until 1965 when the AeR. L. L. 
ceased to funetiont private recruitment Played a significant 
role In the contract labour system. Under Private recruitment 
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systemsp the recipients of lab=r supplies were not the 
only employers or persons to profit through operating a 
contract system* This Is well demonstrated by the A. N. L. L. 9 
a private company which profitedo on behalf of -, its share- 
holdersq trom the contract system It operated (see Appendix C)e 
The risks Inherent In private recruiting are well demonstrated 
by the experience of the A, N*L. L*t hence the advantages of 
a more formal Institutional apparatus to supply contract 
labour to employers, For capitalv the benefits of RsAoLoSeC. 
over private sector recruiting efforts have been In supplying 
a larger quantum of labour at minimum cost and at as low a 
'capitation feel as possible. R@A. L. SoCo had the ability 
to negotiate with governments for large recruiting concessionsg 
something which was more difficult for private recruiters, 
Furthermore# the costs of establishing labour recruitment 
bureaux were high and# unless operated close to capaeityg 
would prove too expensive for the private sector. 
Finallyq In regard to the relationship between the 
contract labour system and employers' profitst it should be 
noted that there are striking similarities between the 
manner In which the Rhodesian contract labour system has 
operated and the *capital transaction' nature of this labour 
supply mechanism. Employers face a Olabour shortage* but 
were unwilling to resort to market adjustment to meet demand, 
Consequentlyg contractees were purchased an 'capital goods' 
In a fashion similar to the acquisition of short-termg in 
this case two-yearl assetso- This perspective on the contract 
system throws into sharp relief the oapital/labour conflict 
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In the Rhodesian economy and highlights the Incentive given 
employers to keep oontractee wages (service costs) low and 
output (return on capital investment) high. Indeed it has 
been in this very conflict that the economic 'rationale* 
of the foreign 'migrant' labour Policy has been situated, 
The contract system has simply represented a highly 
articulated and closely controlled form of this larger cheap 
labour supply system* Its structural significance should 
therefore be assessed in the light of the 'free flow* labour 
system and the transformations that have caused revision to 
Rhodesia's foreign African labour policy in the postwar 
period* 
THE FOREIGN IMIGRANT' PROLETARIAT AND CHEAP LABOUR SUPPLIES 
Since the 1690's the development of peripheral capitalism 
in Rhodesia has depended heavily on foreign sources Of cheap 
labouro Labour mobilization remained 'externally-oriented# 
up until 1958 when the balance was decisively shifted 
towards domestically generated labour power, Howevert even 
after 19589 UP to 19759 the foreign 'migrant' proletariat 
was a major component of the labour force# especially In 
the low-wage Industries. Data on the foreign African labour 
force are provided In Tables 8-10. 
Throughout the Period up to somewhere between 1956 and 
1961 (the date is uncertain because Census Of EmPIOYment 
have not been annual) foreign workers exceeded 50 Percent of 41 
the African working class in Rhodesia. Howeverv their 
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relative and absolute preponderance has tended to declines 
particularly since the beginning of World War II and 
especially since 1958 when non-Federal foreign African 
workers were discouraged from entering Rhodesia. Only 
since the early 1970's however have official attempts been 
made to effectively phase out foreign workers already In 
employment in Rhodesia (and then only in a gradual and 
controlled manner). 
In 1936 there were 144*901 foreign adult African males 
In employment in Southern Rhodesia compared to a local African 
labour force of 107,581- Moot foreign workers were of 
11yasa origin (709362) with the balance more-or-less evenly 42 
divided between Northern Rhodesia and Mocambique. By 
1951 the indigenous adult male labour force had more than 
doubled to 24106839 a level of about 59000 below the foreign 
component of the African adult male labour force, the bulk 
of whom by this stage however were of Mocambiquan origin 
(101,618)o Thus while the 'ýAfrlcan labour'force grew 
six-fold from 1911-51, the domestic component of this 
working class grew at a faster rate (see Table 8). From 
1951-569 the inflow of labour from Nyasaland Into Southern 
Rhodesia rose by 45 percent to 1329643- 
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By 1956 parity 
almost existed between the domestic/foreign components of 
the African labour forces In 1961, three years after the 
'new# labour policy began to operate and close off Southern 
Rhodesia to 'free flow' non-Federal labourg the foreign 
9migrant' proletariat were a minority of the I .. Africans In 
wage employmentg constituting 2789373 workers out of 
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6129573* The bulk of the fall off In foreign labour 
supplies between 1956 and 1961 was from Koeambique and 
N. Vasalands the two largest sources of foreign labour for 
Southern Rhodesian employers, The latest data relate to 
the Census of 1969 when Rhodesian Africans accounted for 
4489744 employees out of a total African labour force of 
6779898. Only 2299124 foreign African workers remained 
In Rhodesia at this timeq a little more than 50 percent 
of the local African labour supply. The 1956-69 period 
therefore brought about a major shift In the pattern of 
labour mobilization (see Table 9). 
Certain characteristics of the foreign 'migrant' 
proletariat need to be Identified. Firstly, It would be 
fallacious to consider this group as a short-term migrant 
labour force Involved in regular annual or seasonal Ilabour 
circulation' from *home* to point of employment. This 
fact needs to be emphasized for the post-1958 period. 
For Instanceq from 1954-58 gross Immigration and emigration 
of adult African males was at a relatively high level (see 
Table 10) of around 30-60 percent of the foreign labour force 
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per annum. Howeverg this implied that around 40-70 
percent of the foreign labour force were continuously 
located at their place of employment as opposed to being 
Involved In Ilabour circulation'. 
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Since 1958 gross 
Immigration and emigration of foreign African males has 
fallen considerablyq with a small net outflow being recorded 
for each year up to 1972. In 19729 for Instance, the 
Inflow was 8.640 and the outflow 169290j levels less than 
-N 
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10 percent and 15 percent respectively of those pertaining 
In the 1954-58 periods In terms of the foreign labour force 
inside, Rhodeslaq however# this Implies that at most 15-20 
percent could have been Involved In external 'migration' 
In 1972* The extent of foreign Imigrancyl must therefore 
be considered smallg the bulk of foreign workers being 
more-or-jess Permanently domiciled In Rhodesia, Indeed# of 
the foreign-born African population of 337#840 (98,680 of 
whom were females) in 1969 only 1179400 had first entered 
Rhodesia sinee 1959 and 1529280 of the remainder of persons 
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who had entered before : 1959 were males* 
Secondlyp a significant portion of the foreign African 
labour force has been composed of females and juveniles, 
a source of ', ultra-eheapl labour power for white domestic 
households and plantation producers. In 1936 few foreign 
workers were women (367 out of a total of 144, goi, the bulk 
of whom were engaged in domestio employment and farm work), 
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By 1956 there were 12gO99 foreign African women and 209870 
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foreign African juveniles In wage employment, Thi s 
trend reflected the increased stabilization of foreign labour 
in Southern Rhodesia as well as the fact that most foreign 
workersg being employed In low wage Industries# had to 
*proletarianize' their families In order to secure adequate 
means of subsistence. This'was especially prevalent on the 
plantations, By 1969 foreign African women and Juveniles 
in employment numbered 159573 and 119853 respectively,, again 
a reflection of a bigher level of proletarianization of the 
families of foreign workers since bY this date the total 
I 
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number of foreign workers had fallen drastically from 1956 
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levels, The sectoral concentration of foreign African 
Juvenile and female workers Is also highly significant. 
Nearly 80 percent of the women and 75 percent of the 
juveniles were In plantation employmentg the lowest wage 
induatry of the economy, 
Thirdlyl although foreign labour polley has been 
epecificallY geared to direct cheap foreign labour supplies 
to the primary seetors by no means all foreign workers have 
been located outside the #industrial complex'. In 1936 
a total of 1079707 out of 144,901 foreign male workers were 50 
employed on the farms and mines of Southern Rhodesia* A 
further 10#712 were In domestic employment (one-third of all 
domestic employees)* These sectors have remained the 
dominant users of foreign labour In Rhodesia. By 1946 the 
foreign component of the domestic household labour force 51 
had riven to 18,932 or 36 percent of all domestic workers* 
In mining and on the plantations foreign workers represented 
75 percent and 58 percent of the total labour force 
respectively at this time, As the re-orientation in labour 
policy became effective after 19589- the preponderance of 
foreign workers in these sectors was reduced in both absolute 
and rilative terms By 1969 a total of 22,462 foreign 
mineworkers (less than 50 percent of the 1946 level) 
remained In Rhodesia, And In agricultural employtent a 
similar process occurredp reflecting the Internali7atio_n of 
labour supply mechanisms in respect of the Plantation 
production systems even though real wages had been stagnant 
I 
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since 1948 and falling since 1963. Nonethelessq foreign 
workers were significant in the 'industrial complex' 
especially prior to the 'new' labour policy of 1958, Thus 
Tow reports that only 50.6 percent and 68.6 percent of the 
Afrioan males and females employed In manufaeturing In 1956 
were of Southern Rhodesian origin$ a total of 379000 In all. 
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At this stage total African employment in manufacturing was 
759117* And despite strieter oontrols on foreign labour 
In urban areas and In industrial employmentq by 1969 there 
were still 179967 foreign workers In. this sectorg close on 
13 percent of all,. African manufacturing workers* All 
I 
branches of production have therefore benefit, ed' from 
Rhodesia's foreign labour polIcyq although the primary 
sector and domestic employees have 'been especially dependent 
on this source of cheap labour, 
THE FOREIGN PROLETARIAT AWD STATE LABOUR POLICY FOR THE 
MOBILIZATION OF CHEAP LABOUR SUPPLIES 
The #migrant' labour system which functioned in Central 
Africa for the benefit of Southern Rhodesian employers was 
not $spontaneous' or *traditional% It was not the result 
of the flux of 'market forces' nor even simply the summed 
consequence of thousands of *independent' decisions made by 
peasants to uproot themselves from their families and 
societies and to go hundreds of miles in searoh Of employment 
and a subsistence wage. in the minest plantations and kitchens 
Of settler-colonial Rhodesia. 
53 
The system was historically 
shaped by the uneven developtent of the Productive forces 
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on the sub-continent of Africag by the concentration of 
capital In specific regions during the colonial periodp and 
by deliberate institutional policies. The massive 
mobilization of labour that resulted required a central 
organizing authorityg collusion between different dependencies 
within the colonial British Empireq and a network of Inter- 
State arrangements and facilities designed speolflýally to 
channel the supply of labour-power to labour-searce centers 
of production. For this reason# It Is a misnomer to refer 
to the foreign proletariat as 1free flow' or 'independent' 
migrant labourg except as a means to differentiate this 
source of labour supply from the closely controlled contract 
labour supply, The fact that for many peasant communities 
the supplying of labour-power to distant employers became a 
matter of course$ following the marginalization of the 
peasantry In Central Africaq should not be taken to imply 
that such practices were 'traditionaV to African social 
formations, They were rooted Ing and remain linked tot 
the relations of domination established by the capitalist 
mode of production over the pre-capitalist social formations 
of South-Central Africa* In articulating these relations 
of dependenoep the role of the State and its labourpolielbles 
(as well as taxationg pricing and political policies) have 
been of central Importance# 
In Southern Rhodesia the State took an early Interest 
in the mobilization of cheap foreign labouro In the 1920's 
the Southern Rhodesian government took fsteps to protect 
migrants'en route to employment., It established medical- 
I 
posts and river ferry services and arranged Inter- 
governmental agreements to facilitate the release of labour 
from neighbouring territories to Southern Rhodesian 
employers* In 1938 the Free Migrant Labour Transport 
Service (Ulpre) was set up to remove cost barriers that 
thwarted prospective migrants In rural Central Africa from 
travelling to and from Southern Rhodesia* These services 
made a major contribution to labour supplies. Mere also 
provided free 'rations' and accommodation along 39500 
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miles of migrant labour routes* The State entered into 
the Inter-Territorial Agreement on Higrant African Labour 
in 1937 specifically to further Increase labour supplies 
from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Revistons to the 
AgrOement in 1947 and the Migrant Labour Act of 1948 
encouraged married migrants to bring their families with 
them and so avoid repatriation after the expiry of two years. 
In any eventq many workers never sought to return to their 
countries of origin and a number of those that did 
subsequently returnedq especially those from depressed 
peasant communities, 
In 1938g the first year of Mere operationsg 20p426 
Africans entered Southern Rhodesia on the State-sponsored 
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transport service, - By 1952 more than 809000 came to 
employment in Rhodesia In this manner and only half this 
number were transported back, by Mere. Indeedg for the 
whole period of Mere's existence (1938-58)0 except for the 
last yeart the numbers brought In remained well above those 
leaving on Mere services* In total Mere brought more than 
23ý 
7509000 foreign workers to Rhodesia during the 1938-58 
period. There can be no doubt, since these workers mostly 
took up farmq mine and domestic employmentl that this labour 
supply had a formative impact on both wage structures and 
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stratification 'within Rhodesia. Additionally many 
thousands of foreign workers entered Southern Rhodesia after 
1938 by themselvesl not under Mere or the R*N. L. S,, C, In 
1938 a total of 71,024 workers arrived in Southern Rhodesia 
from neighbouring territories. By 1951 the annual gross 
inflow was 104,000 and by 1957 it had reached a peak of 
1159000- Thus when labour mobilization policies were 
0 
reviewed In 1958 a significant area for change was foreign 
labour policy. The decision to syst-e mati c ally, reduceý 
dependence on 'externally-derived' labour supplies was taken 
in the Interests of stabilization of the Rhodesian political 
economy and as a recognition of the extent to which domestic 
mechanisms fostering a cheap labour supply had become 
effective In an atmosphere of advanced underdevelopment of 
the peasant economy within Rhodesia. 
CONTROLS ON FOREIGN LABOUR AND THE BE-DIRECTION OF THE 
FOREIGN LABOUR SURPLUS 
Post-1958 labour policy required a rationalization of 
previous patterns of labour mobilization, Domestic 
unemployment had to be averted. The build-up of a surplus 
of foreign workers would have threatened the stability of 
the settler-colonial State. Controls were therefore 
required In addition to attempts to re-direct the foreign' 
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proletariat within Rhodesia towards primary Industries and 
away from the higher-wage 'industrial complex'. 
The controls against foreign workers consisted of two 
types: firstlyq those directed against new migrantal 
secondlyg'those against foreign workers already inside 
Southern Rhodesia. 
The first measure taken was in 1958 with the Introduction 
of the Foreign Migratory Labour Act, The Act gave the 
government the power to restrict non-Federal Africans from 
seeking employment In r"closed labour areas' designated 
under the Act, Initially$ the urban areas were so designated, 
this being a recognition of growing African and European 
unemployment In these areas from 1958 when an economic 
recession was experienced throughout the Federation, 
Before the Act was applied It was felt to be necessar y to 
give notice of intention to apply the 'closed labour areas' 
olausel thus the clauses were first applied to Salisbury 
and Bulawayo in, March 1959. By,, June the Act had been 
applied with greater Intensity as gazetted regulations 
extended the urban 'closed labour areas* to Include the 
adjoining Town Management Board areas of Salisbury and 
Bulawayo as well as all municipalities (except Umtall which 
depended,, heavily on Moeamblean labour). In 1960 the Act 
was amended to widen the Minister's powers permitting the 
closure not only of local authority areas but of any area of 
the country* In addition, all foreign (non-Southern 
Rhodesian) juveniles were prohibited from seeking work In 
'closed labour areas'. By 1961 these areas covered all 
Iý 
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urban centeraq except Umtaliq as well 
areas of Southern Rhodesla, pxclu4ing 
effect of these policy changes was to 
supplies to the agricultural Industry 
*special demands' of farm employers. 
similarly assisted. 
as the south-western 
mining locations,, The 
channel foreign labour 
and so help meet the 
Mining producers were 
Also In 1959P the Southern Rhodesian government 
reviewed the migrant labour agreement which had governed 
the conditions under which *free flow' labour entered Southern 
Rhodeklao, Twelve months' notice of Intention to repeal 
the Migrant Labour Act of 1948 was given as required under 
the 1937 Tripartite Inter-Territorial Agreement on Migrant 
African Labour, In 196o the Migrant Labour iUbt of 1948 
was duly repealed. Neanwhileg the Portuguese Authorities 
had been informed of the Southern Rhodesian government's 
Intention to terminate the Supplementary Agreement to the 
Tate-Agreement and were given eighteen months' notice to that 
effect, And by July 1960 notice was given to the 
Portuguese Authorities of Intention to terminate the Tete 
Agreement Itself which had originally been drawn up in 1934. 
These steps were all necessary policy changes to enable 
Southern Rhodesia to control the steady reduction in 
dependency on external labour supplies. 
Concurrent with these legislative and Internal 
regulating measures was the I: rogressive withdrawal of the 
Ulere-faellities and services which had been provided and 
operated as a means of subsidizing and attracting labour 
migrants into the colony* This had an Immediate and 
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noticeable effect. In 1957 the number of adult male migrants 
brought into Southern Rhodesia by the Free Migrant Transport 
service was 499228* The withdrawal of transport services in 
1958 out this inflow down to 20,813, The only free bus, 
food and shelter route left at the end of 1958 was the 
Misale-Lilongwe-Dadza-Tete-Mtoko service which was not 
withdrawn until early 1961. Thus# by 19619 not Only had the 
Rhodesian government armed Itself with the Powers for Internal 
redirection of non-indigenous labour to specified areas of 
employment# but it had also withdrawn the free facilities 
and services which had hitherto reduced the migrant's costs 
of migration and had enabled large numbers of xorkers_ to 
oscillate between Southern Rhodesia and their respective 
countries of origin. 
As nswaka has reported, the impact of these institutional 
controls,, was In the direction Intended, 
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The 1961 Census 
of Employees showed that 64*2 percent of all workers In the 
seven main urban areas were Of Southern Rhodesian origin, 
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This compared with 52.4 percent in 1956.. In Salisbury the 
Indigenous component of the African labour force Increased 
from 40.4 percent to 58-5 Percent In the same Periode For 
the period up to 1973 only the Foreign Migratory Labour Act 
appliedo In 1973 this measure was reinforced by an even 
more stringent control under the African (Registration and 
Identification) Amendment Act which reintroduced a page 
system Of labour control.. All Africans under this Act have 
to possess a Registration Certificate ( 'SitUpat) though the 
issuing authority could refuse to register 'an African 
I 
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foreigner'. Foreigners without valid registration had to 
leave Rhodesia* The new measures enabled the controlling 
authorities to phase foreign workers out of the urban araas 
at a greater rate than before by simply putting a guillotine 
on the duration of validity of the registration certificates 
for foreign workers and by only endorsing permits for work 
in the plantation economy If Ilabour shortages* In this 
latter sector demanded additional workers* Eventuallyg 
should the authorities deem It warrantedg this discretionary 
work-permit could also be revoked. 
The effect of the new policy of labour direction hae 
already been indicated In general terms. Two major factors 
worked after the Imposition of controls in 1958 to disturb the 
previous labour pattern* FIrstlyq the 'free flow' migration 
fell steadily* Since 1958 a net outflow of foreign adult 
male migrants has been recorded In every year up to 1972. 
More significantly the gross level of Immigration of foreign 
adult male African migrants fell from a peak of 1159700 in 
1957 to 8,640 in 19729 the largest reductions In this inflow 
being recorded In the first few years after 1958, Thusq 
while the Inflow was 1079000 in 19589 it had fallen to 
0,000 by 1964. From 1966-69 the Inflow level remained 
reasonably constant around the 159000 mark (see Table 10), 
Scoondlyl, because of this fall In 'free flow* o1grationg 
and as a result of the decisions of many migrants to return 
home rather than take up less preferred job options on 
farms$ the numbers and proportions of foreign workers In farm 
employment graduallY fell* In 1945, soce 56 percent of, 
11 
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or 560083, workers Ing the plaýtatlon labour force were of 59 
non-indigenous origim By around 1955 these numbers had 
more than doubled and the peak of foreign labour dependence 
in the plantation sector had been reachedg with 60 percent of 
6o 
all workers being of non-indigenous origim Howeverg 
by 1961 only 50 percent of African workers were foreignq and 
by 1972 the proportion had fallen further to 36 percent* 
The number of foreign workers on plantations had also fallen 
In absolute terms from 1956 onwards (when 1379030 foreign 
workers were employed) to the level of 1209964 In 1972* 
Thus the controls Introduced on foreign migrants Initially 
had an Impact in changing the composition of the urban 
labour force and only at a later date an Impact on the farm 
labour force* Thereforeq farm employers contlnuedýto hire 
foreign migratory workers# as well as contract labour 
through the R. A. L. S*Co to the extent that total demand was 
unsatisfied by local suppliesq even though the latter were 
more forthcoming as a result of a serious decline In black 
rural incomes In Rhodesia since 1958, This Policy to 
substitute local labour for foreign workers without Increasing 
wage, costs to employers Involved a delicate optimizing 
arrangement, 
Similar considerations have applied In respect Of 
mineworkers, Controls on foreign labour within the mining 
Industry have only been moderately applied* Policies in 
general have been designed to ensure adequate cheap labour 
to producersg even though this has meant the continuation 
of a heavy dependence on foreign labour. By 19739 however$ 
t4 2- 
mild pressures were being applied bY the State to encourage 
producers to switch to domestic labour supplies* The 
Minister of Labour called for Isizeable reductions (in) the 
61 
foreign content of the labour force'. A major concern, 
similar to that which existed with urban employment 15 years 
before# was Indigenous African unemployment which had by 
this time grown to such an extent that local Africans were 
now ft=ed to take low-wage jobs In mines - as on the 
plantations - whereas previously only migrants from 
extremely depressed rural areas would have been willing to 62 
take such employment* These measures to reverse the flow 
of foreign labour away from even primary production and to 
enforce a net outflow of 'aliens' from this sector marked 
a new phase of labour re-directior4as it also reflected the 
phase of development reached by peripheral capitalism In 
Rhodesia. Both the State and International capital 
co-operated to bring about such a transition as rapidly as 
was consistent with the mainte. nance of a high level of 
63 
profits. By April 1974 the Chamber of Hines had agreed 
to join the Government tin a determined bid to press 
mine-owners to cut the number of foreign African labourers 
64 
employed In the Industry* On some mines foreign labour 
still constituted 75 percent of the labour force and (in 
1969) the foreign mineworker component exceeded 50 percent 65 
of total African mining employment* The process of wholly 
reducing the primary sector's dependence on foreign labour, 
therefore# had a long way to got especially since come 
employers were resistant to switch to local workers and for 
2ý 
a n=ber the transition would not have been a c0stless 
exercise, Indeed# it Is arguable that such a obJec- 
tive had not even been seriously considerod by the mid-1970's. 
although there can be no doubt that the State was at this 
stage actively seeking to reduce dependence on foreign labour, 
The now emphasic in labour re-direction P011cles (the 
elocalizing' of the cheap labour supply In primary production) 
was heightened bY the first formal State acceptance in 
N, ovember 1974 of a policy to permit South African mining 
capital (through wjh1, L*A-, 
) to recruit Africans from Rhodesia 
for work in South Africa, The decision was made without 
reference to the Chamber of Mines or the R, NF, Ug the two 
bodies representing industries that might have been affected 
by Rhodesia's new Olabour exporter$ status in the Southern 
African complex, This outlet for surplus foreign labour 
would benefit 'both the State and International capital, It 
enabled Rhodesia to speed up its 
0100alization' programme 
In the primary sector and so absorb a greater amount of its 
own domestic unemployment# It helped stabilize the labour 
supýly to South African mines which had been cut Off from 
Nalawlan sources by the Malawian government In mid-1974 and 
were being similarly threatened by the deoolonization of 
Mocambiqueo This enabled foreign workers and multinationa3.9 
to boost the net rate of return from operations both in 
Rhodesia and South Africa* Whilet It is too early to assess 
the Impact of this new initiative in the State's foreign 
labour. polloYs it is clear that it represents a decialve 
shift in the cheap-labour supply Position In Rhodellia 
7-94 
and part of a new phase of applying various kinds of 
control on the continued residence and emPloYment of foreign 
African labourers already inside Rhodesia, 
CONCLUSION 
The foreign 'migrant' and contraot labour sYstems have 
served the specific purpose Of Providing for the reproduction 
of cheap labour supplies to primary sectors In the phase of 
industrial capital accumulation, The Internalization of 
the structures of labour supply for these industries which 
began in the 1960's was a logical extension Of controls on 
the 'freel entry of foreign labour Into Rhodesia, State 
policy has been crucial in 
bringing about this transition 
and controlling the process of foreign labour re-direction, 
Reduction In dependence on foreign in-migration and 
resident foreign nationals 
In the Primary sector labour 
force marked a new phase of this Policy and reflects the 
rationalization of the socio-economic problems that have 
arisen from the internal structures of the economy. 
In this new phasel and for the futureq the foreign 
migratory labour system is likely to be entirely absent - 
despite a slight Positive inflow in 1973,66 The contract 
labour system will continue, it seems, at least for a 
short whilev as long as an linsuranceIg or highly profitable 
stop. gap laboUr supply mechanismg is required for the 
plantation economy* An Important foreign labOur exodus 
can be anticipated as peasant labour supplies reduce the 
2A ý 
demand for foreign labour In mining and agriculture,, as 
unetployment In Rhodesia continues to growq and as it 
becomes necessary to respond to pressures to absorb local 
Africans at an increasing rate Into the labour market* 
The foreign and contract labour supply mechanisms have 
become less Important to capitalist development In Rhodesia, 
Their replacement by Internal structures of labour supply - 
particularly the advancement of the underdevelopment of 
the peasant economy - therefore acquired special Importance 
for the postwar period In Rhodesia, 
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CHAPTER 
PEASANT UNI)ERDEVELOPMENT AND THE MOBILIZATION 
OF LOCAL LABOUR SUPPLIES 
The overall processes of proletarlanizationg under- 
development of the peasant economy as well as the development 
of African agrarian capitalism have been central In Postwar 
Rhodesian development. The analysis here Is concerned with 
inter-alla: the changing function of the peasant peripheryl 
the long run macro-economic trends of the peasant economy 
over the perlodl the Impact of Policies affecting the 
primary means of peasant production - land - as these haVe 
enabled cheap labour mobilization; the Internal structural 
adjustments that occurred within the peasant economyt the 
resultant class formation process and Its Impact on labOur 
suppliesl and the mediation of the State In ensuring the 
appropriate Oblend' of underdevelopment necessary to 
reproduce the peasant economy as a Olabour colonyl Incapable 
of autonomous development. 
The significance of these processes can be ascertained 
from their central role in the accumulation of capitalt the 
mobilization of an 
. 
expanding but cheap local labour supply, 
and the development of peripheral capitalism under the settler- 
colonial system. 
THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF PEASANT UNMRDEVELOPMFNT AND 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE IMIGRANTI LABOUR SySTEM 
ITS 
Labour mobilization In postwar Rhodesia became 
Increasingly dependent on local labour supplies, The 
47 
extraction of cheap labour-power from the peasant communities 
within the formal Rhodesian State requiredg as a necessary 
condition for the development of peripheral capitalism and 
the maintenance of settler colonialiamg the sustained 
underdevelopment of the peasantry and the subordination of 
the pre-capitalist mode(s) of production and their social 
formations. 
The peasant production structure (since colonization) 
has been tied to and shaped by the dominant capitalist modeg 
thereby providing the means for the 'primitive' accumulation 
2 
of capital. In doing so It subsidized the low wage policies 
of employersq and provided for the subsistence and replenish- 
ment of a cheap 'migrant' labour supply rooted In the 
'Reserves'. In the period during which industrial capital 
formation became dominantg labour requirements changedt 
especially in requiring the development of cheapq internal 
labour supply mechanisms for all branches of capitalist 
productionj notably primary producers. In this phaseq the 
peasant economy steadily assumed the role ofq and was 
're-created' as, a Olabour colony' for employers of wage- 
labour, It was State policy 'to transform tribesmen. **Into 
... labourers (rather) than Into productive farmers'. 
3 
At 
the same timeg capitalist relations of production steadily 
penetrated the peasant economy, dissolving pre-capitalist 
forms and Integrating the peasantry Into national and 
international exchange relationships which reflected the 
subordination of the peasantry to the labour requirements 
of capital. The dissolution of the pre-capitalist production 
I 
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structure and social formation however was Incomplete and 
4 
uneven* This was necessary In order that the Ilabour 
reserve' economy could continue to perform Important, funetions 
in the service of the dominant classes of capIta1q notably 
that of a supplier of labour-power at wage levels below the 
cost of labour's reproduction. 
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The rural-based Proletarianization process typical of 
settler-colonial Rhodesia of the 1940's onwards9 arose from 
the, necessary character of labour 'migration' and the specific 
articulation between the modes of production. The 
'circulation' of labourers between the peasant economy and the 
centers of production (Industriesq minesq farms and domestic 
households) as well as between 'fractions' of capita, 19 masked 
the essential process that took plaeeg vizot the large-scale 
sale of labour-power clua commodit-i-, -, by a rural-based 
proletariat in accordance with the requirements of capital 
and the State* The long-term success of the $migrant' 
system - and the greater reliance on Internal supply systems 
after the 1940's - presupposed the continuing underdevelopment 
of the productive base of the peasantry. This process was 
assisted by the tendency of rural African class differentiation 
to become more pronounced with the development of African 
agrarian capitalism and the expansion of wage-labour relations 
within the peasant economy. 
Whilst labour 'migration' was an unavoidable experience 
for the peasantryg In order to 'bridge the gap* between 
production and consumption (at subsistence level), It was 
also necessary for the State (at the sZstemic level) to 
0 
ensure a minimum viability of the peasant economic structure 
so that peasant households could continue to supply labour to 
producers under a dominant (non-exclusive) Peripheral capitalist 
6 
mode of production, The contemporary postwar process of 
peasant underdevelopment embodied these two elements of 
'dissolution-reconstitution* of the peasant mode(s) of 
production* The unevenness of the process led to both a 
complex articulation with the dominant mode and a variegated 
class structure within the Rhodesian periphery. 
Structural developments have ensured that the peasant 
economy eventually served theneeds of primary producers 
thereby enabling, through the peasant 'underproduction' crisis, 
the substitution of local for foreign labour supplies In 
mining and plantation production, The way in Uhich the 
reserve economy's subordination to capital was articulated has 
thus altered. In the pre-1940 phaseq the peasantry served 
the function of producing both commodities for export or 
domestic markets and labour for local producers* A large 
share of the costs of labourts reproduction not met from 
wages was borne by $foreign' peaaantries. During and after 
the 1940'sp especially 19589 the Rhodesian peasant economy 
bore more of this burden. Furthermoreg It did so with 
increasing reference to plantation and mining Industries, 
(By 1975 the Rhodesian peasant economy provided a basis for 
the supply of cheap labour to mining producers In South Africa. ) 
This trend was emphasized as wages in the $industrial complex' 
rose more rapidly than in the primary sector and came to 
approximate more closely the costs of labour's reproduction. 
.4 
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Without this tswitchl In policy, primary producers would not 
have been able to keep wages low (and falling after 1963 in 
the case of the plantation sector where most of the absorption 
of local labour supplies occurred) as well as reduce their 
relative"and absolute dependence on foreign labour as 
production and employment both Increased. 
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Political and Institutional means were thus still required 
In the post-19409s to ensure the functional efficiency of 
theýpeasant mode as well as to 'harmonize' the labour 
mobilization process so as to ensure the development of all 
branches of production, Thus the phase of primitive 
accumulation has continued in Rhodesia right up to the 1970's, 
Very, few'primary Industry workers had the full costs of 
reproducing their labour wholly met from wages. Accumulation 
was therefore based on an essential element of value 
transferred from non-eapitalist to capitalist production. 
The Interconnection of primary and secondary industryg and 
the systemia'-Interdependence of all sectors in the social 
formationg also meant that primitive accumulation remained 
the basic pattern even In respect of some producers who 
'remunerated workers above the cost of reproduction of their 
I aboure - 
PERSISTENT PEASANT POVERTY OVER THE LOM TERM 
Maoro-economic data on peasant productiong accumulation, 
marketed sales and Income distribution are not available In 
a comprehensive and adequate form, 
8 
Nonetheless, from the 
0 
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data that do exist it is possible to establish the nature 
of certain important long term trends In the peasant economy. 
With the start of the policy of land allenationg there 
existed a long term In-built mechanism leading to low 
productivity for the peasant economy as a whole. In a 
detailed investigation of productivity changes In African 
agricultureg Yude1man has found that for the period 1900-1950 
the-rural population increased by 'something like 140 percent 
at a time when output rose by 140 to 150 percent and 
9 
cultivated acreage was extended by 260 to 270 percent'* 
For the 1948-58 periodg large shifts in population took 
place In connection with the implementation of the Land 
Aýportlonment Act (1930) and so equivalent indices cannot 
easily be constructed. Nonetheless, Dunlop has constructed 
an index of 'rural labour productivity# which Indicates that 
peasant productivity stagnated at a low level over the 
10 
1946-70 period. Both Yudelman and Dunlop have reported 
that Internal processes of socio-economic stratification and 
concentration of production occurred in 'African Agriculture, 
generally (as between producers in Tribal Trust Lands and 
those In African Purchase Areas). Weinrlohq Le Roux and 
Reynolds have shown that this stratification also existed In 
the case of the 'peasantry proper* (I. e, q within the Tribal 11 
Trust Lands)e The long term postwar pattern of peasant 
underdevelopment does not therefore simply reflect a 
stagnation of output or Incomess but rather a Omarginalization' 
in which various strata of peasantry were created, Some 
peasants were heavily Immersed in wage-labour dependence 
. 2. 
whilst others were able to obtain the means of subsistence 
12 
from peasant production. This Intensified stratification 
of the peasantry was a necessary condition for mobilizing 
cheap local labour supplies towards mining and plantation 
Productiono 
Stagnant acreage yields In the peasant economy and 
falling labour productivity in certain strata of the 
peasantry had a marked effect on the available peasant 
surplus* Surpluses over 'production for own consumption' 
would normally be re-Invested or consumedo In either 
Instance# surpluses would have to be 'realized' through the 
Grain Marketing Board or Its authorized agents in the rural 
areass through 'legal' mission and European farm purchasing 
channelsq through what used to be termed (by Native 
Commissioners) 'Native-to-Nativel transactions$ or through 
'illegal* sales designed to avoid the producer levies 
13 
placed on marketed African surpluses. Typicallyq In poor 
seasonsq -as the Chief Native Commissioner (C, N. C, ) recorded 
In 1941, 'Native to Native transactions (took place) on a 
14 
greatly Increased sealet. And though C*N,, C. 's argued 
in the 1950's that these sales were relatively sma, 119 and 
did not significantly compare with total marketed productiong 
more recent micro studies for the late 1960's Indicate that 
peasants attempted to circumvent authorized dealers In 
significant measure* 
15 
Thus the available time series data 
for marketed crop'sales may be to some degree an Imperfect 
measure of the peasant surplus. Despite thiag the 'income 
n 
from sales' datal which Include sales of stock, can provide 
),, ý 3 ', - 
a useful Insight Into the changing prospects for accumulation 
in the peasant economy. The 'income from sales' component 
of the accounts of the rural household population Is also an 
important measure because it Is Indicative of the cash 
resources available to peasant producers, 
Throughout the 1946-70 period the peasant surplus (as 
reflected through 'income from sales' data) was smallq variable 
and at a level Incapable of furthering the expansion of 
16 
peasant production beyond a basic subsistence level. In 
all the years between 1954 and 1967 the 'income from sales' 
In the rural household sector was more than 25 percent greater 
than in 1968 (as measured in current prices). The rural 
household sector Income from sales per head in 1968'was- 
less than 30 percent of the 1956 level (current price 
estimates)* At no time from 1954 to 1970 did income from 
sales per head of the runal household population exceed- 
$7.6 (current prices)# a level inddequate for even moderate 
expansion of peasant production. 
With accumulation constrainedg incomes per head fallingg 
yields stagnant and an ever Increasing population dependent 
on and resident In the Reserves# the peasant economy existed 
in a state of chronic underdevelopment. 
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Apart from the 
rural African bourgeoisie# most rural African households 
became more dependent on wage-labour for subsistence, 
LAND CONSTRAINTS AND LABOUR MOBILIZATION 
The constraints on peasant production arose from 
structural considerationsg the Imbalance In the relationship 
between land and population being an essential element of 
this malformation In the economic system. As has been 
shown elsewhereq African 'reserve$ land areas were forced to 
bear an Increasing burden of providing for the dependents 
of wage earnersp the unemployedv the slat and the aged. 
Dunlop has shown that over the 1954-71 period the rural-based 
African population 'doubled In relation to a 74 percent rise 
in total population's 
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The size of the African Ilabour 
reserves' (the Tribal Trust Lands) fell from 40*2 million 
acres in 1962 to 39-9 million acres In 1969 during a period 
when African population growth rose by 3.4 percent per annum. 
Furthermore the quality of African land was overwhelmingly 
Inferior to that of'European' designated rural land throughout 
the periodg both from the viewpoint of agro-economic 
20 
conditions, and in relation to markets and Infrastructure* 
The artificial scarcity of land for peasant production 
represented the opposite side of the coin of an equally 
artificial land surplus made available to plantation 
producers* This unequal division of land resources between 
two land-using classes reflected the subordination of the 
peasantry in the social formationg the priorities of the 
settler-oolonial State and Its dominant classesq and the 
central requirement of all branches of production that local 
labour supplies be supplied below the cost of labour's 
reproduction* 
The concrete historical-form In which these social 
relations were articulated must not be seen as a simple 
Taotor allocation' problemg but rather as developments In 
25F 
the specific nature of the political economy of settler 
colonialism, 
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Land was not merely an 'input# Into peasant 
production, let alone a marketable asset of the peasant 
'enterprise'. A different order of relationships existed. 
Land formed the foundation base of peasant production as 
well as the social security base for both peasants and rural- 
dependent labourers (as an unemployment linsurancel and a 
source of post-employment subsistence consumption). It 
served as an Inheritance or non-marketable asset with which 
to provide longer term security beyond the lifespan of the 
household head. State land policies were therefore crucial 
for the 'development* of the peasant economy. and central to 
the process of primitive accumulation upon which capitalist 
development In Rhodesia was dependent. 
The history of land policy-in Rhodesia reveals a record 
of progressive alienation of peasant landst the restricting 
of peasants to lesser quality lands and the undermining of 
the productive capacity of the remainder of the peasant 
economy, The objective was the minimization of competition 
for plantation producers In product markets and the creation 
22 
of a source of low cost labour supply* Land alienation 
also allowed the low eost aoquisition of the means of 
production for plantation owners. Certainly it involved 
more than 'disturbing the equilibrium' between the Africans 
and the landq as Yudleman has suggested, 
23 
The Land 
Apportion, ment Acts of 1930 and 19419 together with the rapid 
expansion of the plantation economy up to this timeg gave 
strong practical effect to previous legal and political 
Policies and philosophies which underpinned the segregating 
of the population and the land Into two *non-eompeting groupst* 
Yetq even In the early 1940's the notion that African 
cultivators 'should conform to an ethnic control map ran 
24 
counter to economic forces operating at the peasant levelt. 
Africans used not only their designated land areas but also 
unoccupied--lands: 'Consequentlys despite the legislative 
division of the country Into different zones of racial 
25 
occupationg the actual situation was quite different*$ 
Indeedq successful primitive capital accumulation required not 
simply the appropriation of landq but also the simultaneous 
creation of a low cost labour force which meant the need to 
maintain an adequate African population on European land. 
During the war policy makers stressed food production and 
not effective land alienation. In the postwar situation large 
scale European Immigration and settlement schemes introduced 
by the government required effective alienation to take place, 
Peasant occupiers were now treated as 'squatters' and plans 
were made to evict 300 9 000 *illegal' residents and 'resettle' 26 
them in African areas. The application of 'resettlement' 
policies however inevitably led to the proletarianization of 
many *squatters'. Since the late 1940's, the effect of land 
reallocation policies# reinforced by population growth and 
the 'crowding' of Reserves under resettlement programmes# was 
to seriously reduce the availability of productive lands In 
the peasant economy. From 1946-69 total African land per 
head fell from 12.6 acres to 8.8 acres. 
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The effects of 
these overall land allocation trends on labour supplies and 
accumulation can be judged by examining three specific phases 
of the Icompulsory' land policies of the post-war period: the 
s1 
implementation of the Land Apportionment Actj the Impact of 
the Land Husbandry Act of 1951; and the effects of the Tribal 
Trust Lands Act of 1967 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969. 
Towards the end of the war It became clear to the 
government that the implementation of the 1941 Land Apportion. 
ment Act would be difficult, De-stooking policies designed 
to make provision for more land for crop production were 
vigorously pursued. In 1946 It was calculated that provision 
would have to be made for some 71t182 African families who 
would be displaced under the 'squatter' eviction policy and 
28 
who would require an additional 7,12 million acres of land. 
Meanwhile the sale of large tracts of Crown land to 
Europeans put pressure on the administration to speed up 
resettlement policies. Many plantation producers favoured 
putting the 'squatters' under labour agreementsg land thus 
In one action (solving) both the land and the labour 
problemef. 
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In 1948 a start was made on resettlement. 
Great. difficulties were experienced In these large scale 
forced removals of peopleg their stooksg grain and goods9 
placing a heavy strain on administrative resourcese The 
economic and political consequences were carefully watched# 
especially in view of the continued scarcity of water supplies 
in the areas of resettlement. 
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In 1950 the Land Appprtionment Amendment Act was passed, 
providing for the removal of all squatters off European Land 
within 5 years. 
31 
In applying the legislation the State 
expected and encountered numerous difficulties, The peasantag 
who had In many cases been on'the same land for many 
generationst indulged in passive resistance by refusing to 
2V 
leave. out of a planned removal of 4,482 families in 1951 
only Is569 were moved. - Passive resistance grew stronger 
and legal action was instituted against those who resisted 
eviction. However, as the C, N. C. put It, *owing to defects 
In the law convictions could not be recorded In many eases', 
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The law was duly amended and It was proclaimed that by the 
following year all Crown land squatters must move. The only 
exceptions permitted were persons who remained under formal 
labour agreements* 
By the end of the 5-year period 649000 Africans had been 
removed from Crown lands* 
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Further plans were made to 
evict the remainder as well as other peasants occupying land 
In the Purchase Areasq Forest Areas and Unassigned Areas of 
the country. In the early 1950's action was taken to remove 
squatters on Purchase Area lands to make way for an expanded 
propertied class of African farmers. Through these policies 
rural African class formation and stratification became more 
distinctive, Squatters either left their traditional lands 
for less fertile and less favoured areas or sought employment 
In the towns and on the mines. Relatively few were Immediate- 
ly attracted to the plantation economy where wage rates were 
low and conditions austere. The"squatterl eviction policy 
was applied steadily In the latter half of the 1950'so As 
Passmore has recorded: 'the Implementation of the re- 
settlement scheme had by 1960 meant the removal by compulsory 
methods of some 1139000 Africans from the various other 
categories of land to Tribal Trust Land and the Native Areale 
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Howevert as the 1960 Select Committee on the Resettlement of 
zo . ., 
the Natives recordedg the total number of African families for 
whom theoretically land would still have to be foynd was no 
less than 11192619 an estimate based on 1957 figures. 
The number of individuals actually resettled was thus but a 
fraction of this figure. 
In the 1960's resettlement policies were still being 
aetivelY pursued. In 1965 30,000 people were resettled In 
the Gokwe area alone* 
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However by the late 1960's and 
1970's Official concern was being directed to a diffbrent 
type of 'squatter$ - those in urban areas* Although eviction 
continued from rural lands In the early 1970's this was on a 
slightly reduced scale compared to the 1950-60 periods a 
de-escalation that reflected the requirement of plantation 
producers for local labour supplies. 
The 'crowding' of the Reserves meant that peasants were 
largely confined to food production for own consumption* 
Pastoral farming necessitated larger acreages than arable 
production, If pursued under 'crowded' conditions It 
would seriously deteriorate the productive capacity of the 
soil and so Jeopardize rural stability and the productivity 
of the arable branch of peasant production. Additionally 
the human carrying capacity of the land was consiAered of more 
Importance to the maintenance of a viable k1labour colony' 
than too rapid an expansion In animal stockv the result of 
which would have been an excess supply of labour and serious 
unemploymentg as well as a competitive threat against ranching 
interests in the plantation sector, 
2LO 
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By 1931 the stock pupulation of the African areas had 
already reached saturation point. In 1941 the cattle 
population was only B-5 percent above the 1931 level. 
36 
And 
in the next decade only another 2.2 percent growth was 
recorded* 
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As Arrighl has noted, this represented a decline 
In the rate of peasant capital accumulation* 
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The State 
regarded the growth in African stock as a threat to the 
continued fertility of the land and thus sought forcibly to 
reduce stock levels. In 1944 the Production and Trade 
commission recommended limitations on the rights of peasant 
households to own cattle as well as compulsory reductions In 
39 
each Reserve area. By technical calculation almost all 
the Reserves were considered to be overstocked. In 1946, 
for instance, 42 of the 134 Reserves were more than 10 percent 
4o 
oVerstookedo By 1967 nearly all areas were reported as 
being highly overstockedg despite the approval of de-stocking 
plans for overstocked Reserves in 19459 a spate of poor 
seasons in the late 1940's which forced peasants to sell 
their stock# and the Implementation of de-stooking measures 
throughout the 1950ts and 1960ts. That overstooking should 
have been acoentuated Is not surprising. The Implementation 
of de-stooking policies absorbed scarce administrative 
resources especially since peasants actively resisted these 
miaLasures. Small additions to individual peasant household 
stock levels serioUsly aggravated the problem at the 
41 
aggregate level* 
Compulsory de-stocking not only allowed for the 'crowding' 
of the Reservesp it also assisted In the marginalization of 
I IN 
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the poorer strata of peasant soeiety by thwarting natural 
farming trends of expansion and accumulation through 
agricultural diversification* Supplies of peasant-owned, 
natural fertilizer for crops were also-reduced* Peasants 
were therefore squeezed at both ends of the spectrum. Land 
suppliesp upon which carrying capacity was dependentq were 
controlled by government policy* the thrust of which was to 
maintain excess land supplies In the protected plantation 
economy even at a time of overstocking In the peasant 
economy* Compulsor7 de-stooking made It more difficult 
for peasants to expand the'size of their Investmentaq 
thereby largely confining the peasantry to food production 
for own consumption or to seeking incomes through wage 
employment* The State sponsorship of the European ranching 
industryq through the general subsidization of plantation 
agriculture# acted as a strong competitive element against 
the further 'natural' development of the peasantry in this 
product markets 
A second major policy which affected land structure In 
the peasant oommunitY and helped create cheap local labour 
supplies was the Implementation of the Land Husbandry Act In 
the 1950*0* The Act came onto the statute books In 1951 and 
represented the high point In compulsory land policies 
enforced upon the peasant economy* Essentially the Act aimed 
at preventing the fragmentation of holdings and so conserving 
the capacity of the African Reserves to support a stabilized 
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population at subsistence level, It sought to do this by 
'individualizing' peasant holdings and explicitly creating a 
If, 
class of propertyless and rightless peasants who It was 
assumed would be absorbed in the 'urban-industrial' labour 
market, Hughes has correctly called the Act 'a "settlement" 
or "resettlement scheme" (albeit on a vast scale)'. 
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it 
was, rceognized by the architects of the policy that the 
successful implementation of the Act would 'completely 
44 
remodel the basis of Native economic life'* The 
registration of land rights In the names of Individual 
holders had as Its principal policy goal 'the transition from 
what (was) predominantly a "squatter" system at bare 
subsistence level to a pea6ant farming structure operating 
in a market economy'* 
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In pursuit of this objective* land 
husbandry provisions were promulgateds stoek holdings were 
to be limited to a designated carrying oapaoityl land rights 
were to be demarcated In 'economic' units and Individual 
-qt 
security of tenure would be guaranteed for 3509000 peasant 
cultivators In the form of negotiable land and grazing 
46 
rights. The problem of future population growth in these 
areas was conveniently ignoredgit being assumed that all 
additional labour Supplies would be absorbed In the capitalist 
mode of production# In order that adequate constraints 
would exist on peasant accumulation and there would be no 
jeopardy to the essential labour replenishment function of 
the Reserves# the proviso was laid down that no Individual 
could own more than three atable allocations* The 
allocations of non-arable grazing land were designed to be 
just sufficient (technically) for 'the eight "large stock 
equivalents" needed to maintain the fertility of (the 
26 3 
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allocated arable) land'. Peasants were thus to be confined 
to those branches of production which were essential to the 
cheap reproduction of labour supplies and the maintenance 
of subsistence consumption, 
In 1952 the C*N*C. argued that the time seemed 
$propitious for enforoing the provisions of the Land Husbandry 
Aot on a Colony-wide scalet, 
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Yets as Johnson has shown, 
in #the first five Years following the passage of theo., Aet, 
progress was slr)wl. 
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By 1955 opposition against the Act 
was growing amongst Africans in the rural and urban areaso 
Many had beenj and many more were to be, made landless by 
the Act* It did not eater for 'migrants* outside the 
Reserves at the time of implementationg while In the long 
term the Act had an In-built mechanism which would effectively 
dispossess future generations as well as younger adults who 
had neither the funds nor had yet acquired the social status 
50 to*aoquire land rights. At this timet the government 
decided to press on with a target of implementing the Act 
fully by the end of 1960. Nearly 27 million acres had to 
be proolaimedg surveyedg assessed, demareatedl and land and 
stock rights and residential sites allocated. Vast resources 
- finaneialg technical and administrative - were Invested in 
this, accelerated programmeq to the detriment of normal 
extension servies. By 1959 the target date had been set 
baokýto 1962 as a result of political campaigns against the 
Act by mass-based African nationalist parties which saw In 
the Act the dispossession and the subjugation of the 
peasantry* As the economy of the Federation went into a 
20 
recession around this periods with employment levels stagnant# 
the general tide of political frustration and opposition to 
the Act grew* By 1961 the rate of implementation of the 
Actq which in effect had barely got off the ground# slowed 
i 
down under political pressuresg resource constraints and an 
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inability to deal with all the Immense human problems Involved. 
Finallyq the State decided to curtail the implementation of 
the Act$ an explicit recognition of the growing unemployment 
problem and the rapidly evolving labour surplus situation in 
the economy* Nonetheless the Act had resulted in the 
displacement of many persons from the peasant economy whog 
on going to the urban centersg were unable to find employmente 
Landlessness and unemployment were two overbearing 
considerations that# if permitted to Increase unduly through 
the implementation of the Act, would have coalesced to 
present a major political confrontation for settler colonialism. 
By 1964 It had become necessary 'in so far as allocation I 
of land was concerned# for the Land Husbandry Act to be 
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suspended'. As a measure to wholly individualize land 
holdings and to dispossess various strata of the peasantrY 
on a massive scaleg the Act can be said to have *f ailed'. 
Observers lamented the abandonment of the 'reforms' (so it 
was argued) that were to be brought about by the Acto 
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However# by the time the Act was beginning to be actively 
lmplementedl, economic conditions were rendering It redundant 
and the Political consequences of uninhibited Implementation 
were proving both serious and unnecessary. As an 
Instrument to reproduce cheap labour supplies the ',, Act did 
6c 
not 'fail$ Insofar as its actual Implementation did contribute 
to the generation of local labour supplies from a growing 
class of 'landless' persons. 
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Recognition of this was 
implicit lnýthe changes brought about in subsequent 
legislative amendment to'land tenure provisions. Changed 
social and political conditions required that stability be 
re-imposed in the Reservesi As Hughes has noted: *It was 
the tenurial aspects of the Land Husbandry legislation which 
were causing difficultieso. s(the State thus) changed those 
aspects of the law dealing with tenure In tribal areas, 
while still trying to achieve (its) technical and economic 
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obJectives'. Other tenurtal means, embodied in the 
Tribal Trust Lands Aot of 19679 were thus employed to meet the 
same ends as well as ensure rural stability. 
The new land tenure arrangements could only be 
legislated in 1967 due to 'certain quirks In the 1961 
Rhodesian constitution'. 
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The new land policy marked the 
end of centralized compulsion and the adoption of a policY 
of de-centralized control over land allocations under a 
re-vitalized, better-financed, status enhanced cadre of 
State-controlled Chiefs and Headmen (designed as Tribal 
Authorities under the Act). 
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All African Reserves were 
designated as 'Tribal Trust Lands' and put under 'communaV 
tenure arrangementsq except for the Purchase Areas In which 
small-scale agrarian capitalism was more actively encouraged 
and private ownership of land was entrenched* The Tribal 
Trust Lands became vested in a State appointed Board of 
Trubtees for 'the sole exclusive use of tribesment. 
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Chiefs exercised control over land rights within their 
jurisdictiong so enabling the slow 'modernization' and 
evolution of *traditional' tenure systems In accordance with 
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local conditions* Shortly afterwards the Land Tenure 
Aot (1969) was introdueeds It systematized the division 
of land resources by allocating the land between black and 
white into two separate areast of roughly equal sizeq with 
provisions to ensure the paramountcy of African interests In 
lAfrican areas' and vlee-versa., 
The new set of center-periphery relations allowed both 
for flexibility and a variety of new policies to be pursued* 
Communal tenure and the extension of nominal land rights to 
'tribesmen' provided the security of a rural homestead - 
however uneconomic and Impoverished - to the vast majority of 
local workers. An Illusion of rural security was thus 
engendered although It also enabled the establishment of a 
rural base for a large part of the African working class, 
The extension of 'Community Development* policies after 1965 
also operated to ensure both the stability and viability of 
the rural areas as well as all ow for the development of 
African Councilsq Community Boards and Provin6tal Authorities 
which would take on the financial responsibilities of 
operating rural policies in the fields of taxationg health, 
6o 
education$ business licenses and road construction, The 
bureaucratic class developed to operate these Institutions 
provided another mechanism through which social control over 
the peasantry could be organized while the essential function 
of the Tribal Trust Lands - that of a cheap labour reservoir 
- was left unencumbered., 
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Land polloles In the post-19406s have therefore had the 
effect of Increasing the local supply of cheap labourg ensuring 
the viability of the peasant mode of production in respect 
of this primary function and Inducing greater stratification 
In African rural society, In this respect at least# land 
alienation sehemesqsquatter' eviction and resettlement 
policiesp de-stooking programmes and land tenure arrangements 
(whether individual or 'communal') had been wholly consistent 
with one another and the general direction of peripheral 
capitalist development In Rhodesia. 
PEASANT DEPENDENCE 
During the post-1940 period the peasant mode of 
production became more dependent on the dominant capitalist 
mode of production, The 'self-subsistence* autonomy of 
peasant society was further eroded by the extension of 
capitalist social relations into the African rural areasp by 
the development of a wage labour force within peasant society# 
by the growing dependence of peasant households on the Income 
remittances from Oproletarianizedi groups rooted In the rural 
areasg by the increased subordination of peasant handicraft 
industries to urban and foreign markets and by the closer 
socio-economic regulation of peasant society by the State, 
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These extensions In dependency relations reinforced the 
labour-power supplying role as the 'Reserves' prime funetion. 
Peasant capacities for production became steadily 
divorced from subsistence consumption requirements, 
Production levels were Increasingly unable to meet basic 
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consumption needs even In respect of food requirements. 
No longer were most ofq or even the most Important, 
instruments of labour supplied from or produced within peasant 
society. The supply of ploughs, harrows# plantersq mowersq 
hand grinding mills# hoes, means of transport and a wide 
range of miscellaneous Instruments used in peasant production 
became monopolized by capitalist producers. 
'TraditionaV craft Industries also wanedp and many 
rural producers in these Industries had to obtain means of 
subsistence through employment In 'informal* trades and 
services in the urban market* In socio-economic terms the 
peasants who formed this class of petty commodity producers 
underwent a transformation in their relationship with the 
dominant mode of production - as did peasants who had been 
proletarianized. Effectively they constituted an appendage 
to the industrial complexg a source of additional and 
immediately available labour-power for urban-industrial 
employers and a producer class whose function was to reduce 63 
the costs of subsistence for the African working class* 
Changing patterns of consumption In peasant soeietyp and 
dependence on commodities supplied from capitalist produeerst 
also enabled monopolistic suppliers and merchants to use 
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commodity pricing policies as a means of accumulation, 
Oreeffect of commodity pricing policies was to raise the 
$effort-price$ of subsistence consumption for peasants and 
so make wage-labourg particularly In low-wage Industries, a 
more 'attractive' and necessary proposition for members of 
peasant householdst especially those Peasants In marginal 
areas or from the lower strata of peasant society* 
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Significant changes in consumption occurred in the diet 65 
of peasants# The availability of credit for the purchase 
of commercial fertilizer Increased as fertilizer Producers 
looked to the Tribal Trust Lands for markets* 
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Similar 
67 
tendencies existed In a wide range of consumer goods. 
By the 1970'a traders were almost wholly engaged In cash 
exchanges with rural Africans and had largely phased out 68 
barter exchanges from their commercial activities* 
The extension of the 'cash nexus' Into peasant society 
69 
accelerated in the 1940-74 periodi The Associated Chambers 
of Co=ercej as well as African businessmen who increasingly 
supplanted white and Asian traders# were especially keen to 
'tap' Tribal Trust Land markets and ralselthe level of wants' 
of rural Africans. 
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The Rhodesian African Show Society, 
set up for this very purpose, sought to represent and extend 
white-owned commereial interests Into rural African, soelety., i 
state agencies - the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation - operated In close 
harmony with monopolistic merchant Interests to extend these 
commercial exchange relationships and more firmly subordinate 
peasant households to the supplying and pricing decisions of 
corporate enterprise, 
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Most large suppliers transformed 
their marketing arrangements to oover the Tribal Trust Lands* 
And regular 'trade fairs' were held in almost all regionsg 
even In areas seriously disturbed by the protracted guerrilla 
war of the late '1960's and 1970's* 
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More African traders - forming a rural elite In 
73 African society - entered the market after the 1950's. 
. 12" 
Their growing presence and business operations had a 
transforming effect on village life, With the passage of 
protective legislation affecting land use and occupation 
rights between Africans and Europeans, especially under the 
Land, Tenure Act of 19699 a limited degree of protection was 
provided and expansion in African merchant capitalism took 
place in rural Rhodesia, In part, howeverg these entre- 
preneurs represented 'fronts' for white businessmens 
Nonetheless# 'African Business Centres' were established in 
rural communitiesq often under the patronage of the 
'traditionaV oligarchy or the new rural bureaucracy whog 
together with African merchant capital# found a veoure and 
rewarding niche in the politicalg administrative and 
commercial arenas permitted them by government policies. 
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State policies also became geared to a 'commercial 
pricing patternIq particularly in the fields of education 
and health services* The demand for education was very 
high* and the State increased the private costs of education 
In overall terms and for the higher grades of the primary 
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and secondary school system. Not only did this policy 
$ration' a limited supply (determined by central State 
deeision) amongst a large rural population, but it also 
provided peasants with an 'incentive$ either to Increase 
production for sale or to increase the sale of labour-power 
76 to capitalist production, Limitations on the expansion 
capacity of peasant production Inevitably meant that 
peasant households $chose' the latter course In order to 
satisfy even rudimentary educational needs, A similar 
. 171 
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pattern of policies was discernible In respect of the State 
controlled supply of rural health services* 
The penetration of commercial exchange relationships 
into the rural areas and the growing dependence of the 
peasantry on the decisions of monopolistic and commercial 
capital and the States together with the development of 
various elements (tradersq farmers and bureaucrats - both 
$traditional$ and modern) of a rural African bourgeoislep led 
to an Important transformation In the African rural areas 
and in the character of articulation between the pre-capitalist 
mode and the dominant capitalist mode of production* This 
class formation process and Its significance In the political 
economy needs to be Identified because from this new pattern 
of peasant underdevelopment additional cheap labour supplies 
were forthcoming to supplement and supplant the use of foreign 
'migrant' and contract labour In capitalist production, 
CLASS FORMATION AND LABOUR MOBILIZATION 
The class structure of peasant and rural society became 
more complex as capitalist relations of production penetrated 
the rural areas and the peasant mode became more subordinate 
In the social formation. The complexity also arises from 
the fact that since the 1940's various strata of rural 
African society had existed as $classes-in-formation', a 
phenomenon which arose out of uneven rural development, ' 
changing State rural policleag and the Impact of socio-economic 
disintegration within peasant communities In some regions 
'a? l 
I 
whilst State intervention In other areas sought to 'prop up* 
and make viable various types of subsistence communities 
moulddd around the pre-existant pre-capitalist framework. 
State rural policies In the 'African Areas' over the 
1940-74 period also led to massive differentiation In the 
peripheral social formation* The general underdevelopment 
of the peasant economy was the most notable feature of policy 
ands together with other socio"eeonomic and political factorsq 
led to an uneven patterng the result of which was the 
marginalization of large numbers of peasants as well as a 
concentration of income amongst a small class of African 
capitalist farmers. 
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Factors which differentiated between 
rich and poor of peasant society were: the extent and nature 
of land rights; the level of wealth and stock holdings; 
educational 4nd literacy standards; proximity of land to 
markets and transport faoilitiesl the size and regularity 
of surpluses; access to credit and loan fundsl and the 
extent of household dependence on wage employment. The 
stratification that occurred between the upper and lower 
strata of peasant society took place in conditions of growing 
rural, poverty,, In 1959 Brown estimated the minimum needs 
of rural peasant-families and concluded that the peasant 
economy at that time did not have the capacity to meet these 
78 
minimum consumption requirements. Weinrich reported the 
findings of, Plowes (for 1963) that an African peasant 
family required an output of 60 bags per annum to subsist in 
. 
the rural-economyy excluding costs of school feesq taxes9 
,, 79 , etc, ý In her studyg Weinrich found thatq for the Tribal 
a73 - , 
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Trust Lands she examined# few peasant cultivators achieved 
production levels even reasonably close to this level of 
output, The decline In cash surpluses available to peasant 
families for the meeting of necessary commItmentsq as shown 
in national accounts data for the period 1957-729 underscores 
the long term process of growing Insecurity In peasant 
farming., Under these conditions wage labour dependence 
has growng even within the peasant production system* 
Because of the lack of statistical coverage of the 
peasant economy and the residual or marginal treatment given 
to the *Rural Household Sector' in national accounts and 
in the Census of Employeesp there are no time series data 
on wage employment In peasant production., Howeverg as Hunt 
has reported: 'a Central Statistical office survey showed 
that as far back as 1959-60, the number of paid employees in 
the Tribal Trust Lands (was) 509000% 
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Wage-labour 
relations had therefore penetrated the rural African economy 
markedly even by this time especially when the extent of this 
wage employment is compared to the total number (3229000) of 
adult African males (over 16 years) resident In the Tribal 
Trust Lands in 1962,81 
The pattern of labour utilization cannot be Indicated 
from available macro-eoonomic data however, A study of 
one rural projeet in Nyamaropa Tribal Trust Land In the late 
1960's by Reynolds provides a better though limited insight, 
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All the peasant farmers In Reynolds' sample employed labourersg 
mostly for seasonal work though on a small-number of farms 
workers were hired almost throughout the year. About 
, 97 
ý 
72 pereent of the 'permanent' labourers were ciales between 
the age of 14 and 25 years and 20 percent were females of 
much the'same age* Only 9 percent were men over 25 years of 
age. More than one-half of the workers were from Mocambique 
C'Nvamaropa Is close to the border) though many others came 
from within Rhodesia but from outside 14ramaropa Itselfo 
None, of the labourers had spent more than 4 years in school 
and 30 percent had never attended school. Family ties were 
of little importance In obtaining employment, The labourers 
lived with the farmer's family In most oases. Women workers 
were required to do domestic work In addition to farm work, 
The labourers In Reynold's sample all worked a 6-day week,, 
except for cattle herders whose job covered a full 7 days. 
Most, labourers received $1.75 to $2*50 In cash wages monthly 
and In addition obtained food rations valued at $1.50 to 
$2*00 monthly* There were widespread oomplaints of poor 
conditionsg long hoursq low pay and bad food. Often 
payment was intermittent* No formal contracts were entered 
Into'and employees were dismissed without notice* On the 
farms, examined by Reynolds the labour cost ranged between 13 
and 42 percent of total farm expenditures. Whilst It Is 
not possible to generalize from this Instance, these trends 
In labour *policy In peasant production indicate that wage 
relationships. effeetively penetrated the peasant economy, 
The workers in peasant enterprises (and In Purchase Areas) 
also constituted a largely unprotectedg- low-wage rural 
proletariat* Their conditions of employment were objectively 
more depressed than aonditions of workers in both the 
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urban-industrial labour market and many enterprises in the 
plantation and mining industries* 
Not unexpectedly# wage relations in the Purchase Areas# 
where an African rural capitalist class had been promoted 
since the 1940'so were well advanced by 19740 the position 
of the rural proletariat being similar to, though slightly 
better than# wage workers in peasant production on 'communal 
ownedt Tribal Trust Land farms* 
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In 1972 a total of 
4,620 persons were permanent wage employees of Purchase Area 
farmersq a figure in exami of one quarter of the potential 
adult male work force (over 16 years) amongst families headed 
84 
by farm owners, In addition, hired casual workers were 
extensively employed In production, Nearly three-quarters 
of all farms used hired casual labour In 1971# the total labour 
supply froa this souroe being equivalent to 59130 full-time 
permanently employed workers undertaking a 300-day work load 
85 
per annum* 
Micro studies confirm this picture of extensive wage 
labour In African agrarian capitalist production In Rhodesia, 
Cheaters for instances examined conditions In Mzingezi 
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Purchase Area during 1973-74 and found the following pattern: 
45 percent of the hired labourers were foreign workers, 
mostly coming from depressed peasant communities In Malawi 
and, Mooambiquel nearly all (Rhodesian) ethnic groups were 
represented amongst the rural farmworkers In HzInSezi; very 
few (less than 4 percent) of the permanent workers were 
relations of the household; average monthly cash wages were 
$6*80 (ranging from $3 to $25) with most workers receiving 
. 
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wages below the average wage level for plantation workersl 
part of the payment Involved the allocation of land for 
tillage, as provided for by plantation ownersi land 
'allocations' to workers coincided particularly with the 
availability of additional labour-power from the farmworker's 
own family (wives and children); some permanent workers 
received no cash wage at all; the Incidence of $traditional* 
work co-operation between owners was declining as wage--- 
relations supplanted these methods of labour mobilizationt 
there was a tendency to transform the enterprise labour 
supply system from one dependent on casual labour to one 
dependent on a permanent work force. 
The development of a low-wage labour force of some 
magnitude in both the Tribal Trust Lands and the Purchase 
Areas was of great importance in the domestic generation 
of cheap labour supplies for the primary sectors, The 
highly marginalized conditions of the peasant and African 
agrarian capitalist enterprises which do employ wage-labour 
helped to create the very conditions which made 'attractive' 
the relatively higher wages that pertained on some mines and 
plantations* 
The resettlement and 'squatter' eviction policies 
during'and after the 19401s also contributed to class 
formation by creating a labour supply for minesq plantation 
producers and African employers of rural labour, The 
effeetiv, e Implementation of the Land Apportionment Actj along 
with the Inflow of postwar white immigrant settlers Into 
plantation production$ set the paoe to this process, By 
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1949 there was a sharp fall 'in the numbers of rent paying 
agreements and an Increase In the number of labour agree- 
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ments'. By the mid-1950's the labour surplus was 
beginning to appear and after 1955 the number of labour 
agreements on alienated European land decreased, This did 
not imply that all farmers sought to sever the semi-feudal 
relations with Ilabouring squatters' on their farms. 
Nonetheless the policy of eviction and resettlement 
continued rapidly and for the 1949-55 period over 719000 
persons were evicted and resettled in the Reservese 
Similarly, persons who farmed communally on Purchase Area 
land'felt the effect of the introduction of Individual land 
rights and were displaced Into peasant areas where land was 
scarce and conditions were marginal. Some settled In large 
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squatter settlements In the perl-urban areas. These 
dispossessed peasantsg one official remarkedg had one thought 
Indawol (I want a place to live) - as their in mind - IdIng 89 
livelihood and security had been threatened, By 1962 the 
problem of'dispossessed peoplep accentuated by the Land 
Husbýandry Aetq was a major headache for the administrationg 
particularly in rggions where dispossessiong often of large 
numbers of personav had left tenant-peasants without any 
90 
security'or employment, Migration to the towns did not 
help much since urban unemployment at this time was growing, 
, So serious was 
the problem of landlessness that the 
government acquired 68,0oo acres of'land In Matabeleland 
and sought to alleviate the acute squatter problem by renting 
the land'to squatters, ý The squatter evictions that continued 
Into the 1970's added to pressures In the Tribal Trust Lands 
that increased the marginality of many peasant groups In 
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these rural communities. More and more peasants were 
forced to become dependent on wage-labour at a time of 
falling employment opportunities. Poorer peasants bore 
the brunt of this underdevelopment process especially in the 
post-1963 period when extensive rural proletarianization on 
plantations took place under conditions of falling-real wage 
levels. 
The rural proletarianization within African owned and 
controlled rural production systems could only occur out of 
a growth of inequality and stratification within African 
rural society and the peasant economy, Capitalist relations 
developed in the rural areas as a result of various forces - 
conscious State -policy, the growing commercialization of 
exchangep the Individualization of land ownership, the 
marketing policies of capitalist commodity producers and 
traderst the accumulation of capital by African farmers# the 
collective organization of Purchase Area producers, and the 
rapid disintegration of 'traditional' peasant social 
formations, 
The development of an African agrarian capitalist class 
was closelyq though not exclusivelys bound up with the creation 
and sponsorship of Purchase Areas in the post-1940 Period. 
The rural elites which emerged In the late 1940's and 19509s 
owed, their development In part to the changing balance of 
economic power within white society In which the traditionally 
strong agricultural Interests steadily ceded political control 
to manufacturing capitalistsg thereby reducing the degree of 
. 2.71 
proteetiong control and monopolization which they held In 
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product markets# In this senseq rural class formation 
was a necessary consequence of capitalist expansion and 
diversification within the political economy of the post- 
1940*s, ', The new African capitalist class also provided an 
important-market for manufacturing outputq a source of cheap 
inputs of commodities for manufacturing production (since 
Purchase, Area development proceeded on the basis of 'extra 
cheap' labour)q a source of supply of additional commodities 
for exports and for the cheapening of the price of locally 
consumed'foodstuffs for the work foreeg and a political 
'ally' tied to privilegel private property and a web of 
financial and sooio-economic links with thelState and private 
financiers. The development of underdevelopment within 
the peasant economy - between rich and poor peasants - was 
of benefit. to plantation agriculture, There existed 
therefore a lesser degree of conflict between competing 
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groups of capitalists than put forward by Arrighlo 
Rural African class differentiation was thus a contributing 
condition for the continuation of a traditional low wage 
policy in-pplantation agrioulturet it is important here also 
to note the gradual approach taken In the formation of the 
rural, African farming elite as well as the increasing 
attention paid to this sector In the 1960's and 1970's when 
primary sector producers became more reliant on local labour 
suppl Ies 
Central. to the rural class differentiation process was 
the creation of a group of Master Farmers who acquired rights 
94 
to acquisition of a Purchase Area farm. One exception 
to the normal practice of granting Purchase Area rights to 
'qualified farmers' was the policy adopted after the war 
towards African ex-servicemen m4ny of whom received either 
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free holdings or land at half price An the Purchase Areas. 
Master Farmers were basically the product of extension 
education and public sector investment geared directly 
towards the requirements of African agricultural production. 
Different gradations of extension investment can be Identified 
between Easter Farmersq Co-operatorsq ioeot persons who 
rotate crops and use manure and fertilizersl and Ordinary 
Farmers... The yield differentials that pertained amongst 
these groups are significant, In 1950 Master Farmers 
produced'6.6 bags of grain per acre compared with 1.5 bags 
for Ordinary Cultivators, 
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The spread of extension 
education and the growth of a Master Farmer class grew 
rapidly in the 1950's- In 1950 there were 1665 Master 
Farmers in relation to a total number of 213,760 cultivators 
97 
(for 19ý8). By 1956 there were 69097 such certificated 
farmers in the country and in 1960 some 8,966.98 The number 
of co-operators also greatly Increasedq from 149293 In 1948 
, 
to-90,499 in-1960., Together these two groups of farmers 
represented 30 percent of African farmers In 1960 compared 
with, only', 8 percent In 1948, The inequality of State 
investment'and rural policies helped produce a skewed Income 
dII. strilbut 
I 
Ion pattern in the peasant community, Thusl as 
Yudleman has reportedr most of the increased output in 
African agriculture In the 1950's came from less than one-third 
. 291 
of the cultivators and In the early 1960's the level of real 
Incomes of the upper 30 percent of African producers 
appeared to be higher than those of the lowest-paid urban 
99 
workers, 
-The'oonoentration of rural African Investment was 
associated with parallel processes of wealth and Income 
concentration In the peasant economy. Thus for the Reserves 
Le Roux has found that 'in the 1948-49 season 52 percent of 
the cultivated land was worked by 30 percent of the farmers 
In units of nine or more acres (while In) the 1959-60 season 
the same percentage of farmers worked 63 percent of the 
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cultivated acreage In units of nine or more acres'. 
The net impact of this process was to underdevelop the 
marginal peasant to the point where small scale or the less 
efficient producers had to leave the land In search of other 
means of livelihood. Thus Le Roux concludes that one 
noticeable feature of the 1948-60 period was the *move 
towards two classes of farmersq one of which (obtained) a 
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reasonable living off the land while the other (did) not* 
This process of stratification deepened'. In the 1960's and 
1970'st the value of average cash sales per Purchase Area 
family being 18 times greater than for peasant farmers In 
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the early 1970's- 
Richer farmers also acted to coneblidate their position, 
Even as early as 1952 every Purchase Area had its own 
Association. By 1972 the African Farmers' Uniong the national 
Purchase Area farmers' organization and lobbyt had 9,000 
membersq adequate financep Its own Journal and growing 
2,97- 
Influence in the political arena* 
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The historical 
emergenco of this rural capitalist class owed much to the 
choices exercised by the State. The Engledow Report in 
1950, for instancep was Infused with enthusiasm for the 
promotion of African capitalist farmingg although it noted 
that these producers would have to be guldedq aidedg given 
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credit facilities$ larger land holdingag and supervised, 
It also focussed on the important Issue of the distribution 
of technical staff between Purchase Area producers and those 
In the Reservesp recommending priority for the former since 
the two would compete for scarce resources* Purchase 
Areas were deemed 'highly Important as an alternative to the 
peasant or family farm*, 
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During and after the 1950's the development of the Purchase 
Areas was accelerated, The rate at which the State sponsored 
this process is Indicated by the data available on the 
alien4tion of Purchase Area farms, By 1947 only 2#192 farms 
had been alienated since the land category formally came Into 
existence In 1925, 
io6 
These farms covered a land area of 
4929305 acres* Bv 1961 some 69426 farms had been alienated 
covering 1089.013, acress After 1956# howeverg the 
applications list was closed. if too much land had been 
alienated for Individual African ownership the labour 
supplying function of the Reserves would have been jeopar. 
dized. 
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Nonetheless by, 1972 there were 8g721 farms 
alienated - more Individual produetion units than in the 
plantation economy* About half of these were wholly owned 
whilstg except for 569 farms which were 'vacant or IllegallY 
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occupied, 99 the balance were leased. 
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The size of alloeated holdings also Involved farming 
inefficiencies In respect of land resource use. While 
peasant farmers were experiencing land shortage and many were 
being made landless through the application of the Land 
Husbandry Acts the Purchase Areas could have supported many 
more farmers* Despite relativelaffluence In Purchase Areas 
as compared with the peasant economy$ inequality within 
this capitalist calss was not minimal. Upper income farmers 
earned Incomes ten times as much as those Purchase Area 
producers at the bottom of the scale. In 1960, for 
Instance, It was calculated that the average annual Income 
per head was $31* 
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The earnings of the top quintile 
Income group were 062 per head and the lowest group $7* 
This Indicates a wide range of variation and serves as a 
warning of the dangers of over-generalization about this 
particular group. 
On the restrictive side of the process of class formations 
there were a number of impositions placed on Purchase Area 
development. Most importantg land areas were fixed by 
governmentg not only In overall sizeq but also in terms of 
the rate at which farms were allenatedg surveyed and made 
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ready for occupation. Despite declared policy objectives 
being to encourage the market-oriented and individual 
ownership type of rural Afr1ean produotion unitp the total 
average acreage made over as Purchase Areas actually declined 
from 1950-69t following the failure of the implementation 
of the Land Husbandry Act and the growing labour surplus from 
1960 onwards, 
III 
The volume and conditions of credit and 
loan capital supplies were also carefully regulated and 
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limited, Restrictions were maintained on leaseholders# 
an Imposition which Impaired the ability or producers to 
provide eollateral for loans. 
African agrarian capitalist development was also 
organized through the African Parmers' Union (A*F*U. )o A 
wide range of political activities pursued by the A&FUe faci- 
litated capital accumulation, Like plantation producers# 
this producer and employer class was anxious to obtain cheap 
labour* The A, F, U, petitioned the State from 1960 onwards 
to $remove the squatters on Purchase Area land'. 
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However# It was from the 'squatters' that the farmers drew 
their labour supplies* In 1961 approximately 3 million 
acres out of 8 million of Purchase Area land were 'occupied 
by squatters', 
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In certain areas farmers even allocated--. - 
land to Itenants' because of the dearth of casual labour 
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supplies. Like plantation owneraq Purchase Area farmers 
made liberal use of the Impoverished conditions prevalent, in 
the Tribal Trust lands to recruit cheap# casual and 
permanent labour for production under very loose teonditions 
of contract I which strongly f avoured employers. African 
agrarian capitalists also understood the benefits to be 
rejaped from rapid disintegration of the peasant social 
formation, The President of the A. F. U. 9 for Instance, 
called for the withdrawal of Tribal Trust Lands Development 
Corporation Investment funds from the Tribal Trust Lands and 
for the capital to be re-invested in enterprises owned by 
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'private Individuals$* 
21 ý 
The class formation process In African rural areas, 
which was greatly Influenced by State policyp was not confined 
to the development of agrarian capitalism or a merchant 
capitalist class, It also embraced the development of a 
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'bureaucratic bourgeoisiO. The emergence of this group 
of State officialst techniciansg civil servantaq local 
councillorst Chiefst Headmen and rural-based ItriballY 
elected' Members of Parliament and Senators was one of the 
most prominent features of the post-1940 period. The State 
'Africanized' Its administrative structures In the rural areas 
to a remarkable degree, After the 1965 directive on 
Community Development the pace of establishing a bureaucratic 
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bourgeoisie was stepped up. The 'Provincialization' 
programmej of making 'African Areas' self-sufficient in 
administration under the political control of the 
conservative elements in African societ7o provided the basic 
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framework for this policy* The bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
was wholly dependent on the Statep although it articulated 
grievances from time to timel and fulfilled the functions 
previously performed at the local level by white administrators* 
The labour supplying role of the peripheral social formation 
was ensured under a re-defined racial allocation of jobs and 
functions* The bureaucratic bourgeoisie also performed an 
economic function by organizing production in peasant society, 
They werej because of their relative autonomy In the political 
economy of the peripheryl In a position to accumulate capital 
through patronage and political control of the finances of 
the areas administered through them. At the same timet the 
peripheral bureaucracy provided. a source of legitimation 
for the central settler-colonial State, It provided the 
social control necessary In a society whose pre-capitalist 
lineage structures had been broken down and transformed by 
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capitalist development. In effectq the authority of 
traditional 'tribal elders' became modernized and entrenched 
In a new bureaucratic order more suited to the needs of 
the settler-colonial State. After the new sub-dominant 
classes of (African) society - merchants, businessmen and 
agrarian capitalists - formed closely inter-linked relation- 
ships with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the commercial and 
bureaucratic Interests worked In close mutual harmony. The 
composition of most African Councils and Community Boards 
reflected this coalition of cross-fertilized 'modern' and 
'traditional' class dominance, The political Influence of 
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was guaranteed by provisions 
of the central State ensuring that *traditional' leaders 
retained a secured Influence and control In the new 
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hierarchies,, 
CHAIMING PATTERNS OF STATE MEDIATIONo 
The manner In which cheap labour supplies were created 
and 'guaranteed' for capitalist producers from the Ilabour 
colonies' of peasant society within the settler-colonial 
State therefore changed markedly over the post-1940 period, 
New forms of control were developed even though much of the 
conventional 'settler ideology' concerning the African peasant 
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and his limited capabilities did not change fundamentally 
(see Appendix B). Peasants were regarded throughout the 
period as a 'parasitical classt and the peasant economy 
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(even In the early 1970'a) was seen as a tmillstonel. 
Yet without Increased dependence on the-peasant mode of 
productiong which bore a large portion of the costs of 
reproduction of wage-labourg the rapid development of 
peripheral capitalism In Rhodesia would have been Impossible. 
The expenditures by the State on peasant economic 
development were tiny and designed largely to ensure the 
maintenance of the subsistence system. As Yudleman has 
notedt 'Before 1940 public expenditures on (African) 
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agricultural development were negligible'. Indeedq 
they were mainly confined to small outlays on road construc- 
tion, bridge constructiong cattle dipping pens and small 
dams* By contrast, In the first fifty years of colonization 
In Southern Rhodesia up to 1940# considerable outlays went to 
subsidize# support and make viable the Infrastruetureq 
marketing channelsq research organizations and services 
geared towards the plantation economy. This trend persisted 
In the post-1940 period though with increased proportions of 
outlays for 'African agriculture* being spent on the develop- 
ment of African agrarian capitalism. From 1941-499 total 
outlays were in the vicinity of L2.5 milliont a relatively 
small investment in the light of rural population size and 
State allocations to both the plantation economy and other 
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sectors. The paucity of public sector support was 
recognized even by high ranking bureaucrats. 
125 
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In the 1950-58 era expenditures from central government 
grew rapidlyg totaling an estimated E15-8 million, a six-fold 
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Increase on the preceeding nine years. Yet the net 
effect of these enlarged outlays on pensant Incomes was 
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marginal. There were various reasons for this: the 
pattern of expenditures favoured soil conservationg road 
maintenancep and the implementation of the Land Husbandry 
Act while a large slice went to meet adminAstrative costs. 
The principal beneficiaries were Purchase Area farmers and 
the small number of cultivators who qualified as Master 
Farmers. In the period up to 1962 further Investments were 
made under the Land Husbandry Acts again reflecting resource 
mal-allocation as far as the bulk of peasant producers were 
concerned, 
In the 1960ts the pattern of financial policy and 
priorities characteristic of the pre-1940's prevailed. 
Outlays were directed towards subsistence maintenance and 
'primary developmentIq l. e,,,, Infra-struoture. The levels 
of State investment remained modestq especially In relation 
to the large growth in rural population and the size of the 
public sector budget., The appropriation of government 
funds from loan votes only began on a relatively extensive 
basis through the African Loan Fund in 1964. The funds 
involved were limitedg biased towards Purchase Area farmers 
and relatively small in comparison to loan facilities made 
available to plantation producers through the State controlled 
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Land Bank and other commercial banking channels. A 
large portion of public funds allocated to African agriculture 
)-sl 
was diverted to irrigation schemes In the post-1965 period. 
The benefits were designed to $prop up' rural peasant 
communities and were highly concentrated amongst a small 
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portion of the peasant population, Similarlyg government 
funding of the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporationg 
which after 1967 acted as a vehicle for the centralization 
of non-agricultural and agricultural Investment In the rural 
areas as well as the development of African commercial 
Interestsq was at a very low level and In stark contrast to 
Investments, loans and subsidies allocated to plantation 
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agriculturee 
The paucity of investment funds affected the various 
fields of development policy in peasant agricultureq one of 
the most critical being the provision of extension services. 
In 1951 there were only 463 African extension staff and 60 
European Land Development Officers with responsibility for 
280,000 farmers6 Each employee was expected to cover an 
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area of 609000 acres and 4509000 acres respectively. 
This-was grossly inadequate and was made more so by the 
diversion of most of the effort of these technical advisers 
Into the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act. Even 
the Purchase Areas suffered from a relative scarcity of 
extension services. In 1972 the ratio of peasant farmers 
to extension staff was still 600: 1, a high levelq especially 
considering the low level of competence of many assistants, 
poor transport and communicationsg and the high degree of 
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Illiteracy of peasant farmers. The importance of this 
phenomenon is highlighted 'when it Is reeognized that peasant 
-1ý0 
i 
producers were In direct competition with plantation producers 
for labour supplies, public funds, subsidlesq research 
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services and government pricing protections. 
Even the problem of producing sufficient food for the 
peasant community was seen In terms of expanding the monopoly 
already obtained by the plantation economy: 'European 
agriculture must raise more and more food to feed the 
country's Native population. This will require more and 
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more Native labour'. The peasant economy was not seen as 
a production system to be developed but as a convenient 
structure to be maintained with the purpose of expanding 
labour supplies to employers. The monopolization of land 
contributed directly to this process, The surplus land 
resources owned by plantation producers were Oldle resources 
contributing little to the economyy though they (could) be 
considered "excess capacity" lands held in reserve to meet 
any sudden demand for products% 
135 
Fore properlyq surplus 
land resources served as objects for speculationg as a basis 
for accumulation and an asset for collateral to facilitate 
high capitalization. Also whereas plantation producers had 
relatively limited marketing problems because of the proximity 
of road and rail servicesq the regional distribution of the 
institutional apparatus and the structure of public 
expendituresp African product marketing was 'chaotic'. The 
principal causes were 'bad road communications# lack of 
transportq want of buyerst variable pricesq unorganized 
sellingo Improper buying methodsq disregard of grades and 
136 
middleman speculation'. 
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The effects of 'structured' competitive relationships 
between the peasant and plantation economies derived from 
entrenched long term originst the effects of which have 
contributed towards the widening gap in the productivity of 
the two systems9 a point overlooked by some economists who 
ignore the historical developments which helped create 
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underdevelopment In the peasant economy. In short-run 
crisesq for Instance In droughteg the net effect of public 
policy was to further reinforce these structural features. 
Peasant producers were increasingly unable to restore their 
previous (albeit unequal) competitive position vis-a-vis 
the plantation economy. 
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The periodicityl Indeed 
regularityq of droughts and poor seasons in Southern 
Rhodesia over the period under reviewq especially concentrated 
In the 1940's and 1960's, combined with drought aid policies 
to prevent the accumulation of surpluses by peasantsq caused 
peasants'to become wage dependent and Impaired the necessary 
level of long term reinvestment In productive capacity 
enabling self-sustaining growth, 
State aid to plantation producers In times of crisis 
had the effect of providing reasonable Incomes for producers 
and even allowing for the maintenance of Investment In 
productive capacity. Inmore recent yearsq a similar policy 
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has applied to Purchase Area farmers. A contrary policy 
has been operative In respect of drought relief measures 
directed'at the peasant economy. Aid facilities extended by 
the State were not as extensive and seldom permitted lost 
surpluses nec'essary for reinvestment to be made up. This 
aq 
policy altered little over the years. Government relief was 
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not forthcoming unless surpluses had already been consumed. 
By contrastj In the plantation eeonomyq substantial subsidies 
In the form of drought aid were given prior to Investible 
surpluses being used for consumption. Peasant drought relief 
was generally only directed at serious privation with the 
objective of maintaining a survival level of consumption 
and with no extensive effort being made to reconstruct peasant 
production. Indeedq In certain years It almost became the 
definition of a 'good season' when 'in no cases was It 
necessary for the Government to undertake famine relief 
measures#4,141 The very emphasis on famine relief, underscored 
the nature of drought policies for peasant producersq by 
comparison with drouaht aid policies for the plantation 
economye Ofteng famine relief was simply the regional 
redistribution of stocks of maize 'which were sold to the 
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Natives at ordinary pripesle This was the case even In 
distriets'where there was serious drought damage and where 
actual famine prevailed. The extra-cost of Importing or 
distributing maize supplies regionally fell Initially on the 
government and in these situations often represented the true 
relief component of drought alleviation policies. Indeedq 
most of the outlay-on drought relief policies for peasant 
producers was. directly recoverable from producer levies 
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drawn from, the Native Development Fund. In different 
eircumstancesg as in the Lowveld In 19649 relief P011cles 
took the form of specific offers of low paid eMPloyment on 
plantations and estatess 'In the lowveld areas drought 
'2 
relief measures had to be taken and employment was provided 
for those who had no stock to sell to enable them to obtain 
funds for purchasing grain, In spite of vociferous demands 
for relief it was remarkable how few people were prepared to 
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take up employment when offered'. It Is not surprising 
that offers of employment of the sort available In Lowveld 
agriculture were refused when the prospective return on 
employment secured in urban areas was significantly higher. 
Belief was thus only given in the last resort as a measure 
for the maintenance of peasant survival ands In most 
eircumstancesp Its Impact was to proletarianize the lower 
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, strata of peasant society. 
Peasant underdevelopment and the domestic generation 
of cheap labour supplies were also.. Implemented through taxation 
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policies which have discriminated against peasant producers. 
The special tax concessions permitted plantation prodUceraq 
in the form of direct subsidies to capital investmentp were 
maintained throughout the period and Improved In various ways, 
Special Income tax deductions applied to farmers In the 
1950's and ig6olst the bulk of the benefit being aimed at 
large-scale plantation producers, These policies combined 
with, land policies to improve the competitiveness of 
plantation producersq to afford plantation, producers better 
access to markets and to lower their costs of transport for 
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marketing and-the purchase of factor inputs. Peasant 
producersq especially from the marginal groups# were unable 
to compete effectively and thus had to develop alternative 
sources of livelihoodg especially through wage employment. 
In 1950 the Grain Marketing Act came Into operation and 
had the effect of providing State control over the marketing 
and pricing of maize,, meal beans, rapokag kaffir corn and 
mungag all Important outputs from peasant production. The 
Grain Marketing Amendment Act Noi 35 of 1951 added ground 
nuts to this list. These Acts Institutionalized State 
controls over a wide range of peasant output and permitted 
the effective introduction of the policy of paying 'A flat 
price to the Native producer throughout the Colony for each 148 
com. moditYla In additiong levies were placed on all 
African products marketed through the system* The introduc- 
tion of the transport equalization-, policy in the 1950'as 
In order to provide equal competitiveness amon African 
producersq also raised costs to peasant producers as a 
whole since 'the transport fee rose from 29 a bag to 6s 10d 
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a bag'. Because producers could not collectively bargain 
for low cost transportp and all sales had to go through 
official marketing channelsq the effect was to provide high 
cost subsidies to distant growers and cause misuse of peasant 
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capital resources. The Imposition of higher average 
cost structures and the enforcement of a production tax 
created serious constraints for peasant accumulationq 
especially as expenditures from the Native Development Fund 
(into which the levies were paid) were distributed in such 
a way that only small Increases in production were forthcoming 
therefrom. Taxation policy was, thereforeq Instrumental in 
maintaining the peasant economy*s underdevelopment, One of 
the basic principles of policy was to ensure that, within 
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the prevailing price structuresq State capital and current 
expenditures In the Reserves were financed# as far as 
possibleg from revenue resources raised from within the 
peasant economy. 
The functional role of African taxation In Southern 
Rhodesia was closely related also to policies of maximizing 
available labour supplies and keeping real wage costs to 
employers as low as possible. For this purpose a personal 
tax under the Native Tax Act had been levied on all adult 
males over 16 years of age. Although it remained In force 
the tax lost much of Its functional Impetus after the late 
1940's as a labour surplus situation developed rapidly. 
Taxation had other Important functions however. It provided 
the revenues with which to administer the Reserves in a self- 
financing wayp thereby ensuring that the peasant economy bore 
as much as possible of the cost of labour's reproduction. 
WhIlst It Is difficult to obtain accurate quantitative- 
estimates of the net tax burden Incurred by the peasant 
economy in the 1940'sq there Is little doubt that if there 
was any net benefit of contribution over recelptsp it was 
only marginally significant In relation to the total 
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government annual revenues. 
The net fiscal return to the peasant economy for the 
period 1948-58 could only have been very small when account 
Is taken of both direct and indirect African peasant tax 
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contributions* One of the most important of this latter 
group of taxes was the levy placed on peasant production in 
1948.. The, taxes covered a wide range of Productsq as well 
)-r) c-: 
I 
as livestookq and could reach 'as high as 15 percent of the 
retail priceO. 
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As a tax on producer surpluses these 
levies were a great burden and adversely affected peasant 
capacities for capital accumulation. The underdevelopment 
effects of the levy system were recognized by high ranking 
government officials: 'The levy system Itself Is a tax on 
the productive sector of the African economy andq when the 
expressed aim is a conversion of the subsistence economy into 
a cash economyg it would aDpearto be somewhat contradictory 
to tax those who produce for the- market and leave untouched 
those whose efforts remain in the subsistence field. ' 
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Whilst this was an implicit call for further taxation of 
the necessary consumption of subsistence-oriented peasants, 
it does reflect the ideology and objectives of 'development' 
administration of the time. The 'apparent' contradiction 
is easily reconciled when the real function of the Reserves 
Is consideredg ie. they were not 'designed' to be highly 
productive areas but regions for the low-cost reproduction 
and supply of cheap labour-power. Thus the levy system 
continued to operate into the 19701sq except for the Purchase 
Areas where it was abolished in 1965- Its Olabour supplying' 
function was diminished however and Its principal function 
became that of providing revenue In an environment in which 
the State was unwilling tog and found it difficult tog 
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provide alternative sources of financee- Nonetheless the 
overall effect of-the levy system enabled the central 
government to become the effective decision maker In respect 
of the investment of peasant surplus as well as reduced the 
2fl 
ability of individual peasants to accumulate capital and so 
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become independent of the labour market for subsistence, 
CONCLUSION 
Peasant underdevelopment In the post-1940's accelerated 
as the peasant modes of production broke down and became more 
dependent on the dominant mode and State policies* The 
peasant economy was largely conserved as a Ilabour colony' 
and Increasingly# In the period under reviewg It came to 
supply more cheap labour-power to capitalist producers, 
These processes of Idi. ssolution-conservation' In the pre- 
capitalist social formation were mediated by State policy - 
over landq the means of production# peasant capital acoumulaý, 
tiont the financing and taxing of the tFleserves' and control 
In the administrative sphere. The proletarianization of 
the Rhodesian peasantry In the post-1940's occurred under 
conditions of primitive capital accumulationg through squatter 
evictionsg *resettlement policiesIg compulsory de-stooking 
and drought taidl. programmes which assisted In the marginall- 
zation of poorer peasant producers and created a stronger 
dependence on wage labourg especially in plantationt but also 
in African agrarian capitalist production, The role of the 
settler-colonial State In these processes was crucial, 
articulating the complex relationships between the peasant 
and other modes of production and controMing the system of 
production and exchanges This was central to the class 
formation process that became more distinctive In rural African 
society and was a necessary condition for the local 
mobilization of cheap labour supplies. 
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RURAL PROLETARIANIZATION IN THE "QUASI-FEUDAL" 
SYSTEM OF PLAIT'ITATION PRODUCTION 
An analysis of the nature of underdevelopment and 
discrimination in the 'modern' rural sector in which black 
farm workers were employed requires an appreciation of 
various changing and inter-related factors: the character 
of produotiong the social relations specific to the agrarian 
#capitalist' mode of production and the process of 
accumulation In the economy-type represented by the 'modern' 
agricultural sector (here referred to as the plantation 
system of production)* 
The plantation form of production has functioned within 
a capitalist system located In the periphery of the world 
I 
economy und under a regime of settler colonialism. 
Howeverg the plantation mode of production In Rhodesia cannot 
simply be equated with an (abstract) agrarian capitalist 
branch of the capitalist mode of productiong as Arrighl and 
Barber have both tended to do (the former explicitlyg the 
2 
latter Implicitly). To do so would be to ignore many 
essential elements Ing and distort the reality ofq the 
political economy of Rhodesian settler colonialism. it 
would also lead to a fals'e conceptualization of plantation 
production as represented by the economic base (the social 
and technical relations of production taken as a $unified' 
whole) and reflected In the ideological and political 
2ýj 
superstructures that are 'realized' In the concrete social 
formation. 
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Rhodesian plantations made use of a variety of relations 
of productiont capitalist (permanent and casual wage-labour)t 
pre-capitalist (tenant-labourers) and 'quasi-capitalist' 
(unpaid, ', labour and labour obtained through *extra-economict 
means)* As Bernstein has correctly pointed outq this 
variegated system of labour relations In production expresses 
the broader relationships between the dominant and subordinate 
4 
modes of production. The different combinations of labour 
typically found In plantation production were used as 
mechanisms for the mobilization of cheap labour. The social 
relations found and the mechanisms characteristic of this 
system provided the conditions which enabled profitable 
production to be carried out. 'Once this Is done#' as 
Mandle has notedg 'the peculiar mix of capitalist enterprise 
and archaic labour relations which typifies the plantation 
economy is made viable, v5 
It will be argued here that plantation production 
structures depended on predominantly quasi-feudal labour 
policies and relied on Institutional or 'extra-economic* 
measures to obtain adequate supplies of cheap labour - hence 
the designation Iguasi-feudall to Partly distinguish It 
from other production systems in the economic systemg 
particularly the 'industrial* capitalist mode. and the peasant 
or pre-eapitalist mode, Plantation production Is easily 
differentiated from the latters as well as from African 
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agrarian capitalist produotiong by the manner In which the 
productive forces and means of production were usedq the 
social relations found on the plantations (the nature of wage 
relations and managerial structures)q the forms of cooperation 
used in production and the political and Ideological authority 
6 
relations linked to these structures* The plantation 
system is also analytically distinguishable from 'orthodox' 
capitalist production found In the *industrial complexlq 
though essentially the two combine to provide the specific 
form of peripheral capitalism that constitutes the settler- 
colonial socio-economio formation, 
In historical termag the plantation production system 
was constructed upon policies of primitive accumulation - 
land alienation# $squatter' eviction and 'ultra-low' wages 
set below the cost of reproduction of labour. This 
accumulation process embraced two aspeotes that of 
dispossessing the peasantry and that of providing the 
necessary re2roductive conditions In the rural areas for the 
generation of a cheap labour force for minesp Itdustrlesq 
the farms themselves and domestic householdse Thus the 
$industrial complex* also came to depend on the plantation 
system being maintained so that producers could obtain 
labour supplies at low cost, During and after the 196019 
the policies of land alienationg squatter evictiong and the 
commutation of Irightst to 'illegal# residence into labour. 
tenant agreements# became less central to this process of 
primitive accumulation* The changing pattern of accumulation 
reflected a transformation In social relations In plantation 
30( 
productions the latter system having become more dependent 
upon contracted wage-relationships* Nonethelessq the 
dominance of nuasl-feudhl labour policies remained as a 
structurally entrenched feature of the plantation mode, 
It is also important to establish the position of 
plantation production in the peripheral capitalist system, 
The essence, of the plantation economy0s relations to the 
dominant 'fractions' of non-agrarian capital Involved a 
system of mutually sustaining dependency links - economic, 
social and political - which made plantation production 
necessary but subordinate to industrial and foreign capital. 
Previous analyses simply assumed that plantation enterprises 
were fully capitalist (in constitution and labour relations), 
an assumption which provided the grounds for aggregating 
agricultural labour with Oother* wage-labour In the economy, 
They also assumed plantation enterprise to be equal In status 
7 
to non-agrarian enterprise (leee non-dependent)* These 
two assumptions have been at variance with the reality of 
the Rhodesian Plantation economy and acceptance of them has 
led analysis away from an understanding of the specific 
conditions relevant to farm labour, 
THE REALITY OF PLAWATION PRODUCTION 
The plantation had more signifleanee than the simple 
economic dimension usually attributed to It, vir, that of a 
productive agrarian enterprise. Its rooto# functioning and 
Integration into the system must therefore not be understood 
3o-I 
solely in leconomistice terms. Its defining characteristic 
Is tthe way in which the factors of productiong primarily 
8 
management and labourg are combined', Smith appropriately 
described the plantation production unit as 'a bureaucratically 
organized system In which whole blocks of people are treated 
as units and are marched through a set of regimentation under 
9 
the surveillance of a small supervisory staff'. Labour 
belonged to the plantation and was made dependent on It for 
a wide range of necessary welfare services as well as basic 
subsistence* 
10 
Labour's dependence was not wholly 
attributable to Oeconomict relations, Dependence manifested 
itself as a type of servilityq that relied for Its maintenance 
on 'extra-eoonomiol measures. 
Plantation production should also strictly be 
differentiated into Its various componentse Here the generic 
term 'plantation' Is used to refer to enterprises whIchq 
while they pursued common objectives and used much the same 
forms of labour mobilizationg were dissimilar In some 
important respects, 
Plantations $proper$ were typically large-scaleg foreign 
ownedq vertically Integratedl with strong forward linkages 
and often run as $rural Industriesto the high degree of 
mechanization and capitalization of these enterprises setting 
them off from smaller settler estates, An example of the 
former was Hippo Valley Estateaq a subsidiary of a South 
African based# multinational company with extensive investments 
throughout Southern Africa and whiehq under Anglo-American 
Rhodesia (Amrho), was heavily Involved In manufacturing, 
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miningg ore processingg Investment finance and discounting 
as well as forestryo 
11 
Settler estateaq under familial ownership or constituted 
as Incorporated enterpriseag were usually smaller In scale 
(though within this group there existed a wide variation) 
and functioned as specialized producers In arable or pastoral 
productiong linked to one another as a powerful lobby through 
the Rhodesia National Farmers* Union (RNF. U, )* These 
producers were dominant as a rural political force and 
provided the basic means whereby. the land was effectively 
monopolized by a small class of landownerso Ranching 
production and forestry may also be identified as specialized 
aspects* The former Vas predominantly In the hands -of 
private capital (both foreign and settler) while# for the most 
parts forestry Investments were controlled by State and 
t 12 foreign capit * 
These types of plantation production unit exerted 
different demands for labour., The differences existing 
between them depended on a wide variety of factors - the 
output mixg the effect of seasonalityg the locality of the 
enterprise In relation to local (reserve) labour suppliesq 
the management structure and the degree of profitability. 
While these 'blends' of labour utilization are Important In 
explaining the specific pattern of labour relationag this 
analysis Is primarily concerned with variations In labour 
mobilization between plantation production and other forms 
of production* 
3ol 
Plantation producers may be Identified as a specific 
group In the capitalist class# exhibiting many common 
soeio-economic characterlstiong employing similar methods 
of labour utilizationg and pursuing common objectives In 
productions These objectives were: the minimization of 
the 'moral and historical element' In wages In order to 
force the subsistence level of workers close to the physical 
minimum and Impose an extraordinarily high degree of under- 
consumption in respect of basic worker-household needst 
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the systematic elimination of workers# bargaining power 
through semi-feudal labour policies and prohibitive controls 
over collective mobilizationj accumulation through the 
ownership and control of surplus land resourceaq the command 
of which maintained peasant underdevelopment and ensured 
cheap labour supplies from the marginalized strata of the 
peasant economy, 
Plantation producers performed a number of Important 
functions for the system of peripheral capitalism* Firstlyq 
the settler-estate plantationg the form which commanded most 
of the land resources and produced the bulk of outputq was 
a basic Institution for settlement and colonization, an 
Instrument for opening up jLndý&veloped areas as well as a 
mechanism for sustaining agrarian ILnderdevelopment In the 
14 
peasant economy* In this latter respectq the plantation 
also served as a vehicle for the maintenance of conditions 
of underdevelopment amongst the agrarian working class, 
This function was fulfilled in part by a large Portion of. 
plantation land being kept under management control on -- 
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behalf of absentee landlords (36,2 peroent in the period 
1949-50) with effective control being exercised from 
elsewhere* 
15 
in 1965 the tenurial distribution of 
plantations indicated that 72 percent of farms were owned 
by owner-ocoupiersp 16 percent by lessees with the balance 
being 'managed** Absentee landlords were thus not uncommon 
In the RhodelAan plantation economy and their existence even 
caused friction within the circles of rural white society* 
16 
Seoondlyt plantations in Rhodesia performed essential 
functions for dependent peripheral capitalism by providing 
for the export earnings required to enable structural 
diversification and Industrialization. In 1965 for Instance, 
40,8 percent of gross agricultural output was exported* 
17 
With a relatively low level of Imports In relation to output 
(3 percent In 1965) and a low Import content In gross fixed 
Investmenti, the plantation sector was able to achieve a net 
foreign exchange earnings position U59.4 million in 1965). 
The ability of plantation producers to perform these 
necessary functions was dependent upon State and non-agrariang 
private capital support for these basic rural-based Institu- 
tions of settler colonialism. State policies traditionally 
proteoted and subsidized Plantation expansion in all its 
format the case of the selling of Hkwasine Estate to a 
South African based multinational consortium In 1974 being 
one Instance of the close relationship that existed between 
State and agrarian capital.. 
18 
This cooperation was manifest 
in all crucial fields: taxationq subsidleag land policy, 
labour policies and Infrastructural Investment, The State 
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therefore allowed and maintained the monopoly of one-half the 
rural land in Rhodesia by this small class of landowners 
(the average plantation unit size in 1965 was 59376 acres)* 
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The land surplus was permitted even In the knowledge of 
growing peasant land scarcitye In 1946 only 2.4 percent of 
European rural land was cultivated and by 1965 this 
proportion had risen to just 3*3 percent,, 
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Although plantation producers were also traditionally 
tied to foreign-controlled credit and financing systemsg 
they gradually became highly dependent on State finance. 
In 1965 $48.6 million was made available tp plantation 
producers In the form of short-term credito $2*7 million 
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coming from commercial bankso Medium and long-term loans 
were funded mostly through a statutory body - the Land Bank 
(later the Agricultural Finance Corporation) - which In 1965 
alone made loans valued at $13 million to over one-third of 
all plantation producers, These advances grew steadily In 
post U*D. I* yearaq so Increasing the level of plantation 
indebtedness and dependeneee On short-term and long-term 
loans the arrears to investments ratio 
-3 Percent to 24ol percent and rose from 14 
from 4.6 percent to 7.6 percent respectively for the period 
22 
1960-65 0 In 1965 more than 55 percent of drought relief 
loans were in arrearsq and for the period 1965-71 the total 
estimated value of assets on European farmst as a ratio of 
Institutional Indebtedneseq rose from 31.6 percent to 
34.8 percent* The plantation economy was therefore 
critically dependentl not only on manufacturing producers 
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for Input supplies of fertilizerag fuel and powerg animal 
feed and crop seedq but also on State and private capital 
for necessary short-term and long-term finance and drought 
aid fundingd, Without these supports producers would not 
have been able to operate at the recorded high levels* 
The relationships which supported the viability of 
plantation productions and which through plantation develop- 
ment provided a specific configuration of peasant and rural 
proletarian underdevelopmentg were relations of mutual 
dependenoep amongst all branches of capitalist production 
and all Ofraotions' of capital in the dominant social classes. 
Howevers these relationships changed over the post-1940 
periodgas did the requirements of plantation producers., 
The central position of the plantation system in 
relation to the core of Rhodesian capitalist enterprise 
diminished despite massive increases In output volume* From 
1954-70 the relative contribution of European agriculture 
to gross domestic product fell from 14.1 percent to 9.1 
percen , 
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At the same time, the gross value of European 
agricultural Output rose from $9,8 million In 1940 to 
$2? 3.4 million In 19? 3 (current price estimates)* 
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This 
massive Increase In production implied a great demand for 
cheap labour supplies despite the relative position of the 
sector waning In terms of gross domestic product& Hoist 
of the additional demand for labour was for unskilled and 
manual workersp a situation well suited to lOw-wage policies 
and foreign and 'migrant$ labour supplies* 
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The diminished position of plantations in the economic 
system and the shift towards a more variegated and industrial 
production structure had the effect of reducing the political 
importance of white agrarian society despite the cultivation 
of close political 'ties' between these groups and other 
eocio-economic settler classes. These ties were fostered 
through the political proceasq the mediation of the Rhodesian 
Front party and white 'nationalism'. More toompromisel was 
required from farmers# more competition resulted (from 
African agrarian capitalicm)q more reliance had to be placed 
on the political Instance in exerting Influence on the 
State (through party politics and the R. TT, F, Uo) and9 because 
of the international position after 1965, labour mobilization 
and utilization had increasingly to be based on local 
supplies of cheap labour. 
Pressures on the supply of cheap labour occasioned the 
Inereased'mechanization, of plantation production* In 1947 
there were 1#155 tractors used on European farms# 
cultivating an area per tractor of 566 acres. 
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By 1965 
the acreage cultivated had Just less than doubled but the 
number of traotors had risen 13-fold to 14,5859 an average 
area cultivated per tractor of 70 acres* African wages as 
a percentage of gross Inputs fell sharply over the periodg 
especially from 1965, following the decline of the labour- 
intensive tobacco sector and the Implementation of a policy 
of diversification in production. In that year the wage 
bill for'2899000 African workers amounted to 31.2 percent 
of Input costs* 
26 By 1972 there were 338*000 farm workers 
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employed and African wages were only 26-5 percent of Input 
costs. The policy of mechanization was pursued with 
enthusiasm by State and private capital within the oonstraint,, - 
that profits had to be maintained. The expansion of low cost 
agricultural employment was necessary for this as well as to 
ensure the stability of the system by absorbing otherwise 
unemployed local labour, 
In 19480 for instance, a government Inquiry established 
that 739 of a sample of 39352 white farmers recognized that 
savings could be made from mechanization* 
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Host of these 
producers were in non-tobacco sectors. Tractor Intensifi- 
cation enabled the elimination of 'plough boys' and oxen 
drivers* It could also out down labour required for planting, 
fertilizing and manual work in the cleaning of marketed food 
crops* Mechanization was also regarded as a meansq not of 
$saving' labourg but of expanding production$ loeo# achieving 
a higher volume of profits, Some producers however were on 
farms which were 'too small' for effective mechanization and 
In some areas of production (eg, ranching) few savings could 
be made (herd boys* were considered Irreplaceable)* On 
tobacco farms reaping and grading could not be effectively 
mechanized* The rate of mechanization was limited by supply 
constraintst the prices of imported capital goodso the 
shortage and cost of fencingg fuel costag the uneven supply 
of electricity in rural areas and the short supply of 
trained farmworkers to operate machinery. Plantation 
interests lobbied for State assistance to overcome these 
problems - especially In the form of low Interest loansq, 
Do 
pricing subsidies for the purchase of agricultural machineryp 
the gearing of domestic Industrialization to agrarian input 
suppliesg and the development of State financed programmes In 
the field of conservationg extension and the elimination of 
vermin. 
These demands remained broadly the same throughout the 
1948-74 period$ the essential feature being that the costs 
to private capital should be reduced and plantation profits 
accordingly enhanced. The R. H. F. U. strongly recommended 
mechanization to its members. To encourage this It provided 
evidence of how mechanization on 'reasonable* sized farms 
could radically reduce the labour cost per acreq provided 
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mechanization was accompanied by acreage expansion. The 
net effect of mechanization was to raise profitog Increase 
the returns to capital goods suppliers and reduce dependence 
on cheap and/or foreign African labour. The effect of 
extensive post-1940 mechanization also raised the demand for 
semi-skilled rural labour, furthering the process of 
stratification of the rural proletariat. In 1973 for 
Instance 1819380 permanent farm workers received less than 
$10 in cash'wages monthly and another 549110 received between 
$10 and $20* 
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A total of more than 139000 workers received 
more than $20# many of these workers being employed In 
agricultural servicesp semi-skilled work and In 'white collar' 
jobs on the plantations. 
The growing-c-omplexity and Intensification of production 
was also accompanied by a change towards incorporation as 
the dominant form of ownershipq especially on settler estates. 
3" 
This was partly a profit maximizing decision resulting from 
the nature of the concessions and benefits accruing to 
Incorporated enterprises as opposed to unincorporated ones. 
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In 1954 only $2.6 million out of a total of 021 million gross 
operating profits were made by companies. 
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In 1970 some 
$20,2 million out of $41-3 million of total gross operating 
profits originated from corporate farming enterprises. 
32 
Furthermorep. large plantations became more prominent 
particularly in the south-vastern lovveld region under the 
sponsorship of the State owned public corporation# the 
Sabi-Limpopo Authorityg and South African controlled multi- 
national enterprises. 
The changed pattern of agricultural production was also 
accompanied by a tendency towards the Interpenetration of 
capital between plantation agriculture and other non-agrarian 
6 ectorsp especially financeg Industry, insurance and 
33 
commerceo Consequentlyq the classes which have had an 
Indirect Interest In the expansion of plantation production 
became. more firmly *looked-into' the development of the rural 
branches of peripheral capitalism In Rhodesia. 
THE ESSERMAL NATURE OF QUASI-FEUDAL LABOUR RELATIONS 
The nature of plantation labour 'rpolicies towards 
African workers must be understood In the context of the 
class structure of rural society. Here attention to drawn 
to the social relations found In the plantation enterprise 
that specifically define the OuaRI-fPudRl elements of these 
labour policies. 
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Firstlyg unlike the industrial capitalist mode of 
production - In which the wage relation between workers and 
management presupposed a 'free' wage-labour force and labour 
relations revolved almost exclusively around a 'cash nexual 
- plantation labour relations Involved a considerable degree 
of non-cash or non-wage committment on both sides of the 
contract* The character of the worker's relationship to 
the plantation was all encompassing. His links with the 
employer were not simply economic but also Involved a high 
degree of (personal) socio-political subordination and 
dependence@ 
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Many of these links were non-oontraetual In 
nature* The low proportion of cash payments to payments 
In kind reflected this paternal (client-patron) pattern In, 
35 
labour policy. 
Quasi-feudal labour relations were further reflected In 
the totality'of the employer* social$ economic and political 
power over labourers under an almost Independent social 
system, , The land-owner was not only the sole employer of 
the worker and his family, but was also the landlord of big 
. 
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worker-tenants* This dual mechanism of control Imposed 
additional restraint on the employee. Loss of job meant 
loss of right to tenure In the farm oompoundv loss of basic 
family subsistence andq If the worker was foreign or from 
a class of local dispossessed peasantryg an extremely high 
level of insecurity. The reliance by workers on employer- 
Initiated and employer-determined welfare Policies reinforced 
this feudal dependency system. The provision of education, 
the supply of medical servicesp the prospect of obtaining 
'ý 13 
Intermittent cash loansgand the local authority of the 
employer for disciplineg order and obedience were all 
dependent to a large degree on the employer's decision and 
inclination* Workers could Ill afford to disregard this 
largely institutionalized social control that Individual 
employers held over them, 
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beoame not only an employees 
The worker In this situation 
but a dependent tenant and a 
subservient client. Because of the all-pervasive character 
of these relationships and the limited options open to most 
farm workersq servility could continue even beyond the point 
at which the worker terminated formal employment as a 
plantation labourer since many workers were III-provided for 
in terms of necessary post-employment consumption needs 
(pension plans-or even gratuities were virtually non-existent 
for farm workers) and workers were partly reliant on a 
retainer status being bestowed upon them on retirementv a 
benefit for which (moderate) manual around-the-house tasks 
were often performed as Implicit payment. In this sense# 
farm workers were truly *tied' to the land ai well as the 
owner and his private propertyq the plantation* The 
ownership transfer of plantations was Invariably carried 
out on the basis of *look-stook-labour-and-barrelli, and 
the asset price often reflected (in part) the availability 
or cheap labour supplies, 
'Extra-wage$ obligations took various formsq one of 
which was (in the case of married workers whose families 
lived with them In the compound) 9 to supplY a significant 
quantum of, familY, labour-power for plantation productions 
particularly at critical times of the year when plantation 
demands for labour were at a peak, Permanent labourers 
were therefore Involved in a Quasi-feudal relationship which 
*tied' their families to long-standing obligations to supply 
periodic labour-power. By contrast, such a situation had 
been atypical of industrial employmentq or eveN though for 
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different reasonal domestic household employment. 
Additionallys where production conditions permitted* 
workers were provided with small plots of land to cultivate, 
Although they did not own themq and no lieng 'rental' or 
share-cropping payments were requiredp the land formed part 
of the Implicit 'contractual' conditions of employment. 
The system reduced the need for the employer to outlay cash 
to meet wage costs; and It provided a means of obtaining 
low coat food for worker subsistence. Alsog by temporarily 
providing (as long as the worker remained on the plantation) 
'private' means of production (however Illusory)q the owner 
gave workers incentive to raise their own level of consumption, 
The scheme thus functioned as an effective way In which to 
raise productivity, The more the worker was able to provide 
of his necessary means of subsistence himselfg the less needed 
to be appropriated from the value produced for the owner to 
meet cash and non-cash wage payments made directly from 
employer to worker. In turns this practice (of 'letting the 
"boys" plough and till a plot of land') became a Justification 
for a low-wage policy since the 'benevolent' allocation of 
land was expected to con tribute meaningfully to the workers' 
real welfare and level of subsistence* However* In this 
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respectq such an arrangement simply provided a mechanism 
whereby family labour was harnessed to plantation production 
under a feudal-paternalist regime In which the output was 
regarded as part of the payment for the workert' labour 
services# whereas the Input consisted primarily of the 
labour-power of the workerls famIlyq an input which was not 
rewarded by the plantation owner In the form of cash wages. 
The #generosity' implied by the allocation of surplus land - 
at little or no cost to the plantation owner - was a masking 
of the true relationship that existed between the employer 
and family labour under plantation conditions. 
Subsistence wage policies In the plantation economy were 
also geared to serve Important functions in retaining the 
status guog quite apart from being profit-maximizing policies 
In an Industry In which there was little direct control over 
export prices. The single most Important area of direct 
management control of Input costs was the largest element 
of Input costs - labour. Subsistence wage policies helped 
to maintain worker ties to the plantation. Without any 
accumulated surplus or alternative securityt workers found 
it impossible to subsist outside the all-embracing 
'paternalist' plantation., Even the costs of short-term 
'migration' were sufficiently prohibitive - In the form of 
loss-of cash wagesp transport costsq costs of possible 
unemployment before obtaining another job and loss of 
Orations"and the family's basic source of subsistence 
so ensuring continued dependence on the plantation. In 
thlsýrespect too the 'farm store* served a valuable functiong 
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not only for channelling the profits from the sale of 
commodities back Into the plantation enterprise, but also 
ensuring that worker Indebtedness remained linked to the 
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plantation-oomplex, 
The feudal dimension of the plantation labour structure 
is furthermore indicated by employer reliance on the 
institutional framework and adjustments thereto as one of 
the basic means of securing cheap labour supplies* At the 
level of the plantation these 'extra-economic' measures 
were also of Importanceg as evidenced for example In the use 
of the 'ticket' systemg the use of foreign contract labourg 
the application of various employer-determined tlocall farm 
rules regarding overtimeq rates of pay for family labourg 
hoursq days-offv leavev piece-work and work on Sundays and 
public holidays. Rural workers furthermore often had no 
ttraditional"land rights or any collective bargaining 
rights and hence had to accept the unilateral determination 
of wages and conditions of employment* It was the ownership 
of land, the means of productiong from which the plantation 
employerOs power was derived# together with sanction and 
support from the settler-colonial State* The power of the 
landed classes was the very power to keep rural workers both 
poor and dependentg even whilet a vast surplus of land 
resources remained in the hands of a few owners and the State 
as a basic means for capital accumulation and as collateral 
for the financing of plantation expansion* The conflict 
between the 'workers' and plantation owners has thus embraced 
a dimension related to the more fundamental conflict over 
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ownership between landless peasants and the landowning 
classes who controlled the means of rural production, it 
has not, therefore simply been a confilet over the distribu- 
tion of surplus from*produotion, 
The production relations described above were typical 
for most plantation workers. The specific composition of 
the wage-labour force on the plantations may however have 
Imposed other important conditions or constraints which 
should be noted, tCasuall workersq usually from adjacent 
Tribal Trust Land areasq often did not partake of the 
benefl ts, of paternalist labOur Policies and received a 
purely cash and fixed contractual wage from the plantation, 
Often allocations of labour time from peasant households In 
the form of casual labour existed side by side with each 
cropping for the market and production for own consumption, 
The creator the element of marginalization in the peasant 
societyg the greater was the prospect of the household being 
more heavily Immersed in casual or 'semi-permanent' labour on 
the plantations, As long as the rural homestead remained 
viableg autonomy from the plantation labour markett. as a 
wholly dependent farm workers was secured. 14arginalized 
peasants who became "tied' to plantation employment had 
usually-reached 'the end of the. road' - economically and in 
terms, of effective choice('exoept perhaps in the case of a 
limited-number who could consider employment In African 
agrarian enterprises at even lower wage levels)* The only 
effective choice for many then was between different employers 
withi plantation production -a choice which the 
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$standardization' of 
employment made more 
For 'squatters' 
was mandatoryt a necý 
this group a variety 
impoverished eonditions In plantation 
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illusory than real* 
or labour-tenants the supply of labour 
assity for tenure and survival. Within 
of employment relationships were f oundq 
the, 'general trend of whichl howeverg was to phase out the 
uI sufruct'associated with tenancy and commercialize the 
tenancy relationship into an exchange of cash and payment 
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In kind for labour time supplied throughout the year* The 
employer's option of terminating the tenancy (under which 
say 6 months of labour would be supplied In exchange for 
lrlghts$, ýcf residence) had been an effective Instrument of 
,, proletarianization. After the growth of unemployment in 
the early 1960ts the termination of tenancy left little 
',. option open 
to labour-tenants besides acceptance of the 
status and, conditions of permanent')-labouro Dispossessed 
peasants# #squatters# and rural workers who reached the 
plantation as a result of peasant underdevelopment thus 
constituted a group of 'concealed' landless workersq the 
underpinning of whose working-class status was determined by 
mechanisms of primitive accumulation bolstered by state 
authority* 
Another large stratum of farm workers who existed in a 
dependeýt and exploitable position were foreign workers, 
especially those from very depressed peasant communities In 
Malawi or Mocamblqueq who no longer retained 'traditional# 
tenure rights and had to subsist wholly on earnings from 
ecaployment, The 'stabilization' of the foreign proletariat 
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on. the plantations was a realized fact and one vhich reflected 
. the reality that many foreign workers In plantation employment 
(denied jobs outside the rural economy by legislation since 
1959) were the 'prisoners' of plantation employersg past 
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labour policies and contemporary structural conditlons* 
Foreign contract workers allocated to farm jobs by the 
: Rhodesian'AfrIcan'Labour Supply Commistion were a special 
component'of the foreign African working-cliass on the 
plantationst'a group whose minimum wages were State determined, 
Their presence provided employers with the opportunity to gear 
Aocal . wages to the most basic floor level requirements of the 
single adult semi-permanent worker* 
The counterpart of the foreign (State recruited) 
contraotee was the worker informally indentured into a 
01abour gang"under the control of private African contractors, 
Much 'seasonal' labour from outside the plantation was supplied 
-,, in this form at low cost to farm employers with the added 
advantage that such labour did not Involve significant addition 
to the costs of supervisiong this element of control beins 
partly provided by the appointed *gang leader' or $boss-boy'. 
For the Plantations howeverg these benefits had to be weighed 
against the risk of wholesale IdesertionIq a oost well In 
excess of the more usual instance of Individual desertion In 
which problems of replacement were less costly. 
Finallyq the plantation economy harboured within it 
a, not Inconsiderable number of unemployed workers - those 
seeAng jobs for the first timeg others changing 'employers*# 
and some foreed to seek farm employment as a result of 
32o 
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frustration In seeking a job In Industry or the towns, 
This class of ruralunemployed was but a component of those 
in need of employment for subsistenceg the rest being in 
search of jobs in the towns or temporarily involved In peasant 
production* Nonethelessq the presence of the group was 
sufficient to provide an element of competition for the better 
paid jobs in plantation agriculture* With the growth of 
even lower paid employment in African agrarian enterprise the 
unemployed functioned as a pressure on labourers already in 
employment to meet management requirements even under austere 43 
conditions. 
DOYJNANT ELEMEWS IN THE PLAWATION CLASS STRUCTURE 
The specific formation of dominant elements within each 
Plantation enterprise depended much on the production and 
ownership strueture, Nonethelessq for plantations-, as a 
wholeg a number of different strata were Identifiable* 
The immediate level of authority above manual workers 
was the *boss-boy*9 a position held by Itrustedtv often 
long serving and experienced farmworkers. Through this 
supervisor and regulator of day-to-day labour utilization 
the orders of the management or owners were transmitted. 
Usually rewarded well above rates of pay for farm labourersq 
the 'boss-boyt obtained both privilege and statusl as well as 
a measure of power (backed by the authority of the plantation 
owner), On smaller settler estates the post was a crucial, 
one for the success of the enterprise, while on large scale 
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plantations less of the overall viability of the enterprise 
was dependent on the efficiency of the 'boss-boy'. 
The *managerial' class on the plantations consisted 
of one or more of four basic typest the white $farm 
assistant(s)l or rural labour aristocracy typically found 
on settler estates (an aspirant owner class)l the managerial 
class proper (skilled professionals employed on large 
plantations)t owners directly Involved (to a varying degree) 
in the management of plantation productionj and State 
employees Involved In the management of large scale schemes. 
It is difficult to obtain accurate time series data on 
the composition of the white rural labour aristocracy. 
From 1958-73 the number of whitep Asian and Coloured 
44 
employees on European farms rose from 39700 to 4,800. 
However# only a small number of these workers were Asians 
and Coloureds, Many were female employees - nominally 
'workers* - who were wives of owners (a classification 
advantageous for tax purposes). This group performed 
secretarial and accounting functions as well as service 
tasks on the plantation. In 1965 a total of 2,062 female 45 
owners (mostly wives) were recorded as *working$ on farms. 
Another 421 females were directly employed* There were also 
4,446 male owners working on European farms at this time 
as well as 19031 male 'occupiers' and 29772 'employees% 
Control of plantation-production thus remained highly 
centralized at the operational level within this small cadre 
of 'managers'. 
2Z 
Although highly paid In relation to f arm workers and 
'boss-boysIq farm assistants and managers often voiced their 
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dissatisfaction with wages and conditions of employment. 
Paradoxicallyp the requirement that farm labourers be left 
Irightless* without colleetive bargaining legislation - 
their conditions were regulated under the Masters and Servants 
Act - meant that the white rural labour aristocracy, too, 
was not able to obtain regulated conditions, 
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Howeverg 
their bargaining power resided In another quarter - their 
essential (but not Irreplaceable) position in the plantation 48 
labour structure* 
Although this group tried to organize against farm 
owners# their attempts were unsuccessful. one 'union' was 
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formed In 1955 In Mashanaland but dissolved two years later. 
The causes of dissolution were: lack of members; members 
themselves became owners; opposition from the R#N*F*Uol 
and because there were no legal mechanisms under the 
Industrial Conciliation Act for the establishment of an 
Industrial Council In the agricultural industry. Another 
attempt to form a *Farm Managers and Assistants Association' 
In 1967 amongst the 29000 to 3,000 eligible members also 
failed* The most that was achieved was through slight 
pressure being exerted on farm employers via the R. 11.? *U. g 
which subsequently drew up a 'Model Agreement' to cover the 
employment conditions of farm managers and assistants in 
the late 19601s. 
50; 
The 'failure* of white agricultural unionism was rooted 
In the character of plantation production and the political 
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economy of rural settler society. Serious challenge to the 
plantation enterprise was unnecessaryl not simply because 
conditions of employment were 'reasonably goodIq but also 
because few farm assistants and even 'learners' envisaged 
themselves as anything other than a land-owning class-In- 
formationg a view encouraged by the availability of cheap 
loans and State settlement schemes designed to expand the 
plantation economy* White farm assistants were also a 
privileged group In social and political terms. 
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Together 
with the ownerp they did not share the misery of rural life 
as experienced by various strata of workers. Feder's 
comments on Latin American 1FLtifundtR are relevant In this 
connection: 'He (the owner) does not share (the farmworkerfs 
and peasantry's) institutions nor Its moods and ambitions. 
The schools are not for his childreng the homes not for his 
entertainmentg the hospital not for his care and the roads 
not for his travel unless they lead to his urban residenee 52 
or are useful for his Pl*easure. 1 
The class nature of ownership of plantations varied as 
did owner-relations to production. TYPIcallYq settler 
estate owners - the $spine' of the Plantation system, - were 
owner-occupiers# a mixture of experienced farcers and *new 
entrants' tied by loans to State capital. 
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By the 19701s 
howeverg the Inflow of 'new entrants' had fallen sharply, 
a result of high and rising land pricest higher Interest 
rates and reduced opportunities for new settlement as land 
alienation polioles exhausted most of the viable nOn-African 
farming areas* By the 1970's a shortage of Young farmers 
I 
had developedg a problem which caused concern to State 
Offlelalsq the R&N*F. U, and private financiers. 
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The 
average age of European farmers in 1974 was 52 years. 
Efforts were thus made to Increase the inflow of new owners 
into plantation production. For instance arrangements 
were made whereby the sale of large scale State plantations 
was made conditional upon the establishment of smaller 
55 
settler estates In the schemes taken over by foreign capital. 
Proposals were mooted and legislation passed whieh enabled 
the State to allocate land and facilities for settlement to 
ex-servicemen. 
The Importance of 'replenishing' the ownership el-Ass 
with 'new entrants' was highlighted by the problem of 
'absentee landlords'. New measures were introduced In 
legislation against this form Of owner. opposition to 
absentee owners was based on two counts. Firstlyq there 
developed hostility to land speculations especially where the 
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owners were resident in foreign countries. Secondlyq the 
non-occupation of landq especially that adjoining Tribal Trust 
Land areasq resulted In practices which enabled both peasants 
and farmworkers to raise their standards of living., They 
could graze their cattleg use natural resources (poles and 
thatching grass) and obtain food (by snaring, poaching and 
raising crops) from unoccupied areas* The net effect of this 
I 
was to produce a minor political crisis in the areas concerned 
and un4ermine the control over subsistence exercised by 
57 
adjacent plantation owners. 
I, - ,ý -2 6- 
The management of State plantations had a different 
effect on labour relations, Being large-scaleg these 
enterprises exerted an Important local Impact on Incomes and 
employment (especially In the South-East Lowveld). State 
managers were directly responsible to State-appointed Boards 
of Directorss the encumbents of which also represented 
professional executives and private capital Interests* 
Invariablyg State plantation labour policies were designed 
so as not to undercut private employer Interests* The 
impact of State Investment on African farm employment however 
was alway, s moderate* In 1956 just less than 1,000 African 
farm workers were employed by the Stateg a figure that rose 58 
more than six-fold in the period up to 1969. 
To the social classes that dominated plantation 
agriculture must-also be added the 'fractions' of capital 
that had a direct vested interest in the expansion of 
plantation 11 production. This groupq viz. manufact 
. 
uring 
suppliersq' foreign capital goods manufacturersg and merchant 
capital whose markets depended on plantation expenditures$ 
applied pressures and gave lobbying support to plantation 
owners In their low wage policiese only the white rural 
petty bourgeoisie - who operated private farm stores - 
stood to gain from higher farm wages. Yet this class. 
remained closely linked by personal and economic relations 
to the landowning class and other rural social strata 
(administrators and technical advisers) who constituted 
an important element of traders' sales as well as the basis 
of the rural political economy without which the traders' 
position would be untenable* 
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Whatever the nature of the particular ownership structures 
Policies amongst employers towards farm labour were very 
similarly applied. Challenges to the legitimacy and 
authority of the plantation and management were not entertained 
lightly, Worker combination was a difficult task and many 
employers considered such organization as a threat, subversive 
in nature and contesting the basic premise of the paternalistic- 
feudal labour policy$ vi7,, that worker welfare was catered 
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for adequately by the prevailing management system* 
FARM WAGES AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FROM THE 1940 'a TO 
THE 19 70 Is 
NO perfect measures of real wage rates for plantation 
labour are available for the period 1946-72* Howeverg 
taking 1948 wage levels In current pricesq deflating for 
price changes In the Intervening period on the basis of 
available Central Statistical Office time series of changes 
In the African (urban) consumer price indexg it can be 
demonstrated that the real average earnings of farm labour 
were probably lower In 1972 than In 1948 (as measured In 
6o 
constant 1964 prices), Indeedq a linked series of real 
earnings for this period would Indicate that the 1972 level 
of farm earnings (0133 per annum) was approximately 10 
percent below the 1948 earnings level. 
The OnlY SigrAficant Increase in real vages Occurred in 
the 1962-63 period when labour supply shortages arose through 
limitations being placed on the ability of the Rhodesian 
African Labour Supply Commission to recruit contract workers 
3-17, 
In Malawi., This led to an Increased bid by employers for 
local labour supplies. It was thus only when there was a 
crisis In the institutionalized wage-determining and labour- 
supplying framework that upward adjustments occurred In 
respect of rPR1 wage rates. After 196% however# real wages 
fell drastically for plantation workers. 
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Despite this$ 
because of the dissolution of the peasant economyq plantation 
employment not only Increased but the proportion of 
indigenous workers In the plantation labour force also rose. 
Falling real wages org at bestv long periods of wage 
stagnationp thus characterized the plantation labour market 
In the postwar periodo even thoughq as reported by two 
Independent evaluationsq labour productivity Increased 62 
Significantlyp especially In the post-1964 period* 
Average wage levels obscure the distribution of wages 
between workers. The cash wage Index can be taken as a 
useful proxy Indicator of ParningR distribution because It 
can be reasonably assumed that there was a constancy of 
'rations' between farm labourers. 
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Unfortunately there are 
no reliable data on the cash wage or earnings distribution 
for farm labourers In the 19401s. Available data only 
relate to the last decade of the period under consideration. 
The fact that there existed a degree of worker wage 
stratification means that In practice many workers actually 
received a lower than average wage. In 1971 some 82.7 
percent of workers received a cash wage (excluding payments 
in kind) of less than $10 monthly. 
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Only 3.2 percent of 
a total of 3039000 workers obtained a cash wage In excess of 
32S 
$209 most of these being employees In agricultural services 
and not In plantation employment propere Higher paid 
employees were usually stockmen, foremeng 'boss-boyslv 
tractor drivers or persons employed in what were essentially 
semi-skilled production tasks related to small scale rural 
manufacturing In canning and processing plants. Reasonably 
significant differentials existed on plantations* For 
Instance* on one farm Investigated In 1974 It was found that 
the stockman's cash wage was more than four times larger than 
that of the fieldworkerst 50 percent larger than the foreman's 
and more than twice the level of wages earned by the tractor 65 
driver* In terms of rural societyg this Implied a 
significantly different standard of consumption especially 
since the pattern of differentiation was often reinforced 
by housing provisions and other conditions of contract* 
It would be misleading and partial to consider only 
, es in the 1940 Conditions of employment farm-wag -73 period. 
also varied and had a profound effect on worker welfare, 
In any analysis of conditions of employment, no available 
quantitative data will suffice. However, there are data 
provided for the late 1940's on conditions of employment on 
farmsp and for the early 1970'sowhich permit a gualitative 
evaluation of the general conditions that pertained on the 
plantations, 
Wadsworths for Instanceg has provided the most 
comprehensive perspectives on farm employment In the late 66 
1940's. Jils analysis (condueted In 1949-51) found that 
work-seekers avoided plantation jobs because of low wages 
32? 
and poor conditionsg provided of course that these workers 
could obtain alternative employment or were able to operate 
as successful peasant cultivators* At this time there was 
a high degree of migrancy between farms9 the peasant economy 
or adjacent foreign territories. Even so, some 18 percent 
of workers In Wadsworth's survey, of tobacco farms had their 
families living with them on the plantation and had been on 
the farm for two or more seasons, Farmers favoured this 
type of Ilabour stabilization' because it provided a *useful 67 
supply of casual labourg available on call'. Labourers 
performed a wide variety of manual production tasks and 
little division of labour was encouraged: 'the Native 
labourer (was) neither required nor encouraged to do any more 68 
than obey Instructions'. Women were extensively and 
almost exclusively used as casual labour to meet peak period 
labour demandse It was found that on tobacco farms more 
than 80 percent of employers drew their labour supplies for 
peak periods from the 'compounds'p i, eo In the form of 
casual family labour from the households of farm workers. 
Only 10 percent of these tobacco farms were wholly dependent 
for casual labour on neighbouring reserves* Male workers 
had a very low absentee ratev a reflection of the high level 
of discipline enforced on plantations. However (casual) 
female workers were often found to be OtroublesomeO and would 
down tools at the slightest provocation* Child labour was 
used extensively throughout the plantation economy: 
'Children f rom. about eight and upwards (were) employed on 69 
both a casual and a permanent basis-' Workers were 
Do, 
employed for six days labour weeklyg normally for nine to 
ten months of the year# most *being paid off* or dismissed 70 
during two or three months of the dry season'. 
It was found that there was little uniform pattern, 
In wage policy. Each plantation exhibited Its own peculiar 
structure and system of wage differentials* The range of 
variation in wage payments was extremely wide and reflected 
the large measure of discretionary emplo influence In 
(unilateral) wage-setting. Wages for general labourers 
could vary by as much as 100 percent# even on the same farm. 
For child labour wages often varied by as much as 800 percent* 
'Rationst were a universal form of payment for permanent 
workersg-"distribution depending on circumstancesq while 
casual labour 'qualified' for Orations$ In varying proportions 
as well. Normallyq If higher ItIcket' wages were paid# 
no 'rational were allowed. More than 65 percent of farm 
owners gave. *Christmas boxes* to their workers* These 
gifts consisted of clothess sweets for childrens beers 
cooking potss etc., a mixture of luxury Items and necessary 
functional-commodities which helped supplement the worker's 
lamentably Inadequate wage# More than two-thirds of 
tobacco farmers permitted tthrlr boys* a garden or plot for 
the growing of mealles and vegetables# the acreage allocated 
varying between 3-10 acres per compound of 30-50 workers* 
Most workers built their own accommodation - usually In off 
duty hours - In the form of pole and dagga huts with earth 
floors, -It was also a widespread practice to encourage 
workers to become indebted to employerss 'Some farcers 
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(advanced) money in order to bind the worker'. 
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In certain 
caseng this level of Indebtedness went up to $209 or 10-15 
times the level of the average labourer's monthlykdge- 
The majority of tobacco farmers also operated a farm store.. 
Nearly all farmers regarded the provision of rough medication 
and first-aid facilities as part of their Idutyt. Some 
farmers even organized recreational facilities In order to 
retain workers. In generalg housing was of udformly poor 
quality* Buts were Improperly ventilatedg windowless and 
often pervious to the weather. At this time the 'ticket* 
system of wage payment was In general use. The system 
provided a mechanism for control over workers, It was 
organized through a variety of policies, one of which was 
to deduct a proportion of the cash wage from workers who 
were inter alia absent without leave or drunk* The Masters 
and Servants Act (1901) was also Ideally suited for enforcing 
the discipline required to make low wages 'acceptable'. it 
is also Important to record thatt despite claims of plantation 
Ilabour shortages' j Wadsworth found that there was a 
significant surplun of labour on most plantations and hn 
Inefficient use of labour in production$ Ioeo a form of 
Olabour-hoarding' was practised by employers. on nearly all 
farms In Southern Rhodesia at this timej farmers favoUred the 
employment of foreign labour because It was cheapt workers 
were more $reliable$# less migratory and more dePendentg as 
well as being more effectively out off from their (resident) 
peasant economyg a factor which reduced absenteeism, On 
maize farms It was found that more than 40 Percent of workers 
7 
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had their families with them as permanent residents on the 
plantation and a higher proportion of workers had been In 
emPloYment for more than two or three seasons on the same 
farm. In generalq farm labour was treated as an 
undifferentiated mass. Wages were not geared to family or 
personal requirements and workers were hardly considered to 
be better than *gang-labourers' who were simply required 
72 
'to obey Instructions ... like the serfs of old'. 
It can Justifiably be said that the welfare of farm 
labourers improved little after the late 19401s. This 
judgement Is agreed upon by a variety of observers - academies$ 
farmersq administrators and even executives of the Rhodesia 
National Farmers' Union. 
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This should not be taken to 
Imply however that there was no change In the pattern of 
employment or In labour policies. Howeverg the changes 
that took place were either --of marginal consequence (as 
Indicated by real earntr7s data) or helped reinforce the 
structural dependence of the plantation labour force. 
Hours of work still tended to be lengthy and workers were 
often required to work throughout the weekends with only 
moderate overtime pay as reward for the extra effort* Yet 
the Jowl absolute level of wages and the dependent and 
subservient relationship with the employer ensured that these 
additional labour supplies were forthcoming in the appropriate 
quantum and at the price desired by employers. Income from 
overtime work was usually only available at certain times of 
the year. Often 2-3 weeks leave was given annually, but In 
many cases these leave periods were unpaid. Women and 
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children were still widely used in production as casual 
labour supplies. The supply of compound labour 'on-call' 
remained an essential means of minimizing labour costs. The 
plantation still had the characteristics of a total Institu- 
tion, In relation to the available land surplus found In 
nearly all plantationsg the acreages 'made over$ to workers 
for their own cultivation still tended to be miniscule and 
barely adequate to meet basic consumption needs* In many 
Instancess workers complained of the Inadequate supply of 
land for tillage# the result of which ensured subsistence 
at an extremely low level. Often too$ land provided was 
poorly sited In respect of water supplies and hence only 
maize could be grown while vegeta1les had to be bought with 
the small cash wage. 
Farm accommodation continued to be almost universally 
74 
of the *traditional* type and of poor quality. There 
were later initiatives to Improve farm workers' accommodation 
in the North-East of the country. The R, N, F, U, attempted 
to obtain Interest-free loans from the State towards this 
end# mainly to meet an Increasing security threat from rural 
guerxilla activities which became more widespread after the 
late 1960's# 
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An Increasing number of workers had their dependents 
76 
living with them* Most workers - except domestic workers 
who lived close to the owner's premises - continued to 
reside In centralized and often squalid compounds, On 
most farms these residential villages were not equipped 
with basic facilities like electricity$ Piped waterg ablution 
and washing areas and other sanitation needs, - 
-li 
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The level of educational deprivation amongst farm workers 
also remained high. It reflected the Inadequacy of schoolog 
government's educational policy, the financial Inability of 
farm workers to send their children beyond primary school and 
the marked lack of funds available from workers' wages to 
finance the education of female children In the farm 
labourerts family, Graduated fees and lack of adequate 
central government subsidization of farm schools ensured the 
77 
perpetuation of this pattern of educational underdevelopment. 
On some plantations the provision of education was made 
dependent upon the children first working for the plantation 
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owners in the morning prior to schooling; and In almost 
all cases the continued attendance of farm labourerla children 
at- the farm school was dependent upon the continued 
employment of the farm worker (and his family) on the 
plantation, 
*Rations' tended to be standardized on the plantationsg 
although some variation did occur. Uormally equal amounts 
of 'rations' were given to each worker Irrespective of family 
requirements* Thus larger families tended to suffer 
relatively more deprivation under this system of remuneration* 
Most farm workers' families were unable to rely on 'rations' 
for basic food requirements and had to spend most of their 
small monthly cash wage on Supplementing their often meagre 
?9 
diet* The family might also have been forced to obtain 
additional food-intake and variation by the picking of natural 
fruits when these were in seasong orp If there was a small 
dam on the farm# the workers with permission might have been 
3"55' 
able to catch fish during certain parts of the year. Even 
80 
so malnutrition remained widespread on European farms. 
Nost workers were inadequately clothed and seldom could 
afford regular replacement of clothing Items which wore out* 
Typically,, there was no legal provision for pensions 
(or post-employment consumption outside the plantation) made 
available to farm workers. The Drinciple of an Industry 
pension was only first approved by the R*N. F. Uo National 
council In 1974.81 By Aprile 1975 it had not received 
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State approval as a compulsory scheme* Its avowed purpose 
was to increase the supply of labour, Although they had 
almost no option, few workers found themselves In a position 
to foresee long term social security within the austere 
conditions of the plantations. 
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Even those who might 
have In the future received pensions under the n, N, F*Uo 
scheme could only contemplate a meagre consumption level on 84 
retirement after a lifespan of labour. 
It Is pertinent to reeord also that on one above average 
standard Hashonaland farm Investigated by Cubitt and Riddellg 
for the purpose of computing a farm-specific Poverty Datum 
Linegit was found that the P, D, L. for a single man was 
closely related to the national average carh wage for farm 
labour while the P#D, L, for a married man was In excess of 
the average earnings In farm employment by over 45 percent. 
In the case of families with children the degree of under- 
consumption and material deprivation was even more markedv 
especially since farm wage policies typically made little 
allowance In remuneration for variations In the dependency 
burden of workers, 
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Workers did not willingly gravitate to farm employment. 
Hence the Importance of Institutional labour supply 
mechanisms rather than reliance on the market to obtain 
labour. Chavunduka found In a study of 4 farms that only 
1*5 percent of workers came to farm employment from the 
86 
Tribal Trust Lands. Nearly 32 percent of employees came 
from town (after being unable to obtain a job there)q while 
a large number had sought to better their conditions through 
a change in jobs within the plantation economy* Over 60 
percent of those who came from the towns took jobs on the 
farm at lower wage rates than their previous employment. 
Over 55 percent of those workers coming from other plantations 
found themselves in a similar predicament* 
The conditions outlined above also conform to the 
situation as documented In the records of the Agricultural 
87 
and Plantation Workers' Union. Conditions were so poor 
that workers undertook numerous 'illegal' strikes In attempts 
to effect Improvements. For instance# with regard to one 
prominent not atypical strike In 19729 the union complained 
that the workers lived in shanty hovels; that there were no 
toilets or showers; that large deductions were made from pay 
If workers were absent from work or late for duty# that 
workers did not get annual wage Incrementsl that there was 
no overtime; that little reward was given for long servicel 
that employers still operated the unfavourable *ticket systemll 
88 
and that no protective clothing was given to workers, 
Although a pattern of constancy In wages and conditions 
for the 1948-72 period can be Identified$ It Is also 
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important to recognize that Important socio-economic forces 
were mobilized In the 1972-74 period to alter the *traditional' 
pattern, Firstly# the breakdown of the peasant economyls 
capacity to provide sources of subsistence to plantation 
workers led to some non-worker pressures to raise wages (the 
pressure from the R. N. F. U, on farmers to Introduce pensions 
being one early perception of this situation)* Foreign 
capital In the mining industry also voiced complaint publicly 
about the low wages of the plantation Industryq the conflict 
in this case really being over the distribution of the *new 
burdens' that all employers were forced to assume as a 
89 
result of stagnation in peasant productiono Commercial 
interests also drew attention to the farm wage situation as 
a means of deflecting attention away from the wage practices 
of commercial enterprises and Uberal opinion Joined this 
90 
group of critics. Large scale plantations In the Lowveld 
attempted to pre-empt this criticismg as well as to rationalize 
outdated labour policies, by raising wages above the average 
91 
levels paid by smaller settler estates. These moves were 
also designed 
, 
to secure local labour supplies In a situation 
in which It became more risky to rely on foreign labour, 
92 
The R,, N. F#U,, made pleas for farmers to 'reform themselvesto 
Similarlys the Rhodesia Tobacco Association has called for 
93 
changes In farm wage policiesik Farm workers In the 
$security conscious areas' added voice to criticism of their 
94 
conditions of employment. These calls did not go 
unnoticedg although little practical effect had been felt by 
1975* 
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THE DETERMINANTS OF FARM WAGES AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
Firstlyq employers and the State sought to keep wages 
down to a bare subsistence level, Various policies of 
maximizing the supply of labour to plantation employers were 
pursued'to enable the demand for labour to be met at this 
pricee The development of an extensive foreign 'migrant' 
and contract'labour system was a lynchpin in these policies. 
Hundreds of thousands of workers entered Rhodesia to take up 
farm jobs at very low wage rates. After 1959 however more 
reliance was placed on local labour supplies In plantation 
production# a switch in policy which did not reflect any 
change in the essence of wage determination on plantations 
but on the contrary took place without rising farm wages* 
Indeed# the substantial expansion of African employment on 
plantations from 1959-73 did so against a background of 
falling real earnings., So too# controls placed on foreign 
workers from 1958 onwards were not designed to Impair 
plantation labour supplies; rather they functioned to 
re-direet labour not needed In non-plantation employment to 
white farms, 
Utban influx control policies worked In a similar manner 
In respeot of loeal labour supplies, In 19719 the Chairman 
of the R. Z; *F*Uo Labour Committee argued that the *employment 
of alien Africans In Greater Salisbury and other urban areas 
should be terminated** 
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The R, N*P. U, suggested that these 
workers 'either be made available for employment on farms or 96 
be returned to their own countries% The delegates to 
the 1971 R. IT, F,, U, Congress also adopted a resolution 
'expressing alarm at Government9s apparent Intention of 
phasing out alien labour In the hope that they could be 
97 
replaced by Indigenous labour". The R, 11, F,, Ue urged the 
government not to implement such measures 'before It could 
E, LInrftntP. f1 that the indigenous population could be economically 
98 
diverted to work on farmst. The n., Z-T, P. U, Chairman's 
appeal and the R,, u, F, uIs subsequent requests followed after 
a number of public announcements pressurizing the public 
authorities to adopt the R*? T*F*U, I-abour control plan, 
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The end result was a more compreherbive influx control and 
labour direction policy than had existed previously* This 
was set up In 1973 with the requirements of plantation 
100 
producers foremost in mind. 
At the name time plantation owners continuour-17 
complained of Ilabour shortagesIq by which they meant a 
shortage at the prevailing subsistence wage level on the 
farmas The Ilabour shortage' argument was the most 
prominent Ideological underpinning of policies designed to 
Increase cheap labour supplies through foreign Importationg 
contract labour and the domestic re-direction of workseekers 
to the farms* 
A closer look at the flabour shortage' reveals that It 
was In the plantation sector that the Olabour shortage' was 
most serious* In domestic employment where wages were 
higherg there were no such constraints repotted even though 
highly Impoverished conditions for the workers were typical 
and It was the next lowest paid sector for black labour In 
the economy. Norg indeedg was there any shortage of 
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manpower for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in commerce and 
Industrye On the contraryl all available evidenee points 
to the existence of a substantial labour surplus having been 
101 
built up In Rhodesia, 
The character of the flabour shortage' In agriculture 
in later years could be regarded as threefold. Firstly$ 
it was arguedl correctly, that local labour was unwilling 
to take farm jobs at the going rates of pay* More often* 
it was Incorrectly thought that this was simply for non- 
economic reasons associated with the worker's unwillingness 
to do farm work Der re or because workers idshed simply to 
sloaftl avoid honest work and *obtain something for nothing'. 
Thus arose the 'theory of the loaferst an important component 
in Rhodesian Ideology# used to justify a multiplicity of 
policies aimed at wage minimizationg labour direction and the 
development of underdevelopment In the peasant economy and 
103 
amongst plantation workerse 
Locnl Africans, It was arguedt just did not viant to 
take farm jobsj therefore foreign workers should be sought. 
102 : 
The conventional wisdom was expressed by one labour recruiter 
thus: 'The reason most farmers prefer foreign labour Is that 
it is more reliable and efficient$ and the main reason one 
cannot absorb local chaps Into agriculture Is that they are 
104 
just not interested In farm jobs. ' That the greater degree 
of reliability ste=ed from a higher degree Of Inseourity 
and dependence - eopecinlly for contract workers serving 
two-year terms -was conveniently overlooked* The myth of 
differential efficiency has nowhere been demonstrated and 
indeed can only really be seen as part'of the overall 
rationalizing ideology of farm employers* Public officials 
held almilar views* The Secretary for Commerce and Industry 
remarked In 1972 that $agricultural employment seems to be 
105 
wanln, o: in popularity. The emphasis In these two 
Influential views was not on the low economic return to labour 
in agricultural occupations, but on the disdain for farm work 
amongst local Africans because of lack of Interest amongst 
workers and a low level of job popularitys These latter 
viewpoints were correet only Insofar as lack of interest 
arises specifically out of the economic circumstances 
associated with farm employmentq the most striking of which# 
after 1963# was fallinz real earnIngs for farm labour. it 
Is therefore not surprising that government pressure to 
persuade employers to take on locallabour was strongly 
resentedo The latter's opportunity-cost In many cases was 
such that employers would need to bid up wage rates In order 
to Increase the supply of local labour In excess of the 
proportion of Indigenous workers already employed. 
Thus a rational aversion to farm employment was created 
by the very system that generated the Ilabour shortage$* 
Againg as In the 1940'at it was not a shortage of labOur 
available that was the operative constraintq but the rational 
unwillingness of labour to be exploited* Needless to sayq 
for employers the seourement of (external) labour supplies 
was aýrational profit maximizing policy. Yet for peasants# 
employment at the plantation wage rate was often Infeasibleg 
particularly-because of the gearing of the wage structure to 
3q2- 
the subsistence consumption requirements of the short-term 
adult foreign migrant worker, 
Given the structural position that farm work had in 
the economyg It Is not surprising to observe that the 
frequent offers of employment made by farmers to Oundmployed' 
urbanites did not prove successful, one such offer took 
the following form in 1971t *I have a 6,000 acre farm to 
run -I am offering free accommodationg free rations - 16 lbo 
of meal a week# 1 lb. of fish# 2 lbo of beans and 4 lb. of 
meat a month - and $8 a month wagess which is really spending W 
money". This employer had a recruiting officer In 
Salisbury for four weeks and only succeeded in attracting 
flveýpersons to the jobs he was offering* He was looking 
for 200 to 300 workers* 
The Bedond type of Ilabour shortage' argumentp often 
put forward to justify labour Importationg came from those 
plantations and estates who po'Inted to the fact that their 
peak seasonal demands for labourg (say) for cotton picking, 
remained unsatisfied year after year, In 1971 one official 
source estimated the $need for 259000 cotton pickers' in the 
Rhodesian Lowveld adding that# for this reasong no steps 
were being taken to create employment for persons from 
drought-striken rural areas 'as there (clearly) was no 
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shortage of Jobs for Africans's Thuss excess short term 
labour demands were equated with there being an adequate 
supply of permanent jobs* It is from the above hypotheses 
that the Incorrect Inference was made that there was a general 
labour shortrýge and that therefore labour Importation was 
3ý3 
justified, Here againg labour supply was not seen in the 
context of supply at an adjustable market rateg but In terms 
of an institutionally and historically determined wage 
structure* It was also argued that the long-run supply 
solution lay In labour Importation and not adjustment to 
seasonal wage ratese Indeedq the attitudes of plantation 
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producers were typically against upward wage adjustment* 
policy-makers and politiciansl In whose hands the question 
of labour Importation rested, strongly advocated African 
labour Immigration to Rhodeslas one such Member of Parliament 
arguing that tallen labour should be used In areas where 
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Africans were not prepared to do the work'. The Mop., 
concerned suggested that as many as 600 workers a day could 
and should be flown In from 11ocambique and Malawi to take 
such Jobso 
A third thesiat popular In R. N. F. U. circles and often 
put forward by farm employerst was that# as In the mines of 
the south-west of Rhodesia In the 1940'st there existed 
tpookets' Of labour scarcity in areas highly dependent on 
imported labours particularly contract labour supplies, 
The weakness of this thesis Is$ again# that It implicitly 
accepted the shortage because It existed at the 'going' price* 
It too# like arguments proposing that Africans in Rhodesia 
harbour an irrational aversion to farm workt can be regarded 
more or less as a rationalization for a status nuo which 
favourably served employer Interestso 
lihile Ilabour shortage$ notions underpinned *Policies of 
labour re-direotion they were not the only forms of 
34q 
textra-economict pressure applied to workers in order to 
obtain cheap labour-power. More direct measures were used 
and condoned by employers to *control' labour and obtain 
high returns from low wages* 
In 1948t for instaneeg a Central African Statisti-cal. 
Office reportg based on a surveyp noted the preferences of 
farmers In regard to various forms of coercion aimed at 
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increasing both cheap labour supplies andlabour productivity, 
Few farmers still wanted conscription and compulsory labour 
under Statutep a form bf labour supply that had been abandoned 
In 1946 with the repeal of the Compulsory Native Labour Act* 
Various forms of eviction policy were however sanctioned - 
evictions oflworkseekerstfrom the towns and 'loafers' from 
the reserves, One farmer even wished for 7-year periods of 
Indenture for contract labour. Many were In favour of 
greater use of unpaid labour ganga. Others expressed 
preferences for prison labour and one farmer recommended the 
establishment of 'mobile jallst, Some sought to extend the 
permissible period of work under labour-tenant agreements 
from 6 months to 11 months of each year's tenancy, Stricter 
'pass iawsl, were also favoured as were stricter forms of 
discipline over labour for absenteeism and desertion (one 
farmer wanting corporal punishment by farmers legalized - an 
admission-of, its widespread practice). Farmers who felt 
that labour'supplies were being 'hoarded' desired to see a 
rationing scheme Introducedq while others argued for the 
establishment of a plantation monopoly over the whole supply 
of foreign labour In the economy. 
A wide variety of means were proposed for boosting 
'productivity' org as the report called it, *enforcing a 
III 
higher output'* A large number of farmers favoured 
the setting of fixed hours of work3onger than those prevailing. 
Reduced wages were recommended for 'loafers'. Controls 
ought also to apply over the maximum wage permissible sineeg 
It was arguedq Ohigh wages simply led to a lower output% 
It was proposed that taxes be Increased on all Africans not 
In employment and State laid' to the reserves be out 'in 
order to force out labourt. Lower prices still should be 
put on 'African produced' maize# In order to make it more 
difficult for peasants to obtain the means of subsistence* 
Some thought that other non-wage forms of subsistence (e. g* 
Independent beer-brewing) should be stoppedo The need for 
more fturopean) supervision was stressec; and absentees 
should be penalized by withdrawal of meat from their *rational, 
Credit (the loquiritt system) should be abolished because it 
spoiled the workers* The employment of women and children 
on lower wages was widely encouraged. It was also proposed 
that men should be. obliged to be accompanied by their families 
when seeking farm work, Small plots or gardens should 
always be made available, In certain areasg calls were 
made for the re-instatement of rent-paying tenanoiess even 
though they had been abolished in the mid-1930's- 
A large element of direct or indirect coerelong or at 
least 'extra-economic' compulsion, was thus implicit In 
policies advocated by f arm employers whose objective was to 
reduce labour costs and Increase profits. The above-mentioned 
Sq6 
Ideas were often actually present in the practice of farm 
labour policies and even by the 1970's remained a common 
feature of Rhodesian plantations, The freedom of employers 
to use various forms of coercion enforcing the low wage 
policies on plantations arose from the politicalp social and 
economic power of plantation producers over their workers* 
Worker job security and family subsistence# for the most 
partg, were wholly dependent on an all-powerful employer 
paternalism. Labourers thus had to regularly accept both 
verbal and physical violence from managers and supervisors 
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as a necessary requirement for survival* Much worker 
discontent was absorbed In hostility towards 'boss-boyst 
and others who collaborated with the plantation management, 
or simply diffused In tfaction' fights and beer drink 
brawls. The average farm worker had few opportunities for 
$advancement' on the plantation. At beat he could hope for 
continuity of employment and the favour of being kept on 
as a tretainert after decades of service. In his place of 
employment he lived under a pervasive system of social 
control. The compound (his 'homel). did not belong to h1mg 
although in general he had built It, rudimentary though it 
was, and had sacrificed leisure time to do so. The 
plantation owners Incurred few of the costs of up-keep for 
113 
the compounds# Farm workers were too poor to maintain 
them other than in a squalid conditione Storekeepers, 
neighbouring plantations$ police and State administrators 
In the rural areas all functioned to protect the interests of 
employers. Penaltiesp fines and rigid discipline were widely 
3fl 
used to keep down resistance to a policy that was based on 
cheap labour and poor conditions of employment. The worker 
was prevented from effective combination by a number of 
pressures* EthnicitY was used to cultivate divisions and 
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fragment the rural working class, Entertainment was 
controlled and often made into a *privilege' (the allowance 
of beer drinking for instance) that could be withdrawn if 
the worker did not *toe the line', Unionists were made 
po-rsonn non-Frata In European farm areas and were usually 
strictly forbidden to Itrespasn' In compounds. The worker 
wasIkept in his placeO and persons who articulated unionist 
Ideas (notions thatp as farmers argued, were Imported by 
'town munts' and 'agitators') were sacked or threatened, 
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A conception of the $good munt' was built upon employers' 
preferences for subservieneet obedience and hard work with 
little pay* It wan made known on the plantation what this 
stereotype was and what the penalties were for deviating 
from. ' it* The social mechanisms of control available to 
farm employers thus helped condition an acceptance of employer 
dominance and low wage policies* 
State labour policies were of particular importance In 
the wage determining process*- Political and economic 
pressures persuaded various Rhodesian governments to design 
policy to the advantage of plantation producers. Whilst 
the government often argued that policy rested on the 
'invisible hand'# or Interchange of the market forces of 
supply and demandp this could only be considered to have been 
so in a highly structured and Institutionalized system of 
unequal bargaining strengths and opportunities between 
2ý9 
labourers and management* The government took no measures 
n6 
to Introduce minimum-wage policy in the plantation sector; 
nor were any other conditions of contract specified except 
those In the Masters and Servants Act relating to hours of 
work (10 hours being the maximum allowed) and the minimum 
52 non-working days per annumi, which, It Is reporteds were 
often breached In practice, 
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No adequate Inspectorate 
system operated to protect workers from exploitation, Even 
+-re conditions were shown to be manifestly exploitative# 
there was seldom any policy Initiative forthcoming to rectify 
the problem, 
Government policy was based on three rationalizations 
aimed at keeping agricultural labour legislation outside the 
Industrial Conciliation Aott 'Inherent difficulties in 
prescribing comprehensive conditions of service for farm 
people; the need for a big Inspectorate to enforce the 
regulated conditional and the large seasonal fluctuating 
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labour force on farms*' The arguments on all three counts 
can be shown to be extremely weak and to simply have reflected 
a desire to maintain the status-cuoo The problems of 
prescribing regulations were not unique to the agricultural. 
Industry and extremely complex arrangements had been regulated 
for other Industries. Technicalities were clearly used to 
obscure matters of principle and to protect plantation 
producers* Problems of job sýýeification and demarcation 
for instance had been overcome and regulations successfully 
Implemented In other more highly complex Industries. Larger 
Inspeotorates than had been used for the industrial complex 
3 'f 9 
would obviously have had to be employed, But this was 
hardly surprising In the light of the fact that the legisla- 
tion would be protecting more than 3509000 workerss or 35 
percent of the total African labour foreeg In over 6,, 000 
difTerent production units, The excuse that there was too 
large a casual labour supply simply cannot be borne out by 
the evidence* In 1972 some 72 percent of all employees 
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were permanent or semi-permanent workers, Instead of 
protecting worker Interests the government preferred to 
protect employer Interests. Thus In 1973 the State rejected 
calls for a farm wage minimum of 030t an amount that would 
not meet even the most basic consumption needs of a married 
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couple without children in plantation societY. It was 
not the State's responsibility# it vras argueds to legislate 
wage and salary structures. In their policy choleel the 
State recognized that legislation governing wage-setting 
could have'as Important an impact In Its absence or lack of 
application as In Its effective operations The sector was 
governed by the provisions of the archaic Masters and Servants 
Actq a legislative device which was based on a 19th century 
Cape Colony labour code Introduced to Rhodesian statts In 
1901, The Act was originally designed to deal with a 
situation of labour scarcity In the nascent colonial economy 
and was employed as a means of minimizing the *rate of 
desertion* on contraetsl a common occurrence In the early 
years of the century and still in the 1970's amongst workers 
contracted by the R*A, L*S, C, The Act did -not provide for 
wage setting machineryg or any collective bargaining apparatuss, 
3 
and one half of Its provisions related to penal provisions, 
Indeedl It was particularly anarchic In respect of wage ratess 
allovdng them to be determined by *market forces' in a 
situation of MghW. structured institutional arrangements. 
Given supply-demand relationshipst the worker's bargaining 
option was either unemployment or a sub-marginal peasant 
incomeq whilst the employer's option varied between obtaining 
foreign contracted supplies# Increasing the degree of 
mechanization Inn production# employing higher-rated short- 
term labour for pealt periodsg switching investments into less 
labour-intensive outputaq or simply waiting for other job 
seekers who would offer themeelves at the desired low wage 
rate. Those provisions of the African Labour Regulations 
Act (Chapter 100)(1911) which applied to farms were similarly 
designed to thwart pressures that might help increase farm 
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wage rates, 
Whilst Individual'- bargaining opportunities provided 
workers with little scope for advancementt the restrictions 
placed on effective unionization and collective bargaining 
viere detrimental. Under the Masters and Servants Act no 
unions could be registered for collective bargaining purposest 
and although unions might be formed and could function (at 
least technically)g in terms of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act of 19599 unions In the agricultural sector could only 
obtain-the status of Ounregistered' unions and were required 
to file returns and comply with tL11 the obligations imposed 
on registered unionsp but without benefiting from any of the 
rights that were normally attached to registered unionsg 
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especially the right to collective bargaining. This Is the 
position In which the Agricultumal and Plantation Workers$ 
Union (A, P, W, U#) found Itself, 
Conditions for union growth were almost prohibitive, 
The union began In 1964 and by 1972 It only had a total of 
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900 paid-up members. Book membership was reported as 
being considerably greaterg In the region of 8gOOOg though 
these members were 'theoretical' rather than fully paid-up 
or active unionists, Paid-up members were often forced to 
be relatively passive and even to conceal membership of the 
union, Thus in 1972 paid-up membership of the A, P*W*Uo 
constituted less than 0*5 percent of all farm workers* In 
effectl theng the plantation labour force was non-unionized, 
N'Overthelessp because union membership tended to be concen- 
trated on large plantations and commercial estatesq the 
regional Impact of unionism was more significante The 
union Itself, howevert had no overall Influence in the all- 
Important process of wage bargaining and the larger employers 
whom It approached - Anglo American Corporationg for Instanceq 
as well as the R, IT, F*U, - simply refused to deal with the 
organization, 
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T he union was-caught in an intended 'double-bind% 
Employers refused to negotiate with the union because (they 
argued) the sector had not been legally Incorporated under 
the Industrial Conciliation Act; and the governmentg under 
influence from the plantation lobby through the did 
not alter the law* This would have allowed a greater degree 
of unionizations acceptance of collective bargaining, upward 
35"ý- 
wage pressure and the possible undermining of marginal 
(settler) plantation producers* 
Union formation was difficult for structural reasons 
as well* Some strata of the farm labour force were 
relativol, % transitoryl the sector had a high dependence on 
foreign and migrant workers who could not normally be easily 
unionized; although membership fees were low (joining fee 
25c and monthly subscription 10e)q these amounts were not 
inconsiderable for low-paid rural workerst most of whom 
subsisted on minimal budgets. Because some farm workers 
were not fully proletarianizedl or were casual labourers# 
female workers or juvenilesq the need for labour organization 
was not visibly apparent; furtherg workers were often 
harshly penalized for joining the uniong some being dismissed 
124 
from employment, 
Various political factors also Impaired union formation, 
The structure of the Land Tenure Act and the operation of 
the repressive Emergency Powers Regulations since 1965 made 
it difficults If not Impossibles for union officials to 
travel freely and hold public meetings In racially segregated 
'European' farming areas. Plantation producers. actively 
discouraged unionismg expressed no desire to negotiate with 
African unionistsp who to them represented 'outside' and 
subversive Interests, and would generally not hesitate to 
call in the police to evict union officials from their farms 
If $illegal$ meetings were being held. Union Officials were 
also continuously harassed by the authorities and various 
executives and officials spent lengthy Periods In detention 
3S3 
without trial as a result of which they were unable to operate 
the union effectively* This has discouraged other officialop 
union membership# and has had a crippling effect on the 
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A*P*W*U* - as intended by State policy, 
Financial problems resulted from the high cost Incurred 
in the collection of union dues from members scattered across 
the country* The pitifully small sum of monies made over 
to the union by the International Trades Secretariat 
(International Federation of Plantations Agricultural and 
Allied Workers) was Inadequate to meet even the minimal 
requirements of a skeleton staff of executive members# all 
of whom had great difficulty In meeting personal expenses 
Incurred by full-time union activitiess The dependency 
syndrome built'into the existing sYstemof, 'labour relations 
In the plantation economy was disadvantageous for worker 
organization., With no institutional representation$ 
Individual workers had to rely on employer paternalism for 
even minimal improvement In what wereg in most casesg feudal 
conditions of contract. Contracts themselves were seldom 
unilaterally revised by employers, or re-negotiatedg In 
times of changing employee needs or changed employer ability 
to pay* Workers were unable to effectively negotiate 
legislated wage increases and other Improvements9 or to 
obtain greater protection against exploitation, simply 
because no sufficiently strong pressures operated to force 
plantation producers to consider establishing a negotiating 
forum, The contract labour system# State labOur policy and 
unemployment were highly relevant factors in the bargaining 
weakness of farm workers* These facts were recognized and 
condemned by the National African Federation of Unions 
(N. A, P, U. ) and the African Trades Union Congress (A*T*U*C, )g 
the two major confederations of African unions In Rhodesia, 
126 
as well as the A*P*W. U. Persistent approaches were made 
over the years by the union to the governmentg requesting 
a change in legislation and Increased protection for farm 
workers* These submissions were barely considered by 
government and were usually met with curt rebuttals in the 
form of a brief acknowledgement of receipt from the Minister 
of Labour's private secretaryg normally no longer than half 
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a dozen lines. The government at no stage agreed to 
consider seriously the union's caseq nor did the Minister of 
Labour accede to any of the numerous requests from AsPoW, U. 
officials to meet to discuss the problems experienced by 
128 
farm workers, 
The A. P,, WoU* attempted to use various other policies 
to advance the, case of farm workers, It soughtg for 
Instance# to petition management directly by approaching 
individual employers and the R. N*F., Ue on behalf of aggrieved 
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workers In certain cases where conditions were appalling. 
Those solicitations met with limited success. The union 
also compliedg under a measure of compulsiong with directives 
or requests from the public authorities (usually through 
the Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department) 
to intervene In post-strike situations so as to assist In the 
resolution of conflicts between management and workers, 
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These 'third party* activities In post-strike conditions were 
30 
not unrewarding for workers or the union, The latter 
gained in credibility amongst the workeraq whileg for the 
formerg significant economic benefits were reported, 
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The union also tried to Influence national labour policy 
through participation In the Mational African Federation of 
Unions# It )smbmitted numerous resolutions to annual N, A, F, U, 
congresses which were adopted and passed on to the Minister 
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of Labour* The A*P, W. U, called for freedom of 
associationg for the Inclusion of agriculture under the 
Industrial Conciliation Act# for an impartial Commission 
of Enquiry into Wages And Working Conditions In Farm Employ- 
mentq for national social welfare policies that would 
materially assist farm workers In respect of healthq social 
security and educationg for government Initiatives In the 
Improvement of housing for plantation workerss and for 
adequate Inspectorate facilities to prevent the exploitation 
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of farm workers - meng women and children alike. The 
union maintained close and regular liaison with the 
International Federation of Plantation, Agrieultural and 
Allied Workers$ Union through the local offices of the 
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I, C, F, T, U*g direct correspondence and some personal contacts. 
The A, P&W, U, also lobbied the British government to 
intervene and lend assistance In obtaining better conditions 
for farm workersq especially In the Post-196ý, 5 period during 
which the local settler regime had an 'illegal' International 
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statuse In 1971 the union submitted a memorandum to the 
Pearce Commission in which It called attention to the plight 136 
of farm labourers In Rhodesia. The A, P, W, U, rejected the 
35ý 
'Settlement' proposals after holding branch meetings and 
after receiving a unanimous rejection of them from its 
members. The grounds for rejection were similar to those 
put forward by the African National Council, but In additions 
the A, P*W, Ue condemned the exploitation of cheap labourg the 
fact that the union could not obtain an appropriate legal 
status even if the proposals were Introduced and the fact 
that the children of farm workers would not benefit much 
from the educational aid tied to the 'Settlements package* 
During one strike at this time (At the Hippo Valley Estates) 
137 
250 union members were discharged* The union's 
aotivities were thus thwarted not only by legislation but 
also by constant harassment from the police and employerag 
and selective detention of members on the union executive* 
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Union members were treated similarly, 
139 
The subject of AeP*WeU* petitioning and lobbying varied, 
some themeshowever were continuously and persistently put 
forward: the repeal of the Masters and Servants Actq 
amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Aetj the need for 
improved health facilities for farm workerss complaints 
about the high accident rate on plantationsp and objection to 
the high posts of education, low wages and the inadequacy 
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of schooling facilities on farms. These issues dominated 
the A*P*W*Uots efforts after the unionts formation In 1964, 
At the same time the union attempted to participate in the 
general African working-class struggle against Settler 
colonialism, racial discrimination and exploitation., 
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it 
tried to encourage unity between N,, A. F', oU* and A, T, U, C* and 
I 
3ý1 
also involved-itself In African nationalist political 
organizations. All these efforts however had only a marginal 
effects In terms of their impact on general farm employment 
conditionst this primarily because of the structural 
restraints placed on the union's operations and effectiveness. 
state policies affecting farm wages and conditions of 
employment were not confined to labour policy alone* The 
fiscal structure can be regarded as having had a depressing 
Impact on plantation wage rates, In providing for 
significant subsidies to capital investment and other 
plantation expenditurel the structure of the fiscal system 
implicitly taxed the utilization of labour in production and 
reduced aggregate demand for this factor Input* This sort 
of fiscal structureq designed for the benefit of the 
plantation producersq was particularly suited to the 
requirements of the plantation mode of production, It had 
the particular effect of reducing demands for supplies of 
unskilled labourp the principal labour Input-type In 
plantation production and major form of peasant Olabour-exportlo 
This Institutional protection of plantation producers was 
further reinforced by tariff protection on the Input side of 
plantation., production, For Instances under the 1972 Tariff 
the duty levied on trucks was ad valorem a levy of 5 percent 
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on the c, value, of the vehicle. Traotorsq tractor parts, 
accessories and fertilizers (under licence) were exempt from 
all duties* In the mains these Inputs were used In 
plantation production, By comparisons inputs common In 
peasant production (though also used In the plantation economy) 
I 
35'S , 
were subject to relatively heavy duties* Carts and wagons 
had to bear an ad valorem duty at 20 pereentg wheelbarrows at 
30 percentv shovels and spades at 30 percent, hoes at 20 
percentq other hand tools at 20 peroentg and single furrow 
ploughs at 15 percent, In relative terms these inputs were 
more vital to peasant producers who had fewer feasible 
technological choices open to themo given the constraints 
on their ability to obtain credit and finance. The element 
of taxation Imposed on peasant producers increased the 
number of Imarginalized' people who were forced to seek 
wage employment. These workers eventually gravitated 
towards farm employment,, so adding another pressure to 
Increase the supply of cheap labour and keep down the wages 
of farm workers* 
The State sponsorship of rural African capitalism in 
the Purchase Areas also had Important Implications for the 
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lowering of plantation wage rates* Its significance was 
that It helped further develop the process of peasant 
marginalization by setting up an *extra-oheapl labour force 
in agrarian production outside the plantation economyq the net 
effect of which enabled farm wages to be set at lower levels 
as local labour supplies expanded, 
Farm wage-setting policies were in part conditioned by 
the expected payments that had to be paid to the rural white 
labour aristocracy, Traditionally these 'employees' 
performed 'quasi-managerial' roleaq but at relatively high 
cost In terms of salaries and fringe benefits# especially 
when compared to the total cash wage Payments allocated to 
-II 
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African farm workers* In 19749 for instaneep 'assistant 
farm managers' were offered not less than $200 monthlys a 
participation bonus based on profits, free housing with light, 
water and domestic employees# free medical aid ac ident 
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insurance and generous paid leave conditions. The 
numbers of white workers - some were Coloureds - in these 
Jobs was relatively small in relation to the total farm 
labour forces no more than 1*5 percent for the whole of the 
period under review and It never exceeded 59000 persons In 
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number* Yet in 1958 this labour aristocracy received a 
wage bill that was-26.8 percent of that of the total African 
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wage bill* By 1972 their proportion had Increased to 
29o3 percente The average earnings of European farm 
employees grew from $1p919 to 029863 from 1958-729 a 49*2 
percent Increase in current prices during a period in which 
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the European Consumer Price Index rose only 42*7 percent. 
This trend contrasted with the trend in African farm workers' 
wagese The structure of plantation production under a 
quasi-feudal labour regime necessitated such a division of 
payments as management control and authority was ooneentrated 
amongst the managerial-cum-labour aristocracy group, 
The pattern of Institutionalized labour supplies from the 
peasant economyq historically focussed as it had been on a 
demand for mainly adult male African labourg also helped to 
create a degree of redundancy or underemployment for female 
and juvenile African labour in the peasant economy and the 
plantation region* This labour supply was subsequently used 
as a short-term or casual labour poolp thereby allowing 
36o 
plantations either to offset pressures to offer a higher wage 
rate to permanent labours or to out back on Investment In 
training plantation workers In order to secure higher labour 
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productivity* 
In the 1970's the dependence on casual labour supplies 
grew. - Casual labour, if avallableg was cheap and did not 
have associated non-wage costs attached to Its employment, 
This source of labour was strongly favoured by employers* 
in 1972 casual labour on Rhodesian farms totalled 26.4 
149 
percent of all labour used In production,, The bulk of 
this form of labour supply (62 percent) was comprised of 
females* From 1969-72 the growth in casual workers was 
29,1609 an average rate of erowth of 31 percent per annum 
at a time when agricultural labour force growth was well under 
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5 percent. Another type of non-permanent employee 
increasingly used by farmers to supplement permanent labour 
was the internally contracted (African) labourere In 1967 
there were 79200 such workers In farm employment* By 
19699 229525 workers of this type were recorded as being In 
agricultural employment though ,. this levelled off in the 
1970-72 period to approximately 17#000 per annumo Most of 
these workers were short-term contractees performing tasks 
In tobacco grading, cotton pickingg maize harvestingg 
construction work and land clearing* Their wages averaged 
around 58 to 78 percent of the wage of permanent employees, 
They were therefore in great demands Finallyq juvenile 
labour supplies were extensively recruited. The timing of 
school vacations# particularly in the highly capital-intensive 
3ý1 
Lowveld estates area# wasq on ocoasiong suddenly rescheduled 
to enable the release of school children to meet seasonal 
(cotton-picking) labour demands, 
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The lower cost of short-term Casualg female and juvenile 
labour suppliess measured by comparison with the producers' 
opportunity cost Of structurally adjusting the wages of all 
permanent workersq was Illustrated by Duncan# who has shown 
that on average the female farm worker was rewarded around a 
level of 54 percent of that of an adult male workersg while 
juvenile labour was priced at 46-50 percent of adult male 
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labour costso It Is highly doubtful, though perhaps not 
one hundred percent certain# that the actual worker 
performance and differential productivity amongst these'three 
categories of employee in similar jobs$ justified anything 
like so large a variation In wage payments* Indeed# the 
use of family labour enabled the employer to raise the 
quantum of profits that could be obtained under plantation 
conditions* The extension of these production relations 
was always being sought on Rhodesian plantationq as one 
manager of a tea plantation noted In 1974: 'what we are 
really aiming at in the long term Is family participation - 
the wifeg husband and children all working on the 
plantationstoove are building the foundations for whole 
generations of plantation workers right here and now. $ 
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ThUs despite iddological claims from time to time about the 
'white areas' being reserved for whitest the European farming 
areas were-always *conveniently' populated by Africans - just 
so longs that isp as the labour services of these persons were 
being supplied under conditions favourable to employers. 
3 ; - 
Variations in wager. were also related to specific 
conditions of production, Some large estates and 
plantation producers were able In the 1970's to offer slightly 
I 
better wages and conditions to African workers than were 
smaller settler-type plantations* This was especially 
necessary so as to remain competitive In local labour 
marketse Ability to pay more resulted from specific factors: 
the effect of scale on profitabilityl the fact that in the 
case of these producers the enterprises were more vertically 
integrated and the sources of profit for the corporation did 
not arise from the sale of agricultunal output alone; unit 
costs of providing benefits such as housingg health and 
eduoation were often lower for large plantations* Also some 
of these plantations were keen to maintain a favourable 
publie image and international profile as #good employers'. 
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These employers had In thep_agt relied heavily on foreign 
labour suppliesq as well as short-term casual labourv In order 
to keep down their total wage bill, Further# these large 
employers had a pronounced Impact on wage-setting In 
particular regions, eege In the Lovveld where two or three 
large employers acted as quasi-monopsonists and dominated 
the local labour market* 
The Power of regional monopsonists of this kind (represen- 
ting foreign capital) was only one heightened Instance of 
general employer dominance in the setting of contracts of 
employment* Employer bargaining strength had an entrenched 
origin which became Institutionalized* Historicallyl few 
employers actually used wage bargaining with labour In the 
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normal practlee of hiring* More usually the traditional 
farm-wage was known and taken as given while workers either 
adJusted to it or forewent employment* It was seldom 
re-negotiated, An important social process may also have 
had a regional or local effect on wage determinatiom For 
whitesq rural living was often an isolating experience and 
social contacts with neighbourss general dealersq administra- 
tors and other farmers were often considered by plantation 
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producers to be crucial to the quality of rural life* 
In this situationg collusive wage setting amongst employers 
tended to be strong. Not only did farmers attempt to set 
low wages for profit-maximizing reasonss but also so as to 
maintain good social relations within the white rural 
community, Employers would tend to set wages (within limits) 
comewhere around wage rates offered by the least efficient 
plantation to ensure aontinued viability for all* 
Farmers were able to use the threat of mechanization 
as an excuse to avoid paying higher wages* This was a 
powerful argument at the (individual) farm level because 
workers had almost no control over production decisions# were 
highly vulnerable to the threat of unemployment and In general 
had to rank job security over and above the desire for higher 
earnings* At the national level# howeverg 31holevale 
mechanization (to the degree threatened by individual 
employers) would probably have been Impracticablegand became 
more co in the'1970st If only because of the non-availability 
of suppliesl the shortage of foreign exchange and the priority 
given in exchange allocations to commerce and Indurtry,, 
--- --- "N 
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Plantation employers also cultivated and nurtured an 
ideology about the propensities and productivity of African 
farm labourera which was used to rationalize the system of 
cheap labour upon which plantations depended* Thus It 
was argued that 'Nine out of ten African farm workers much 
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prefer leisure to money as an inoentivelo Farm workers 
were also regularly stereotyped as having very simple wants, 
Indeedg one farmer argued (whilst admitting that he paid his 
workers less than half of what they were worth) that 'more 
money would spoil them - they have such simple needs that 
157 
It would be spent on drink and other corrupting distractionsto 
Cash wages were regarded by many employers as a form of 
1pooket moneylp an excess over and above payments In kind 
(which provided for all *basic needs$) out of which the worker 
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could purchase Oluxuriesto 
For farm labourers ideology was an Insufficient compen- 
sation or excuse for the low wage situation and many attempted 
to offset their disadvantages by theft# slackness on the 
job and by taking up 'informal' employment opportunities* 
Thus in 1973 it was reported that the following situation was 
not atypical on settler plantationst 'Farmers often complain 
of snaring on their farms*,.. Farmers complain that their 
labourers steal maize or mealie meal**** They COMPlain that 
their chickens or fowls are stolen by their labouremooe 
They steal eggs**** They steal all these thingsq they either 
steal them to go and sell them in order to go and got some 
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money# or In ordere, oto eat theme$ This Pattern of 
necessary and 'illegal' supplementation was not an 
34ý 
uncharasteristio response found amongst deprived labourera 
in similar situationso 
This bargaining power was strongly Influenced by the 
character of the Rhodesian polltýeal economy In which vested 
agricultural employer Interests had always been strongg 
despite gradual reduction in the relative influence of the 
plantation lobby In white politics after the 1950'so The 
plantation lobbyg through the R*NP. U* and other smaller 
associations and rural-based bodleog was Instrumental in 
directing gover=ent policy to accord with the Interests of 
profit maximization for plantation producers* The farm 
lobby was at the height of its political strength in the 
19301a when It effectively used the government system to 
Intervene decisively In the economy to regulate conditionsp 
16o 
pricesp taxes and subsidies to Its own advantages In 
19429 the plantation lobby gained additional institutional 
strength through the formation of the R., NZF., U* The R*N*F*U., 
was instrumental in setting up the Rhodesian Native Labour 
Supply Commission In 1946. It persuaded the State that the 
farm Ilabour shortage' was serious and that foreign migratory 
labour 0, Vht to be encouragedq despite the clear evidence 
that this was not soo The R. N#FoU& was continuously active 
on the RoN4, LoSC, throughout the perIodq obtaining a high 
Proportion of all labour supplies contracted for the 
plantation economy, In the post-. 1962 era it acted to ensure 
the continued existence of the contract supply agencyo After 
this date it was also successful In monopolizing contracted 
- -' 
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labour supplies. The R*N*F. U, successfully fought off 
attempts in the early 1950's to have the sector Incorporated 
under the terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959, 
In the early period of application of the new labour policy, 
the R,, N*F*Uo maintained pressures on the State to ensure 
that only a gradual reduction In the level of dependency on 
foreign labour took place - this so as not to jeopardize 
profits based on the plantation wage structure. Furtherp 
it was the R*N*F*U* which ensured that the 'closed labour 
areas' policy was not applied extensively to the rural areas* 
Indeed It was only in the 1970's that the R. N*F. Ust 
through its Labour Committeeg began to take an active Interest 
In improving farm wages and conditions, Their activities 
in this direction were undertaken for a variety of purposes: 
to answer the criticisms levied at the agricultural sector 
by international and industrial capitalists about low wage 
policies; to demonstrate to government and the $public' 
that plantation employers were meeting 'social responsibilities'; 
to ward off Internal pressures on the State exerted by 
producers in commerce and Industry (notably the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce and the Association of Rhodesian 
Industries) to Introduce legislation or minimum wage policies 
to regulate labour conditions in agriculture; to couple 
Improvements In wages and conditions with productivity growth 
and so boost farm profitability through the introduction of 
more rational management policies; to meet the threats 
posed by the confrontation of settler colonialism and 
guerrilla penetration In the north-east of Rhodesia, 
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ACCU14ULATION AND PROFITS BASED ON QUASI-FEUDAL LABOUR POLICIES 
The accumulation of capital through Investment In 
plantation production required that the long practised labour 
policies of employers be maintained and extendedo Accumula- 
tion was based on a process of primitive accumulation (the 
transfer of value from the peasant economy by employers 
avoiding the full costs of reproduction of labour) and was 
supplemented by re-Investment of profits as well as capital 
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derived from speculation In land, 
For the period 1950-54, for instaneeg the sum Of total 
gross operating profits of plantation producers was X42-5 
million while the total sum of payment for labour to African 
workers on farms came to X31-3 million. The gross 
operating profits in this period were 30 percent of total 
output of the whole of plantation agriculture* For the 
period 1954-64 thb total sum of gross operating profits 
was jC177*1 million while total African wages amounted to 
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9147-9 milli*on. For the whole of this period gross 
operating profits were 32,3 percent of total output* In 
the 1965-71 period gross operating profits continued to be 
earned at a level In excess of total African wage payments. 
Total gross operating profits for this latter period were 
163 
P2D., 7milliony whili'total African wages were $236 millions 
Throughout this period gross fixed capital formation was at 
a level well within the margin of gross operating profits at 
40 percent of the latter level* The corresponding figure 
for 1954-64 was 50 percent* As a general conclusion therefore 
3ý9 
it can be said that plantation producers had an ability to 
pay higher wages even within their existing profit margins, 
It Is worth recording however that not all plantations 
had a record of high prof its, In 1971-72 (a f avourable 
season),, for instance# a sample survey of 115 white farms 
found that there was a wide variation in net farm profits, 
ranging from an average of $249624 amongst the top one third, 
to $89413 for the middle third and only 0621 for the bottom 
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thirde In this last category, 28 percent of producers 
made a net loss while another 40 percent made in excess of 
$2,000 during the year. Overall theng 11 percent of 
producers in the sample made a net loss and 79 percent made 
In excess of $29000 during the year, Despite this inequality 
within the plantation sector$ the earnings of owners were very 
high and regular subsidy policies guaranteed the viability 
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of the more marginal enterprises, 
These profits were In no small measure secured by 
institutional and Policy arrangements which sought to 
Iguaranteet returns to plantation producers in an order of 
magnitude which would ensure the continued viability of the 
plantations and hence settler colonialim The growing 
dependency of the plantation system on the State and the 
weakening of its economic and political power as a whole 
made it more urgent for producers to attempt to secure 
traditional profit margins through various incorporative 
and Integrating strategies binding the fortunes of the 
Industrial and plantation sectors more closely together* 
The farm lobby was successful In establishing public concern 
3 
for farm profitability and secured a government commission 
of enquiry Into rising Input costs in plantation production, 
Part of this general concern - to maintain the viability of 
an unreformed settler colonial structure and to keep 
plantation producers on the land - arose from the pressures 
on settler agriculture in the post-1965 period during which 
sanotionsg drought and guerrilla war made producers more 
Insecure* Nonethelessq despite these vi#oissitudesg 
plantation enterprises were still In a strong financial 
position In 1974,166 There was little prospect that this 
position would be jeopardized and profits diminished by 
redistribution of the income earned from production to the 
workers employed on the plantations, Their experience from 
the 19401's onwards was largely one of bare subsistenceg 
applying to both foreign and local workers. This was so 
even while the switch In labour supplies transformed the 
composition of the plantation labour force and employers 
became more dependent on local labour supplies* 
0 
COMLUSION 
Plantation labour policies were qualitatively different 
from labour mobilization In other production structures in 
Rhodesiae The plantation sector was an essential component 
of Rhodesian settler colonialism as well as a necessary part 
of the peripheral capitalist systemo The accumulation of 
capital and profits was; based on Suasi-feuddl labour policies 
which led to massive underconsumption amongst plantation 
workers and the impoverishment of the rural Atr1ean working 
class, 
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CHAPTER 
MASTERS AND SERVANTS UNDER THE DOMESTIC 
MODE OF 'PRODUCTION' 
'Underdevelopment theory' has embodied few analytical 
perspectives on the subject of domestic workers In peripheral 
social formations despite evidence that a high proportion 
I 
of labour-power is utilized In this form. Domestic labour 
Is treated simply as another 'part' of the general labour 
market. Howeverg the relations to production of domestic 
workers were quite different from those of Industrial, 
plantation or mining labourersq even though they constituted 
part of the working-class. The qualitative differences 
between the position of domestic workers and other wage- 
labourers were typically accentuated in settler-colonial 
societies - for Instance in the case of Southern Africa 
generally. The structural position of domestic, -. workers 
In Rhodesia must therefore be located In relation to the 
specific conditions pertaining to (Rhodesian) peripheral 
capitalism within the settler-colonial system. 
THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE SETTLER-COLONIAL DOMESTIC 
MODE OF 'PRODUCTION' 
The characteristics of the $settler-colonial' domestic 
2 
mode of 'production' should be clarified at the outset, 
The domestic household considered here was an 'exceptional 
household' within the social formation in. which It was 
located, 
3 
It was a household which relied for Its efficiency 
I/ 
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on the mobilization of labour-power from without, In the 
main these households were those of the settler bourgeoisie* 
With the development of an African bourgeoisie# the use of 
hired non-family domestic labour spread within African society* 
Asians. and Coloureds - both marginal groups within the 
settler-colonial power structures though not In the 
peripheral capitalist system - were also part of this 
dominant class of households. Nonethelessq all these house- 
holdso. considered togethers constituted a minority of the 
households found in the economic system (approximately 7-8 
percent In 1974). Their significances howeverg lay In their 
ab IlItyg-based on unequal access to the means of subsistence 
and unequal Income distribution, to monopolize the largest 
stratum of. wage labourers outside plantation production for 
the sole and exclusive use of the household and Its members. 
The mobilization of cheap labour supplies for use in 
the (settler-colonial) domestic mode of production was for 
a specific purpose -a purpose different in nature from the 
objectives of labour utilization In other production structures. 
Although labour-power was purchased gua commodityg the 
#production' of the workers so employed was not manifest In 
the form of commodity production, nor was It exchanged In 
4 
the market place. No *exchange value' was attached to the 
$production' that resulted from domestic labour, Considerable 
luseývaluel did result9 however# In the form of value solely 
'realized' within the domestic mode of production In 
accordance with the requirements and objectives of the 
household Itself* Furtherv the employment of domestic labour 
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was a transaction dependent on the dominant capitalist mode 
of production since the Incomes of households which were able 
to employ domestic workers were themselves wholly dependent 
(but In different ways) on the principal mode and Its branches 
of production. The class position of the household thus 
affected the household's ability to hire domestic labour as 
well as the conditions under which domestic workers were 
employed in the settler-colonial domestic mode of production* 
The widespread employment of domestle workers was 
functional to the settler-colonial system of peripheral 
capitalism. Firstly# although domestic labour was 
$unproductive labourl from the viewpoint of the mass of the 
population who did not realize any part of the use values 
'Produced's the labour of domestic workers was not wholly 
unp3toduotive from the viewpoint of capital accumulation, 
The'employment of domestic labour was conducted In relation 
to small-scale settler-colonial capital. It produced value 
which'was realized both through the process of 'petty 
accumulation' (especially In the case of residential property) 
and by the direct appropriation of 'use values' by employers 
whose real consumption level (especially of services) was 
raised throu gh the utilization of cheap hired labour. 
5 
The notion of 'petty accumulation' used here denotes a 
specific aspect of the process of primitive accumulation that 
was the fundamental form of accumulation in Rhodesia, it 
had the essential characteristics of the latterg Itz. It has 
been based on the transfer of value from the non-capitalist 
modes-of production through the employment of labour below 
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the cost of its own reproduction, It was also a form of 
aecumulation'that enabled the benefits of accumulation to 
be spread amongst a varied set of classes* flearly all 
elements of the dominant classes of settler colonialism were 
able to obtain capital in this way. An Integral part of 
the process was the utilization of cheap domestic labour In 
tasks that either maintained the asset value of household 
property at very low cost or expanded the value of that 
property through the household management allocating labour. 
6 
power to tasks which had just such an accumulative purpose, 
Of some Importance In this conneotiong and one reason 
why the (predominantly white) labour aristocracy were 
Incorporated as part of the ruling class coalition of 
Interests# was the way In which petty accumulation by the 
labour aristocracy depended upon their position as emDloyprs 
of cheap domestic labour, 
7 
Cheap domestic labour also helped 
ensure the reproduction of the settler-colonial syetem of 
class dominance by providing conditions which favoured the 
labour aristocracy - an 'essential' class of skilled and 
semi-skilled workers in the capitalist mode of production, 
Female participants were released for employment outside 
the household, Stability In the white class coalition was 
promoted and a secured basis for political cohesion established* 
Collective settler interests were not grounded simply in 
racist. prejudice and opposition to African Interests ýPer se. 
Rather they were based on a specific economic rationale and 
a'logio that in practice was supported by the State during 
8 
all phases of the history of settler colonialism In Rhodesia* 
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The settler colonial domestic mode of production was 
thus central to the economic system In Rhodesia and has 
remained no-despite 'irrational$ and occasional calls from 
9 
ultra-conservative whites to 'do away with servants'. The 
truth of the matter wasq as settlers actually recognized, that 
10 
households 'could not afford to do without (their) servants', 
At the systemic level# too, domestic labour was both 
functional and essential. Cheap domestic labour was 
importantp not only for the replenishment of settlers to 
staff the strategic positions In the socio-economic systemp 
but also as an Instrument to subordinate the collective 
$servant classes' to the political power of capital and the 
'master classes' who exercised social control within the 
system of peripheral capitalism, The fact that Aslansq 
Coloureds and some Africans passed from the side of 
Iservant"to 'master$ in this relationship in no way contradicts 
11 
this perception, Rather# this latter process reflected 
the 'modernization$ of the system and the reproduction of 
*settler-colonial# social relations In a different but 
equally effeetive form. 
The-domestic labour system served the function of 
providing for an element of systems stability in other ways 
as well. Its continuance did not depend solely on the 
political Inclinations and power of the white electorate, 
though this was an important factor behind Its perpetuation 
as a-basis for unprotected and cheap labouro 
12 
'Extra- 
economic' controls over labour were important In underpinning 
37Y 
the domestic labour policies that were pursued by households 
and sanctioned by the State, Various classes of labour that 
were created as a result of the dissolution of the peasant 
codes of productiong and that were suppressed from 
functioning as patty commodity producersq were absorbed Into 
domestic employmente The sector also functioned as a 
residual form of 'reserve army' Of eMD10YPd persons in low- 
wage jobs,, an urban IP0011 of workers from wbich Industry 
and commerce could draw as expansion required. 
13 
Paternalist 
labour policies did not therefore simply function to provide 
'use values' to employers of domestic laboure They also 
provided an element of privately financed 'social securitYlo 
not found elsewhere in the economic aystemp and a form of 
stabilization without which overall social control would have 
disintegrated* Before examining these aspects of household 
labour polleys howeverg a closer specification of the 
production requirements and objectives of the 'typical* 
household must be made, 
THE PRODUCTION REVIREMENTS AND OBJECTIVES OF HOUSEHOLDS 
It will be useful to consider the settler-colonial 
household as a production unit seeking to maximize Its 
own welfare through meeting a combination of Income and leisure 
objectives at a given level of household efficiency, In the 
attainment of these objectiveag the employment of cheap 
domestic labour andq more speoifioallyq the terms on which 
domestic workers were employedq were crucial, Employers or 
3U '' 
households thus attempted to adopt a maximizing policy, 
They maximized the Produetion of $use values' obtained from 
the utilization of domestic labour and at the level of 
consumption they maximized real household Income as well as 
diverting domestic labour-power to tasks which facilitated 
accumulation* 
Considerations of production and consumption therefore 
provided incentive for employers to 'exploit' domestic 
workers& The pursuit of efficiency required the household 
to maximize the difference between ELggregate revenues and 
household operating costs, One of these cost9 Indeed the 
most important one over which households had some direct 
controls was the cost of domestic labour, It was in the 
Interests of the household that labour costs were minimized. 
In the Rhodesian case a 'free' labour marked mediated the 
supply and demand determining wages for domestic labour. 
The existence of non-capitalist modes of production In the 
economic eystemg from which means of subsistence were 
avallableg placed a 'floor level' on the labour cost borne 
by the domestic household. This level tended to be the 
level of wages required to meet the basic subsistence 
consumption needs of the Individual workers in his domain of 
employment. In practiceg wage rates normally exceeded the 
minimum subsistence costs of the Individual workerg though 
not the full costs of subsistence and reproduction for the 
worker and his family, This feature had substantial rami- 
ficatione for the worker who was forced to find sources of 
Income supplementation and keep his dependents In the rural 
.1 ---, I 
areass maintaining economic rights and links In the rural 
economy as a aecurity for that period of his life during 
which he would not be employed or able to work, 
A conflict of Interests existed between higher worker 
wages and the achievement of household objectives, In this 
situationg employers attemptedg individually and In collusion 
with one anothers to adopt an optimizing strategy* The 
optimal strategy from the point of view of the households 
would have been achieved through a collective policy designed 
to supply the appropriate quantum of domestic labour at the 
desired (low) price* This goal was served by a variety of 
policies Including Inter alia: the Institutionalization of 
labour suppliesl the creation of unattractive rural optional 
a minimization of legal protection for workers; the 
minimization of labourts bargaining powerl the minimization 
of household commitments to meet the workerst extra-subsistenoe 
needs or costs9 particularly in respect of dependents; and 
the maintenance of a policy of paternalist dependency which 
ttledt the worker to the household and functioned with other 
'extra-economic$ measures to provide cheap labour and ensure 
the power of employers, 
The employment of domestic labour in the household 
enabled the release of labour linputst that would otherwise 
be provided by members of the householdg- usually the wife 
of the household head* 
14 
The husband/head of household, 
was also relieved of a wide variety of manual tasks. Howeverp 
the released female labour factor might not seek employment 
In the labour market and the addition to household welfare 
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would be obtained In the form of additional leisure consump- 
tion, Because of the usually full employment state of the 
white female labour marketq the (opportunity-cost) value of 
leisure consumed was normally represented by the female's 
prospective wage rate. 
Certain other characteristics of production conditioned 
labour utilization policy, Firstly, a minimum quantum of 
female labour derived from the household would nearly always 
be used in 'managing' household production, Howeverg it was 
feasible that the minimum female factor input could be 
reduced by the domestic labour Input assuming some of the 
functions undertaken by the femalel in particular this 
occurred where the domestic worker undertook the household's 
purchasingg ordering of foodstuffs9 and a greater Imanagementl 
role* This situationg howeverg may be regarded as a special 
case* Its main effect was to increase the female's leisure 
time with possible upward adjustment in wage rates for 
domestic workers who assumed greater managerial responsibilities. 
Secondlyg whilst it can be assumed, for employers In 
gener. alp that part-time domestic labour was limited In supplyq 
this was not always the case for each individual household. 
In high density housing or In flats$ employers 'shared' 
domestic labourers amongst households. This labour utiliza- 
tion practice was widespread in household cleaning services 
in many flat areas of urban Hhodesia and was normally 
institutionalized In the case of garden workers who were 
employed by flat owners to maintain the exterior of the 
premises. 
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Thirdlys capital could be substituted for labour in 
production within limits. The rate of substitution depended 
not simply on the relative cost ratio of capital to labour 
even though the cost of full mechanization would have been 
relatively high. 
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Labour-saving devices could not entirely 
eliminate labour since operators were required to work the 
machines. Additionallys the system of domestic service In 
Rhodesia was such that a number of tasksg regarded as part 
of the job of the domestic workerg could not easily have been 
mechanized* The desire to maintain a high level of household 
efficiency also operated to make the substitution of capital 
Inputs for labour Inputs not only expensive but inconvenient 
for many domestic households. At the systemic levels 
'excess' mechanization would be both de-stabilizing and costly 
In terms of utilization of scarce foreign exchange resources. 
FourthlY9 employer maximizing policies set a wage 
minimum In accordance with a desire for a minimum level of 
worker effioiencys though this m6st often manifested itself 
In the payment of a large portion of the real wage in kind 
and the design of labour policies to attract workers who 
woUld. provide continuity of service and reduce the social 
costs of repeated personnel selection and *retraining'. 
The social relations and broad conditions of production 
found In the 'settler-colonial$ domestic mode of production 
will now be examined in their concrete form with special 
reference to the post-19404s. The empirical material is 
arranged so as to consider the following Issues: the macro- 
economic'significance of the domestic labour Marketj the 
specific pattern of production and employment In white 
urban households in the 19601s; wage trends and wage 
stratification amongst domestic workersl the pattern of 
labour mobilization over the long-term; employers' labour 
policies and the resultant conditions of employment; the 
determinants of wages and conditions of employmentj and the 
'extra-economic' forms of labour control that were associated 
with the domestic mode of production at the point of 
'production' as well as those at the level of State policy, 
THE MACHO-ECONOMIC IMPORTAME OF DOMESTIC EMPLOYMBUT 
It has not been widely recognired that the $Private 
Domestic Services' sect, 6r was one of the most Important 
sectors In the Rhodesian economic systemv particularly as a 
determinant of African economic welfare* Data on employment 
and earnings in this labour market are shown in Tables 1-4. 
The most striking characteristic to record Is that the 
sector was the second most Important employment sector In 
the economy throughout the Post-1954 period, Employment 
grew from 379896 to 1149200 in the 30-year period from 
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1941-71. Nearly 14.6 percent of all black employees were 
engaged In domestic work (mainly for white employers) In 1971. 
When employment in Agriculture and Forestry Is excluded from 
the calculationg the 'Private Domestic Services' sectorls 
Importance Is highlighted still further* In 1971 there were 
23.8 percent of all black non-agricultural workers employed 
in domestic employmentl andq on occasiong this proportion 
reached as high as 26.8 percent (1963) - 
39, 
The source of domestic labourl as shown by the country 
of origin of employees In the sectorg Is also, of considerable 
interests In 1961 some 39 percent of workers were of 
non-indigenous origing Indicating the extent to which domestic 
employers relied upon foreign labour and the extent to which 
Rhodesian blacks were not attracted to domestic employmento 
The majority of foreign workers came from Malawi and 
ilooambiquee Most were 'free-flow$ Immigrants and none 
was supplied to employers by the Rhodesian African Labour 
Supply Commission or Agriculture Native Labour LIm1tedq the 
only licensed private foreign labour recruitment bureau--. 
allowed to operate by the State after 1946. 
The character of the labour market for domestic workers 
Is Illustrated by the relatively high proportion of female 
and juvenile labour employedq this being 13.2 percent and 
12.2 percent re-spectively In 1961. Of employment sectors 
readily open to African workersp it was one of the least male 
dominated and one of the few in which juvenile workers 
remained highly significantl the other Important sector In 
this regard was Agriculture and Forestry In which the sex/age 
and country of origin composition of the labour forceq as 
well as the governing labour legislationg were not dissimilar. 
Whilst the 'Private Domestic Services' sector was the 
second most Important employer of African labourt after 1958 
It ranked as the second lowest paying sector In terms of 
average employee earnings, Average earnings grew In current 
prices by 71.1 percent from 1955-719 an annual rate of growth 
of 4.4 percent. Howeverg most of this growth was confined 
3E2 
to the period up to 1963g after which time the rate of growth 
of earnings In current prices was 2.6 percent Per annum, 
When current earnings data nre deflated# the real growth in 
earnings Is far less significantl being 15.7 percent for the 
16-year period$ or an average of 0,98 percent per annum, 
Againg in the post-1963 periodg wage stagnation was 
characteristic of the sector with earnings growing by only 
0.28 percent per annum. In real terms. 
WHITE HOUSE-HOLD PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURES 
The only available comprehensive data in recent years 
concerning the employment of domestic labour In Rhodesia 
relate to 1960 and 1968 when urban budget studies on white 
17 
households were conducted by the Central Statistical Office. 
These studies are of limited usefulness for a number of 
reasons, They only analysed white households* Nonetheless 
these households probably employed about 90 percent of all 
domestic workers* The results were based on sample surveys. 
Thisis not a significant liability however since It was on 
these surveys that the European Consumer Price Index was 
constructed and the information can be regarded asfairly 
reliable., The surveys were not designed to produce data on 
domestic household labour structures and hence there are gaps 
in the data which this analysis cannot remedy* The evidence 
Is nevertheless useful and does throw considerable light on 
the labour structure of white households, 7 
3F3 
The data pertaining to 1960 and 1968 are set out in 
Tables 7 and 8* These data are not directly comparable for 
three reasons. Firstlyg the data In Table 8 refer to all 
white households in Rhodesia whilat those In Table 7 are 
confined to the higher Income Salisbury area; secondly# 
the data relating to incomes, earnings and costs are In 
current prices and cannot be compared without adjustment for 
price changes. From 1960-1968 the European Consumer Price 
18 
Index reflected an 18*5 percent Increase In prices. 
Finallys the data In the income groups noted cannot be 
directly compared even If the data were to be adjusted for 
price changes because the data In each quintile income group 
relates to the composite average of the group and there Is 
no evidence available on the distribution of Incomes# earnings 
and costs around the mean* For these reasons the data 
for 1960 and 1968 are considered separatelyo Nonetheless# 
the evidence helps provide a more diRaggregated and accurate 
picture of the structure of white households and domestic 
employment, 
Consider firstly the data for white households in 
Salisbury In 1960 (see Table 7). 
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Households In all 
quintile income groups employed on average more than one 
domestic worker. The average number of domestic workers 
employed was 1*79 ranging from an estimated 1.49 In the case 
of households with gross Incomes under 024os to 2*7 in 
households in which the gross income exceeded $486. 
The total outlays on domestic labour are shown In line 3* 
These outlays Increased In absolute amounts with the riseAn 
Yq 
household Incomes. The average households earning 0325 
monthlyg spent 020*72 on domestic labour per month. The 
average monthly outlay per worker was $12,18, These 
outlays Included cash wages, rations and valuation for 
accommodation as well as other, forms of payment, Overall 
cash outlays accounted for 68 percent of total outlays* 
The proportion paid In kind was reasonably constant across 
quintile income groups (see line 10). 
Whilst total outlays on domestic labour tended to 
Increase with household Incomeaq both In absolute and relative 
terms (line 9)p this was not the case as far as wages given 
per worker were concerned (line 8). Workers In more 
prosperous households received higher wages than workers in 
lower income earning householdsq but as a proportion of 
household Incomeq domestic workers' wage (cash and kind) 
fell consistently across Income groups. 
Household Incomes were augmented by the earnings of 
working wives in all quintile income groups (line 2). The 
contribution of white female labour to aggregate household 
income Increased as household income levels inereasedg 
except In the case of quintile income group 5 (line 11)9 
The relationship between average female earnings and 
the wages of domestic workers In shown In line 12. In 
quintile Income group I the ratio of the former to the latter 
was 0,49: 19 reflecting the higher female labour Input Into 
the domestic household# the lower opportunity cost of white 
female workers in this category and the lower wages paid to 
domestic workers by lower Income households. This may In 
3ff3 
part result from the age structure of white households 
since young couples most probably predominated In the lower 
Income groups* In Income groups 2-5 there was a radically 
different relationship between female earnings and domestic 
labour wages* In these quintile Income groups this latter 
ratio was greater than unity, Hence the average ratio of 
all households was 1#95: 1. This reflects the higher female 
labour participation rate in upper Income groupss the higher 
wages paid to these females and their greater relative 
contribution to gross household Income, 
A rough idea of the price ratio between domestic labour 
and the opportunity cost of female labour used In the domestic 
household can be obtained from the 1960 budget study. The 
average Income per working wife In Salisbury was $100,08 in 
20 
196o,, Average domestic worker wage per household covered 
In the survey for Salisbury was just above $12. Assuming 
. that both were working full-timel that the female worked a 
5ý-dayg 40-hour week and the domestic worker a 6-day, 54-hour 
week$ then It can be calculated that the hourly wage rate 
of the two workers respectively was %0.625 and 00*055* This 
yields a price ratio of female to domestic labour of 11.4tio 
It was therefore highly worthwhile for the 
household to employ domestic labour whilst the female sought 
employment in the labour market at a rate that helped 
maximize the net income to the household after allowance for 
domestic labour costs* 
The, data for 1968 for Rhodesia as a whole present a 
similar picture (see Table 8), 
21 
All quintile Income groups 
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employed more than one worker, The numbers of workers 
employed ranged up to 2*2 workers for households with Incomes 
greater than $470 monthly, On averages white households 
employed 1.4 domestic workers (line 6)* The majority of 
domestic workers were full-time labourers (line 13)9 with 
households on average satisfying only 15 percent of total 
labour requirements In the form of part-time workers* The 
percentage of part-time labour employed tended to decrease 
as household Income rosee Lower Income householdsp In which 
fema3e labour Inputs were highestg tended to employ a greater 
amount of part-time domestic labourg though such households 
also employed an average of 1.2 workers per household (see 
quintile Income group I in line 6), 
Outlays on domestic labour Increased as household Income 
rose (line 4)9 though this was not the case In proportionate 
terms (line 9)e The average household outlay was $24,31, 
giving a labour cost per worker employed of $17-36. Wages 
for domestic workers were positively related to household 
incomes (line 8) though as household income rose both the 
outlays on domestic labour and the average worker wage formed 
a smaller proportion of household Incomes Thus households 
earning below $254 spent $15,43 on domestic labourp paying 
an average wage rate (cash and kind) of $12,85 per worker 
employed& The outlays formed 7961 percent and the worker's 
wage 6933 percent of the monthly household income* At the 
other end of the spectrumg households earning in excess of 
$470 spent $38*82 on domestic labour at an average wage per 
worker employed of $17.64* These expenditures formed 6*25 
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percent and 2.84 percent respectively of monthly household 
Incomes. In all quintile Income groups the earnings of 
working females made a significant contribution to total 
household inoomep ranging from 4#0 percent to 12.6 percent 
between the highest and lowest Income groups* The monthly 
pro-taxincome earned by females in all households was. %45,, 31 
on avera. 609 a contribution of 12*1 percent to household 
Incomes* Given the high level of employment of full-time 
domestic workers in nearly all householdsl It may thus be 
concluded that leisure-consumption was a very important 
component of household welfare* 
Finallyp the data bhow that there existed a certain 
variation In the pattern of utilization of domestic labour, 
Variations in the amount of domestic labour used and In wage 
levels found In household production were closely associated 
with income levels of the households, an Index that reflected 
the existence of a degree of class differentiation within 
white society* 
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The non-uniformity of wage levels also 
Implied a large measure of employer discretion in fixing 
remuneration for domestic workeres a phenomenon that 
manifested Itself typically In the worker% search for a 
#good' employer. 
WAGE TRENDS AND WAGE STRATIFICATION 
This study will consider wage growth firstly In its 
long-term historical context, In 1914 domestic labourers 
earned 20/- In cash and 10/- in a food sUpplement, 
23 
By 
? Fe 
1920 these levels were 24/- and 151- respectivelylo an overall 
increase of 30 percent at current prices In the six-year 
period* The weighted average wage for Southern Rhodesia 
In April 1950 was Z1915*29 reflecting the small growth In 
real cash wages that had been obtained by domestic workers 
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In the previous 30 years, Indeedq In current priceag the 
cash wage growth was equivalent to approximately 4*5 perce 
per annuz9 or an average of 1.5 percent annually. Real 
earnings for domestic workers therefore fell between 1920 and 
19509 taking Into account cash wages and food outlays but 
excluding housing allowances (see Table 9)o Average real 
wages for domestic labour fell from 45/3d In 1920-24 to 
36/2d In 1950 (as measured In 1939 prices)* It was not until 
the 1950*0 that the 1924 level was restored. After 1955 
real earnings grewl quickly at first and then sluggishly 
after 1963- At this time the wage rates for domestic labour 
improved markedly* By 1961 the average in Salisbury for 
cash viages# rations and other emoluments was X6. o. 6. This 
represented (in 1939 prices) a real wage of 51/10d monthlyg 
an amount that was 14.6 percent above the 1920-24 level and 
4391 percent above the 1950 level. Thus# using 1920-24 
earnings levels representing a base value of 1000 for an 
Index cf' real earnIngs9 the 1950 Index figure Is 809 the 1961 
level is 114.6 and the 19? 1 level Is 118. It may be 
legitimately argued then that wage stagnation was a 
characteristic feature of the domestic services sector since 
real earnings grew at an average of less than one-half of one 
percent per annum for the 1924-71 period, 
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Secondlyq consider the question of income differentials 
within the household between employers and employees* 
Because the long-term wage trend of the domestic worker 
was close to stagnation# and only marginally positive In the 
Post-1950 periodg there Is a Driorl evidence that Income 
differentials between 'Masters and Servants' grew consistently 
throughout the twentieth century, However, comprehensive 
data are available only for the 1965-70 period, if 
European personal Income per canita Jx compared with the 
earnings of domestic workers Per enpita (assuming that each 
worker had two additional dependents to support) the Income 
difforential is recorded as having grown from $1,428 to 
X1,537 In real terms between 1965ý-70 (see Tables 5 and 6), 
Not only did the absolute gap growg but relative income 
differentials did toop from 20.6ti to 21,2: 1 In the same 
period* 
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Thirdlyg consider the relationship between the absolute 
level of wages and the costs of urban subsistence* The 
revised wage data given by the Central Statistical Office 
for 1973 show that the average level of monthly earnings of 
26 
domestic workers in that year was $27. This estimate 
included cash wageop allowancesg bonuses# employer contribu- 
tions to pension fundsp holiday fundsq and the cash value of 
all income received In kind. This figure can be compared 
with the Poverty Datum Line for a single unmarried adult male 
In the urban areas set at approximately $18 for January 1974,27 
The earnings level exceeded this P, DeL. * by approximately 
50 percent. However$ at that time the P*D, Ika for a married 
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man with no children was 9359 and for a married man with one 
small child It was 038*50* Thus it is clear that the wage 
level for domestic workers was closely geared to the 
subsistence level of the single adult worker. In 1973-74 it 
was considerably higher than this subsistence levelq yet 
still substantially below the minimum level required to meet 
the costs of reproduction of labour and to meet the 
subsistence consumption needs of non-Eingle workers, 
In general termss then$ the average wage of domestic 
workers rose above the subsistence level for the individualg 
a situation which reflected Inter alia: the decreasing 
ability of the peasant economy to meet the subsistence 
requirements of the dependents of domestic workers in the 
reserves; the possibility of a greater amount of labour 
stabilization amongst workers in the domestic labour market 
28 
as a result of growing unemployment problemst a 
possible reconsideration by employers of the 'moral element' 
in setting 'appropriate' wages; 
29 
the changing structural 
position of employers who gained considerably from the pattern 
of growth; the fact that changes recorded In average wage 
levels were , influenced by the wages paid to the higher 
paid strata of domestic workers* 
Whilst It has not been possible to identify with any 
prec, i, s 
, 
ion, the relative importance of these forcess It has 
been possible to examine the significance of stratification 
that existed between domestic workers, As Talles 7 and 8 
have showng wage Inequalities were noticeable in both 1960 
and 1968* These data (as do earnings figures from the Central 
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Statistical Office) tend to overestimate the average wage 
because African employers (who would fall mostly Into the 
lower income households) are excluded from the calculations, 
Consequently the ranee of inequality in payments has been 
underestimated. With these qualifications$ howeverg 
Important perspectives can be obtained from an analysis of 
the 1961 and 1971 cash wace distribution between domestic 
workers (see Tables 10 and 11). 
The 1971 data demonstrate a number of singularly 
important charaoteriptics of the sector, Firstly., 9 whilct 
average earnings in the sector were low by comparison with 
black earnings in all other industries except agriculture$ 
the Intra-seotoral distribution of cash wages reflected 
a large proportion of even lower paid workers* Secondlyl 
payments in kind were highly significant and payment in 
#cash and kind$ formed the dominant pattern of remuneration. 
Only 2*7 percent of all workers were paid in cash onlys of 
which 28 percent received less than $10 monthly* 
30 
In 
the case of all workers* 31.6 percent received a cash wage of 
less than $0 monthly and 91*1 percent less than $20 monthly. 
In 19? 10 no workers received a cash wage In excess of $70* 
Unfortunatelys there Is no comparable earnings data available 
for 1971 to permit an analysis of earnings distribution; and 
too little Is known of the Income base of employees to permit 
a quantitative specification of the Income distribution of 
domestic workerso 
It Is possible to compare shifts In the each wage 
distribution within the sector between 1961 and 1971 (see 
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Table 99 Appendix A)* In 1961 come 64.6 percent of non-rural 
domestic workers received a cash wage of less than $12,26 
(1971 prices) monthly* The data for 1971 show this proportion 
at 85#2 percent* Howeverg the 1961 and 1971 data are not 
directly comparable (see explanation In Appendix A)* After 
making necessary adjustment to the data# it Is found that 
the proportion paid monthly each waCec below %12*26 (1971 
prices) had most probably risen between 1961 and 1971 from 
approximately 81*5 percent to 85*2 percent, Thus whilat 
domestic workers' earnings grew only very modestly from 
1961-71 (see Tables 3 and 4)0 by approximately 8 percent# 
for many workers there was no Improvement In real cash 
31 
wages* Indeed$ a large number of domestic workers appear 
to have suffered a decline in real cash wages (nee Table 99 
Appendix A), 
LABOUR FlOBILIZATIOll PATTERNS 
Trends in wages need to be considered against a back- 
ground of labour mobilization, In the early decades of the 
twentieth century in Rhodesia there were a number of whites 
as well as Asians and Coloureds who held jobs as domestic 
workers. Even in the 1940's a portion of the white immigrant 
labour force arrived in Rhodesia to take up this form of 
32 
employment* In the 1940's Coloured females were heavily 
dependent on earnings from domestic employment# The bulk 
of the domestic work force in the late 1930's and 194ofs 
however was compriced of African males, 
33 
BY this time 
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Coloured domestic workers were in short supply, Changes In 
the racial composition of the occupational structure after 
the 1940's resulted In the absorption of Coloureds into 
other higher-paid Jobs, By 1950 there were few (if any) 
whiter, engaged in domestic employment* Their labour was 
too expe=ive and the cost of importation of whites for 
domestic labour - which was mooted as an alternative to the 
use, of African women in domestic employment in the 1930's - 
was prohibitive* 
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,, The economic advantage in utilizing African women In the 
domestic mode of production - at least Insofar as there was 
an inadequate supply of African males - was quickly realized 35 
by employers and a government Commission of Inquir7o The 
preponderance of African males in domestic employment 
resulted essentially from the central position of African 
women In the maintenance of the rural household (to care for 
children and dependents and to maintain essential peasant 
produotion)q, 
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At the same times as demands for cheap labour 
inereasedg African women became steadily proletarianized in 
the domestic mode of production# a process which 'released' 
African men for employment elsewhere In more 'productive' 
areas of the economic system, This $substitution' process 
was actively promoted by the State and betwwn 1936 and 1969 
the number of African women in domestic employment greu from 
488 to 169474.37 Howeverg the Post-1958 surplus of labour 
reduced the need for deliberate State policies designed to 
promote the substitution of females for males In domestic 
employment, 
159 q 
The need for State Intervention was not whollY removed 
however since the low-wage labour supplies required by 
plantation producers were not fully satisfied and one effect 
of controls placed on foreign African labour In the urban 
economy was to displace foreign workers (mostly males) from 
domestic jobs In theae areas. 
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Stricter controls placed 
upon foreign Africans in urban employment in 1973 were 
designed to accentuate this trend andq by the 1970'at cheap 
labour supply mechanisms had once again become important for 
domestic employers, 
LABOUll POLICIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS 
Labour polleies pursued by employers and the State in 
respect of domestic labour did not vary greatlY over the 
1940-74 period, In some respects the Istylet changed but 
the essence of the policies did not* Employers tried to keep 
the remuneration given to domestic workers at the most basic 
level needed for survival and maintenance* Observers and 
fauthorities' on the *native labour problem$ regularly noted 
that the-domestic worker fneed not be pampered** 
39 
Howeverg 
it was essential for productivity that workers should be 
properly and 8ufficiently fed. For this reason employers 
kept control over worker consumption expenditures by making 
a large part of the payment for the job In the form of 
40 
'rations'. In 1971 nearly one-half of total earnings 
received by domestic wo, rkers were still paid In the form of 41 
remuneration in kind* 
31ý 
The State at this time also recommended 'appropriate' 
and commonly practised policies to would-be employers and 
42 
newly arrived Immigrants. It blatantly suggested that 
Africansg and hence domestic workers# were 'racial Inferiors' 
and that the grandfather of the domestic worker (and any 
other African worker) Inaa a savage$, Inatiorf scales were 
also clearly laid down (based roughly on the 1911 Orations 43 
scale# for single workers In the mining industry)* 
The rationale behind employers controlling the food 
consumption of the worker was based on a number of f aotoreq 
one of which was to bolster notions of superiority amongst 
employers (for Instance with the suggestion that 'the 
African does not understand the meaning of vitamins), 
F-mployers were warned to provide adequate variety In 
foodstuffs rather than 'allow the servants to resort to 
petty thieving from the pantry', It was strongly advised 
that 'all main supplies should be looked and that servants 
should have no access to them', The basic objective here 
was to control access to the means of subsistence and reduce 
tho incidence of wage compensation through thefts Clear 
differentials In wages were recommended for various 
occupational positions* the highest rewards being kept for 
'cookboys'. 'HouseboYs' were to be rewarded (dep(inding on 
experierpe) at levels ranging from 40 to 75 percent of the 
wage received by 'cookboys"s and 'adult garden boys' were to 
44 
be similarly remunerated. The State also requested 
employers to oomply withs and thereby make effeetive, the 
'pass system', All worksoekers had tO haVe a Valid pass* 
3%, 
African workers employed had to be 'signed on' and the 
particulars of the emjýoyment contract noted an the tRegis- 
5 
tration Certificate's All tesertersO were to be reported 
to the Registrar of Natives within 10 days or else the employer 
would face proscoution, 
EmploYers exercised other forms of control over domestic 
labour, In the 1940's the 'ticket systeO was reported to 46 
býe still 1jenerally in vogue$. This enabled einployers to 
*dock' the ticket and withhold waaes for work already 
completed. BY the 1970's the system was not as widely 47 
used*- Howeverg threats to workers (mostly verbalg but 
48 
occasionally physical) were still common, Police raids 
on living quarters of domestic workers also acted as a 
regular form of social control and discipline which made 
workers more insecure In the tenancy of tNir lklat (dwelling) 
and served to keep workers servile and $adjusted' to low 
wages and poor conditions. 
Whilst domestic workers had to contend with the reality 
of low wages$ the State and employers in general only 
considered the lot of the domestic worker at the level of 
ideologro The UnUrter of Labour remarked In the Bouse of 
Assembly In 1966p for instance# that relations 'between 
49 
masters and servants (appeared) to be fairly harmonious', 
Employers echoed this view and almost to a man firmly believed 
50 that they provided all for Ithpir boys$, OServantst, it 
wan arguodp 'received not only their salaries but free 
acco=odationg food and other "parks" f ar In exoess of those 51 
Visualized under the Aetel Indeed# according to one 
3ql 
employers licervanteg in praoticeg were favoured by the Act,,, 
(and)eoothe fact that there were many old and faithful 
servants showed they were not unhappy with their conditions$* 
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Others went beyond these claims to suggest that 'the relation- 
ships between servants and agriculturnl workersq covered by 
53 
the Act$ and their employers, were generally excellent's 
Despite these claims however there were numerous house- 
54 
holds where the 'madam could not keep a servant'* Few 
employers obtained a 'good reputationIq as far as workers 
were concerneds for their employment practices - and even 
these employers were judged in relative terms. Most 
domestic employers indulged In frequent discussions amongst 
themselves over the 'correct treatment of servants'* The 
objective of the exercise was nearly always related to ways 
and means to control domestic workers within the confines of 
a low wage policy. 
For their own satisfaction and to justify a variety of 
employment practices, employers created and maintained a 
stereotype of 'the servant'. For many he was lazy and 
often untrustworthy4 Some claimed domestic workers would 
#steal anythinst, Hiring policies were also affected in 
part by Images of these stereotypes* The idea that the 
luneducatod ones' were best was widely acknowledged* 
Employers preferred workers who knew what was texpeetedl and 
who would be servile and satisfied with poor pay. 'Smartt 
or 'cheeky' workers were mostly dismissed on the spot. The 
abundance of workneekers: ensured easy replacement even In 
the came of 'bad employers' whose reputation was locally 
31S 
notorious, Very few employers had to resort to the 
employment exchange to obtain domestic labour, In a survey 
of domestic employers in Ft. Victoriag Weinrich found that 
79 percent (of a 33 percent sample)of white households 
thought it best to pay low wages but to provide 'rations' 
and accommodation because Africans were lirresponsiblelp 
would spend their wages flippantly and would thereby become 
. 55 
'incapable' of hard work# 
Later surveys of the conditions of employment of 
domestic labourers confirmed that conditions were harsh for 
workers despite employerst claims that workers were $looked 
after'* One study of a sample of 30 workers In 1973 found 
the following, 
56 
Not only were wages low and inadequate 
In meeting the basic subsistence consumption needs of workers 
and their families (and in some cases even workers by 
themselves) but hours of work were extremely long, This 
was not simply In reference to time $on call' but to time 
'on the job'* Many workers worked long hours from early in 
the morning until late at night. Thus the wage per hour 
was extremely low. In the survey the average employee 
worked a 1OJ hour day and a 63-. ý hour week. 
57 
More than 60 
percent of employees interviewed received j day or less off 
during the week, Some individuals worked as long as 16 
hours per day. No one interviewed worked less than 8 hours 
daily* 
Leave provisions were unfavourable for workers, Some 
36 percent of the sample received 'no definite leave' 
annually, Some had never received leave. The average leave 
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period tended to be of 2 weeks duration. Often, howeverg 
leave was unpaid. Provision for $days off' on publie 
holidays was even more irregular than were conditions 
relatins to formal leave. Very few workers received free 
days on public holidayss and In all cases workers did not 
receive any compensation in terms of leave or additional pay 
for public holidays forfeited* This Included Christmasq 
Tiew Yearl Good FrIdayq Easter Sunday and other (religious) 
holidays* 
No vorkers in the sample received social security 
provisions covering both medical aid and pension requirements, 
A large number of workers were given undefinedg loose or 
occasional (employer) medical aid for themselves and, In 
a number of casesl for their familles. Eoweverg In the main, 
medical aid was often an uncertain benefit accruing to the 
contractf and many workers did not receive It. Unemployment 
insurance, or social security, was of course non-existent. 
Pension provisions were the exception rather than the rule 
and very few workers worked with one employer long enough to 
develop 'entitlement' to pension-benefits. Most expected to 
find their ultimate social security In the Tribal Trust Lands, 
though many domestic workers in urban areas attempted to 
maintain a permanent urban existence. 
A notable feature was that once dicemployedp domestic 
workers could seldom find a j6ob at their previous wage level, 
Manys In faotj left their jobs because of poor conditions and 
wagess only to end up with jobs in the same occupational 
category paying Inferior wages. Workers were keenly aware 
ý05 
of their low wage levels andq If given alternative 
opportunities# declared that they would willingly change 
jobs, 
Labour relations tended to be built squarely on a system 
of paternalism and dependency, Vearly all workers received 
substantial payments in kindg often not as part of an explicit 
contract but on various ad hoe bases. One common form of 
benefit was the receipt of Ileftoverst from the household. 
A number of workers In the sample Indicated their strong 
disapproval of the manner In which their employers dealt 
with them and many expressed a high preference for employment 
with 'good employersO. Contracts were mostly determined 
unilaterally by employers and wage Increases tended to be 
irregulars Established $benefits' under contracts were not 
regularly amended by negotiatione Henceq change In employ- 
ment conditions was slow and the status cluo was preserved 
except where employers volitionally decided to make 
amendments to conditions of contract, 
The situation found In Salisbury was very similar to 
that found in Weinrich's study of Ft. Victoria (which was 
based on a 25 percent sample of domestic workers in the town)* 
In the latter study additional perspectives of importance 
wero recorded* The employment of juveniles was common 
practice and nearly all juvenile workers were employed as 
gardoners and paid wages well below the average for the sector* 
Most gardeners had few other opportunities open to them, 
Apart from the hope of getting work outside the domestic 
household$ they mostly aspired to become $inside workers' or 
go/ 
cookes an occupational advance which would probably double 
their pay, Most workers were forced to find ways to 
supplement their Incomes from employment* More than 50 
percent of the females employed claimed that their wages did 
not cover their basic needs and most received money from 
#boyfriends' or from prostitution, More than 65 percent 
of males claimed their wages were inadequate for subsistence* 
Very few could leave' and most owned very little property 
despite 68 percent of the male workers being married* Many 
had previously been dismissed for lunsanotionedt visits to 
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the rural areas to see their wives and childrens Most 
workers obtained 'leftovers' from the household as a 
regular part of their diet9 an important supplement to their 
formal 'rations* package* 
DETEMIMINTS OF WAGES AND CONDITIO17S OF EMPLOYMENT 
The overall structural forces that created a cheaP 
supply of labour In the economy in generalq especially the 
foreien labour policy and the process of peasant under- 
development, were influential In determining wage levels for 
domestic workers. Other specific factors operated upon and 
within the domestic mode of production. A number of these 
determinants were of an 'extra-economic' nature and were 
rooted in political and institutional structures* For this 
reason they were of special significance, Before onnsidering 
them in detail howeverg the demand pattern and supply of 
domestic labours as fashioned by State Policies and the 
income distribution structures need to be briefly noted, ý 
ý01 
The demand for domestic labour was Influenced by the 
cost of labour which was low In relation to gross and net 
(after tax) Incomes of the domestic households of most whitesq 
Asians and Coloureds as well as an Increasing number of 
Africans* With workers firmly under direct household 
controll and no effective restrictions In the terms of 
contract for domestic employment, employers were In a 
position to benefit substantially from the use of hired 
domestic labour In household production, Thus the demand 
for domestic labour was high. Often where wage risen were 
awarded by employersq In order to 'rationalize' the employment 
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patterng Increasing work levels were required of the worker. 
Most European households therefore regarded domestic labour 
as an essential Input in productiong necessary to enable the 
household to maximize Incomes (by Ireleasingf the female for 
employment In the labour market) providing a basis for 
extensive leisure consumption (by the appropriation of the 
'use values' produced by domestic workers at employer 
discretion)g and permitting greater opportunity for petty 
accumulation (by providing for the low cost maintenance and 
improvement of movable and immovable property). The 
employment of domestic labour was thus gnnerally regarded 
as a sine nua non for the maintenance of the socio-economic 
60 
position of the dominant classes. So, too, white 
Immigrants who were absorbed into this class structure 
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quickly and willingly adopted the established pattern. 
With such a pattern of demand It could have been expected 
that wages would rise both quickly and would remain competitive 
1 'J 
with wages paid In other similar urban jobs. Both those 
expectations were not fulfilled In practiceg the reason 
being that wages were not determined solely by demand con- 
siderations. Supply factors were very important In keeping 
wage rates low and conditions of employment were highly 
dependent upon employer prerogatives. In conventional 
termsq domestic labour supply could be said to have been 
highly elastic. A variety of factors were important In 
keeping this situation on terms favourable to employer Inte- I 
restse There was widespread urban unemployment at the i 
unskilled levelq despite urban Influx control policies and 
the existence of opportunities for income-earning In petty 
commodity production. 
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Many persons In the $informal 
sector' In urban areas were able to maintain only a very 
marginal existence andq although supposedly In self- 
employmentl existed as a $reserve army$ of latent wage- 
labourers who would have willingly taken advantage of the 
#security' of domestic employment. Feasants in the rural 
areas who came from the marginalized strata of peasant 63 
society also often sought domestic employment, Fopulation 
growth and rural overcrowding, In particular after the late 
19400sq accentuated this situation, The existence and 
tightening of various 'vagrancy controlt laws after 1960 
reflected the abundance of labour and the State's attempt 
to keep the 'surplus' out of the urban areass especially 
the suburbs Inhabited by the rich and those employing domestic 
workers* Theve latter persons often offered 'Illegal# 
shelter to aspirant workseekers and relatives In need or even 64 
took in temporary 'illegal lodgers'. 
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The alirn=ent of the forces of demand and supply thus 
tended to perpetuate wage stagnation for domestic workers, 
In this situationt the level of employer Income (ability to 
pay) as well as *moral* considerations were Important 
determinants of the wage level and the standard of subsistence 
fixed for workers under this paternalist labour system. 
Employer power to determine wages was not of course absoluteg 
but had loplicitly to account for the specific occupation for 
which the workers was hired and the existence and size of 
that portion of dependents* consumption which had (necessarily) 
to be met from wages* The power or employers was thus 
Immense but not omnipotent, It was not able to exceed 
structural limits imposed on the determination of subsistence, 
Employer control has also been mediated through various 
institutional arrangements which have been designed to 
strengthen the employer's hand In the wage-setting process, 
One Institutionalized practice has been the exclusion 
of formal wage bargaining In wage settingo Traditionallyg 
the employer has unilaterally set the wage rate and stipulated 
the conditions of employment that had to be adhered to by 
the workere This process was directly assisted by the 
structure of employment legislation governing domestic 
employment which 'individualized' and 'privatized' the setting 
of contracts* Few contracts of employment were determined 
by metunl bargaining between the employer and the employee, 
The employer's option to bargaining was to wait for another 
applicant for the postj the worker's alternative was 
usually unemploymentg lose of potential incomet accommodation 
ý6ý 
and urban security* Henceq the balance was significantly 
weighted nZaInst the worker. 
The abnence of colls*ctive bargaining influencen on the 
ride of labour In thin situation further Institutionalized 
a depressing influence on wage growth. There were no unions 
or workers' associationav the essence of contracts being 
that they were set between Individuals of unequal bargaining 
strenZtht though the $traditional wage$ was adjusted over 
time by come employers. 
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Even the very little effective 
Individual bargaining that took place at the household level 
normally related to a narrow range of Income between the 
employer's offer and the workerleldemand'. Many etployers 
however tended to collude Implicitly through Informal 
networks to net wages and conditions for 'their servants' 
at or around the accepted local norm. 
Indicative of the absence of bargaining and as evidence 
of how formal and informal networks could determine vase 
rates Ic the data contained In an Trformntlon Pooklet (1972) 
given to new members of staff by the University of Rhodesia 
Women's Club "hog in their advice on household labour policy, 
recorded the following statement: 'Wages: No hard and fast 
rule can be laid down; it In left to the discretion of the 
Individualg and depends on concelenoeq elasticity of the 
employerts purneg and the capability of the employee. 0 The 
Booklet went on txplicitly to recommend cash wages for various 
classes of worki for exampleg cooks 016-020 conthlyl cook 
cum houBe-worker 014-g2O monthlyg and gardeners 08-914 
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monthly, Important perspectives are captUred In this 
ýbL 
policy advice which were common In the wage-setting process 
for domestic employment* It was assumed that wages were not 
set through bargaining or after any discussion with workers 
about their minimum needs. The wages and conditions of 
employment were pre-supposed to be acceptable and pre-patterned 
by employersp largely on the basis of individual and not 
family requirements, The influence of moral conscience was 
assumed to have a dominant effect on the actual wage rate 
establishedg and the relatively wide range recommended between 
the upper and lower end of the wage scales allowed sufficient 
latitude so as to accommodate most types of political 
persuasion: found amongst the dominant classes* 
The absence of bargaining was made more critical by the 
absence of a Domestic Workers' Trade Union or Association, 
Union organization would in any case have been a diffieult 
task* The conditions for union formation and the Internal 
operations in the sector were restrictive* There was no 
I 
provision in the Masters and Servants Act for the registration 
and operation of a legally Incorporated uniong urban areas 
legiBlation made it difficult for a union to formg for 
workers to hold meetingag or for a union to intervene in 
private wage setting* There were ---- no visible employers' 
lassociations' and It would have been difficult to set up a 
workable Industrial council on the lines of other Industries. 
In these cireumstancesq strongly favouring employersq workers 
had to place their hopes for wage growth either In paternalism 
or In State Intervention to regulate wages* 
16-7 
Howeverp government policy did not operate to promote 
wage growth in the domestic labour market, The State was 
committed to maintaining a low cost domestic labour policy 
In order to attract white Immigrants# provide attractions to 
hold potential white emigrants and keep down the cost of 
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living for its electoral support group, The State 
established no minimum wage nor did It seek at any stage 
to properly regulate wages and conditions of employment for 
domestic workers despite a *general strike' In 1948 In 
68 
which domestic workers played a prominent part* 
Government policy specifically excluded this sector from 
the more secure protections provided under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act; It implemented controls on domestic labour 
through the application of Its policy on IdesertionsIg 
prosecutions for which still occurred In 19731 and the 
public sector labour Inspeotorate was also notable for Its 
lack of activity In overviewing conditions of employment 
In this sector. 
If the absence of favourable government policy was 
noticeable# the lack of formal legal protection for workers 
was even more so, The Masters and Servants Act (the principal 
legislation governing employment relations In the sector) 
was founded upon a social and historical Inequality between 
'Master and Servant#, The former represented the colonizers 
and the latter the colonized* In broad terms this position 
hardly altered during the twentieth century up to 1975. The 
Act was introduced onto the Statutes at a time In Rhodesia's 
economic history when employers wished to obtain and retain 
ýb 9 
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labour in the face of a relative labour shortage. Indeedq 
the changed economic conditions of the 1970's especially 
the presence of a substantial labour surplus made the Act 
less necessary than before as an instrument with which to 
mobilize and retain labour supplies In domestic households. 
Nonetheless$ the harsh and unfavourable provisions of the 
Act continued seriously to delimit worker rights and 
opportunities for organizing to better their economic status. 
As a result domestic workers constituted a special stratum 
of the proletariat# largely unprotected by the State* 
There Is no unambiguous way to test the precise effects 
of the lack of unionism and protection in the domestic labour 
market* Howeverg it Is possible to examine Industries In 
which legislation of a superior kind wan in forceg In order 
to form an overall Impression of the contrasts In the welfare 
of workers In similar occupations* For Instance$ consider 
a comparison with the conditions that prevailedg or at least 
were legislatedg in the Hotel and Catering Industry under 
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the State established National Industrial Councilo Many 
workers In both sectors performed similar tasks or# at leastq 
could be said to have had similar occupational skills* Yet 
one was governed by the Industrial Conciliation Act (Chapter 
246) of 1959 and the other by the Hasters and Servants Act, 
Catering workers were represented by a registered union, 
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the Rhodesia Catering and Hotel Workers2 Union. The 
Union bargained regularly with the Catering Employers$ 
Association of Rhodeslaq some 49 different categories of 
employee being demarcated and defined* Some workers performed 
lb ý 
tasks similar to domestic workers' jobs, esg, cooks (6 
categories defined)# general duties handsq grounds and 
garden handeq and waiters (5 categories defined). These 
categories and the wages applying to them have been set out 
In Table 12., Even Grade I 'wages' compared most favourably 
with learningsO for domestic workers* The most similar 
occupational group In domestic employment would have been 
'garden workers' and 9cleaners1q groups rewarded well below 
the average In domestic employment. Similar differences 
applied to 'cooks' and 'waiters'. The same conclusion was 
reinforced after consideration of overtime rates# prospects 
of wage advancementg accommodation allowancesq minimum 
conditions of contractq periods of notteeg leave provisionsg 
medical aMowanoesq clothing provisions and other conditions 
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of employmente It can be concluded that the lack of 
unionism and Ineffective legal protection were Important 
causes of the Inferior conditions experienced by domestic 
workerso Government labour policy was the factor ultimately 
responsible for this state of affairs* 
IEXTRA-ECONOMICI FORMS OF LABOUR CONTROL 
Various textra-economict forms of control typified the 
labour policies found In the domestic mode of production. 
These controls functioned as mechanisms to maintain the labour 
foroein a subordinate positiong create and sustain a high 
level of worker dependence on employer paternalismg ensure the 
cheap supply of domestic labour-power to employersq and 
provide the employer with personal means of social control 
over workers* 
tPaternalism' was the basis upon which labour policies 
were founded* One reflection of this prominent feature of 
domestic employment was the extent to which non-cash 
relationships bound the worker to the employer, In 1961 
some 95,7 percent of domestic workers were paid in cash 
and kindq the highest proportion in any sector of the 
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economy, In 1971 this figure still stood at a very high 
level (97.3 percent)* Employment relationships did not 
shift towards a monetary basis as occurred to a significant 
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extent in other sectors* 
Most employers provided both 'free' housing and 'rations' 
for domestic workers in addition to cash wages* These 
payments In kind were not *free' unidirectional transfers 
from employer to employee* They were an Integral but 
special part'of the real wage payment for labour services 
rendered. " In 19719 nearly 83 percent of workers received 
housing and rations as part of their real wages. This 
payments system was conditioned partly by legislation 
requiring'employers to provide accommodation for their 
employeesl and partly by the consequences of a pattern of 
employment'which often necessitated workers 'living-in' on 
the employers' premises* Most workers resided on the 
householder's premises and few earned sufficient to be able 
to exercise the option of choice In the location of their 
acco=odationq especially since there was a chronic urban 
housing'shortage for Africans. A small proportion Of workers 
In 1971 received housing and no rations (6.2 percent) and only 
8,1 percent received rations and no housing, 
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Various reasons were advanced by employers to justify 
their method of payment, It was arguedg for Instanceg that 
payment In kind was necessary to maintain the worker's health 
and efficiency since if all wages were paid in cash# workers 
would not provide themselves with adequate nourishment, 
Furthermore it was suggested that the eystem provided 
security and the guarantee of a quantum of cash income for 
Inon-essentials' or 'luxuries', Both of these arguments 
served to bolster up the system of paternalism and helped 
sustain conditions of dependency, In addition# part of the 
underlying rationale was that In this way employers could 
provide workers with the minimum necessary commodities for 
subsistence cansumption at the lowest cost to the 
household* Households were themselves able to finance bulk 
Purchase transactions and so achieved a lower unit cost of 
supply, At the marging this practice had the effect of 
reducing the costs Of labour for employers, 
The idea that oash wages were an 'extra' emolument after 
rationsq reinforced the dependency nature of Masters and 
Servants relationships at the economic and psychological 
level* The rather typical comment of the Minister of Labour 
In a parliamentary debate reflected the dominant employer 
perspective: ' 'the actual cash wage (domestic workers) get 
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is unencumbered and In the nature of pocket money', it 
indicated the 'child-like' status conferred upon domestic 
workers by legislationg households and national labour policy. 
This psychological perception of wages as being akin to 
$pocket money' was reflected in actual terms by the amounts 
q1 
made over for labour services. 
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Because employer preferences 
(in respect of waSe rates) were so dominant* wage practices 
reflected employer requirements, In such a situationg as 
In an adult-child relationshipg the adult (employer) decided 
what was $good' for the child (employee) and set conditions 
according to his own subjective and often Impressionistic 
opipiono Indeedq because many employers simply wished to 
believe It# there existed the widespread myth of the 
contented domestic worker, As one employer put Itt 'my 
domestic worker is content with his lot, He has his food* 
Everything Is provided for hime He has no worries; and 
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he has spare money. ' This attitudeq expressed In 1973, 
was pervasive throughout the post-19401s and differed little 
from attitudes held by domestic employers in the early years 
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of the twentieth century. 
Paternalism and dependence were also actively fostered 
by the widespread occurrence of 'non-contractual' relationships 
established by employers and Involving the transfer of 
commodities from the household to the worker* xon-contractual 
transfers made by employers to employees were not a direct 
payment for labour services* Rather they served the purpose 
of expressing *the relationship that exists between the donor 
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Qnd the recipient', As WhIsson and Well have observed In 
the South African contextq the *giving of presents usually 
places the recipient under obligation to reciprocate In some 
way In order to assert adult status in a systet of exchange# 
but In the context of gifts given by an employer to her 
servantq reciprocation In material form Is not possible and 
q13 
the debt so created either demeans the servant or is 
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discharged in the form of loyal service$. This statement 
correctly describes the situation In the domestic labour 
market in Rhodesia* The unsolicited offer of gifts, which 
could not easily be refusedp helped to reinforce this 
Inequality of exchange since the worker was unable to return 
the Ifavourl In gifts of approximate value# utility or type, 
Thuag as'Whisson and Weil have argueds 'the recipient of a 
tiny wageg secondhand clotheag food and lodgingg "holidays 
with the f, amily"g medical care and school fees for her 
children# is most completely demeaned* The manner of payment 
Implies that she Is unable to organize her life In almost 
every directiong whether choosing her clothes or saving for 
her children's schooling. That part which Is a payment for 
work and'that part-which is a gift for charity or friendship 
Is not made clear* The acepetance on both sides that no 
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reciprocation is expected means that the latter part demaans. ' 
The overall effect placed the worker more firmly under the 
control of household decision makers. There was also a 
subsidiary impact to the practice of employers making non- 
contractual transfers* The practical economics of the 
transaotion. were important especially as most households 
employing, domeatic workers operated the system of *non= 
contractual transferal as a means of Implicit,,, employer- 
determined and irregular payment for the supply of labour, 
In essenceqýthe system represented the partial but wholly 
subordinate Integration of the worker Into the structure of 
household consumption, The payment process enabled the 
household to offer real Income supplements to the normal, wage 
rate at low (or zero) cost to the household, The 'awards' 
ý)q 
were lboth personal and discretionary and helped weaken worker 
resistance to the low wage policy of employers* In respect 
of certain Itemsp such as 'leftover' foodstuffs# the domestic 
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worker gained a real benefit from additional consumption. 
This holds even though In functional terms the worker was in 
effect consuming the purchasing and consumption Inefficiencies 
of the household which did notq and indeed in practice could 
notq operate under the rigid marginal conditions attributed 
to the household by the neo-classical theory of the consumer 
unit., 
The structural position of domestic workers in the 
economic system was one of labourer and tenant of their 
Peraonal,,! master'9 who functioned effectively as employer 
and landlordo This dual function provided the means whereby 
the supply of cheap labour-power obtained from workers could 
be maximized and provided at times convenient for employers. 
Without the widespread IkIaO system (a small hut9 building 
or living quarter for the worker - usually situated out of 
sight at the back of the ownerts premises)p these 'extra- 
economict forms of labour control would have been much less 
effective and higher costs would have been incurred by the 
household in obtaining laboure 
Leglýlatlon governing the housing of domestic workers 
was embodied in a variety of State lawag municipal bye-laws 
and administrative regulations. The governing statute was 
the African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act. 
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It was first passed in 1951 Ito consolidate certain laws which 
make provision to provide free accommodation for their African 
ýly 
servants# and certain wives of such servants', The Act 
applied for all 'designated areasIq lee. local authority 
areas proclaimed as such under the Act, 
Under Section 5(1) every person who employed an African 
under contract to perform work within a designated area hald 
to, $at his own expenses provide accommodation for such 
Africans and on such Africants request for his approved wife$ 
If such African is able to comply with certain conditions as 
laid down'# Accommodation could be on the employers' 
premises or in an African residential area. In most cases 
it was on the employers$ premises* Under Section 7 special 
permits were required for an 'approved wife* to be provided 
with accommodation, Under Section 7(j) permission was 
authorized solely at the discretion of the licensing authority, 
vir, the local authority* 
Employers had to apply for their premises to be licensed 
under the Act In order to permit the accommodation of 
domestic workers (Section 16)9 The local authority set 
down the conditions under which private premises could be 
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licensed (Section 17), These regulations usually set a 
limit to the number of persons who could live in the licensed 
accommodation* Licences were Issued for a small fee as set 
down in the regulations (Section 20)9 
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The licensing 
authority had power to Inspeot the premises at anY time 
(Section 21) and couldg In theorvg call upon the employer or 86 
owner to remedy defects (Section 22)o 
No employer was permitted to allow children to live on 
licensed premises except under special authority (Section 24). 
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This permission was issued at the discrbtlon of the 
1.1oensing authority* Furtherg permission required the 
, .1 
oonsent of the employer of the worker* Persons who were 
not employees were not entitled to reside In licensed 
premises (Section 25) unless special permission had been 
obtained from the licensing authority and the employer or 
owner* 
Under the principal Act all employees had to be Issued 
with 'certificates of occupation' (Sectlan 33)o Am 
employee who lents sold or delivered this certificate to 
any other African became guilty of an offence and liable to 
a 020 fine or Imprisonment up to one month (Section 34). 
The same penalties applied to any person who tmutilated' 
certificate of occupation and to any employer who 
obtained a certificate of occupation for any African who 
was-not In his employ, 
There have therefore been significant constraints# as 
a result of housing and residential legislations placed on 
domeatio, workerso Most domestic workers did live under 
these conditions on the employerst premiseal these areas 
wemwhite suburbs proclaimed under the Land Tenure Act of 
19699 This latter Act also proclaimed the paramountcy of 
'European interests' In 'European Areas', The African 
1/) ; 
(Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act was moulded 
to fit in with this broader edict. Under the legislations 
domestic workers had limited freedom of choice in respect of 
housing and the conduct of their family life. 
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Most urban areasq and therefore most domestic workersl 
were covered by the provisions cited above* The Land 
Tenure (Section 17:, Exemptions) Notice of 1970 provides 
details of these areas. They included: the municipal 
areas of Bulawayop Salisbury# Gatoomat Gwelog Que Que and 
Umtaliq as well as the Town Council areas of Greendaleg 
Hatfieldg Highlands9 Mabelreignq Heyrick Parkq Marlborought 
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Mount Pleasant and Waterfalls. The comments that follow 
may thus be said to have applied to a high proportion of 
domestic workers* 
In praotice workers were seldoz allowed to live with 
their wives on employers' premisest and children even less 
BOO Family life was thus disrupted. The law was strictly 
enforced on this-pointy even though a small number of 89 
employers 'broke the rules'* Various domestic workers 
complained bitterly about this aspect of the legal situation 
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within which they found themselves. The problem was 
accentuated by the severe housing shortages being experienced 
by the African communityq particularly in Salisbury. For 
domestic workers employed in flats housing was a major 
difficulty and many had to cycle great distances daily to and 
f rom their place of employment. 
This process of social control placed definite economic 
costs on the employees he was denied accommodation close 
to his place of Oresidencell he had to incur higher costs In 
order to run two (separate) homesl there was the social cost 
of being without family for long periodel and there was a 
risk to be taken when having friends and family to stay 
ýlf 
$illegally' in his accommodation, Accommodation provided 
by employers was mostly poor in quality, Premises were 
less rgsularly Inspected to check *standards' than they were 
to check the 'legality$ or otherwise of the occupant(s), 
Certain costs were incurred by households In providing 
this accommodation. A capital sum had to be outlayed to 
build the skialp the premises needed to be maintained at 
employer expense and a small, licensing fee had to be paid. 
On the other handp considerable economic and practical 
benefits attached to these housing arrangements, On-site 
accommodation provided the employer with a basis for 
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guaranteeing round-the-clock service, It also reduced the 
transport costs for the worker to and from work andq by 
Implication# the real subsistence wage that employers would 
have to pay* Further# accommodation for the Individual 
household's employee was made independent of the general 
urban housing problem and a high rate of labour turnovert 
from the employer's viewpoints did not Impose the subsidiary 
costs and bureaucratic problems of having to find accommodation 
for employees* Furthermoreq the existence of a 'kial on the 
premises helped promote the dependency factor in labour 
contracts* Alsop since accommodation was not usually built 
for familiesq and often consisted of a single rooms an 
explicit structural factor was built into the housing system 
which tended to reinforce the traditional policies of house. 
holds in gearing wages and other conditions Of employment to 
the subsistence needs of the ginele worker. 
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The high degree of social control exercised by the 
MwOrker's employer and 
by the State also tended to weaken the 
capacity of workers to challenge the Mtatus guo. The 
tightening of controls by local authorities in the 1970-74 
period was designed to create even more worker insecurity, 
The control of tillegall lodgers reduced the opportunities for 
workers to supplement low cash wages, The Mabelreign Town 
Councils for Instanoeq set up a policy In 1970 partly for 
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this purposes It sought to evict women and children 
as well as 'loafers' and was Implemented through regular 
(unscheduled) Inspections of living quarters and týr means of 
night raids and prosecutions, Similar policies were adopted 
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in other towns In Rhodesia, 
'Sanitary lanes' were also closed off In most parts of 
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urban Rhodesia after the early 19601s. The object of 
this policy was to ensure employer security and Increase 
control over the 'leisure activities' of workers by reducing 
the Incidence of gamblingg prostitutiong $illegal' vending 
as well as the other trades which regularly situated them- 
selves In such alleys and which depended for their continuance 
on a degree of obscurity (from employer scrutiny)* This 
policy removed a number of opportunities for non-employment 
earnings that vere available to domestic workers and so made 
workers more dependent on household labour policies for 
subsistence* The elimination of the #sanitary lanes also 
gave, more'social control to employers over the 'coming and 
going' of their employees and facilitated greater scrutiny 
of the hours and times of absence of workers from the Okial, 
ý 2-0 
Workers were forced to enter and leave their Ikias' either 
by the front gate or through 'special entrances' in the 
front of the premises which typically were situated in such 
a position as to afford employers greater surveillance over 
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all 'irregular' movements, 
Employers were thus allowed to wield almost unlimited 
personal control over the lives of their workerog not simply 
stopping at control of the wage level* This $extra-economict 
control has been a lynchpin In the social control of a low 
wage proletariat In domestic employment, 
CONCLUSION 
The conditions of labour under the settler-colonial 
0 domestic mode of production were determined by specific 
'production' requirements of this class of employer* The 
utilization of domestic labour differed in Important ways 
from the exploitation of plantation and Industrial labour4, 
It has thus been necessary to consider the essential social 
relations between 'masters and servants' In the light of 
these differences* 3Ls in plantation employmentg a number of 
specific *extra-economic' means of labour control characterized 
employment relationshipsg measures which were essential to 
the system of labour utilization within the settler-colonial 
domestic mode of production, Domestic workers gained very 
little from the feconomic growth$ of the post-19400s, They 
constituted an impoverished and defined stratum of the African 
working class# underprivileged in many respects (both legal 
and ooonomie) and highly dependent on paternalism and the 
power of the individual employeryie- 
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CHAPTER 
AFRICAN WORKERS AND LABOUR POLICY IN THE 
'INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" 
This chapter analyses the position of African workers 
under the Industrial capitalist mode of production. Their 
class situation was complicated by the complexity of the 
soolo-economic milieu within which production In the urban- 
Industrial economy occurred. 
The Chapter to divided Into two sections. The first 
section deals with the black proletariat in the 'industrial 
complex' (those sectors constituting the Industrial capitalist 
mode of production and falling outside the Masters and 
Servants Aotq viz, manufacturingg miningg commereet distri- 
butiong finance and public services). Special features of 
the process of proletarianization of African mineworkers and 
class conflict In the foreign-controlled mining Industry are 
dealt with in Chapter 9. The second section highlights the 
subordinate but functional Integration of petty commodity 
producers and other underelasses in African society Into the 
urban-industrial economy. It also Identifies some Important 
aspects of urban labour and economic policy which have 
af fected the experience of the Industrial working class and 
mediated the relationships between workers and capital on the 
one hand and petty production and Industrial production on 
the other. 
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1. AFRICAN WORKERS IN THE IINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX' 
This section deals with the economic transformation that 
took place during the postwar period In the 'industrial 
oomplexl with special reference to African workers. Firstly, 
certain theoretical views on the development of the African 
wage structure are examined. An investigation is then made 
of the historical evolution of wage-setting procedures and 
other relevant perspectives not catered for In earlier 
analyses$ but which influenced employer and State policies 
geared to a low wage system. The wage structure Is also 
examined in relation to changes in the occupational structure. 
State and employer policies of manpower utilization are 
related to the class and racial complexion of the Industrial 
labour force and attention Is given to various forms of 
occupational protection and discrimination found In labour 
markets In the 'industrial complex'. Finally,, the relations 
between capitaly African unions and the State are examined 
Insofar as they were essential to the reproduction of the 
cheap labour system, 
THEORETICAL VIEWS ON THE DE'MOPMENT OF THE AFRICAN WAGE 
STRUCTURE 
, Important trends requiring explanation are the rise In 
black wages In the 1950's and 1960'st the growth In wage 
inequalitY within the black proletariat and the emergence 
of a small class of semi-skilled and skilled African workers 
receiving wages closer tog or even In excess ofs the basic 
subsistence needs of the urban family unit. 
I 
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Various explanations have been offered to explain these 
trends, Arrighig for instaneeg has effectively argued 
against Barber's thesis that rising real wages for blacks In 
postwar Rhodesia were simply a reflection of supply constraints 
2 
and a function of 'market forces$. The basis of Arrighils 
explanation Is that wage growth was the consequence of an 
$upgrading' process9 the need for labour stabilization to 
ensure the maximization of productivity under conditions of 
capital intensification In the industrial sectorg an Increased 
demand for semi-skilled labourg the wage policies of large- 
scale corporations and the conscious breaking-away by 
international capitalism from the $low wages - high turnover 
- low productivity - low wages' syndrome which previously 
dominated wage policies* 
For Arrighip these combined forces produced a two-tiered 
black proletariat - one tier a Ilabour aristocracy19 the 
other semi-proletarianizedy remaining significantly dependent 
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on the rural areas* Behind the development of the former 
was the power of large-scale International capitalism with 
its ability to pass on wage increasesq Its strategy of using 
wage policy as a political instrument as well as a means with 
which to re-struoture the consumption bias of the labour 
force as a necessary condition for successful Industrializa- 
tion together with its goal of undermining the competitive 
position of resident capitalists, In this scheme the 
effective stabilization of the labour aristocracy In urban- 
based production had the dual effect Of cutting the links 
previously maintained with the'peasantry and reducing further 
ýzj 
proletarianization as jobs became occupledg and emooyment 
stagnated. 
The Arrighlan theses have widespread appeal and 
undoubtedly contain important elements of truth concerning 
the process of postwar stratification and wage growth in 
Rhodesia. It is not so much what Is contained In the 
thesesq however# that Is subject to criticisml rather It is 
the Partinl character of the analysis, For Instanoel 
Arrighl has attributed little to African unionism as a factor 
behind sustained wage growth and worker stratification* 
Furthermoret Arrighils explanation makes rather emphatic 
assumptions about the antagonisms between resident and 
International corporations and so tends to overlook the 
'partnership' elements In this coalition of Interests which, 
at least as much as the conflicts between the two groups, 
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requires explanationo It also (unjustifiably) argues that 
the resident capitalist class were Incapable of or 
uninterested in breaking the $migrant - low wage' syndrome, 
employing capital-intensive techniques and benefiting from 
a higher industrial worker wage policy, 
Harris has advanced a number of criticisms of Arrighils 
partial explanation of black wage growth and stratification 
and has suggested other equallyg If not moregimportant 
5 
causes* 
Harris correctly argues that but a few African workers 
weTe part of the labour aristocracy, For instanceg an 
estimate of the numbers of semi-skilled and skilled African 
workers would number less than 8 percent of the black 
ý25ý 
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Andustrial- labour force# This was nonetheless an important 
class* Furtherg Arrighl does not account for the uneven 
pattern of black occupational advanoemento viz, the fact that 
It occurred'only In selected sectors, In additiong Harris 
advances four further determinants of African Industrial wage 
growth which he says should be considered Jointly with 
Arrighl's explanations in an attempt to reconcile the 
historical evidence. 
The firstly Influence was the permeation of skills 
amongst, the black proletariat* Although white unions 
reslstedýl ntrusions Into areas of occupational privilegeg 
black occupational advance occurred In areas where the white 
labour monopoly was not entrenched# particularly at the 
operator level. However, this advance was confined to a 
limited number of sectors andq Harris argues# the increased 
average earnings of black industrial workers were In part 
attributable to the growth of a high Income 'core' of skilled 
workers*'- 
Secondlyl,, the institutionalization of wage setting 
procedures had the effect of narrowing the range within which 
market foroes' were operativet so creating local or internal 
labour markets. in which wage rates were based on the floor 
established by State minimum wages policy, In these markets# 
particularly In manufacturingg employer resistance to wage 
growth was moderate because wage costs were a small portion 
of total costs* Furthermoreg arbitration procedures favoured 
wage -awards above those that employers would have oonceded 
volitionally., 
Thirdly# government labour policy Influenced wages 
through the regulation of Industrial Boardsq control over 
the supply of technical skills to blacks,, and manipulation of 
the rate of $Afrioanization' in the Civil Service, In the 
period up to 1963, policy was 'permissive' In opening up 
skilled job opportunities to blacks and legislating higher 
minlinum wage rates* After 1963 the Rhodesian Front 
Government Introduced a change In the tactics to maintain 
settler-colonial hegemony by switching towards a policy of 
maintaining rural dependency# lowering the rates of Increase 
of minimum wagesq closing technical training opportunities to 
blacks and terminating 'liberal' Africanization, policies In 
the Civil Services 
Fourthly, Harris arguesq the naturp of African industrial 
labour's rural dependence changeds though dependence remained, 
African workers were not able to afford to break their links 
with the rural-based social security vystem* Insteadp these 
workers constituted a lumpen-proletartat that had not been 
completely p roletarianizedo 
7 
Their basic conditions of 
existence were characterized by poverty and urban Insecurity 
and they were forced to depend on rural Income supplements* 
Their full proletarianization was thwarted by structural 
barrierso In order to avoid the withdrawal of Olabour time' 
- which employers wanted invested in industrial production 
so as to maintain high productivity - the form in which 
traditional rural 'rights' were maintained was transformed, 
Rural households were more reliant on financial remittances 
and the worker's periodic visits. Increased wages were thus; 
q27 
regarded as a consequence of the conversion of the form In 
which rural linlics were maintained and of the diminished 
capacity of the rural economy to support the dependents of 
the industrial labour force. 
Undoubtedly# Harris' additional perspectives ure an 
improvement on Arrighils explanation, Howeverg criticisms 
may be-,.. levied against these observations. Firstlyp there 
is an acceptance In Harris' argument of Arrighl's 'two-tier' 
structuring of the total Industrial labour foreeg although 
In Harris' case whites form the Olabour aristocracy' and 
bla6ks a luml2en-Droletarint. There Is some evidence to 
contradict this conception of the labour force structure: a 
number of'bl4eks worked In the same occupational categories 
as whites and under 'rate for the jobt policies - strictly 
enforced - received the same remuneration; also there had 
developed a high degree of stratification within the black 
proletariat; and conflict concerning union wage policy 
occurred betwee black workers In the unskilled and semi- 
8 
skilled grades* 
Secondly# the argument that white workers comprised the 
labour aristocracy underemphasizes the real gains made by 
some black workers In terms of job status, Income and 
security* Indeedp a number of black workers In the higher 
skill grades in fact supported skilled unions In their 
restrictive labour policies by resisting 'fragmentation$ 
schemes which would undermine their economic Position, In 
factq within what were usually relatively democratic 
institutions - the African trade unions - there were groups 
ý 2, F 
of influential workers who exerted pressure on union wage 
policy In order to secure better wages for the more skilled 
workerss to the disadvantage of the less-secure and unskilled 
9 
groups* It Is also Important to note that the white labour 
aristocracy had on numerous occasions seen their long term 
position as being more secure In a situation In which skilled 
black labour was carefully co-opted Into$ rather than excluded 
from# the Ilabour aristocracy** As a reault9 various 
white-controlled 'multi-racial' unions cultivated alliances 
with their skilled black membersq although this was based 
on $rate for the job' and 'no-fragmentation' principles 
designed to ensure that wage structures remained favourable 
for skilled workers* 
Thirdlyp Harris' noting of the institutionalization of 
wage-setting practices as an Influence on wages Is correct, 
Howevers It does not so far enough in explaining the soclo. 
economic origins and struoture(i', of these Institutions which 
were used specifically to control the threat of unionism and 
strike actions In partioularg the uneven impact of 
institutionalized wage-setting praetices was partly responsible 
for wage stratification amongst the African industrial labour 
force* The power of various African unions also differed 
and was a partial cause of variations in the wage structure, 
Both Arrighl and Harris understress the Impact of African 
union formation on the development of the wage structure. 
Fourthlyq black wage advance was to some extent 
dependent on the skilled labour supply constraints In the 
market as dictated by the success or failure of white 
ý23 
immigration policy. In certain areast this policy resulted 
In significant constraints on skilled labour suppliesq thereby 
adding to pressure for fragmentation. In such oases 
employers raised blacks Into semi-skilled grades but with 
rates of pay lower than those for whites, 
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FinallYo It may be said that both Arrighl's and Harris' 
analyses have not been based on a full examination of the 
historical process of labour policy and wage formation, 
It Is this omission in both analyses that accounts for the 
fact that Harris' criticisms do not amount to a rejection 
of# but Instead complement$ ArrighlOs explanation of the 
development of the African wage structure in postwar 
Rhodesia* A depper investigation of the historical record 
is required in order to emphasize a number of aspects of 
the wage formation process missed on previous analyses. it 
is also necessary to examine the historical process so that 
the nature of State and employer wage policiesq and their 
discriminatory bias, can be more clearly delineated. 
THE DE'VELOPMENT OF LABOUR LEGISLATION AND COMHOL OVER 
AFRICAN WAGES 
Until 1947 African Industrial workers# like all African 
labourereg had their wages and conditions of employment 
'regulated' by the Masters and Servants Act. In practiceg 
the Act did not interpose between parties to contracts of 
employment# Wages were therdfore determined by individual 
bargain-setting# except for those relatively few black workers 
for whom wage-fixing was the result of negotiations between -. 
ý30 
manaZement and white unions under the 1934 Industrial 
Conciliation Act (ICA)* Skilled work was monopolized by 
a olass of highly paid white workers. The white artisan 
class was determined to keep their Privileges and aristocratic 
Position In the Political and labour structure. 
11 
They 
used unionization and their electoral power to Influence the 
State and ensure that this position was maintained, 
11oweverg industrialization had resulted In more Africans 
entering semi-skilled occupations In the $industrial complex', 
Already by the late 1930's much work formerly undertaken by 
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whites was being done by Africans. In part, this 
reflected the recovery from the Depression of the 1930's and 
the changes that were occurring in Industrial production as 
plants expanded In size and mechanization spread* up to 
1934 the Industrial Disputes Ordinance (1920) was the 
foundation for labour legislation in the 'industrial complex' 
- at least for white workers* Although its provisions made 
no specific mention of raceg the do facto operations of the 
Ordinance ensured that It applied only to the settlement of 
white wage disputes through a series of arbitration 
procedures* 
The 1934 ICA replaced the 1920 Ordinance* It provided 
for oollective bargaining for all workers defined under the 
Acto 'Natives$ were not regarded aa *employees' for this 
purpose# Howeverp the Act also excluded the State and 
the agricultural industry from Its provisions, Under it 
Industrial Councils could be established. Management and 
unions had equal representation on these bodies and the 
If3l 
Chairman was elected* These Industrial Councils had power 
to specify wages and conditions of employment for 'natives'* 
The effect of the Act therefore was to give unionized skilled 
workers an effective veto over the setting of wages and 
occupational provisions relating to African laboure Com- 
petition from cheap labour could thus be easily regulated* 
Employers also found the terms advantageous since thbir prime 
dependence was on skilled workers who were not easily 
replaceable In production. By contrastg adequate supplies 
of cheap unskilled African labour were available in the 
urban-industrial economy. 
In 1937 that portion of the 1934 ICA relating to 
Africans was repealed* The Governor was given power to 
determine the conditions of employment for Africans 
previously affected by the ICA, The rates set down In the 
1934 Act now applied to all workers In the categories of 
employment ooncernedl i9e. *rate-for-the-jobl applied. 
Howeverg Africans were effectively excluded from obtaining 
industrial skiMs under the ICA. Both employers and skilled 
Journeymen united against African occupational advancement 
Into the skilled grades* There was little way therefore 
In which African advancement could occur and Africans had 
no legal right to participate In the process of wage- 
determination, 
Africoýhs agitated against their subordination and 
exclusion from Participation In the wage-setting process* 
Austere subsistence conditions In the $industrial complex's 
urban Inseourityp and a growing conselousness of exploitationg 
ý32. 
created the conditions in which collective worker mobilization 
In the form of strike action and unionization became widespread* 
Inflation and atagnatt money wages combined to cause 
substantial political and labour unrest, State Intervention 
became necessary In these conditions not only to control 
strikesl stabilize socio-economic conditions and Incorporate 
African unions Into the wage-setting processq but also to 
regulate wage structures more closely and ensure the viability 
of industrial capitalist enterprisesp especially marginal 
producersp and the privileged position of the labour 
aristooraoy*13 . 
The State's Initial overall strategy was to 
Institutionalize the wage-setting process and channel African 
union demands into a bureaucratic and legal framework from 
which could come a wage policy baned on collective employer 
paternalism, This would replace Individual employer wage. 
setting. The Idea was that in removing some of the worst 
excesses and abucesp the State would absorb worker disoontent, 
Legislation was thus proposed $to make provision for the 
reasonable demands Of the African worker - and thus create 14 
harmony, in the various Industries In the territorylo 
The legislative Instrument first designed to restore 
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'equilibrium' was the Native Labour Boards Aot (194? ), 
The Aet did not apply to white workersl similarly the ICA9 
amended in 19459 excluded Africans. The Act did not apply 
to a wide'range Of Occupations and industriesq eog. private 
domestic servicesq agricultural employment# the mining 
Industry (except In establishments employing more than 300 
4133 
Afrioans)l government Institutions (including educational 
institutions) and the Rhodesia Railways. It therefore 
aimed at meeting the challenges from African workers in the 
urban-industrial economy onlyq and then only those who 
were unionized and demonstrated a capacity for Industrial 
action, The Act was the outcome of the Labour Advisory 
Committee's effortst a body composed entirely of employer 
representatives# and appropriately reflecting their Interests* 
The principal purpose of the 1947 Act was to set up 
Labour Boards* The Boards were charged with the task 
(under Section 15) of Investigating conditions of employment 
in order to recommend to the Minister appropriate changes, 
The purpose here was to 'improve' conditions generally, 
prevent unrest as well as assist in the settlement of 
disputes* The Act was not designed solely for the imple- 
mentation of a minimum wage policy or to specifically raise 
wagese The Act did not lay down the criteria upon which 
recommendations were to be based. Boards were thus given 
a degree of flexibility In their task. The key Institution 
In the Boards system was the Native Labour Advisory Boardq 
a body originally appointed in 1946, prior to the Aotg to 
advice the Ninister on wage policy after the successful 1945 
strike by African railway workers, Except for the 
statutory position of the Commissioner of Labour$ its members 
were appointed at the Minister's discretion. Under It 
were a number of National and Regional Boards, Regional 
and National Boards consisted primarily of State officials 
and employer representatives. Also present on these bodies 
1931r 
were members of the Trades and Labour Council of Southern 
Rhodesia# the white labour confederation at this time, 
Wh1te labour exerted some Influence over the Labour Boards 
because in certain instances the latter had to consult 
Industrial Councils (ICA 1945 Section 19(1) ). 
The nature of the Labour Boards system was paternalistic 
and concessionary* It was the kind of short-term compromise 
that reluctant employers were prepared to make in the f ace of 
mounting African working-class militancy, It did not 
provide for the tright to strike', nor did It recognize 
unions for the purposes of collective bargaining, The 
Boards received evidence from all partiesq but they had no 
power to negotiater". directly with unions. In effect thent 
the Boards institutionalized unilateral wage-settingt a process 
that had been do rigeur in settler-colonial labour policy. 
Because of thist the Boards tended to set wages at levels 
that would not impair the profitability of marginal enter. 
prisest but which would provide some benefit to workers* 
As a result# African workers were disappointed with the 
operations of the Boards system and unionists continued to 
object to It in prinolplee The prime conflict here was 
over the legal recognition of African unionog a step that 
African workers regarded as necessary before real improvement 
In their conditions of employment could be guaranteed* 
Official policy was not prepared to grant uninhibited 
legitimacy to African trade unions* Not even the General 
Strike of 1948 was sufficient to force the State and employers 
to concede this principlel even though throughout the 1940's 
ý3.5" 
and up to 1959* when African unions were first recognized In 
law for collective bargaining purposeeg there developed a 
large African union movementg massive political mobilization 
against the State through the nationalist partiesq and 
widespread agitation over conditions of labour, 
Instead of free unions the State settled for the 
establishment of Native Works Committees. This proposal 
arose from investigations Into the 1948 strike, The 
Committees were designed as instruments through which changes 
in conditions of employment could be communicated to workers, 
It was not a measure introduced by statuteg but took the 
form of 'a domestic arrangement between an employerý and his 
16 
Native employees In the same concern% The Works 
Committee system failed lamentably, Employers had 'very 
deep'rooted objections to meeting their African employees across 
the table'* 
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There existed no legal compulsion for them I 
to bargain with African workers, In 1950 there were only 
18 
13 Committees functioning and In 1953 only 18. Employer 
apathy was matched by worker suspicion, Unions were hostile 
to the Committees and# after an initial flirtation with the 
system# they continued to press for full collective 
bargaining status. 
The initial State labour strategy following World War II 
was thus two-pronged* It tried to set minimum conditions 
of employment through national or regional regulations and 
It attempted to foster a fragmented and weak bargaining 
situation whereby workers could 'discuss* conditions with 
management through Works Committees-* Both sets of measures. 
ý36 
failed to contain fully the development of African trade 
unions and stop claims for higher wages. African worker 
strike action and unionization thus necessitated that social 
controls over labour be reproduced under new and more 
effective institutional arrangements. The General Strike 
of 1948 was the highlight of African working-class action 
against the cheap labour system, It followed on the 1945 
African railway workersP strike which had resulted In 
Important gains for workers in terms of wages and conditions 
of employment* The Labour Boards system was quickly used 
as a mechanism to deal with further discontent and forestall 
disputes, A National Native Labour Board appointed for 
the urban areas conducted hearings* The results of its 
recommendations were embodied In the 1949 Labour Regulations. 
Whilat these wage regulations provided benefits for'workers 
that had not been obtainable before industrial action in the 
1945-48 period, they did not forestall disputes, Insteads 
strikes spread. In 1951 aloneg 104 industrial disputes 
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were recorded, African unionization also strengthened 
rank-and-file pressures for higher wagesq and againg in 
Novemberp 1953g the State Intervened to revise the previous 
Regulations# 
Although denied a de iure status, African unions had an 
Important de-faeto power, Their actions in 
period up to 1953 were a major factor behind 
the Industrial wage structure and Stite. -Polic, 
average cash wages for Africans in secondary 
only 7 percent in current prices UP to Z15*2 
19 
the postwar 
the revisions to 
Les. From 1939-45 
Industry rose 
21 
per annum, - 
W7 
Howevery since prices had Increased 140 percent over the 
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1939-47 period, the real wage had fallen markedly, 
These conditions gave rise to worker combination and strike 
action to raise wages, The challenge from African labour 
was a successful one. From 1946-48 average annual cash 
wages for African workers in secondary industry rose 52 
percent to Z23*1 and in the following two years rose a further 
22 percent* 
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By 1952 average earnings (cash and kind) of 
African industrial workers had risen 133 percent above the 
1946 level* 
Heanwhileg It was beeoming core apparent to the dominant 
class that loontrolledt unionism was required. African 
objections to the Labour Boards also made these regulatory 
instruments politically undesirable in the context of the 
expanded enterprise of Federal capitalism and tmultl-racial* 
partnership# the basis of which was to be the expansion of 
the industrial capitalist mode of production in Southern 
Rhodesia*' The Labour Boards Act was also incapable of 
Institutionalizing organized working-class action which was 
expressed in de facto unionist form* in April 1954 a Bill 
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to bring Africans under the ICA was prepareds In June 
the Native Labour Board Amendment Act replaced the existing 
Regional Boards with Boards for specific industries, 
Advantages for employers flowed from this new situation* 
Labour markets - and wage regulation with them - could be 
more localized or circumscribed, Variations In wage 
policy could be realilated in- order to maintain low-profit, 
sectors or employers and ensure the diffusion of unionist 
ý39 
effort towards industry-specific problems, This was a 
short-term measureq howeverg because from the (Federal) 
capitalist perspeotiveg there was an urgent need to deal not 
only with unions and an Increasingly assertive industrial 
working class# but also with the political dimension of 
discontent In the form of mass nationalist parties. An 
element of, compromiseg involving departure from previous 
policies towards Alýrloan labourg was required* The Native 
Industrial Workers* Bill (1954) was the first attempt to 
provide now Institutional mechanisms of control* It was 
rejected ultimately because It aMowed for horizontal union 
formationg an option that had been rejected in the 1954 
revision of the Labour Boards Act largely as a result of 
employer pressures. The Bill was also an Inadequate control 
instrument because it did not provide for immediate 
registration of African unions# nor for Industrial Councils 
and direct collective bargaining. African union leaders 
unanimously rejected the Bill as providing separate and unequal 
recognitiono The Bill was delayedg sent to two Select 
Committeest and finally emerged In 1959 as the ICA9 
substantially amendedg accommodating some of the unionist 
objectionsg but also including a number of features of 
con&rol that provided adequate scope for incorporating the 
union challenge in a weakening fashiong particularly In its 
provision for vertical unionism, Not only would this weaken 
unions as a whole but It would enable easier isolation of 
and control over dissident elements* Stabilized labour 
relations were an essential aim of the new strategy which 
was designed to ensure $responsible' unionism, 
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The provisions of the Act covered all employers except 
those engaged In, domestic services agrioult=eq the Civil 
Service and those employed by Rhodesia Railways. Those 
Africans employed In agriculture and domestic services who 
at the time numbered 32390009 accounted for 51 percent of 
all wage employed Africans, They had their employment 
conditions regulated under the significantly less favourable 
provisions of the Masters and Servants Act., Employees In 
goverment service 'negotiated' directly with their employer 
and were subject to special provisions whichg given the 
balance-of employee Influence In the Civil Service# ensured 
thatthe labour aristocracy were given preference in wage 
policy*, Employees of Rhodesia Railways fell under the 
Jurisdiction of the Rhodesia Railways Aotq although this 
was altered soon after by an amendment which brought all 
of these workers under more direct government control* At 
the outset of the 1959 Aet the Interests of nearly all 
white workers were catered for by the maohinery of Industrial 
legislations whereas only a minority of black workers were 
covered by the ICA# the proportions for 1960 being 78 percent 
and 41 percent respectively* In addition to thisy white 
lLbour could expect more sympathetic treatment from 
employers over wages and conditions, the bargaining position 
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of skilled workers being strong, 
The mechanisms of wage regulation were further designed 
to disori minate against African unions, Wage determination 
operated through two primary Institutions - the Industrial 
Boards and Industrial Councils, For those industries which 
ýýc 
did not have unions whieh, In the Ministerts opinion, 
fully represented, employeesq or which did not have unions 
at allp wage agreements were regulated through an Industrial 
Board. 'This was a much less useful bargaining Instrument 
than the Industrial Council since the majority of members of 
this Board viere not employeest and unions were hot directly 
represented. The Board consisted of a chkirmang appointed 
by the Ministers members chosen by the Minister to represent 
the employeesg employers and other members chosen by 
the Minister to assist the Board, All agreements had to be 
approved by the Minister. Industrial Boards only met when 
the Minister deemed this necessary (from time to time), 
Increasingly wage policy was regulated under the Industrial 
Boards system. Boards increased in number after 1960 and 
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became the primary wage regulating Instrument* They were 
poor substitutes for Industrial Councils andt although the 
Ministry of Labour argued that they were established as 
*halfway stages* on the road to full Industrial Councilsp this 
was not borne out by experience. Other inferior Instruments 
existed in the form of the Conciliation Board - called into 
being by the Minister to settle a particular dispute - which 
also had a composition strongly influenced by Ministerial 
chciml and Statutory Industrial Councils - bodies formed when 
employers'refused to form an Industrial Council - which were 
composed of Ministerial representatives operating under a 
constitution dictated by the Minister* 
The most Promising bargaining Instrument for African 
workers then'was the Industrial Council, These could onlY 
ýli I 
be formedl howeverg if management agreed to do so, Agree- 
ments of the Council had to be submitted for the approval 
of the Minister and under the 1973 Amendment to the Act the 
Minister had power to amend the terms of any agreement where 
he considered the agreement to be contrary to the Interests 
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of loonsumers' and *the public as a whole'. Thus the 
African Trade Union Congress argued correctly that Industrial 
Councils had been reduced to the status of Industrial Boards, 
The importance of this demotion in status was that under 
Industrial Boards the criteria for determining wage recommen-, 
dations were restkiotive and did not Include any latitude 
to allow Boards to consider wage determinations on the basis 
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of Poverty Datum Line findings* Such an argument could 
only be effectively presented at Industrial Council levele 
Howevert the greater power over the freely negotiated wage 
regulations of Industrial Councilas assumed by the Minister 
of Labour under the 1973 Amendmentl meant that State 
acceptance of the #P*DoL* argument' became necessary before 
wages could be regulated at the P*D., Lo level, The rejection 
of the P., D*L* as a criterion in wage-setting was confirmed 
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by Ministerial and employer reaction to the 1974 P, D, L, 
Report's findings. As a result State wage policy has become 
more firmly linked to a wage structure that does not allow 
for unskilled workers to obtain wages sufficient to meet the 
costs of family subsistence, 
The basle framework within whieh State wage Policy was 
formulated changed over the postwar period, This develop- 
ment was conditioned by the socio-economic changes brought 
ý4 
about by industrial development. The';. legal superstrueture 
had to be adapted to meet the challenge to wage structures and 
settler-colonial labour policy from unskilled and semi- 
skilled unions and workers. Specifle Institutions were 
thus developed to deal with the new problems posed by the 
growth of power of the African Industrial working class, 
The most significant institutional constraints were 
embodied In the design of labour legislation, the manner in 
which it was administered and the controls it placed on 
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trade unions* The basic principle applied was to 
recognize the political and wage threat of unions and 
African workers in the Industrial complexq co-opt or 
incorporate these challenges within a carefully structured 
Institutional systomp and reduce the ability of worker 
groups and their political allies to effectively organize 
re-adjustment to the stntus cuo. Harris and Arrishl have 
both laid too little emphasis on this determinant of wage 
policy. Both have considered the factors which have led 
to woZe growth but# In so doing# have tended to consider 
wages in Isolation from the socio-economic and legal pressures 
that forced African industrial wages upwards and which In the 
process caused a greater stratification amongst African 
workerse Both have also ignored subsidiary features of 
the system, e*ge the effect of the African Labour Regulations 
Act (1911) on wage bargbining and the conditions of labour In 
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certain sectors of the $industrial complex'*- 
The development of a legislative framework-conducive to 
control of African wages only constituted the conditioning 
ýl . 
framework of State wage policy* Other factors at the 
operational level of wage-setting were also Important In the 
wage formation process, 
STATE WAGE POLICY TOWARDS AFRICAN WORKERS IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX 
A number of social and economic forces led to increased 
State Intervention In the regulation of wages, Some of 
these weret the desire In the 19406s and 1950's to create 
sufficiently large internal markets for Industrial eervelop- 
ment through collective upward wage adjustments which 
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Individual employers had an Incentive to avoid; the 
desire to establish a black middle class as a political 
Insurance against the challenge from militant African unionism 
and radical nationalism which grew rapidly in the 19500s and 
19609s; the need to Incorporate black worker threats by 
'buying-offt strike action through a policy of pre-emptive 
wage adjustmentl the need to protect the more marginal 
firms from the burden of competitive bidding - the minimum 
wage policy here removed some of the Incentive for 
tprogressivel higher-profit firms to pay wages In excess of 
those set by employers in generall the need to ensure an 
ordered stabilization of the Industrial proletariat as 
subsidies for workers' dependents provided by the peiasant 
economy were diminished by rural underdevelopment; and the 
need to cope with the strategy of African unions which made 
high minimum wage claims the prime focus of their negotiating 
and proselytizing strategies. 
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The State thus pursued a number of objectives In its 
wage policy. The complex requirements of the industrializa- 
tion process led to an uneven pattern In the range of minimum 
wages regulatedo There was an underlying tendency however 
to keep legislated wage minima as low as possible within 
the confines of the production requirements of employers and 
the state* Indeed, some producers were exempted from 
minimum wage legislation, For Instance# In sectors In which 
regulation would have seriously jeopardized the viability of 
many (resident settler) enterprisesl as In the case of small- 
scale mining establishmentas which in de facto terms were 
excluded from the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act and obligatory wage determination$ minimum wages were 
not appliedo Thus despite pressure from one of the strongest 
white-led unions In the country - the Associated Mineworkers 
Union - government did not agree to Introduce basic regula. 
tions on wages for mines which employed less than 3 qualified 
journeymen* 
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In 1967 it was estimated that there were 
between 89000 and 109000 mine workers in this category. 
These workers comprised 20 percent of the mining labour forcel 
and In 1971 only 56 mines out of atDtal of 341 mires were 
under the terms of the Industrial Council Agreement for the 
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mining industry, 
The State also consistently attempted to minimize the 
costs of unskilled labour In its own enterprises. Minimum 
wages for the public sector - municipalitiess Central African 
Power Corporationg Cold Storage Commissiong Electricity 
Supply Commission and the Grain Marketing Board - were all 
IJD 
'77r 
situated at the lower end of the scale of industrial minimum 
wage rates* 
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In 1969 the highest public sector minimum 
wage rate was $22.40 monthly (Central African Power Corpora. 
tion) while some of the other rates applicable to public 
corporations were below $20#00, In additibn, it was 
common practice amongst employers, particularly In the public 
sectorg to place the bulk of the lower-skilled labour force 
at the bottom end of the wage scaleg which Itself usually 
exhibited a small range between the bottom and top of the 
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grade, 
The State had a varied set of reasons for keeping the 
wage rates of its unskilled labourers low, Given a limited 
quantum of revenueg it had to meet the large wage bill of 
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the labour aristocracy in Its employ# This was necessary 
so as to staff the key positions In the State apparatus, 
The bureaucracy In the State sector was a powerful pressure 
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group, The State sought to keep taxation low for the 
electorate ands unlike private producers# It was not easy 
for government to pass on higher costs of operation* 
Since 1965 these pressures Increased so that unskilled 
African workers were usually the last to be considered 
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for wage increases in the State sector, The expansiom 
of the polices military and security apparatus after 1962, 
together with Pressures to keep a large and Permanent white 
'defence forceIg raised wage costs substantially, 
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Pay Increases to these groups of State employees were 
substantial. Discrimination In pay scales against Coloured 
and Asian national servicemen (until March, 1974) and the 
ýqg 
expansion of the lower cost African component of State 
security forcesq did not stop the rapid rise In Defence 
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expenditures* The State also responded to wage pressures 
from well organized groups of employeesq e. g. the Rhodesian 
African Teacherst Association (R, A, T*A, )g an Important group 
in the skilled and professional classes amongst African 
employees* Thus In 1974, for instanceg B, A, T*Ao wan able 
to secure a $2#8 million increase for the 209000 members 
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of the United African Teaching Service. An Important 
feature of this re-structuring of African teachers' wages 
was the fact that It led to a widening of wage differentials 
between teachers and provided substantial rewards for the 
upper echelons, the group with the most effective control 
over RA. T. Aofa negotiating policy. 
Minimum wage policy, ýalso became more austere after 
1963- 11swaka has shown that the rate of increase in 
negotiated minimum rates for lower paid workers fell 
notlecablyt this being partly an adjustment to the growing 
labour surplus In the economy and partly a conscious 
government inspired Initiative to maintain the attractions 
of Rhodesia for International Investors and ensure the 
viability of substitutive industrialization policies In 
the constrained atmosphere of a sanctions-bound economic 43 
structure. The government therefore rejected the 
Introduction of an Incomes policy for African working-class 
households in Rhodesia. It instead chose to keep its 
wage policy geared to ensuring the cheap OuPblY of labour 
to producers* 
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The State adopted the view that it was 
ýo 
Inot the responsibility of Government to legislate for wage 
and saary structures'. 
45 
Indeedq the Minister of Labour 
argued (in 1973) that proposals for raising national wage 
minima were girresponsiblelg even though It was conceded 46 
that there were 'a few exploiters of labour'. The 1974 
Budget Statement confirmed thin direction in State policy, 
A further indication of State willingness to keep the 
profits of producers high# came In the announcement after the 
1974 Budget that The Emergency Powers (Price control) Order 
had been amended to allow producers to benefit more eabily 47 
from the passing on of higher wage increases to consumerso 
The State successfully pursued a strategy Increasing 
its Influence In wage-setting In the *industrial complex% 
After 1966 the relative and absolute numbers of workers 
covered by Industrial Councils deereasedg while those 
covered by Industrial Boards# more amenable to direct 
48 
government controlg increased* It was. 2 =1 because of 
the rapid spread of Industrial Boards and the statutorY 
incorporation of black workers under this form of wage 
determining machinery that the total numbers of workers in 
the 'industrial complex' whose wages were controlled by 
State designed institutional arrangements increased* The 
slow growth of minimum wage rates# coupled with the absence 
of effectively organizedýAfrlcan labour In those Industries 
covered by Industrial Boardsq switched the balance Of power 
In the distribution struggle towards a coalition of 
management and organized white labour. Unskilled workers 
were the major losers in this re-alignment process, so 
I 
WS 
accentuating the process of stratification within the black 
proletariat between effectively represented and unrepresented 
workers, To a lesser extent this was reinforced by the 
non-uniformity of Industrial Board wage regulations whereby 
some industries experienced considerably lower minimum wage 49 
rates for unskilled workers than others* The wider use 
of Industrinl Boards enabled a brake to be put on the wage 
Impact of African uniorilsq6 As a result of a 1967 amendment, 
fit has become almost Impossible for a trade union to 
develop under Industrial Board regulations as the Industrial 
Conciliation Act now (1971) prohibits the deduction of Union 
dues from wages In an Industry for which there is no 
Industrial Council's 
50 
Wage ne; rotintion 'at industrial 
boards (has thus been) a complete myth (and) quite shocking 51 
exploitation of unrepresented workers (has) resulted** 
This weakened the base upon which union formation could 
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proceed* Indeedq the State was able to use the ICA to 
subvert the collective bargaining rights It bestowed upon 
African industrial workers in 1959- The development of a 
closely controlled system of wage regulation via Industrial 
Boards meant that In wag*. -settIng there was less of a 
departure from the Labour Boards system of 1947-59 than 
there appeared to have been after the redesign of labour 
legislation In 1959, 
EMPLOYER WAGE POLICIES 
In general terms, State labour "Policies created 
favourable conditions for employers and enabled them to - 
ýy 
maintain a low wage policy for most but not all African 
workers* However$ the requirements of employers were not 
uniform* Various tendencies In wage policy could be 
discerned* Some rigidly maintained the $traditional' cheap 
labour policies of the 1940's# others FtlDreared as more, 
OprogressiveIg a factor which suggested that the old wage 
structures were being dissolved. The apparent differences 
amongst employers in their wage policiesq i, e, the existence 
of a 'conservation-dissolution' element in the industrial 
capitalist mode of produotiont in explained by the fact that 
complex requirements of production had to be met and different 
soolo-economic constraints applied to different classes of 
employer In the Oindustrial complex's 
The central institutions representing employers - 
pushed (them) higher'* Higher African wages uere 
regularly condemnfed by ACCOR as the prime cause of a rising 
rate of inflation in the Post-UDI periods even though In the 
wholesale and retail sectors (of which ACCORIS 2*000 members 
the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia (ACCOR)9 
The Association of Rhodesian Industries (ARNI)t the 
Confederation of Rhodesian Employers and the Institute of 
Directors - articulated the general concern of employers with 
regard to adequate supplies of cheap labour and cautious 
adjustment to African wage structures, The ACCO11 General 
Secretary# for instance# constantly reiterated the organiza- 
tion's view that up until then African wages had been 
adequate# should only $keep pace with the cost of living, 
and should be limited to that until the supply position 53 
Wb 
form the bulk) gross operating profits rose from $44*2 million 
In 1965 to 070*0 million In 1972 while European wages rose 54 
from %40*1 million to 065-5 million in the same period* 
African wages Increased by only 011.7 million to V23*3 
million* ARNI adopted a stringent approach to African wages 
and kept a close watch on 'the problem' through their 
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Labour Committee* The Importance of these national 
employer organization was threefold* They adopted 
reasonably uniform policies on the need to keep African wages 
as low as was compatible with the socio-economic requirements 
of urban-industrial producers, They were an effective 
pressure on the State to keep down leeislated wage minima$ 
and they articulated an Ideology of low African wages which 
helped justify employer policies in public debate. 
Employers adopted a variety of tactics in order to 
control and reduce wages* Soceg like the Salisbury 56 
EAUnicipalitys attempted to sponsor 'company unions'* 
Otherig were content to establish and operate 'works 57 
committees' instead of allowing fully fledged unionism. 
Employers in the Building industry cut wages In situations 
where industrial agreements lapsed and negotiations did not 
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lead to their renewal* Other employers sought to lengthen 
the duration of validity of Industrial Council eZreements 
(up to 3 years In eascs) in order to allay pressures for 
the restruoturing of wages, Furthermoreq In dispute 
situations employers 'stalled' In negotiationsg so attempting 59 
to dissipate union energies. The latter strategy was 
even used as a negotiating tactic against skilled workers 
ýv 
and was a source of major conflict in an 'illegal' white-led 
strike of workers belonging to the Associated Engineering 6o 
Union in 1974. The easy access which employers had to 
the upper echelons of the State apparatus ensured that 
managerial ideologies were paramount in Industrial Board 
decisions* Indeedq the latter functioned largely as 
extensions of the managerial system, 
This does not mean that employer policies were mono- 
lithloo Particular demands required the adOPtIOn Of 
different policies In certain industries and by sbjected 
employers* hulti-nationalu typically adopted a 'schizo- 
phrenic' policy towards African wages. on the one hand, 
employees In the #management' and clerical grades were 
lifted to Income levels In excess of basic subsistence needsy 
whileg on the other handq the same corporations paid African 
production workers (who usually were 'less visible19 e. g. 
workers in mines and oný plantations) at a level well below 61 
basic subsistence requirements. In later timesp this 
policy was Influenced by pressures from South African based 
corporations - owned by American and British Investors - 
at least to lift wages for urbanworkers up to the P. D*L* 
This was partly an attempt to 'buy off' strike action and 
crippling Industrial confrontation which In the 1970's 
upset profits and production routines In Southern African 62 
plants* An Important factor In subsistence wage 
adjustment was also the desire of corporations to meet with 
social andYor government approval'in overseas metropolitan 
centers, In addition# foreign firms based their call for 
45ý24 
a $new deal' on the need to create a class of semi-skilled 
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and skilled African workers and so-- meet the skills shortages 
Foreign businessmen also exhorted local businessmen to lay 
$the foundations for a truly multiracial force rather than a 64 
racially layered labour force$. The desire to absorb 
discontent in this way was prompted by expectation of rapid 
political change In Rhodesia# an expectation nurtuted by the 
dissolution of Portuguese colonial control in Mocambique and 
Increasing trade and security threats to white-dominated 
Southern Africa after the mid-19609s. Foreign capital sought 
to anticipate what was regarded as Inevitable chanee In the 
direction of African majority rule, 
The large foreign-owned corporations had a long history 
of responsiveness to political pressure in Rhodesia* A 
number of large corporations# mostly foreign-owned enter- 
prisesl had in the past iraugurated employment policies 
designed to employ black personnel In juniorg middle and 
upper management levels in an attempt to ensure 'multi-raciall 
employment and promotion policies In their organizations. 
Some Africans who fell within the ambit of these policies 
did in fact advance reasonably quickly above their previous 
positions, The ideological demand for $fair* employment 
policies was relatively strong In the 'integrationist' 
Federal periodg but after -1962 the political impetus behind 
this movement fell awaye As a result Africans were 
generally only employed in the management structure with 
regard to (African) personnel administrationg sales promotion 
to black. consumers and other areas of the firms$ relationship 
with the African market* A number of difficulties surrounded 
the widespread application of 'Africanization' programmes of 65 
this sort* Among them were the problems generated by white 
employee reactions to what has been regarded as discrimination 
in reverBee 
The Initial phase of the 'African advancementt Policies 
sponsored In the late 1950's came at a stage when the supply 
of highly trained and technically competent black managerial 
personnel was limited. The local supply of African 
graduates w* also small* Many employers who did encounter 
poor managerial performance generalised their experience of 
one or two candidates into an unshakeable judgement about the 
poor quality of black managerial personnel In toto. 
Employers were also naturally Interested in maintaining good 
relations with their skilled employees and thus responded 
quickly to any Intret-firm dissatisfaction generated by 
these schemes. Despite the development of a less receptive 
Ideological climate# 'Africanizationt In the lower rungs of 
the managerial and professional staff proceeded In the 
private sector* In the Civil Service advancement was more 
restrained after the Rhodesian Front party came to power In 
1962* 
'Progressive' employment policies were not confined to 
foreign firms or limited to the upper strata of the occupa. 
tional structure, Local firms also attempted to Introduce 
'Job enrichment' Policies and Improve fringe benefits as 
well as wages received by unskilled and semi-skilled ýrlean 66 
workers, The objeotive of these polloles was higher -- 
ý1ý1 
productivity and profits* As one manufacturer explained: 
#It is our experience that job enrichment and a contented 
staff leads to higher productivity, which Is where It all 
pays offs, ostaff turnover last year (fell) to only 12 percent 
among the weekly paid workersee, the volume of output In the 
past three years (has) Increased 100 percentq while the 
staff strength (has) Increased only 45 percent. ' 
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Corporations therefore had clear Incentives to improve 
conditions of employment up to a point, 
One objective of moving away from paying the statutory 
minimum wage was to Increase the stability of the labour 
force* By 1973-74 there were for this reason a growing 
number of firms, willing to pay In excess of Industrial Board 
minima* As a survey of the Salisbury Commercial Employers' 
Association showed (covering 127 firms), exployers were 
Increasingly willing to do thlaq and to a greater degreeg 68 
In the case of the higher paid gradeso These are the 
semi-skilled grades in which stabilization had positive 
effects on productivity. The pattern of 'high wages - 
labour stabilization - higher output*9 howeverg came about 
as a gradual adjustment procesag rationalized by the speeific 
requirements of production and dependent upon the particular 69 
needs and ability-to. pay of different producers, Thus one 
manufacturer employing 540 African Industrial workers in 1973 
had a labour force in which 41 percent of the workers had 
been in employment for'5 years or more and only 22 percent 
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for less than one year. Even though the average weekly 
wage was 20 pereent above the Industrial minimum (at $8*82 
weekly)q 80 percent of the labour force received less than 
$10 weekly. Only 4 workers were paid In excess of ; f6o 
monthly* Thus whilst wages had to rise above the Individual 
subsistence level in order to reduce labour turnoverg the 
level of increase did not have to meet the full costs of 
family subsistence in order to achieve a *reasonable' stability 
amongst employees, The surplus of African industrial 
workers thus helped at a certain point to contain the 
necessity for employers to pursue $progressive* wage policies. 
To some extent this was offset by the relative ease with 
which manufacturing employers were able to allow for sizeable 
risen in African wage rates without radically affecting cost 
structures* Not only were African wage payments in manu- 
facturing less than 8 percent of gross output over the 
period 1968-729 thereby making such adjustments possibleo 
but productivity gains from higher wages# the benefits from 
the development of Internal Industrial marketsp and the fact 
that each dollar transferred from profits to wages was tax 
deduetable up to 40 percent* reduced the labour costs 
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involved In this wage policy adjustments 
'Progressive# employer policies can thus be explained 
as an element In an overall employer strategy which led to 
the reconstitution of the industrial capitalist mode of 
ptoductiono Other elements of employer labour policy lagged 
behind and had the effect of conserving traditional production 
and payment arrangementse, These differences In employer 
policy contributed to the stratificationodf the African 
industrial labour f orceo 
i 
ýo 
Employer desires to maintain traditional cheap labour 
policies arose from a number of factors, Some unskilled 
jobs were easily performed under a low-wage migrant system* 
There was no incentive to jeopardize profits by paying above 
the minimum necessary rate-for-the-job in these cases. 
SImIlarlyq the productivity of some grades of unskilled 
labour could not have been improved through stabilization 
policies* Various unskilled categories of employment were 
non-unionized and workers In such jobs (e*g, nightwatchmen 
and private security guards) were easily replaceable* In 
these cases very low wages pertained and conditions were 
often worse than In certain occupational categories found in 
72 
domestic household employment. The structure of agreements 
regulated under the ICA also tended to strengthen the 
conservative elements in wage policy formulation* Agreements 
typically provided that African women should receive at 
least two-thirds of the minimum wage prescribed for men* 
The regulations usually sanctioned the employment of females 
of 14 years of age and over. 
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Juvenile workers (below 16 
years of age) were only protected to a level of 50 percent 
of the minimum rate (though in some cases - as for Instance 
the Industrial Agreement of the Commercial Undertakings of 
Bulawayo - there existed a stipulation that the level of 
Juvenile employment could not exceed 20 percent of the total 
number of employees), Enterprises were also allowed to pay 
Ijuniors', (workers between 16 and 19 years of age) at a rate 
five-sixths of the minimum wage as well as employ up to 25 
percent of the labour force in the form of 'Junior' labour 
ýý-7 
In certain Industries* These legal provisions had the 
effect of allowing employers to lower the minimum wage costs 
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that had to be borne. Within limits they encouraged 
competition amongst workers which led to a lower average wage 
level. 
Employers were also Influenced by popular and professional 
Ideology concerning the propensities and capabilities of 
75 
Africans In the skilled and management grades In Industry, 
Culturalist theoriest alongside racist Ideologys were a 
powerful force in persuading some employers against *switching' 
production techniques towards lower-cost black labour 
structures* This Ideology reinforced other Institutional 
supports of the high *Europeant wage policy in skilled employee 
grades* Employers who aceppted these Ideologies were not 
necessarily being tirrationall as far as profit maximization 
was concerned, Ideological propositions about African 
industrial ineapacities provided a protection against the 
de-stabilization of the system. They helped ensure the 
position of the labour aristooracyg the group upon whom the 
settler-oolonial system essentially depended. Undoubtedly# 
some employers were too cautiousq perceiving little potential 
for economic gain with the 'Afrioanizationt of high cost 
skilled and semi-skilled jobs. other $racist' employers 
resisted tAfrican advancement', Small producers found it 
difficult to break with pruvailing Ilabour codes19 especially 
where there existed the prospect of boycotts by white unionst 
strong reaction from white staffq consumer disapprovalg or 
the prospect of retaliation from sUppliers, The claims made 
ýS-g 
about African cultural disabilities therefore helped in 
conditioning this pattern of higher skilled labour demand, 
Howeverg as the necessary requirements of production changedg 
so the ideology adjusted (but not instantaneously and not 
without friction) to the new circumstances. 
76 
it is also worth recording that the development of a 
bliaok capitalist class had a restraining effect on African 
wages* African businessmen operated under a number of 
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structural constraints; and In order to secure 'satisfactory' 
profits# kept (African) wages low. This was the experience 
in a number of seetorep eogol transportq distribution and 
building* African businessmen attempted to compensate 
their disadvantageous position by employing whites in 
strategic posts In the clerical and management grades who 
would have had extensive contaoteg on the firm's behalfq with 
white suppliersq consumersp local authorities and State 
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bodies* They therefore tended to followq rather than 
deviate fromg wage and occupational patterns found amongst 
other employers, 
In this respecto African employers In the lindustrial 
complex' deviated little from the policies of others In 
raising the level of profits. Some African bus operators, 
for instanceo breached Industrial Board regulations on a 
79 
wide range qf issues* The Transport Operating Workers$ 
UnIon*s attempts to get the Department of Labour to maintain 
inspection of conditions of employment failed repeatedly, 
The Union's General Secretary noted for Instance that 
European-owned bus operators were as much to blame as African 
1,5v 
bus operatorsq but that 'African firms were the biggest 
80 
offenders ion the whole'* Other forms of employment 
malpractice often caused complaints from individual workers 
and unions* These included Illegal deductions (where 
employees were, sick or late for work)q forced leave without 
pay (for up to 3 weeks on occasion) and discretionary payment 
81 
of overtime* These offences were particularly common In 
Industries not covered by Industrial Boardso 
Employer wage J)olicies should be viewed In the light of 
structural constraints imposed on employer manoeuverability 
in wage setting, Firstly# most employers In the industrial 
complex tended to respond to the social and political 
pressures and Imperatives of settler-colonial society* 
These additional influences on employer policies aimed 
at setting a high standard of living for whitesq protecting 
whites against inflationg and in setting wages at a sufficient- 
ly attractive level to lure white Immigrants from metropolitan 
countries* These pressures were met by reducing the surplus 
available to semi-skilled and unskilled labour& The 
Institutionalization of white labour Immigration In a formal 
government sponsored policy of economic Incentives and 
recruitment tied wage structures to overseas metropolitan 
standards and helped widen skilled/unskilled earnings 
differentialse Thus arose complaints from African 
parliamentarians that government wage policy was 'one of 
trying to accommodate manpower as under the requirements 
(determined) by the immigration policy% 
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Most of the 
criticism In public debate was concentred on the relatively 
ý6 C, 
low level of skill of much Imported white manpower. Howeverg 
this criticism overlooked the structural Issue in wage 
determinationg vize that a high level of dependencee on 
imported skilled manpower was the central feature of the labour 
supply system and enabled locally-based skilled employees to 
ensure that wages remained equal to or better than those 
In the metropolitan countries* These workers were In the 
main non-Afrioan. Foreign dependence also contributed to 
the underdevelopment of local supplies of industrial skillaq 
especially among the African labour force. 
These constraints created distorting influences on wage 
structurese Skilled workeraq relatively scarce In supply# 
commanded a premium or rent on the market* Employers 
therefore had to bid up wage rates to attract journeymen 
and other workers In the skilled grades* Howeverg they were 
provided with an Incentive to substitute cheaper labour In 
production through a 'rationalization$ of job structures* 
This tendency has taken various forms: the indenturing of 
black sipprentices against white union oppositiont employing 
$non-certified' workersq viz. $Megal# workersq in jobs which 
wele subject to major labour supply constraints; and - 
'fragmenting' tasks on the job In breach of Industrial Council 
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regulationso These latter two practices proved highly 
profitable because the tillegall worker - typically African 
- was not usually in a bargaining position to obtain the 
rate-for-the-jobo 
Employers had other reasons for keeping Industrial wages_ 
lows, There was, for Instanceq a clearly noticeable 
ý(, I 
reluctance on the part of employers to 'spark off$ a round 
of competitive bidding for labour - both skilled and 
unskilled - within the 'industrial complex', This desire 
was most effectively Implemented In the case of unskilled 
workers* The $poaching' of skilled workers was not as well 
controlled by public exhortations or private lobbying 
inside employer organizations* The desire to contain labour 
cost increases by reliance on a cheap labour policy was 
a reflection in part of the need for Industrial producers 
to remain competitive in external markets. Denials of 
this point by the Chairman of the ARM Export Advisory 
Committee could not be justified since Rhodesia's competitive 
edge in export markets was threatened in the post-1964 
period by an adverse shift In Rhodesia's terms of trade (the 
terms of trade index for 1973 was 85-1 over a 1964 base 
year of . 100)0 
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This enoouraged industrial exporters to 
ensure even lower domestic production costs In order to remain 
in the market, African wages were one of the few variable 
costs under direct management control* 
EMPLOYERS9 THE STATE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
SUBSISTENCE WAGES 
The'confllot over the nature of contemporary African 
wage policy n the urban-industrial economy of Rhodesia is 
well reflected In the PoDoLs debate that preceded and 
followed the 1974 urban P*D, L, study* A consideration-of 
this $moment' In Rhodesian history thus provides an 
opportunity to examine certain of the co7ntradictions that 
charaoterized the settler-colonlal system In the early 1970'so 
-10 
The P., D. L. -study was not the first In Rhodesian labour 
historyg despite the claims of come employers (e*g* those on 
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the Industrial Council of the Textile Industry In 1974). 
The first formal P*D. L. Investigationt by Batson In 1944,, 
was conducted before African railway workers came out on 
strike claiming that wages were Inadequate to meet subsistence 
needs* African strikers In the 1920's expressed similar 
(though less refined) concepts when they compared their 
requirements with actual wages received, The central 
significance of the formal P*D*L. studies In Rhodesia is 
that they provided objective evidence concerning the costs 
of labour's relproluction In the environment of employment 
at a particular historical juncture, Bettison's 1958- 
studyg contained in the Report of a government commission 
of Inquirys was of this kind, It Incorporated elements In 
the composition of the subsistence minimum which differed 86 
(necessarily) from the study done 14 years earlier* 
Likewise the 1974 study can be seen to reflect the structural 
and historical circumstances of Its timeo To a large 
extentp differences amongst these studies have reflected 
the 'historical and moral element* in the formulation of 
the subsistence wageg apartg that isq from technical 
improvements In methods of estimation. 
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The P*D*L, study showed that$ when considered against 
the African wage structure and including non-employment 
sources of Income for black urban households$ most African 
families were In receipt of sub-P, D,, Lo wages and Incomes 
even when measured against the needs of moderately sized 
ý63 
household units (See Chapter 2)o It thus showed that 
industrialoapital accumulation depended heavily on a 
proletariat rooted In the rural areas from which employers 
derived substantial subsidies to enable the reproduetion of 
labour for them but not by them, Not surprisinglyg State 
officials (well-aware of these conditions) were hostile to 
the implications of the results of the P*D. L. studyp vizo 
that the settler-colonial system of peripheral capitalism 
was dependent upon peasant underdevelopmentq urban poverty 
and cheap African laboure These Implications represented 
unwanted'political criticism of the status nuo. Full 
knowledge of this fact underlay the refusal from the Central 
statistical Officeg the Ministry of Labourg the Rhodesia 
National Farmers' Uniong the Rhodesia Tobacco Associationg 
A. 6COR and ARNI to participate In the Advisory Committee 
which, was responsible for the management of the P,, D, %Lo 
researche This policy adopted by the State was consistent 
with a long-standing general government reluctance to use 
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P*D#Lo criteria -! in wage-determination, 
Even biý, ore the P*DoLo findings were released the State 
offensive began against it, One of the first statements 
made'by the Minister of Labour was to stress that the number 
of-children per wage-earner could play no part in determining 89 
the wage paid* Claims that such a policy was 
Idiseriminatoryls made by African unionists and parliamen- 
tariansq were dismissed on the grounds that all minimum wages 
were In, on-raoiall In character and payments above these 
minimum levels were 'up to the discretion of Individual 
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employers', The real point about discrimination In this 
context$ however# cannot be so easily avoided, since wage 
policies In respect of non-Africans were seldom geared at 
levels below the costs of family subsistence. 
The State also raised a number of arguments against 
the PD, Le studyg stressing that 'its use In pay dIspute6 
could be 
. Positively harmful'. 
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The actual publication of 
the P, DL, brought a rejeotion of It as a basis for wage 
negotiations in the future, State officials sought refuge 
In 'authoritative' criticisms made of P, D*L, ls in general 
(as a basis for minimum wages) by Batson who was brought by 
the goverment from South Africa for the purpose of holding 
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consultations with the Minister of Labour on the P. D*L. 
Separately published, Treasury criticisms along similar lines 
were released at the same time* Other criticisms about 
the studyls 'objectivity' and the motives behind the research 
were designed to legitimise State rejection of the case for 
P*D, Le findings being extensively used In wage negotiations* 
It was even suggested by the Minister of Labour that 
application of the concept to minimum wage levels would amount 
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to 'misuse and abuse* of the P, D*L. Ministerial and 
official policy thus timplied a clear rejection of need as a 
basis for wage policy, Insteadq it recommended a reliance 
on the existent balance of Imakket forcesi and the 
preservation of the status guo In the political economy. 
Employer reaction to the PD., L9 study and Its findings 
was more'equitocall reflecting the apparently contradictory 
'1 
elements-of 'progressiveness' and loonservativisme In the 
W7 
employer class* Employers did not wish to seem to sanction 
the P*DoL, concept en bloo - hence the refusal to participate 
by all but two of the top six main employer associations. 
However# these employers wished to Influence the study prior 
to publication so as to keep the final recorded prices of 
levels of subsistence for different households as low as 
possible and to exclude expenditure components reflecting 94 
social requirements as far as was possible. Some 
Involvement In the internal Politics of research formulation 
was thus'deemed by business interests to be important. 
Furthers the Salisbury Commercial Employers' Associations an 
organization subsidiary to and controlled by ACCOR, provided 
a small portion of the finance for the research* Like the 
States employers set out to ensure that the PeD*L* would 
not be used extensively*for wage-fixing, ACCOR recommended# 
for instance# that lemploversg national Industrial councileg 
and Industrial boards should adopt a conservative approach 
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to the findings of the Poverty Datum Line survey'. ARM 
rejected the use of the concept for wage-fixing as *not In 
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the interests of Industry or the country as a whole', 
Employers themselvess however# adopted a conservative approach 
to the use of the. P*D*Lo in wage polloy,. Textile industry 
employers rejected the concept even though the basis of the 
claim made by workers In their 1974 wage negotiations was 
geared to an unrealistically small family sizeq a strategy 
used by the United Textile Workers' Union to get emPloyers to 
accept In principle the need. to re-structure Wages. The 
P, D., L*-based wage claim in the foreign-owned African Explosives, 
and Chemical Industries was also rejectedt a fact which 
suggests that the notion that foreign corporations were keen 
to establish high wage policies needs to be treated with 
97- 
caution,,, , Nonethelessq some foreign firms used the P*D*L, 
to re-structure wages (e. go Mobil Oil and Colgate-Palmolive), 
Indeedg. they began to do so ]2rio to the publication of the 
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P, D. L* findings. Conservative employer wage 
strateglesq adopted fairly widely in the private sectorg 
coincided with the pattern chosen by State employers* The 
views of the'Sallsbury City Council were particularly 
revealing* Its strategy for dealing with the PeD, L, issue 
involved ensuring that employers did not act Individuallyg 
that adjustment took place only over a long period and that 
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limited alloWances'be made for family size in wage adjustments. 
In the eventq the Council's subsequent offer to African 
workers was worth approximately 8 percentq a figure rejected 
as wholly unreasonable, by the Salisbury Municipal Workers' 
Union$ as it implied a total rejection of the P. D*L* 
Nonetheless# differences In employer attitudes to the 
P*D*Lo with regard to wage policyt were rooted largely In 
. production conditions and variations In the extent of 
constraints on the ability to finance higher wages at existing 
profit levels without re-organization In the skilled/unskilled 
labour structure, Consequentlyq State reaction to the 
PeD. L9 had to accommodate this fact by allowing a margin of 
inconsistency In reaction to the P. D. Leg Inferring that It 
could provide a potentially useful tguldelinel If not used 
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as a 'deciding factor' in wage-setting* 
ý67 
'Progressive* employers regarded the application of the 
P, D, L, In wage-setting as an instrument for systems 
stabilization. Many analysts discounted the view thatv 
under the existing Rhodesian eircumstanceog with high profits 
being made in manufacturing and producers already dependent 
on highly capital-intensive Imported technology (for the 
expansion of which there, was only a limited supply of foreign 
exchange)9 employers could not Increase African wages to 
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P, D, Le levels without increasing unemployment* This 
view could not be said to have applied to all producers - 
since production conditions differed and In some firms 
re-organization of labour structures would have been required 
to ensure increases In productivity* Howeverg this criticism 
largely missed the point of the wage debate# vize that at the 
root of the conflict was the choice between alternative 
politioal-and social systems favoureds on the one hand by 
Afrioan-workers and peasants and, on the other hand. 9 by most 
employers and the labour aristocracy. The P*D. L, debate 
therefore reflected a'class conflict In Rhodesian society* 
A minority"of employers favoured the payment of higher wages 
set at P*D*L* levels In, order to absorb and resolve this 
conflict over forced rural dependenceg urban poverty and 
social instability. Charaoteristicallyg certain producers 
with mass commodity markets strongly supported this wage 
strategy since It provided the basis for an expansion In 
102 
market demand* The reason for lack of State and employer 
Initiative In pursuing this sort Of wage Policy was that 
accumulation could proceed more rapidly on the basis of 
469 
sub-P, D. L, p wages* There was no general political or economic 
need then to abandon cheap labour policleaq despite strong 
African union opposition to the wage policy and extensive 
worker frustration caused by the low-wage syndrome* Indeedg 
the abandonment of the policy and the substitution of a new 
standard of wages along P. D. Le lines throughout the economic 
system would have required a radical transformation of 
production arrangementsg especially in the system of labour 
utilizatiom This would have Involved a threat to an 
essential class in settler-colonial sooletyp vi7,. the labour 
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aristocracy* Substantial political changes would have 
followed., UP to 19749 the State# dependent on these 
interests# was unable to sanction such a change even though 
some employers sought to change wage policies In that 
direction* Few employers openly took up the calls of 
African unionists for across-the-board wage re-struoturing, 
Even those foreign corporations which were ineline-d towards 
Oprogressivet labour policies only partially adopted the 
P*D*Los carefully reserving Its application for some areas 
of urban employment to the neglect of their mining and/or 
plantation, enterprises In which production continued on the 
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basic of traditional cheap labour policies* 
The political element in subsistence wage determination 
was always cruciall not only in providing for different 
State pressures on employers to meet minimum requirements, 
but also In the use of wage policies in the service of 
political expediency* State minimum wages for Africans were 
low for politico-coonomic reasons* SimilarlYt wage minima 
'I 
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for unskilled Afrioans In the private seetor adequately 
reflected the limited political power of this class In the 
socio-eoonomio system, The conflict over higher or PDL, 
wage policies therefore involved the full range of political 
adversaries* Employers were well aware of this element of 
wage policy* Prominent Rhodesian businessmen thus attempted 
to use offers of higher wages In the quest for a political 
and constitutional settlement of the Anglo-Rhodesian dispute* 
At the tiiae of the Pearce Commission In 19720 corporations 
made numerous promises to African workers if they would 
approve the Terms, of Settlement, 
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In 19749 once again 
In pursuit of the same objeetiveg the Chairman of Rhodesian 
Alloys (and a director of Anglo-American Corporation) 
pleaded with his firds employeess 'Help us to get a political 
settlement and I promise every one of you that I will 
personally see that you receive an extra three months pay 
per year'* The President of ARM, a group with strong 
foreign capital conneetionag and the President of the 
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Bulawayo Chamber of Commereeg aoclaimed the offer* The 
statements were part of a oo-ordinated campaign - Independent 
of government - undertaken to obtain a settlement with 
Britain and re-open free trade by reversing the overwhelming 
African rejection of the 1971 Smith-Home 'Package Proposals', 
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The offers were treated vith derision and contempt by African 
trade unionists and rejected outright by the African Trade 
Union Congress* The African National Council adopted a 
similar position after describing the offers as *sheer 
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bribery', 
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Corporate interests sought to give the same impression 
In general labour policies# especially In respect of 
discrimination against African workers9 an example of which 
can be found in the reaction of the business community to 
the prospect of Settlement In late 1971. At the time 
employer. groups lobbied extensively for a settlement in the 
knowledge that It would out Import costso Increase export 
prices and stretch 'tight' profit margins through additional 
sales volumee, More than 500 companies rushed to join 
'People Against Racial Discrimination' (PARD) in the 
euphoria following the announcement of agreement between 
the British and Rhodesian governments over Terms of Settlement, 
PARDIs aim was to combat discrimination in the post- 
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settlement situatiom Yet once the prospect of 
settlement fell away so too did the promises of non- 
discriminatory corporate labour policies. Hence by 
September# 19729 only 30 out of the ý00 companies which were 
originalýsignatories to PARD 'signified their determination 
to continue to work for the elimination of racial discrimina- 
tion'. The Rhodesia Front controlled Financial Gazette 
commenteds #for sheer opportunism the attitude of some 470 
Rhodesian firms is going to take some beating's 
The-diversity of views expressed on the P. DsL. thus 
reflected underlying soolo-economic interests and alternative 
conceptions of appropriate economic strategies to be followed, 
Insofar as the payment of sub-P. D. L. wages to African workers 
was Macriminatoryl (in that most non-Africans received wages 
in excess of basic minimum consumption needs), wage policy was 
ý 
but one reflection of the general subordination of working- 
class Af ricanso 
PROFITS9 DISCRIMINATION AND IMOLERVIZATIONI OF THE IVIDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEXI IN THE SETTLER-COLONIAL SYSTEM 
Discriminatory policy In Rhodesian labour markets was 
a means to an end# not an end In itnelfe, The objectives of 
employers and the Stateg the two dominant groups determining 
labour polieleag were not olv. Ws coincidental In detail# but 
they were broadly consistent In the pursuit of rapid 
accumulation and high profits for capitalist producerse 
Divergences in policy were mostly concerned with the tactics 
and not the strategy of implementing the objectives of the 
dominant classes within the settler-colonial systeme One 
important controversy concerned the management of class 
conflict between employers$ African workers and the labour 
aristocracy so as to maintain the stability of the system 
under which high profits were being made. State mediation 
in this and other class conflicts was required so as to 
resolve differences on terms favourable to the 'hegemonic' 
classes* As the requirements of the production system 
chanaedq so arose the need to *reform* and rationalize 
discriminatory structures* Not all these adjustments were 
without friction or wholly successfull and a complex set of 
labour policiesg structures of labour mobilization and labour 
Ideologies developed. 
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Changing production demands required a revision of the 
concept of 'European Jobs', This was most sttikingly 
illustrated when seen In long-term historical perspective, 
Thusq in 1901 Europeans occupied the following employment 
oategoriess gangersl wagon conduetorsy tallorsq stokersq 
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paintersq gardenerap domestic workers and bricklayers* 
BY 1973 most Of these tasks were tAfrican jobs#, In 
industrial employmentp white unions held strong ideas on 
which tasks were 'European jobs' as well as the (European) 
toate of pay' that ought to be attached thereto* White 
labour's acceptance of the rate-for-the-job principle was 
really a policy for modernizing the segregationist *white 
and black Jobs' concepts that dominated in the pre- and 
early industrialization phase, The policy was regarded by 
skilled unions as a device to keep at bay competitive threats 
posed bY black advancement In the occupational structure, 
Despite acceptance of rate-for-the-job In publieg In some 
industries skilled unions had continued to maintain clear 
notions of hierarchy between the (white) labour aristocracy 
113 . 10 
and other clasces of worker* Nonethelenc* the racial 
composition of employment categories eventually had to changes 
skilled union ideologies thus had to accommodate these changes 
even though the occupational insecurity of white employees 
made their unions resistant to the re-organization of produc. 
tion that accompanied rapid Industrial development and 
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mechanization. 
The mechanisms whereby this transition occurred, 
implementing one form of discrimination In Place of anotherip 
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were both formal and Informal* Because there existed little 
de lure labour legislation In postwar Rhodeslaq rooial job 
reservation was an Important mechanism determining racial 
job classification* Social patterns had to change to 
accommodate changes in the employment structure, These 
switches occurred in respect of barmens hotel stewardsq bank 
clerksq buildersq accountants and cashiers In Bupermarketsq 
amongst others* An important formal means for changing 
employee composition was the redefinition of job content and 
the definition of journeyman's work In Industrial Council 
Agreementso White unionsp although acting as restrictive 
agenciess were not totally resistent to these re-classifioations* 
Indeed, bver time they accommodated them# though this was 
generally a $lagged' consequence of employer pressure or 
government Initiative* Skilled unions were simply cautious 
and conservative and attempted to extract the maximum benefit 
from employers for their abandonment of monopolies held over 
various production tasks# Unions were able to pursue such 
a policy In the knowledge that the labour aristocracy 
constituted an essential class In the political economy 
organized under settler colonialism. 
over the long-terms pcwerful pressures for the intro- 
duction of cheaper semi-skilled African workers in production 
grewl especially after the late 1960's with the fall off in 
white Immisrationo Recognition of the need for change came 
from marq quarterss particularly employers who felt the 
#profits pinch' as a result of the skilled manpower shortage* 
These included the Chairman of the Building Societies 
I 
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Association (a seotor first hit by the manpower constraint)g 
the Deputy Chairman of Anglo-American Corporationg the 
Midlandc Chamber of Commerceg ARNII, and the government (as 
expressed through the Minister of Labour and the Apprentice- 
ship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Authority), 
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Calla for #rationalization$ were made with increasing 
frequency after 1970 - even from the normally conservative 
ACCOR whose spokesman noted that 'trade unionists in Rhodesia 
(have) seen that the introduction of the semi-skilled non- 
Europe= could only enhance the position and earning power of 
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the skilled European$* The nature of this coalition 
between employers and the labour aristooraoy was well 
expressed in the statementg by the head of a large multi- 
national corporationg that skilled labour's Interests would 
be best catered for in a redefined production structure 
incorporating more semi-skilled black workers in the 
industrial system throush fragmentation schemes and the 
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removal of 'repressive legislation or policy'* Under 
this atrategy9 white labour would shift upwards In the 
hierarchy into supervisory Grades and Into a more protected 
positions White union leaders were quick to appreciate the 
logic of this compelling argument. Thus the President of 
the white-controlled Trades Union Congress remarked: 'I 
would agree in principle that certainly something on (these) 
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lines could come about'@ The white labour/management 
conflict has thus centered around the details of Implementation 
of necessary labour policy changes* The Statets role In 
this 'non-antagonistio' class conflict was to mediate and 
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resolve dioPuteas provide legnl backing for Implementing 
agreed strategies and to apply pressure to parties which 
attempted to Jeopardize the stability of re-negotiated 
labour arrangements* 
Different kinds of adjustcent problems arove in State 
employmento In the Civil Service discrimination was 
principally manifest in two formst low wages for blacks 
along with inferior placement In the employment structure and 
a reduced rate of Africanization in the post-1962 period* 
The latter trend was partly influenced by the sanctions 
situation which on the one hand necessitated the use of the 
government apparatus in an employment-absorbing manner in 
respect of displaced whitesq and at the same time fostered 
a high degree of awareness of security that was translated 
into the de-barment of Africans from higher strategic posts 
and from certain Important Ministries$ eeg*9 the Central 
Statistical Office and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
In addition* pay scales for African teachers and nurses were 
set at levels lower than for their European counterparts* 
The ability to discriminate rested on the government's 
bargainina power as a near monopsonist In the education and 
health fields and the $tight* labour market for graduate 
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black professionals# Discrimination In pay scales applied 
In many areas of the public sector# If not directly In terms 
of pcq differentials for the same jobg then in the exclusion 
of Africans from various postaw Examples In this latter 
regard could be found In the Polioeq Defence Force and 
A 
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Hinistrv of Internal Affairs. In some departments Africans 
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were employed only in tenial tasks - for instance in the 120 
Ineomo Tax Department, Government Policy was Justified 
on the basis of Ithe prinelple of rate for the jobg of no 
fragmontation of skilled trades$ that merit is the criterion 
and that discrimination on the grounds of race should be 
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avoided#* In explanation of this polieyq the Minister of 
the Public Service noted that the principle of merit -Amplied 
that attention had to be given to the foultability' of a 
candidatep not simply academic qualificationsg and above all 
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$loyalty to the State#* These qualificationsy applied 
by civil corvants in the context of the insularg white- 
controlled and politically conservative Civil Service s7stemq 
tended to guarantee that black appointments were not made In 
senior grades and that black upward job mobility was 
slanif Icantly constrainedo 
In publie seetor enterprise - eagop the railwaysp a 
nationalized Industry since 1947 - similar discrimination 
operated, l In this seetor white unions were strong* Here 
employment Preference was exercised in favour of whites as well 
asg though to a lesser degreeg Coloureds, 
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African 
occupational advancement wan kept in check by a syetem of 
job classif Ication, and restrained by the obligation on 
Rhodesia Railways to take on the sons of white rallwaymen as 
apprentices and employees* The significance of railway 
employment policy must be adjudged in the light of this 
agency beins the largest employer in the country Outside the 
central governments particularly In respect of skilled jobs* 
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Even hereq howeverl supply constraints were felt at the skilled- 
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level# Thus the Hinister of Transport and Industry noted 
in 1972 that there existed a 'multitude of problems arising 
from the conflict between the necessity of crewing the trains 
and the desirability of not disturbing traditional job 
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opportunities'* The railways also performed a protective 
function In respect of semi-skilled white labour by ensuring 
not only employcentg but relatively high wages as well. 
The internal labour market of most private firms was 
segregated with not only separate wage sonles applying# but 
also significantly different promotion ladders and other 
differential benefits, Barriers existed to black upward 
mobility particularly from the production level to the 
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management grades. The seourement of profits from 
discrimination in wages and employment policy had obvious 
beneficiaries - capitalists and the labour aristocracy* 
Part of the high wages obtained by white workers were a 
t recognized by payment for this 'manageriaV funotiong a factt 
all employers who lauded the existence of Oresponsiblet 
unionism and worker participation in the supervisory process; 
the State which always cultivated the labour aristocracy for 
political and economic reasons; and African workers whose 
organized union leaders criticized the #exploitation of 
black workers not only by their employers but also by their 
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fellow white workers as wellt, Indeed, the price that 
manazement had to pay to obtain skilled union acquiescence 
to the expansion of the semi-skilled grades# 'fragmentation# 
and abodular training'19 was to grant further supervisory. 
cum-managorldl status and commensurately higher wages to the 
labour aristocracy-# 
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-EMPLOYMENT SUBSISTENCE 
CONSUMPTION 
Disorimination In the pattern of remuneration was 
particularly noticeable In the different principles and 
practices that applied to pensions. The adoption of 
discriminating practices was profitable for employers and 
the labour arictoeracy, In the pre-1940's African workers 
were left wholly dependent on the peasant economy for post- 
employment subsistence consumption. The African Ilabour 
reserves' were required to perform the function of providing 
an 'indigenous pension' for the bulk of the Industrial work 
force* Capitalist producers did not make pension provisions 
because they were interested In the mobilization and 
maintenance of labour-power not labourers themselves* 
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Once 
workers became non-functionalg they were dispensable. 
The existence of the reserves provided the means for the 
disposal of 'surplus' labourers. However, the incapacity 
of the reserve economy to provide adpounte means to support 
i 
this practice caused revisions to have to be made to payments 
practices by employers. Thus gratuities were Introduced 
extensively in the early phase of industrialization In order 
to provide for some means of subsistence for workers In the 
post-employment period spent inside the reserves (a pattern 
ensured by urban policies). The levels of gratuities were 
raised as the availability of means of subsistence in the 
peasant economy diminished and as African unions placed 
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greater priority In bargaining on reform In gratuities policies. 1 
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Here it Is Important to note the manner In which workers 
purchased their personal social security - equivalent to a 
'pension plan' - in the peasant economy. Typicallys this 
was done through a variety of alternative or complementary 
policies of maintaining kinship linksg sending back regular 
remittancesg or purchasing Inputs for the rural houEeholdg 
which were either of an Investment or consumption good natureg 
In order to help maintain its long-run viability. These 
were forms of 'savings' o3; more properly, deferred consumption. 
Butq as Arrighl has pointed outg under conditions of land 131 
constraintg the worker's ssavingst could be illusory. 
For most workers (those receiving sub-P. D. L. wages) the act 
of 'saving' for retirement Implied a real postponement of 
consumption. In practicel the worker was attempting to 
realize his rights vis-a-vis the 'traditional* economy and 
not to accumulate capital In the form of real productive 
assets In the reserves. Yet there might not have been the 
possibility for the worker to realize his retirement plans 
in the rural economy if the changing character of the peasant 
production system did not allow it to 'fulfill Its social 
security obligations, As labour stabilization in the 
lindustrial complex9 proceeded fewer vacancies became 
available. More persons thus became dependent on means of 
subsistence derived from within the reservene Under these 
conditions a smaller portion of the labour force was able to 
realize their *rights' in rural society. 
Employer recognition of the potentially disruptive Impact 
of these structural trends In the Olabour reserves' was behind, 
LIlO 
the transformation of gratuity arrangements into more 
beneficial pension plans In later years. The Introduction 
of pension schemes did not reflect a departure from cheap 
labour policies for the bulk of African workers, Rather 
It transformed the social security provisions In the light 
of modern requirements, The form of gratuities and pensions 
introduced after the 1940's confirms this judgement* 
The Old Age Pensions Act (1936) provided for non- 
contributory pensions for all non-Africans over the age of 
60 (if they had lived in the colony of Southern Rhodesia for 
15 years or more), 
132 
No pensions were paid to Africans 
under statute law; these were left to private arrangements 
that, employers mipht make with their employees. Few 
employers'at this time even had gratuity schemes for their 
workers* By contrast one-quarter of white employees were 
covered by private pension schemes and In 1944 the State Old 
Age Pension Act provided for 19202 whites and 115 Asians 
and Coloureds* In instances of destitution non-Africans 
received either Orations' and/or the payment of maintenance 
grants to institutions while In case of sickness free health 
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services or reduced rates were made available. Africans, 
as the Report of the Social Security Officer recorded in 
1944, 'received no old age pensions and very little In the 
way of relief, the general assumption being that the Reserves 
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will support their old, sick and destitute'. Private 
employers followed this policy. Social insurance existed 
only in the sphere of occupational disability (except for 
casual workers and domestic employees In private households). " 
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With rapid permanent Af rican urbanizationg it was 
realized that changes would have to be made to State pension 
policies* Thus the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 
argued in 1943: 'Natives who are capable of earning the same 
wages as Coloured or Asiatic workmen should be taken out of 
the 141ative cln-; F; and should enjoy the same benefitse. othat 
is, payment of a pension'. 
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This was In aceordance with 
recommendations to divide the African population into two 
categoriesg the other group being 'kraal natives' to whom it 
was considered pension rights should not apply, Howeverg 
the definition of *kraal natives' embraced the bulk of the 
African working'-clnss, Their labouring days spent outside 
the reserves were regarded as *an Interlude' between 
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departure from and ultimate return to the rural areaso 
It was thought that there was no need for pensions or 
sickness and unemployment benefits* This was not wholly 
acourateg howeverg since the reserve econom79 even as early 
as the 19401sq was not adequately able to meet social 
security liabilities, And toog as Ibbotson reported# at 
this time 20 percent of Africans (out of an urban sample of 
2,338 eases he Investigated) could be regarded as 'permanent 
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town dwellerss some of whom have known no other mode of life'. 
This Implied that up to 4090oo permanent urban African 
dwellers existed at this time* The two socio-economie 
pressures of rural underdevelopment and urban working-class 
needs thus provided the State and employers with a major 
problem In providing for the future subsistence of African 
workers in their post-employment period, 
The first Initiative and strategy adopted was to provide 
lump'; -sum cash benefitsp In the form of gratuities# upon 
retirementg even though In 1944 such policies were opposed 
by Influential groups such as magistrates (because they would 
be 'premature and Inadvisable') and many Native Commissioners 
(because $they would weaken the sense of tribal responsibilityO) 
as well as employers, 
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The, Introduction of the Labour 
Boards system of wage regulationg followed by collective 
bargaining bodies after 19599 together with constant pressure 
from African workers and unions, provided the pressures 
necessary to spread the use of these schemes and raise the 
level of benefits received, From the 1940's to 19739 
a system of gratuities provided the prime form of provision 
for post-employment subsistence for African workers* In 
some smaller enterprises not even gratuities were provided* 
Howeverg these employers often provided periodic cash 
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awards to employees for Olong service and loyalty$., 
Typically these outlays were small and therefore of little 
benefit to the worker. 
The extension of statutory wage determinationg 
especially under the Post-1959 Industrial Board system$ 
generalized the legal obligation- of employers to provide 
gratuities for African workers in all grades of employment, 
The amounts laid down were fairly small and varied in 
accordance with the worker's length of service (with the same 
employer) and the level of earnings at the termination of 
the contract of employment. The typical Industrial Board 
and Industrial Council gratuity was Only payable If the worker 
qp3 
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had been In continuous service for at least 10 Years, In 
other cases$ like the Engineerings Iron and Steel industryl 
141 
the minimum qualifying period was 20 years. In this 
latter instance a worker receiving a basic wage below $40 
monthly would# after 20 years continuous service# receive 
a Jump sum payment of %360. A period of 35 years of 
continuous service would entitle workers to receive $lp200 
upon retirement* For a worker In the 040-070 rangep the 
lump sum payment in the latter case would be 019500- These 
were very modest rewards for long periods of labouro In 
Industries# like Air Transportq where gratuities were paid 
after 10 years c-ontinuous service# workers receiving less 
than $30 monthly at the end of their working life (a wage 
position many considered themselves fortunate to be In) were 
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entitled to receive only 030 as a gratuity* For manyr' 
workors - those dismisseds those who changdd employers and 
others who failed to maintain $continuity' of employment - 
these were theoretical benefits at best. Thus a significant 
portion of the permanent African labour force were not able 
to rely on reeelpt of gratuity payments. 
Other disadvantages experienced by workers with regard 
to Cratuity Echemes provided additional incentive for African 
unions to negotiate pension schemes. The, Railways Associated 
Workers' Unions for Instances had been negotiating since 1965 
for a pension scheme to be introducedo but up to 1972 had had 
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no success, Even as late as 1971 the state was still 
opposed to statutory old age pensions for Africans. This left 
141,390 Africans over 60 years of age without access to 
li Ca 707 
statutory cupportg a legal right from which white old age 
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pensioners received $47 monthly. At this stage the 
Minister of Labour noted government's opposition to the 
provision of an old age pension of %5 monthly for all 
Africans over 60 yearsq a provision that would have cost 
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$8,5 million per annumo Nonetheless# the State was 
prepared to make the first moves towards brinZing selected 
groups of Africans in government employment (significantly 
enough In the Police$ Defence Forces and Prisons) into a 
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government pension plan In 1971. 
Around this times private employers began to respond 
to long-standing worker demands for pension schemes to 
replace the system of gratuities* Both ACCOR and ARNI 
established pension schemes the former In 1974 and the 
latter a few years earlier. 
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These two schemes provided 
for benefits to be transferable between companies operating 
in the same pension schemes so removing an Important dis- 
advantaZe for 12mf% workers, The Mining IndustI7 Pension 
Fund was also selective* only 500 of the industryts 40,000 
148 
Africans were on the scheme In 1973. Snlisbury City 
Council only, began to study pensions for African workers 
In the same year. 
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Private Industrial employers were 
more Oprocreasivel than this, however* The introduction of 
private pension schemesg as in the Catering and Hotel 
Industry and the Clothing Industrys was closely linked with 
instances of long established unionism, Howevers many 
Industries were non-unionized or regulated under Industrial 
Board arrangements and thus the bulk of African workers by 
1974 remained on gratuity schemes. 
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The differences amongst African workers in terms of 
retirement benefits was part of the general stratification 
found in the lindustrial complex's although not simply 
mirrored an many schemes were not confined to higher paid 
groups and the Introduction of pensions was heavily 
dependent upon management-union negotiationsl themselves 
confined to specific Industries and ability-to-paye 
Benefits thus varied from employer to employer, 17onetheless, 
the adjustment made in labour polibles to introduce pensions 
for African Industrial workers became pronounced and clearly 
confirmed the divorce of large numbers of Africans from any 
access to means of production In the reserves as well as 
the incapacity of these areas to provide means of subsistence 
for the expanding populations constitutionally confined as 
they were to the land areas of the Tribal Trust Lands* 
MANPOWER 'POLICY AIM THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE 
State control over the Industrial labour market was 
not confined simply to wages* Through manpower policy It 
influenced the supply of skills and thereby the racial 
occupational pattern in both the private and public sectors. 
The pre-1940 pattern (of rigid 'master-servantt division of 
labour) gave way to more complex arrangementso More 
Africans entered the semi-skilled grades and those In 
skilled jobs were to a large measure segmented into Inon. 
competing groups'. This Osegregationt was not Universal, 
however* Thus explanations of the changing Occupational 
ýgý 
patterng based on the notion that there was a *floating 
colour-bar'. though broadly useful, must be qualified by the 
fact that the resultant occupational stratification was 
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more complex. Elite groups of African employees were 
the subject of a process of embourreoisement as they were 
incorporated Into the labour aristocracy whilst stratification 
also took place between semi-skilled and unskilled workers. 
The management of this process of occupational change 
required the use of various regulatory mechanisms by the 
State, itself the most Important employer in the economy 
and therefore well placed to Influence this process of 
adjustment, 
The State seetor in Rhodesia was both large and growing. 
It encompassed central governments public sector enterprisesg 
Statutory Boards and Local Authorities in both the European 
and the African administrative systems. State policy in the 
labour market was eruclalq especially In respect of high- 
level manpower. 
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The State also Influenced private sector 
employers and in large measure conditioned their labour 
policies within defined limits* 
The extent of governmentts ability to directly regulate 
white employment levels was considerable given that 37 percent 
of white employees in 1961 were employed In Central Government, 152 
Statutory Corporations and Local Government enterprises, 
By 1969 the numbers of whites In public sector employment had 
grown by more than 10 percent and the proportion of total 
white labour so employed was 38 percent, With regard to 
African labourl the government employed 14.8 percent of-all 
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waZe-employed blacks in 1961 and 14.0 percent In 1969. 
Thus in 1969 a total of 1309000 persons were directly employed 
in the public sectorg this being equivalent to 17 percent of 
all wase-labourers in the economy, a figure In excess of the 
numbors of workers In the manufacturing sector In that year. 
The public sector was of greater relative importance In 
the market for high level manpower and skilled labour, This 
feature can be demonstrated from an analysis of taxiLtion data. 
For Instances throughout the period 1964-67 the number of 
persona employed in State employment who paid individual In- 
come tax was In the region of 33 percent of the total number 1 ý3ý 
of IndivAcLual income taxpayers in the economy, Even 
discounting for the fact that soma of these persons might 
have been cemi-skilleds there is no doubt that the State was 
the single most important employer of skilled workers 
(particularly in the administrative field). 
Another broad indicator of the public sector role in the 
labour market in the extent to vrhich State institutions 
contributed towards the total quantum of wager. and salaries 
paid to employees for labour services* In 1965 the State 
was responsible for a =Ze bill of $110.4 million (current 
p, rices) or 27; 9 Percent of total tinge and salary payments in 
14 
the ooonomye By 1970 these outlays had grown by 44 per- 
cent to $159*3 million, or 29*1 percent of the total wage 
bill for labour serviccc* 
The State was therefore well placed to regulate 
effectivelY the occupation placement of Africans* During 
I 
the Federal period come efforts were made to recruit, train 
ýj8 
and employ blacks in the higher grades In the Civil Service 
and to a lesser extent In quaci-state Inrtitutions. After 
the Federal break-upl howeverg recruitment of blacks in the 
administrative grades virtually ceased and Africans were 
restricted to lower grades and non-executive appointments* 
After May 1967 the Public Services Board did not permit 
black clerks access to courses at the Civil Service Training 
Centres thereby reducing their chances of promotion In a 
system in which higher positions wore allocated on the basis 
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of seniority and examination. After UDI black graduates 
also experienced difficulty in obtaining employment in the 
public neetorg except In fields such as African education 
and more recently the African Councils systemo Some 
Ministries refused to take on African graduates for 
professional jobs, 
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This position however eased after 
the downturn in white immigration from 1971 onwardso Even 
so, In ITovember. 1974# it was reported that there were only 
187 Africans holding senior posts (e, g, school inspectorst 
social welfare officerst medical personnelg technicians 
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and administrators) in the public service* only 96o 
were employed in established postap about 7 percent of all 
such positions* Thece numbers Increased relatively quickly 
after 1969 as the result of adoption (by the Rhodesian Front) 
bf a policy of Provincialization and expansion of the rural 
African bureaucratic class. Even urban local government 
policies had the effect of establishing a small nucleus of 
African bureaucrats in the urban administrative sYstem, 
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The State confined African occupational advancements 
except for political , Appointments such as Senatorsp below the 
upper and executive levels in the bureaucracy* It was only 
In Novemberg 19749 for instanceg that the first African 
appointment was made to a Board of Directors of a quasi- 
government institution# the Tribal Trust Lands Development 
Corporation* 
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No top Jobs In the Civil Service (cog* 
Under-Seeretary and above) were held by Africans* Although 
the Public Services Board has argued that few Africans have 
had the experience for these posts# it Is the case that the 
political requirements of settler colonialism had up to 1974 
required that control remained in white handse The State 
was particularly sensitive about appointing blacks In 
executive positions over white subordinates# to positions 
which required control over the allocation of what were 
commonly regarded as white taxpayers fundst and to posts 
where the encumbents have to represent government Interests 
to the white dominated private sector, These practices had 
a dual effect. They provided a self-supporting system of job 
reservation on the one hand andq on the other# they worked 
to reinforce white control over the economic instruments of 
government and the occupational structure* 
Government employment policy also had Indirect effects 
an private employers* Firms dealing with government 
departments$ agencies and public corporations were encouraged 
to take into account the ovexithelmins preponderance of white 
staff In government Institutions In order to maintain 
harmonious relations through social contacts with employeeS 
ý10 
in State agencies., To onsure that their negotiations, 
contraotos requestss sales and service demands were met with 
the minimum of delay and difficultyg private firms were 
motivated to employ white personnel in those grades which 
depended upon access to State bureaucrats for their effective 
performance., 
These restrictive elements in State employment policies 
contributed to the general shortage of skilled employees in 
the economy* This point was made by the Public Services 
16o 
Board Itself* Typically# however, the shortage was used 
as evidence that the wages of State employees should be 
raised still furtherl In order to retain staff who tight 
otherwise seek employment In the private sectoro An element 
of competitive bidding thus took place between State and 
private employersp thereby forcing up skilled workers' 
earnings* Seldom was the shortage taken as evidence of the 
need for radical re-structuring of policies towards the 
supply of skills and hiring practices. As Harris has pointed 
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out#ýthis apparent 'Paradox' was consistent with the 
Oprevalling rationality* of the system. Instead of training 
and employing Africans in sufficiently large numbers k to 
overcome the shortages, the State adopted a conservative 
policy of maintaining or only slowly altering traditional 
occupational'hierarchies In many grades f or which Af rican 
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workseekers were available* 
Employers In the 'industrial cOmplext were affected by 
the high eosts (in skilled workers' unaea and constrainti; on 
production) brought on by the skilled manpower shortage. UP 
-4 
ýql 
to 1972-73 they were satisfied with Immigration as a source 
of such manpowerg 80 percent of okilled workers needed 
annually having been obtained from outside Rhodesia up to 
this time., 
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The Mooambique situation and political 
uncertainty In Rhodesia after 1971 caused a fall off in this 
suurce of supply* Employers thus became more vocal In 
their calls for a change in State manpower supply policies 
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towards the training of Africans* They also attempted 
to recruit from South African through an ARNI Initiative 
designed to attract workers with industrial skills In more 
than 140 occupationsq many of which could easily have been 
filled by local African workers had training and hiring 
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policies been more flexible. nio-Tintot one of the 
largest (foroign-owned) mining concernsgset up Its own 
Foundation to finance the further education of African youth 
In the technical fieldso especially those relevant to the 
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mining industry* This stratagem was directed not only 
at the State's limited Initiatives in the field of industrial 
traininz for Africanat but also at the resistance of the 
whltc-ýcontrolled Associated Mineworkers' Union who strongly 
resisted occupational change in the mining Industry* 
An appreciation of how the contemporary skills crisis 
developed requires a consideration of postwar manpower policies 
of both employers and the State In the fields of Immigration, 
apprenticeship and occupational protection In the skiMed 
worker grades* Consider firstly State policies, 
Traditionallyp employers depended on white IMMigration 
for skilled laboure The growth of the white labour force 
"Z 
was based more on immigration than on growth through natural 
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increase, White immigration promotion was a. -I"Undamental 
priority of the government In postwar years, Settler- 
colonial society felt Itself threatened politically and 
economically by the numerical superiority and high rate of 
natural Increase of the African populationo In additiong 
howevor# the foreign skilled labour policy was a mechanism of 
forestalling dependence for labour supplies on the local 
African populations a dependence which If prematurely created 
would have had serious repercussions on the stability of 
the iihite-oontrolled political economy, Hence# Immigration 
was Rhodesia's traditionalsource of skilled and to some 
extent somi-skilled labour, In additiong the immigration 
policy also provided the shortfall between the demand for 
and the local supply of (mostly white) apprentices* 
Employers were satisfied with this labour supply mechanism 
largely because it Involved their enterprises In minimal 168 
Investment costs In the recruitment and training of workers, 
The i=igration policy passed through various stages 
after 1945, The 1945-60 period was one of hiCh Immigration 
with a modicum of governmental asaistancel the 1960-65 era 
was a tine of fluctuating fortunes with net outflows being 
recorded in most yearn; and the 1965-74 period was one In 
which extensive governmental recruitment efforts and 
subsidies were outlayed to Increase the Inflow of white 
I=igrantso 
Tho postwar boom in Rhodesia Itself attracted a large 
number of white Immigrants* When the Impetus started to 
993 
abate the economic boost from the formation of the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Iqlasaland, worked to restore a high level of 
immigrations at least until around 1960 when Internal 
political upheaval and loss of confidence In the new political 
enterprise led to economic stagnation and reductions in 
private foreign capital Inflows. After 1964 white Immigra- 
tiong exeept for 19669 was both positive and increasins in 
169 
magnitudog at least until 1972. 
The post-1964 upsurge In Immigration was not an unplanned 
phenomenons In 1964 the government 'decided that It waa 
vital for the future welfare of Rhodesia that vast numbers 
of people from Britain and Europe should be persuaded to 
settle In this countrylo 
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To facilitate this policy a 
separate 1,111nistry of Immigration and Tourism was established., 
it was given funds to establish assisted passage sohemes and 
was charged-, with the task of arranging for Immigrants' 
reception and settlement In housing, employment and social 
services. Shortly afterwardsq the government announced 
generous Income tax abatements and concessions for Immigrants. 
Up to 1964 a number of qualitative requirements had 
had to be fulfilled by prospective Immigrants, However$ 
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after that date the policy became less selective, Many 
semi-skilled and clerical workers thus entered Rhodesia* 
This had an adverse effect on African occupational advance- 
ments despite the claim made by State officials that 'every 
person of whatever race has (had) a built-in interest in 
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interest In Buropean Immigration% The importation of 
skilled employees also maintained nhodesia's dependence on 
iIý 
ýqj 
non-local supplies and took pressure off the State to develop 
African Industria, 19 administrative and professional skills. 
The inflow allowed for the under-utilization of capacity In 
technical training Institutionsq a policy that ensured the 
position of the labour aristoexacy, African worker Interests 
were damoZed by these policies and high wages and full 
employment were assured for the labour aristocracy, In- 
coming im=lgranta benefited not only from Rhodesia's labour 
policy, but also from the general protection to white 
immigrant labour in the Southern African labour market since 
whites displaced either by business failures or occupational 
chanses were able to take advantage of easy emigration to 
and job reservation and protection In South Africa, The 
State was thus saved the political and economic burden of I 
an unemployed class of whites and ensured an expanded support 
group and electorate to man the settler-colonial system. 
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Up to the late 1960's the system also suited most employersl 
as long as supplies kept pace with the demand for skilled 
labourg and other policies (fragmentation etc, ) coped with 
their need for semi-skilled operatives. 
Two f orces caused a rervision In the Dattern of reliance 
on foreign white labour supplieso Firstlyq the high rate 
of manufacturing growth in tho porlod of substitutive 
industrialization after 1965 occasioned a growing demand for 
skilled labour; secondlyg political and military factors 
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had an adverse effect on the lm=igration supply, The 
net result was a growing shortfall or Ovaoancy rate' In the 
skilled trades, This led to a higher degree of skilled union, 
1ý5- 
government and employer collusion as to the best strategy 
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to be adopted. Government embarked on more extensive 
immigration promotion plans (the 'Settler 1741 campaign to 
obtain the names of a million potential immigrants being the 
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most prominent). Howeverg the scheme proved to be not 
only a failure but was also rejected by African political 
groups* Other strategies had to be adopted to meet employer 
requirements and one important area of change was in 
apprenticeship policy. 
Prior to the 'non-raoiall Apprentioeship Aot of 1959, 
apprenticeship for Africans was catered for ýunder the 
Masters and Servants Act. Very few African workers were 
formally apprenticed. State officials claimed that9because 
the Masters and Servants Act did not mention Oracell it 
too wan 'non-racial'* In effeotq however, it eibluded all 
Africans as a class of underprivileged workers from 
apprenticeship legislation prior to 1959, Further# the 
fact thatg under the 1934 and 1945 ICA9 industrial agreements 
did not apply to Africans constituted a barrier to African 
apprentices since conditions of employment could not be 
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easily proscribed for them. The main effect of the 1959 
Act was to transfer control over apprenticeship supply to the 
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Ministry of Labour. The introduction of discretionary 
legislation which 'enabled' black apprenticeship did not, 
howeverg lead to radical changes In the internal skilled 
labour supply mechanisms in the Oindustrial complex'# The 
major, sources of supDly continued to come from the white 
resident population and from Immigration, This was 
deliberate State policy* Few technical training institutions 
qq6 
were effectivoly $open' to Africans. The Luveve College 
In Bulawayo, established in 1961 to train African apprenticess 
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was converted into a Otechnical high school' In 19 3- 
The rationalization for this was that segregvtýed facilities 
I 
were no lonzer necessary* The State thus decided to 
$divert' all aspirant Afriman. apprentices to the then existing 
(European) Institutions* The effect however was to close off 
opportunities for African apprentices since entry Into these 
technical Institutions was extremely difficult for Africans* 
The major source of technical training that was provided for 
Afric=s was by this time threefoldt (a) on-the-job 
trainInZ# mostly uncertifiedl (b) training provided 'illegally' 
by missionsg again mostly uncertified# (c) vocational 
training (primarily for agriculture) In the African schools 
systeml a provision having been made for a small number 
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folloving changes In educational policy after 1967* 
Africans were thus effectively excluded from skilled work 
even after the 1959 Act# except for a small cadre In selected 
trades and occupations* This Is borne out by the record of 
Indentured apprentices after the 1959 Act* 
A small number of Africans were apprenticed In the 
first few years after 1959- Training was made available 
to them and governmentOs policy of 'taking a leadt in 
employment practice helped to overcome traditional skilled 
union recistance. A few employers followed this example. 
Howeverp the coming to power of the Rhodesian Front 
government significantly altered this trend when uhite union 
pressure was brought to bear within the governing party, 
, q? 7 
In the 1962-69 period only 114 blacks were apprenticed out 
of a total of 39433 registered apprenticeshipsg less than 
3-5 percent of the total. 
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Of these, 65 were in the 1968-69 
periodl a consequenceln part of additional governmental 
pressure being applied through the Apprenticeship Training 
and Skilled Manpower Development Authority in the face of 
supply shortages in certain tradess particularly in the 
building industry. For 1970-73 it Is estimated that about 
182 
80 Africans were apprenticed for all industries. At 
this stage the annual intake of European apprentices (a number 
of them Coloureds) was about 450 and there were 10v500 
qualified (mostly white) Journeymen in employment. Pressures 
therefore grew after 1968 for more African apprentices to 
be absorbed into the Industrial system. Howeverg the 
numbers subsequently apprenticed represented only a fraction 
183 
of those who had qualified and sought to be indentured. 
Opportunities *, for inoreasing the existing suPPlY Of 
184 
African apprentices existed after 1959, The Select 
committee on Apprenticeship and Technical Education In 1964 
set out a number of proposals to be followed to increase the 
throughput of the apprenticeship system. 
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Tts main 
proposal was a call for a new administrative system involving 
the establishment of an Apprenticeship Training and Skilled 
Manpower Development Authority. The State delayed action 
on this proposal until 1968. The setting up of the Authority 
was meant to centralize State control over apprenticeship 
supply, thereby reducing the extent of influence that both 
employers and skilled unions could exert over manpower policy* 
W 
The legislation to constitute the Authority was designed 
186 
to specifically alter previous Olaissez-fairet practices, 
one important provision empowered the Minister to prescriber'. 
certain designated trades as 'protected trades' and to 
define the areas in which protection applied. Once so 
prescribedp no employer was allowed to employ a person In 
such a trade or area unless the worker was in possession of 
a Journeyman's certificate. The certificate was only to be 
Issued upon satisfactory completion of a registered period 
of apprenticeship, The State thereby bolstered skilled 
union Influence and control over the rate of increase of 
African apprenticesq despite employers possibly wanting to 
Indenture Africans* The political power of the labour 
aristocracy within the Rhodesian Front party and skilled 
union Influence with the State was expressed through this 
aspect of 1,11nisterial policy. Some tradesq howeverp were 
left unprotected# eogol the building Industry* These jobs 
were quickly 'Africanized' despite opposition from white 
187 
unionists and conservative white politicians. The fact 
that charzes In job demarcations at Industrial Council N 
level required majority voting support (and Industrial Councils 
in the skilled trades had equal employer-employee represen- 
tation) save unionists a mechanism with which to block 
employer schemes designed to 'fragment' the job and hire 
cheap semi-skiMed labour to perform the task. The defini. 
tion of 'Journeymen's work' thus became crucial In the 
grestrictiveO policies pursued by skilled unions and 
sanctioned (within limits) by the State. 
qqq 
The $restrictive# function of the apprenticeship policy 
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has been clearly noted by Harris* The 5-year minimum 
apprenticeship period common to all trades (which the 1964 
Select Committee recommended should be substantially reduced) 
was anomalous and did not have any 'efficiency' justification. 
in-service testing provisions, to enable the acceleration 
of manpower throughputs requiring only some persons to 'serve 
out their time's were lacking. The acceptance of military 
service periods (which after 1966 were increased from 4-5 
months to 9 months)p as a legitimate part of the 5-year 
indentures clearly Illustrated that the minimum period was 
excessive* Lengthy service provisions were insisted upon 
by journeymen and skilled unions. The State sanctioned 
these restrictions by failing to Implement recommendations 
In the 1964 Select Committee report which would have 
eliminated their 'restrictive' function* 
Pressures to reform the apprenticeship policYs mOstlY 
employer sponsoredg built up as industrialization proceededg 
white Immigration fell off9 the supply of qualified African 
aspirants Increased and skilled unions - reading the signs - 
sought other measures and tactics to protect their privileged 
position. In 19719 following a lengthy review of 
apprenticeship polAcyq plans were formulated by the State to 
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Introduce a new system of control* -The building Industry 
was the first area to be affected. Trade testing was 
permitted after 3 years and 3 months of Indenture, Successful 
candidates qualif led for National Industrial Council 
certification and journeyman status* For whites, length of 
S766 
military service exemptions applieds thus reducing the 
actual in-training period to 2*5 years* By 1974 the 
Authority declared Its intention to apply the scheme to 
nearly all of the 77 trades for which apprenticeship 
requirements applied. Manpower plans were Introducedq in 
respect of selected occupationsg in order to contain 
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particular supply problems. The Manpower Productivity 
Service# whose principal focus was the phased introduction 
of schemes of 'fragmentationIq was re-established. By this 
stage the State was abandoning Its reliance upon immigration 
as a source of apprentices. It was preparing plans for the 
greater use of African apprentices to meet the skilled 
manpower shortage without jeopardizing the stability of 
settler colonialism, 
Adjustments by the State to apprenticeship policy had 
to take Into account the class conflict between Industrial 
capital and the (white) Industrial labour aristoeracya 
White unionist opposition to change was rooted In the 
Insecurity perceived as a result of radical changes to the 
racial composition of the journeyman labour force and the 
supply of skilled workers, Large numbers of apprentices 
would have eroded high minimum wages which had been based 
upon the maintenance of supply scarcities* 'Africanization's 
unless controlled within the skilled uniong would lead to a 
lowering in the : rate of growth of minimum wage rates because 
employer negotiating strength would have been improved by 
being able to confront a disorganized or disunited labour 
force at Industrial Council level. The existence of African 
S-6( 
journeymen also removed a pressure that white journeymen had 
been able to use at the production level to stop the 
Africanization of the apprenticeship system# vize a refusal 
to accept the request of employersto actually train the 
apprenticeo 
Employers were more, interested in the indentureship 
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of blaeksg but not enthusiastically so. The Indenture 
period imposed costs on employers which were avoidable If 
qualified journeymen were obtainable at no cost to 
Individual employers through the Immigration policy* 
Preferences were given to white applioantag the pressures 
to do so being exerted in various forms - through social 
networkag white journeymen and employee prejudice and the 
fact that minimum rates of pay for all were stipulated by 
Industrial Councils thereby providing no direct cost 
incentive to prefer blacks, Particular emploYers adopted 
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very resistant stands on African apprenticeship* Thus 
on Rhodesia Rallwaysp which apprenticed a number of African 
applicants in the mid-1960's, management were persuaded by 
strong white-led unions to 'reserve* employment for whites 
and particularly apprenticeships for the kin of existing 
white employeeso From 1968-71 no Africans were apprenticed 
on the railways as white applicants exceeded the supply of 
places* Air Rhodesia (a State enterprise) Indentured a 
couple of African apprentices In the Federal period and their 
continued employment was partly maintained by carefully 
prepared approaches to the white union and by 'a policy of 
limiting the numbers and not overdoing Its, In the mining 
5-62- 
industry only a few mines took on black apprentices - usually 
In remote rural are I as where there were 'localized' white 
labour shortages* Up until 19719 of the 300 employers In 
the engineering Industry only two had taken black apprenticesp 
and in the motor trades no more than a hLandful df black 
workers were indentured. 
The failure of the Immigration. policy In the Post-1971 
period strengthened the case made by employers for revisions 
in policy* 
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In 1974 ARM proposed 'sweeping radical 
changes'* 
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In effect these amounted to major revisions in 
job classificationg the result of which would have been the 
reduction In employer requirements for skilled journeymen 
and thereby less reliance on apprenticeship policy* To 
eliminate the stigma of 'fragmentationlg employers gave the 
new scheme (essentially the same) the name 'modular training'. 
The ARM scheme was designed to provide 'crash courses' for 
African industrial workers 'to fill the gap between the 
qualified artisan and the semi-skilled worker** 
195 
The 
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Authority accepted the case for modular training In principle., 
Howeverg it delayed its implementation across the whole 
spectrum of Industry In order to build in protections for the 
(white) labour aristocracy so as to overcome what the 
Chairman of the Authority referred to as Oentrenched 
attitudes' and 1politioal obstacles'* In many respects the 
employer proposals for modular training represented a 
compromise between the $older' version of fragmentation as 
previously proposed and the skilled union's Insistence on 
strict application of the 'no-job-fragmentationt principle, 
r 
50 
with 'rate-for-the-Jobl* These two principles embodied In 
State labour policy should also be considered In the study 
of policies towards the occupational structure since they 
were prime instruments in State policy to $maintain standards, 
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and prevent the exploitation of iskilled artisans's 
The prinelple of rate-for-the-jobg or lequal pay for 
equal work' as It Is sometimes calledg displays an overtly 
egalitarian connotation* In practicelhowevers the principle 
was used to block black entry Into jobs In the upper levels 
of the industrial occupational structure and so cause 
'crowding' In lower levels. Employerag by lawt were 
required to pay African labour at the same rate as they would 
white labour should they have substituted black for white 
employees* Under prevailing soolo-economic eircumstanceeg 
employers have exhibited a strong tendency to employ whitesq 
at least as long as adequate labour supplies were made 
available to themp a phenomenon well appreciated by the white 
unions who strongly resisted any pressure for a relaxation 
In the application of this principle. on numerous occasions 
the government has re-iterated Its support for the principle 
of rati-for-the-job and proclaimed it to be the foundation 
stone of an equitable and modern Industrial labour policy* 
The Minister of Labour stated in 1971 that* 'Any erosion of 
the rate for the jobg for exampley by massive fragmentation 
negotiated for reasons of expediency at the Industrial council 
tablep will Inevitably mean a lowering of standardag a 
situation which Government cannot accept if It Is to protect 198 1 
the Interests of the country as a whole'. Rate-for-therJob 
5-3 y 
was an axiom of the labour philosophy of skilled unionsq 
and it was supported by some employers who recognized In It 
the ordered mechanism of control that was necessary in 
maintaining the stability of the white labour aristocracy. 
Some African and Coloured workerog fortunate enough to reach 
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the skilled grades# also supported the protective policy* 
In additiong the policy figured prominently in the political 
programmes of the right-wing Republican Allianceg the 
segregationist Rhodesian Front and the liberal-eapitalist 
Centre Party whose main quibble with white labour was over 
the rate of fragmentation to which unions would agree and the 
high input costs of labour Imposed on employers by the 
restrictive policies Insisted upon by the skilled unions* 
The setting of a high wage for the job forced employers 
to pay those workers who monopolized skilled jobs a higher 
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rate than In a freer market situation, Union polioy thus 
aimed at 'clearing' the market at a wage rate thai ensured 
that there were no unemployed union members* Through control 
of entry toýtrades and the restrictive apprenticeship policy 
the threat from competing African workersq who could have 
underbid white labourl, was reduced@ Institutional wage- 
setting and supply constraints were critical in this protection 
process* Exeluddd potential black workers had to seek 
employment in labour markets of a lower order of skillq usually 
in $black' jobs. They therefore added to supply In these 
markets with a oonsequent depressing effeet on semi-skilled 
wage rates* 
5-65- 
The critical area of application of high rate f or the 
job policies was in the occupations in which there existed 
a potentially high threat from African workers* In some 
labour markets in the clerioalg administrativeg secretarial 
and general bureaucratic fields of employment the rate-for- 
the-job principle was used to ensure the widespread employment 
of white female labouro In many of these job categories 
black male workers were avallable to perform the required 
tasks* Howeverl under most Industrial Council and Industrial 
Board agreements there was statutory provision for female 
workers - irrespective of race - to be employed at two-thirds 
or three-quarters the rate for male labour. This provision 
effectively protected white women In semi-skilled employment 
where the rate-for-the-job was negotiated by a skilled union 
and at a high level* Whereg howeverg adequate non-white 
female labour was available - for instaneeg Coloured women - 
the Jobs were re-structured and white women generally left 
these fields of employment$ esg#9 cinemas and counter-services* 
Employers as a class were Interested In the lowest cost 
occupational structure compatible with long-run profit 
maximization. This necessitated change In employer 
strategies to meet PrOduOtion requirements. When demand for 
skilled labour was limited and easily satisfied through 
Immigrant supply and local (white) sources there was 
r elatively little conflict of Interest with white labour over 
the #rationalization' of production techniques. How'vverg 
rapid Industrialization changed those constraints and the 
Increasing supply of educated African workers In the late 
J-bg. 
19400s and 1950*8 provided a base upon which employers could 
make profitable Investments In black industrial skills at 
the semi-skilled levelq provided re-elassification could 
be negotiated In Industrial agreements. 
Large scale and foreign corporations were particularly 
Interested in low-cost black labour supplies and opted for 
fragmentation strategies* Fragmentation also came About 
'illegally'# e*g, in the building trades. On the other 
handq some smaller businessmen and owner-oapitalists resident 
in Rhodesia were relatively less willing or less able to 
jeopardize white labour's interestaq partly so as not to 
alienate local social contacts and also not to risk 
Instability in the political economy, At the same timeq 
all employers had an incentive to 'beat the system* Individual- 
lyq by the employment of 'illegal' tradesmen at low wage 
rates so as to undercut high cost skilled labour, 
Collectively# these practices# if pursued on a wide scale# 
would have been de-stabilizing* In recognition of this the 
State sought to regulate policies closely through Its 
influence' at the Industrial Board and Industrial Council 
levelg by use of an Inspeotorate system, by giving support to 
skilled unions,, by prosecuting breaches of regulationss and 
by Its control over other important decisions affecting 
corporate production - notably pricing policies and foreign 
exchange allocations - which acted as a 'braking mechanism' 
on deviation from the aocePted norm. 
The general empiloyer interest In fragmentation led to 
a marked negleot of employer responsibilities In training 
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local labour supplies through the apprenticeship system,, at 
least whilat immigration was buoyant and no cost was imposed 
on roluotant employers who did not bear an equitable share of 
the costs of training local skilled labour, Thus the 
President of the Trades Union Congress (T*U*C*) complained 
In 1971 that 'there (were) many employers In this country 
who have not even bothered to train any apprentices in their 
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establishments** In the whole of the mining industry 
for ex=ple. 'the bulk of the apprentices and their training 
has been undertakeng over the past decade (1961-71)0 by just 
some six mine managementep or perhaps a little more***at 
the outmýostl* 
202 
Indeed# In anticipation of the allowance 
of fragmentations some employers In the Industry had 
4 
laetually reduced their Intake of apprenticesp even though 
they'(were) In a position to train a good size number of 
4prentices of all grades's 
203 
The Minister of Labour 
complained strongly about lemployers,, onot facing up to their 204 
obligations In training apprentices', It was recognized 
in prinoiple toog for the first timeg that *there were too few 
European apprentices and (Rh, odesia) must turn to other 
races'* 
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, Revisions made to apprenticeship policy had to 
take special account of the interests of the labour 
aristooracyo Thus the Chairman of the Apprenticeship 
Training and Skilled Manpower Development Authority commented: 
ISomehow or another we must safeguard the position of the 
skilled European# develop and utilize the skills of the other 
races in nhodesia# and attempt to create as stable a labour 
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force as possible In this changing worldt, 
I 
"1 
5c 
More adventurous employers simply anticipated this 
ultimate switch in policyg and indeed might have contributed 
towards it in their praotices of training and using 'illegal' 
black workers on the job in trades which were subject to 
particularly severe supply restrictions* Other employersp 
unable to effectively breach Industrial Council regulations 
or avoid union vigilancet were confined to making calls for 
change# lobbying government informally and attempting to 
persuade skilled unions of the ultimate beneficial outcome 
of *rationalization', ARM were particularly vocal In this 
respect* Their Annual Re-port for 1970 severely criticized 
protectionist government policy and made a strong plea for 
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widespread fragmentation. In an attempt to ally white 
labour's fears of job security ARNI argued: Ne do sympathise 
with skiMad workers who Identify their place in Industry 
with maintenance of standards# and we sympathise with 
employers who do not want to be undercut on the product 
market by others with less qualified staff9 lower pay rates 
and perhaps inferior products, *** But we cannot share the 
pessimistic approach of the skilled man who Is unwilling to 
delegate his less skilled operations**. * This approach*** 208 
does not fit Rhodesia in 1970-' 
It would be Inaccurate to interpret the plea for lower 
cost structures as an attempt to undermine the settler- 
colonial political economy. The employer plea for frag- 
mentation was nearly always qualified. Thus the President 
of ACCOR argued In 19712 *It is not truet hOwevert that 
employers - In patticular those represented by ACCOR - would 
I 
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endeavour to solve manpower problems by mass fragmentation 
and we have never advocated such a course* We are of the 
opinion that apprenticeship plus the level of Immigration 
we are currently achieving will not solve the backlog of 
skilled manpower shortage and we mustq therefore* turn to a 
rationalization of the present manpower structures to 
achieve a better and more efficient use of the labour we 
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have availableO Similarly the President of the 
Confederation of Rhodesian Employers argued In late 1971: 
"If one thinks In terms of fragmentation as meaning wholesalt- iý-ý 
Africanizationg well than I would disagree with It In that 
contextq because I don't think that It Is in anybody's 
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interestsO The emphasis in employer policies for change 
in occupational struotureq was on gradual changeq but change 
nonetheless. The union 'adjustment lag' was in this sense 
a conservative force In a coalition In which the $dependent 
partner$ (the union)p had eventually - and$ up until 1974, -, 
usually willingly - to follow the 'progressive' capitalist 
lead* Thud the General Secretary of ACCOR was able to 
comment in 1973: 'there have nevertheless been many 
instances of "rationalization" where enlightened trade 
unionists have been able to see that the Introduction of the 
semi-skilled operatorg or as they are now called In South 
Af rioa "alds"q can only enhance both the position and the 
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pay of the European skilled artisan's It was not easy 
to convince the skilled unions of thiss however. They 
therefore stalled In negotiations in order to ensure firm 
guarantees concerning security of employment, The dispute- 
5-10 
between the Chamber of Mines and the Assoolated Mineworkers 
Union# Intended to be settled In a newly negotiated Agreement 
In 1972t thus lingered on until 19759 then only to be 
settled as a result of arbitration through an Industrial 
tribunal* The unionists' concern wasgas the T*U., Co President 
put its that the artisan was Oalding' himself out of a job 
by conceding widespread fragmentation without guarantees., 
It was claimed, that the only group to gain from this would 
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be employers, Indeed# there were cases where this did 
occur# eogo where taides* doing approximately the same work 
in the mining Industry were paid only 21 percent of the 
Journeyman's rate-for-the-Job, Howeverg the fact remains 
that journeymen In the Industry were not disadvantaged andq 
asAn other Industries, tended to take on a greater 
supervisory role In the re-defined produotion aystemg a 
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task for which additional benefits were provided, The 
prospect ofloontinued benefit for white workers In the 
mining Industry Is quite realistic$ given the acute skilled 
manpower shortage in the sectorg planned expansion and the 
rapid opening up of new mines. Howevers It was considered 
a wise. 'strategy on the part of skilled unions to resist the 
introduction of fragmentation schemes as long as was feasibleg 
knowing that they would have to concede in the end, Their 
resistance Increased the amount of benefits which management 
was willing ultimately to give for their cooperation, For 
this, reaso no"fragmentation' was opposed in principle and 
gradually, conceded In practice. The T*U. C. rejection of 
ImOdular training' in December# 1974, fell Into this patterno'- 
V/ 
a pattern which would ultimately have to be determined by 
Ministerial decision at Industrial Board level and State 
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policy in disputes at Industrial tribunals, By contrasts 
African unions like the ATUC9 as a representative confederationg 
openly commended employer Initiatives in this directiong just 
as previously they had supported Oprogressivel employers who 
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sought to Introduce 'fragmentation' schemes* 
By late 19739 under strong employer pressureq the policy 
decision to switch to a structure In which black workers were 
more prominent In the semi-skilled grades had already been 
taken* Employers had long been calling for a Ore-think on 
labour policy$. The Minister of Labour had calledg for 
the first time# for *industry to have training programmes 
for semi-oskilled or even unskilled workers (in order) to 
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achieve maximum productivity from manpower', Government 
entered discussions with industry and the (white) trade 
unions for the purpose of produoing a #blueprint' to solve 
RhodeslaOs manpower problemse This Ineluded the tSettlers 
1741 Immigration oampaign whieh sought to attraot 'artisans*.. 
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willing to train semi-skilled Afrioan labourle Government 
policy thus shifted towards lifting the status of African 
semi-skilled workersq while at the same time preventing the 
erosion of the artlean*s status. As beforeq the objective 
of. polley was the $modernization' of the Industrial labour 
supply system under conditions of settler colonialism, 
The'Isudden' realization of the need to base continued 
Industrial expansion on a semi-skilled black working class 
provides an Interesting oo=ent on the generally prevalent 
pz 
ideology concerning African working-class propensities for 
Industrial labour* For instances Gibb reported In 1971 that 
'There (was) a widespread belief among employers that the 
African has certain generic failings which inhibit him from 
satisfying the requirements of employment on levels higher 
than those on which he is generally employed at the moment'* 
Employer ideology regarded Africans as lacking the requisite 
mental flexibility to cope with unforeseen circumstances# as 
having no other capacity to learn except by roteg as lacking 
in awareness of the need for perseverence and consistency# 
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and as failing to observe civilized standards of honesty and 
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morality* Yet these same employersl not long after# 
readily redefined the production structureq uplifted Africans 
to a skilled and a semi-skilled levelq relied upon worker 
ability to adjust to new circumstances and expected# as well 
as receivedg'satisfaotory performance In newly defined job 
roles which had added responsibility attached to them* 
Changing I economic circumstances thus produced a change in 
managerial Ideology, 
MANPOWER AND OCCUPATIONAL PROTECTION 
Occupational protection still occurred extensively In 
the Rhodesian labour market. The most frequent form was the 
soolal job reservation of employment oategories. There were 
many jobs for which black applicants were simply not 
considered - principally those high In the echelons of 
responsibility and reward and particularly where white clerical 
, V3 
staff, twould fall directly under the jurisdiction of black 
administrators. This $explicit' reservation was adequately 
expressed in job advertisements which often specified the 
race of the applicant. Some advertisements simply called 
for 'European personneV. Others suggested their implicit 
bias by explicitly noting that the employer required 
applicants who had completed military service (an obligation 
that Africans did not have to fulfil), while some noted that 
successful applicants would be trained In South Africaq a 
clear indicator of racial preference. Part of the reason 
for protection was rooted In the need to retain potential 
emigrants in Rhodesia. Without this certain members of a 
family might have had difficulty In obtaining a job with 
earnings commensurateý with the practically applied concept 
of a 'white man's wage'. Selective protection - usually In 
the public sector - enabled the retention of the individual's 
family In the country, Policies towards displaced whites 
were thus an Important ingredient of civil service labour 
policy# particularly in traditionally reserved sectors like 
the railways* The distribution of Africans In employment 
categories was a reflection of this protection, In 1971 
the only Jobs 'open' to blacks In the railways administrative 
hierarchy were those below a level requiring 900 Level entry 
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certificates* The restraining Influence of unions and 
government was Important in determining this Policy even 
though on the railways black workers were a highly stable 
labour force and there existed adequate African personnel who 
could easily have shifted upwards on merit In the 
IVY 
administrative system* In other public agencies - like the 
Post and Telecommunications Corporation - occupational 
protection occurred In a wide range of semi-skilled gradess 
e. g. technicians and counter-operators* Here white consumer 
discrimination was significant In ensuring that limited 
numbers of blacks received technical training to become 
repair operators, Corporate employment policies were little 
better and in the main were geared to taking on unskilled 
black workers with low levels of education, School-leavers 
with higher academic qualifications were often unable to get 
employment because they were regarded as . $over-qualifiedIg 
whilst extensive recruiting attempts were usually made to 
obtain similarly. or less qualified whites. In corporate 
employment structures the dictates of existing (white) 
employees were often explicitly taken into account. 
Employer demand for black labour was conditioned by the 
functions of the job and thus jobs involving personal 
services with white clients were largely reserved for whites. 
,, In the high-level manpower sector of the labour market 
various forms of exclusivism were appliedg one form 
radically affecting the graduate labour market9 albeit a 
small, ecotion of the occupational structure. Until the 
19501s It was not thought necessary to train African graduateag 
let, alone find jobs for them in the colonial occupational 
structuree With the Increasing demands placed on scarce 
white manpower supplies and expansion in the bureaucratic 
complex-to control Africans# this pattern changed, Blacks 
were selectively absorbed In various occupational categories 
PS' 
in the professionsg In the civil service - in jobs dealing 
with "African' problems - and in certain larger corporate 
employment structures* Howeverg the rate of absorption of 
graduate blacks was carefully controlled, by the government 
regulation of bursaries and loans policies for higher 
educational financeg by the planning of both the rate and 
pattern of expansion in the University of Rhodesia so that 
no lexcesst graduate manpower supply would be produced and 
by Soaring the supply of higher education to the employment 
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'needs* of the economyg ýLlz, q government and corporations, 
For Instance$ the University operated at a level significantly 
under capacity* Its student enrolment grew only moderately 
in the 1960's and 1970*s. Itturned, away many black 
applicants because of lack of finance for fees* Govern=ent 
loan finance was closely tied to the State's own employment 
needs - particularly In supplying black teachers to 
African schools - and only those blacks with independent 
sources of finance were able to take degrees in law and 
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economics* The University adopted a policy of Imulti- 
racialism' which had as a promise the argument that a 
numerical 'parity' ought to be maintained In respect of the 
ratio of black to white students. This policy has been 
functional to the economic system as constituted and has 
restrained the flow of qualified blacks onto the graduate 
labour market* The University's own experience of-employing 
few qualified blacks was also subject to much internal 
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criticism* 
S-A 
Only gradually did employers absorb African graduates 
Into skilled employment. Black graduates experienced great 
difficulty in securing employment commensurate with their 
qualifications* Many graduateog especially those who 
did not have pre-arranged employment contracts# experienced 
long periods of unemployment after graduationg underemployment 
in their first and subsequent Jobsq and inevitably a large 
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degree of wage discrimination, A 1973 survey of 
graduate employment prospects in the Rhodesian economy showed 
that there was a high degree of employer discrimination against 
black graduates. Of a total of 1*889 employers canvassed# 
employing 48*511 whites and 1489096 blackal no less than 
57o5 percent of the 665 respondents indicated their 
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unwillingness to employ black graduateso As skilled 
manpower shortages grew# howeverg private employer policies 
changedo Fewer African graduates were left unemployedg but 
most were employed at levels below their qualificationse 
In the accountancy profession$ traditionally a white 
preserve# It was found In a survey conducted in 1964 that 
14 out of 44 firms responded negatively to a question asking 
whether the firm would be willing 'to consider applications 
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for articles from non-Europeansto Client prejudice was 
noted as being strong and the post-1965 awareness of security 
In the face of sanctions was a significant deterrent. In 
additiong employers (accountancy firms) found it difficult 
to obtain adequate benefits from black articled clerks as 
these persons were confined to performing a limited number 
of taskso As the growth- of the economy Increased the demand 
,! 
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for accountancy servicesl there was a redefinition of the 
'colour bar' and blacks In small numbers - following Aslansq 
and a few Coloureds - were admitted into the ranks of the 
profession* This was partly a response to a growth in 
business placed by black-owned and Asian Incorporated 
enterprises with professional accountants under the obligatory 
provisions for auditing found In the Companies Act. This 
process of selective absorption did not transform the 
occupational struetureq however. It merely modernized It 
In the light of changing constraints and profit opportunities* 
In the legal professiong similar constraints applied# 
though here there were a number of qualified black advocates 
and attorneysg most of them educated outside Rhodesia, 
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Client prejudice was particularly strong as was discrimination 
from the white staff of law firms. As in accountancyg the 
profession was geared to supply from established channels - 
I=igrants, the training of local whitesq or the recruitment 
of staff from whites who had completed university training 
In South Africa. The shortage of briefs available for 
Africansg both Inside established practices and outside# where 
a small number of Africans sought to practise Independentlyg 
led to Africans establishing a separate Bar Association In 
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order to advance their own Interests* This move# though 
legals was condemned by the established professions which 
proposed'legislative changes to stop the breakaway groups 
even though In fact It did not pose any threat to white control 
and dominance In the legal profession. The appointment of 
judgesg magistrates and prosecutors was State controlled and- 
5-19 
only non-Africans were appointed to these posts* This 
confined African lawyers and advocates to private practice 
where Ocrowding' Into an easily satisfied market forced 
African lawyers to take on less remunerative briefs amongst 
a lower Income clientele. The discriminatory structures In 
the legal profession received criticism from various 
quarters# such as International businessmen whose political 
strategy for Rhodesia was to advocate the creation of a 
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middle class group of Africans* 
The Importance of these bottlenecks was in their cumulative 
Impact adding to other resistances Impeding upward mobility 
of Africans In the economic structure. Their effect was 
to widen wage differentials and reinforce the stratification 
found In the economic system. Through selective absorptiong 
only a few Africans were taken Into the professional classes. 
For these reasonsg many qualified blacks emigrated to countries 
In which their talents were better recognizeds particularly 
the United Kingdom and the United States* One report In 
the 1970's put the estimate of African gradiiates outside 
Rhodesia at over IgOOO personsg a major manpower loss when 
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calculated in terms of Rhodesian requirements. The one 
agency with power to overcome the problem effectively - the 
government - was the very party entertaining the, I-east 
inclination to do so, 
EMPLOYER LABOUR POLICIES IN TRANSITION 
The problems for employers In incorporating African workers 
under the regime of capitalist production In the 'Itndustrial 
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complex' generated a variety of pressures as they made 
attempts to secure least-cost solutions compatible with 
long-run profit maximization, or 
In certain casesq employers took the initiative to 
increase black wages beyond Industrial Council minima and 
to propose black occupational advancementAnto the semi- 
skilled grades* Many of these manufacturers were In a 
position to gain collectively from a higher wage African 
labour force leading to expansion of the domectic, markets 
On the other handq each employer had to reconcile this 
Increase with the Incentive to minimize his own (wage) costs 
in such a structural revision. Higher wages also filtered 
into expenditures In the Tribal Trust Lands for which rural 
stores were the principal beneficiaries; hence the interest 
In the 1970's amongst Industrialists and commercial forms to 
establish retail outlets In the African rural areas. 
Employers also wished to avoid the costs associated with 
disruptive African strike activity, Although most employers 
here relied on the draconian controls of governmentq larger 
firms realised It would be In their Interests - If Only to 
satisfy foreign shareholders and foreign home-country 
governments - to be viewed as 'fair* employers paying above- 
P, D. Lo wages* 
These policies towards African (unskiMed) workers had 
to be formulated within the framework of the strategic need 
(implicit in these policies) to cultivate the labour 
aristocracy and protect the place of this class In the 
occupational structure - at least as long as there was no' 
D-10 
readily substitutable cheaper labour Input - thereby ensuring 
that skilled labour requirements were met. Employers thus 
had to meet pressures for higher wages from white workers 
where these demands were placed upon them. The expansion 
of production on the basis of cheap African labour was 
profitable and could not have taken place so efficiently 
without the cooperation of white labour - hence the 'high- 
waget pay-off for white labourlslmanageriall services at the 
supervisory level* Employers were careful in trying to 
provide options for white workers displaced as a result of 
fragmentation schemest if only to absorb whites Into higher 
managerial grades In the face of supply constraints at this 
level too* Finallyq producers In certain Industries - those 
producing luxury commodities - benefited from the skewed 
income discribution, pattern and were -dependent- upon 
it for 
the maintenance of a large Internal consumer market for their 
commoditlese 
Against these partly conflicting pressures (between 
different classes of labour) employers attempted to organize 
themselves so as to contain union demands from whatever 
quarter they arose. The incentive to do this inereasedin 
the post-1965 period when extensive price controls regulated 
revenues* For the Industrialists who geared their markets 
to exportsp there was a higher degree of competition to be 
met than for those whose output was solely for domestic 
markets. Wages in this situation were one of the'more easily 
controlled input costs, Employers therefore strongly 
supported their trade and industrial organizations which in 
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the late 1960's came together to form the Rhodesian 
Confederation of Employers# a registered employer confedera- 
tion under the ICA. This ensured that employers as a group 
were well organized and well financed to meet wage disputes 
at the Industrial Council level and even become Involved - 
with relatively little loss - In protracted negotiations and 
disputes* The competition for skilled labour proved to be 
a basis for capitalists coming together to form a united 
front and a common policy with which to lobby government, 
Employers thus maintained close associations and linksp 
unification being closely associated with common concern over 
labour matters. For Instance# in 1969 the'following 
relevant observation was made: 'The National Employers' 
Committee (of the Motor Trades Employers' Association) ... 
again permitted employers In the different areas of the 
country to exchange views and to adopt a unified approach 
In negotiations. The greatest single advantage of this# 
Is that standard Industrial Agreements will now apply 
throughout the countryp and we would hope that the past horror 
of "leap-frogging" between Matabeleland and Mashonalandq 
which was of considerable detriment to employersq has forever 
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disappeared. ' Fear of unions among employers was a 
reaction to development of effective African unions, 
PACLWCCL1aKd - (F r, -2V 
Thus the Chairman of the Mashonaland and Matabeleland Motor 
Trades Association argued in 1971: 'Wep together with all 
other employers In commerceq Industry and manufacturingg are 
well aware of Increasing Trade Union activitiess an Increase 
in recruiting drivesq more sophistication In their approaehg-- 
r2 -L 
considerable development of African views# and one would be 
well advised to recognize that Trade Unionism... will grow 
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stronger each year*' In recognizing the employer need 
for better strategies he argued: 'Trade Unionism Is on the 
march, and we must be well equipped to meet them at all 
levels. This makes it quite obvious that we must eventually 
have a National Industrial Council, but first a National 
Employerst Associationg Is the only practical wayg with a 
professional Secretaryg well-trained and well schooled in 
Industrial Legislationg Negotiations and agreements. Gentle- 
men, the Trade Unionists are professionalsq and we must be 
nothing lessl we must match them well and we must have a 
body to speak with a national voiceg a voice that will be 
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recognized by Government. ' 
This call for action did not apply against black workers 
alone - white labour's wage bill was a high portion of input 
costs in most plants. Employers were therefore generally 
happy with the nature of the Industrial Conciliation Act and 
especially with the effective removal of the *legal' right to 
strike In 1973, Howevers as regards the increased Ministerial 
control on Industrial Council agreementsq employers were 
relatively unhappy because of the possibility that this 
mechanism could be used as a lever to frustrate wage and 
occupational policies negotiated at the firm or industry level. 
This had not up until 1974 proved to be a justified fear and 
their prime consideration actually was the problem of control 
over (African) labour. To this endq employers in commerceo 
for instances perceived In the 1970's a need to Intensify 
P3 
their watch over wage Initiatives* This feeling was behind 
the 1972 change of name of the ACCOR Labour Committee to the 
'Co-ordinating Committee of Commercial Employers' because 
tthe aim of the Co-ordinating Committee Is firstly to make 
each other aware of trade union demands9 thus avoiding one 
employer body being played off against another, A single 
point given away quite innocently by one association would 
have a rippling effect on other employer/employee meetings. 
We have come to know this as the leap-frog method of 
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negotiations. ' Similarly on the Railways 'leap-frogging' 
wage claims - arising basically out of the white union 
insistence on the need to restore differentials after wage 
concessions to black workers - were a feature of the Imulti- 
union* structure of the Industrial Council. 
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Employers 
In these circumstances were interested in resisting all wage 
claims# at least to an extent compatible with the 
differential bargaining power of the trade unions they 
confronted., 
The ability of employers to avoid wage claims was in 
part based on the existence and toleration by the central 
government of a degree of African unemployment and a 
relatively easy way out to South Africa for unemployed white 
labourt(Rhodesials 'skilled' labour export). As long as a 
higher degree of statutory and de facto job reservation was 
In existence in the more protectionist labour markets, of 
South Africag management In Rhodesia were not seriously 
perturbed at the Idispkacement' of whites by Orationalization' 
programmess Employer strategy was thus--based on the use of 
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visible African unemploycent as a justification for not 
meeting higher wage claims* 
Whilst employers thus established a hiprarchl of 
exploitation - white workers being preferred above black 
workers - the employer class had to deal with an often 
uneasy institution of mediation in the ruling class coalition 
- the government, At times, not unexpectedlyg the employer- 
government relationship was antinimous. This occurred, for 
examples In respect of price eontrolsq Emergency Powers 
regulations which controlled hiring and firing In certain 
Industriesp the best way to distribute the Increased costs 
of the military draft and Its effects on production 
(particularly the Intermittent call-up of skilled workers and 
management personnel for operational duties)q and Increased 
Ministerial control in negotiated Industrial Council agree- 
mentse On other occasions management were In perfect harmony 
with the State - for instance, In the effective removal of 
the right to strikes the design of fiscal policy and 
Inpentives benefiting Industry$ the administrative control 
of unionization amongst black workers andq most importantly, 
in the need and call for a co- nservative settlement of the 
Anglo-Rhodesian constitutional dispute. The managerial 
classt once a marginally dissident element In the Rhodesian 
political economys esgog In 1965 at the time of U, D, I, when 
It was Informally organized into the anti-regime Forum group, 
had by the 19706s been wholly 'co-opted' Into managing the 
sanctions economyg helping to maintain political stability 
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and identifying with the Rhodesian Front party. 
CAPITAL* AFRICAN UNIONISM AND Tjlj-; STATE 
Capital relied upon the soolal eontrol of various forms 
of African trade unionism In order to keep down labour costs 
and maintain the profitable complexion of setter colonialism. 
The main focus of social control of unionism was on the 
tindustrial complex' and the principal instruments of 
regulation (both legislative and 'extra-legalt) were organized 
by the State* Before considering these restrictions# 
however* the controls on collective labour mobilizationt 
derived from constraints at the level of the mode of produc- 
tion In the economic system# should be noted* 
Under non-eapitalist produotion (peasant and petty 
commodity production) the development of wage relations had 
not up until 1975 led to collective worker mobilization or 
unionization* In the domestic household mode of production 
paternalism and the social control of labour effectively 
prevented worker organization against employerso The extra- 
economic controls and 'extra-wage' relationships that were 
common in plantation production also contributed to the 
belated and weak development of plantation unionism* 
Similarly unionism had not taken root in African agrarian 
capitalist enterprise* African trade unionism was closely 
associated with the development of an Industrial capitalist 
mode of production and urban-industrial employment. In the 
mining compounds special features of the proletarianization 
process and employer organization of labour conditioned the 
malformed character that African unionism adopted (see 
Chapter 9)e As Industrial capitalist Production became 
I 
dominantg so African unionization developed, Nevertheless 
union development was not unencumbered# but was rather 
profoundly Influenced by the labour policies of the settler- 
colonial State and the changing character of the African 
nationalist and working-class struggle against capital and 
the State* This section will be primarily concernedg 
however# with State and employer attempts to control the 
unionist element of the movementg especially after the 
changing character of productiong and the transition to a 
dominant industrial capitalist modeq loosened the social 
controls that previously prevailed and required the 
reproduction of new forms of control over collective 
worker mobilizatiom 
Up until the 1940's few formal African union organiza- 
tions existed. 
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The most prominent In the pre-1940's 
were the Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association and 
the broadly based Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. 
Neither posed any major challenge to the soolo-eoonomic 
I 
system. The sharpening of class conflietp the Impoverishment 
of most workers In the *industrial complext and worker. 
peasant insecurity provided the socio-economic conditions 
for rapid union formation and the development of a more 
advanced class consciousness amongst African Industrial 
workers In the postwar period. This latter develppment was 
coupled with widespread African political mobilization against 
the State* Mass nationalist parties took over from more 
elitist organizations and forged close links with the union. 
movemente In these conditions both capital and the State 
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needed to revise previous strategies devised for coping with 
protestq dissent and challenge to the low wage system, 
Initially a policy of non-recognition of African unions was 
appliedg except In the case of the RRAEA following the 
successful 1945 railway strike# and the Labour Boards system 
was used as a means to moderately improve conditions of 
employment for workers* Few employers would recognize 
unions at this time even though State officials recognized 
the Inevitability of incorporation of African trade unions 
Into the collective bargaining framework* The State 
continued to deny legal recognition to African trade unionsg 
howeverg despite considerable strike action In the late 
1940's and early 19501sq widespread union organization# the 
transition to mass political mobilization and considerable 
worker unrest* Instead# It relied on policies of 
i 
amellorationg on the one hands designed to meet pressures for 
change as they arosep and more repressive controlso on the 
other, 
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The Subversive Activities Act (1950) was 
9 
designed to cope specifically with the new situationo it 
arose out of the Hudson Commission of Inquiry Into the 1948 
General Strike and sought to prevent the development of 
similar strikes or circumstances, 
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The Act was condemned 
by African labour confederations and trade unions# but since 
African workers were voteless and unions were without direct 
political representation they were unable to resist Its 
Introduotiono 
Throughout the 1950's union organization proceeded in 
the *industrial. complex' and the right of recognition was-, 
more explicitly demanded* 
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The combination of widespread 
organization and close alliance with African nationalist 
political parties caused the State to consider revisions to 
previous policies of non-recognition of African labour 
organizations* A new policy was required to deal with the 
threat posed to the wage structure by militant unions and 
disruptive strikees The Native Industrial Workers' Union 
Bill was Introduced in 1954 so as to legalize existing 
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African unionso Dispute over the issue led to the defer- 
ment of the Bills the setting up of a Select Committee 
(under G*S* Todd) to investigate and recommend upon new 
industrial labour legislations and an eventual delay of 5 
years before the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended. 
The dynamics of the unions' challenge could not be 
ignored by policy-makereg particularly as any government In 
Southern Rhodesia had to vie for the electoral support of 
white worker Interests and there was 'a real fear on the part 
of the European that he may be displaced by Native labour at 
a rate of wages which It would be Impossible for the 
European to accept without abandoning his conventional 
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standard-of living'* The Bill sought to solve the 
problem by Igiving legal recognition to African trade unions 
as suchp by bringing them on to an Industrial rather than a 
regional basiss and by controlling them*,, 
? 43 
Collective 
bargaining rights for Africans were recommandedg 'subject to 
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certain essential controls', In reforming the conventional 
settler ideology that had previous prevailedl the Committee 
argued that. somp Africans had reached the stage of being able 
5 ýZ7 
to take part in trade union activities. It was also 
important that additional unions would not be fostered by 
discretionary legislation: 'legislation ... should not be 
designed to create trade unions but only to deal with those 
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which come Into existence'. Since It would also assist 
the process of incorporation If established and 'responsible* 
skilled unions took control over particular African worker 
Interests in union formationg the Committee came out strongly 
against racially based Unions which it argued would 'in the 
long runoesbe detrimental to the interests of European 
labours African labour and the country as a wholet. 
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The 
principle of 'non-racial' unionism thus ensured that the 
entrenched skilled unions would have the opportunity to 
register as the bonn fidp. union in the Industry concerned 
and so Incorporate black workers within their institutional 
structures and under legislation to protect minority 
Interests* It Is not surprisingg thereforeq that white 
A 
labour leaders anticipated sympathetic treatment of the 
recommended legislative structure: 'Almost without exception 
European trade union leaders were confident that the existing 
European trade unions would open the door to African raember- 
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ghipel The underlying principle of the recommendations 
was to ensure social control over the African working class, 
especially industrial workeres and to provide protection for 
the labour aristocracy* The Ideology of Inon-raoialism1p 
eventually enshrined as a cornerstone of the amended Industrial 
Conciliation Actq which served to mask these class conflicts, 
coincided with the political philosophy of 'Partnership' and 
the strategy-of 'progressive' capitalismg and'also contributed 
00 
to attempts by the State to meet both white liberal and# 
more criticallY9 African objections to discriminatory labour 
legislation which had previously prevailed. 
One of the prime objectives of the new legislation was 
to provide the means for the systematic underdevelopment OZ 
semi-skilled and unskilled (African) unions in the 'industrial 
compleV, In a statement on the Act's provisionsg the 
Minister of Labour recorded that 'it could be argued that to 
provide for these associations Is nothing___more than a 
248 
control mpasure andl let me be perfectly frankq It isto 
It was Intended to make the road to registration both 
treacherous and hard and not to open the door to full trade 
union rights for all overnight* The Incorporation of African 
unionism was regarded as the lesser of two evils. - the other 
being the danger of having militant and organized workers 
excluded from the machinery of industrial control* The 
principal opposition spokesman - who became the Minister of 
Labour In the 19609s under the Rhodesian Front government - 
regarded the Act 'as In many ways an excellent control 
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measure'* It was strongly felt that the African worker 
should be taken tunder the wing' of the European worker* 
'Multi-raciall unionism was well suited for this purpose* 
If this could not be achieved then more subtle tactics of 
persuasion were required. If they did not work9 and 
'responsible' unionism did not emergeg there was always the 
fallbaok onto Increased administrative control and political 
regulation. It was therefore with a measure of confidence 
that the'Minister of Labour-to-be could conclude in the 
5'31 
following wayt 'There are certain people In this country who 
have expressed fears that this legislation will mean that the 
European worker in Industry will be swamped, In my opinion 
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osethe reverse Is the case*$ Indeed$ it was argued that 
Afrioan unions should only be given limited rights provided 
'this form of conelliation (was) without any reperoussions 
251 
ooeurring to the existing European organizations'* it 
was important then for the African to be brought Into the 
system of conoillationg but 'preferably without reference to 
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his rights as such$* Thus, whilat many skilled unions 
remained largely unaffected# others 'converted' themselves 
into 'multi-raeial* unionsg obtained registered union 
rights for the whole industry, esgo the mineworkers uniong 
and were able to meet the challenges from semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers within their own long-established union 
structures under special protection devices provided by the 
1959Aet for skilled minority worker Interests (Section 47). 
The organizational strength and relative position of black 
workers were not greatly enhanoed by the Aet Itself. 
Skilled workers were granted a monopoly of oontrol in the 
lmultl-4aelall unions by preferential distribution of voting 
powers and constitutional arrangements which gave skilled 
workers greater weight than unskilled workers In deliberative 
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votes* 
The divisive impact of the Act on the working class as 
a wholep exemplified by the privileges it provided for the 
labour, aristocracyq was well suited to the strategy of both 
international and local capitals Where sk. 11led unions 
vi 
retained rights to bargain for themselves alone they could be 
utilized by management In conflicts with semi-skilled and/or 
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unskilled unions at Industrial Council level. Where the 
latter classes of workers were directly dependent on a 
controlling skilled worker class within a union hierarchyp 
management had the advantage of bargaining nominally with a 
union 'representing' all classes of labours but In fact 
essentially concerned with the Interests of a small element 
constituting the top stratum of the labour force* The lack 
of union democracy was further advantage6us in that the 
very existence of a union precluded any other group from 
obtaining legal recognition because unions could only obtain 
legal rights if representing a class of worker in a single 
Industryq trade or areae- It thus ensured a weaker union 
structure than would otherwise have prevailed under a 
centralized system of eollective bargaining, Further, the 
establishment of unions on a vertical-industrial basis 
diffused union resources over a wide range of employment 
situations and made It more 41ffloult for labour confodera- 
tions (like the Reformed Industrial and Commarcial Workers' 
Unions the Federation of Bulawayo African Workerst UnIonsq 
the Southern Rhodesian African Trade Union Congress and the 
confederation of African Labour) to be effective In wage- 
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bargaining* In industries where effective unions did not 
existg or where the State and employers could afford to ignore 
the ones that didg non-negotiating/wage-determining bodies 
(Industrial Boards) were to be establishedl on the lines of 
the Labour Boards systeml except that any One Board was 
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confined to a specific areaq class of worker or industry, 
Here Interests of the employer class were effectively catered 
for by diligent State regulation of the wage structure, 
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Benefits did not simply flow from 'coverage* and a change 
In status. Unions had to register to obtain the benefits 
of the Act and the status necessary for collective bargaining. 
This was easier for established unions which were already 
registered under the 1945 Act and who had established their 
bona-fides, with the Ministry of Labour, For these unions# 
the Act meant an uninterrupted legal status* Unskilled 
unions found registration more difficult. Those which 
obtained the status of 'registered' unions had to comply with 
numerous restrictive and bureaucratic requirements In order 
to maintain their status. Unions which were not accorded 
recognition for collective bargaining purposes still had to 
be registered with the Industrial Registrar as $unregistered' 
unions* Unregistered unions were made subjeot to all the 
liabilities of registered unions - with none of the 
corresponding benefits, They had to keep books of accounts 
have their financial affairs audited annuallyq keep minutes 
of all meetings (in English)s maintain a register of members 
(with their addresses), keep records of subscriptions# and 
have'all'records and books available and open to Inspection 
by the Industrial Registrar. Annual returns had to be 
submittedg providing full details of a host of bureaucratic 
I i tems. All- officials had to have their names and addresses 
lodged, with the Industrial Registrar* The', unregistered 
union, was prohibited from affiliating with any politioal party 
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or organization and from Using any funds for furthering the 
interests of any political party or organizationo Nor 
could It accept monies from any organization named in the 
Schedule to the Unlawful Organizations Act. Officials of 
unregistered unions were restricted to working on behalf of 
only one such unregistered union, The formation of 
unregistered unions required the drawing up of a 'satisfactory' 
constitution which had to be lodged with the Industrial 
Registraro All unions unregistered prior to lot Januaryq 
1960 - as were all black unions - had to comply with these 
provisions* Any unregistered union could be wound UP by 
application of the Industrial Registrar If the union contra- 
vened any of these requirements, Thereafter It would be 
illegal for organizers to function as though on behalf of 
the union* Under these conditionst there can be little 
doubt of the Intentions of legislation. Similar restraints 
applied to registered unions* 
These controlling provisions had practical effect* 
A number ofýunregistered unions were denied collective 
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bargaining status. In 1972 many African unions (12) 
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were still unregistered* Once registered# the threat of 
de-registration. was realt being exercised on a number of 259 
ocoasionst The African Trade Union Congress (ATUC)t a 
labour Confederation composed largely of registered unions, 
20 
was refused registration status (in 1969). The Statels 
application of the law also made It more difficult for union- 
ists to ally with African political parties and in so dbing 
It helped to divoroe the unionist from the POlitioal wing' of 
the labour movement, 
n: r 
From 1959 onwards a varletY of controls were applied to 
semi-skilled and unskilled African unions, some In the form 
of more stringent legislation$ others in changes In 
administrative policy under the 1959 Act, The general 
consensus within the ruling class coalition on the 1959 Act 
- sit was a bi-party Act# - made It relatively easy In 
political terms to Introduce further control measures* 
This was emphasized by the repression of African political 
activity In the post-1960 period* 
in 1964g after a period of intense African political 
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and union activityl further controls were Introduced. 
Firstl. vg the right to object to the registration of an 
employerslassociation was restricted to only registered unions 
or employerslassociations., Previously, unregistered unions 
could object to the registration of an employers' association, 
Secondlys because many small Industries did not have an 
Industrial Boardq an amendment was passed to enable the 
establishment of a Board to be responsible for various 
miscellaneous Industries. This brought more workers under 
Industrial Board control, ThIrdlyl to expedite Industrial 
Board wage regulationst the Chairman (appointed by the 
Minister) was given power to sign the Board's recommendations 
whereas previously all members had to sign the recommenda- 
tionse Fourthlys far reaching powers were extended to the 
Industrial Registrar to enable a better check and control to 
be placed on (African) unions, Fifthly# additional 
restrictions were brought into the legislation to divorce 
unions. more, effeotively from 'political activities' and so 
narrow the range-of"legitimatel union activity, 
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in 1967 yet further control was introducedg again 
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largely aimed at restraining union growth and Impact, 
Firstly# disputes could no longer be heard by the industrial 
court but had to be referred to a newly established Industrial 
Tribunal system - the composition of which was directly 
influenced by the Minister, Secondlyp the Minister's power 
arbitrarily to change Industrial Board recommendations was 
clarified and made more explicit. Thirdly, Industrial 
Boards were prohibited from permitting the compulsory 
deduction of union dues in employment regulations. The 
option of compulsory check-off was thus confined to the 
Industrial Council system. Fourthlyl measures were Intro- 
duced to control assistance, In any formg to trade unions 
by other organizations or bodies. This basically reduced 
the Inflow of International financial aid to African unions 
and was an attempt to forestall the possibility of funds 
coming in from banned organizations to unions via the 
financing of Individuals connected with unions, Fifthly$ 
. asingly the financial affairs of unregistered unions Incre 
came under the control of the Industrial Registrar who was 
given extensive power to Investigate all1aspeots of these 
bodies* Sixthlys the removal of the right to strike was 
applied to *essential industrieslo the list of such Industries 
having been extended considerably, 
The pattern was repeated In 1971 when a further Act was 263 
passedo This put considerable restraint on the 'right to 
strike's withdrawing it $if against the public Interests, 
_ Because the Minister was of the opinion that the Act did-not 
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go far enough in preventing anti-Stateg or 'subversive', 
activitlesq-being fostered under the guise of trade unionismg 
percons convicted under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 
(a particularly extensive and embracing statute) and the 
Unlawful Organizations Act would be automatically excluded 
for 7 years from holding office in a trade union if their 
conviction Involved a minimum specified sentenceo 
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This Act was again amended In 1973- The Minister 
was given power to intervene directly, upset bargains 
struck at Industrial Council level and change the terms of 
any negotiated agreement. In effect$ theng all employment 
contracts were subject to State approval. Alsog the 
possibility of using Independent arbitration In a dispute 
arising from an Industrial Council or Conciliation Board was 
denied by, the amending legislation - all disputes having to 
go to the Industrial Tribunal where the method of arbitration 
was laid down by Ministerial decree. Finallyp the Minister 
was given power to use the Presidential decree to alter the 
terms of agreements which previously were justiciable In the 
Industrial Court* 
, 
The impact of control substantially crippled the semi- 
skilled and unskilled (African) union movement and constrained 
the organizational centers of working-class action, Any 
evaluation of unionist Impact must account for this process 
of sy. stematie repression by the State apparatus. 
The financial crises endemic in unions of low Paid workers 
were, made'worse by making *check-off' arrangements conditional 
upon management agreement and applicable OnlY to Industries 
covered by Industrial Councils, Only atrongg well-organized 
unions were therefore able to 'negotiate' comprehensive 
cheok-off facilities and so reduce the cost of collection of 
union duese 
these f aollitles. 
The Act made union recruitment problems more difficult* 
only union members were liable for dues. Howeverg agreements 
and benefits negotiated by the union under the law applied to 
allýworkers In the Industryq Including non-mebberse There 
was no available means for unions to enforce non-members to 
pay for the costs of unionization. The only exception was 
the case of lolosed-shopl unions# there being only one such 
body In 1973, - the Chemical and Explosives Workers' Union# 
a Imulti-raelall and 'single-plant' union In the fertilizer 
Industrye It was generally very difficult for 'closed-shop* 
agreements to be negotiated, Government policy and 
employersq In generalq were strongly opposed to such practices, 
The State used the 1959 Industrial Conciliation machinery 
to reduoe, the effeotiveness of Independent wage-push 
pressures from organized African labouro The extent to which 
government policy was effective in reducing the Incidence and 
Impact of Industrial disputes from 1961-71 can be gauged 
from the reductions In work stoppages In the post-1965 period 
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as compared with the, -- period 1961-65- The numbers of 
em 
- 
ployees Involved In labour disputes dwindled consistently 
after 196$ and the number of mandays lost through industrial 
disputes was drastically reduced. Organized confrontation 
as a. basis for improving wages was forcibly constrained by 
Empl. P. Vors were also largely against allowing 
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legal and governmental restrictions and threats, 
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Where disputes arose they had to go through the 
settlement procedures of mediation or arbitration before a 
'legal strike' could be declareds Having gone through 
these extensiveg costly and time consuming proceduresq unions 
were allowed to call a 'legal' strikes and then only after 
publication of a notice to this effect by the Minister in the 
Gazette* In effects the 'right to strike' was withdrawn 
and all strike actions took place In an atmosphere of 
#Illegality's outside the ICA and under the Law and Order 
Maintenance Act and the Emergency Powers Begulational both 
of which provided for severe penalties, The application of 
harsh 'security laws* severely affected the unions of semi- 
skilled and unskilled workers* 
I-n particularp the union leadership was systematically 
hampered by political repression* Their links with African 
nationalist, parties were outlawed and the quality of union 
leadership was jeopardized by extensive restrictionsg 
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detentions and harassments. The result was a more 
unstable and inexperienced leadershipg susceptible to State 
and managerial controls a problem which union leadership 
training programmes were not able to overcome fully* 
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Restraints on organizers were extensive. Meetings were 
banned on numerous occasions andq under the Law and Order 
(Maintenance) Aotq restrictions were put on permits for 
general meetings* The Vagrancy Act was also used extensively 
against various union officials. The banning of successive 
African political parties (the National Democratic Party, 
the Zimbabwe African People's Union# the Peoplels Caretaker 
5-ýc 
Council, the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe 
National Party)q whose leaders and branch officials were 
closely connected with labour confederations and individual 
unionsl had serious Implications for the socio-economic and 
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political strength of the African labour movement* it 
forced theunion leadership and the rank-and-file members to 
be more circumspect In bargaining and collective mobilization. 
The impact of State and employer control on Industrial 
unions was most clearly manifest In the pattern of under- 
developmentl varying In Intensityq existent amongst African 
unions@ Unevenness existed In a number of forms: the 
distribution of unions in the 'industrial complex'; the 
-distribution of membership strength In the union movement; 
slow unionization in certain sectors; and variation in the 
legal status of, semi-skilled and unskilled unions* 
I-11nistry of Labour records Indicate- that in 1972 there 
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'31"Africant unions functioning, Nineteen of these were n 
were registered, unionso By comparison with skilled labour 
unionsq the data show that there were fower semi-skilled/ 
unskilled unions and of these unions fewer were repistered. 
This was'offset partly by the fact that a few of the 
OskilledO designated unions were $multi-racial' unions which 
catered for all classes of workers. ITO accurate records 
exist to'show the relative degree of unionization by skill 
category-*_ However use of the 'racial' breakdown of union 
membership provides a rough estimate of workers unionized In 
skilled employment and those unionized In semi-skilled or 
unskilled'employment, o Brand's calculations show that 
5YI 
-, approximatelY 329500 
(36 percent) white workers In 1971 were 
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formally'organizede Black union 'representativeness' was 
nuch less. accentuated. The International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICF7. U) records of registered 'national 
centres' indicate that in 1966 paid-up membership was 
restrieted. -to 219,726 workers In "national' unions (as 
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IrecoGnized' by the ICFIU),, The 'book membership' at the 
time was 559946. BY 1971 it was'reported that this member- 
ship had'increased to 42g357 and 66g299 respectively# a 33 
percent increase in paid-up membership In the 1966-71 period, 
The bulk'of, thIs'growth In numbers can be attributed to rapid 
growth of'memberchip In a small number of large unions* 
Four of1the twenty-four 'national' unions covered In the 
1CFrU data experienced a decline in paid-up membership. 
Paid up unionized African workers were a minority group within 
the viage employed black labour force. In 1969, when 697,000 
Africans, "-, ýwere'ln wage employmento onlY 5.4 percent were 
paid-up union members and only 7.9 percent were ýbook members' 
on African union registers, It Is true,, that a number of 
cemi-skilled. and unskilled unionists fell into the category 
4, II 
of. Imulti-racial, *, unions, ) but even inclusion of these 
relatively small additions (79000 or so) would not significantly 
alter the situation In proportianal terms. Excluding both 
agricultural workers and domestic service employeess who 
together constituted most of those employees excluded from 
the Industrial, Conciliation Act, only 11.6 percent were paid- 
up members in 196.9. The exclusion of mining workers would 
. raise'the figure to approximately 15 percent, 
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However the unions' significance cannot be confined to 
a numerical assessment of paid-up membership, The unions 
bargained directly on behalf of non-members in the Industries 
for which they were registered. Their bargaining strength 
was thus of crucial significance for all workers in the 
'industrial complex' who were subject to Industrial Council 
wage determination as well as those affected by Industrial 
Board regulations in industries where unions had not received 
official recognition or collective bargaining rights$ but 
nonetheless were an important pressure on the wage- 
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determination process. 
Union strength amongst semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers was concentrated in selected sectors (e. ge manu- 
facturingg transport and local government)* Strong unions 
were not able to assist legally In the development of unions 
outside of the seetorg area or class of worker for which 
their ovin union rights had been registered. This accentuated 
the uneven pattern of union formation. Labour confederations, 
as a result of both the Act and State policyq were unalble to 
correct these distortions, Consequently some sectors were 
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not even"unionized' by weak unions. In other sectors 
unions formed but were unable to sustain themselves# often 
as a direct result of State labour policy, The uneven 
pattern of union formation was not caused by a lack In 
unionists trying to establish unionst as the reeord of the 
extensive union formation of the post-1940's clearly 
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demonstratese The State set out to contain existing 
. f. 
unionsg control and constrain the development of nascent 
03 
unional as well as thwart potential union formation In non- 
unionized sectors of the 'industrial cooplexle 
Union resistance to unequal incorporation into the 
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collective bargaining apparatus was extensive. In the 
form of action, unionists organized strikess attempted to 
raise the political consciousness of workers, formed alliances 
with African nationalist politiciansg lobbied paternalist 
groups, submitted memoranda to governments participated 
in the formation of Industrial Councils and tried varioun 
tactics to effect meaningful change, Their basic goal was 
to remove injustices improve conditions for workers and 
contribute towards political liberation. This was an 
attempt to exercise Independent political and economic power 
In the market-place and to mitigate the effects of discri- 
mination that contributed towards the poverty of the African 
working class. In the 1970's unions were more closely 
aligned with the radical African nationalist struggle against 
the States 
The fact that unions Rpr se were not able to transform 
settler colonialism and, capitalist domination Is not- evidence 
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of abject 'failure'. It neither appropriately reflects 
the historical record nor does it account for the Increasing 
control which was exercised over semi-skilled and unskilled 
unions as the changing character of capitalist enterprise 
gave birth to new forms of social control over labour, Unions 
,, ought properly to be evaluated In the light of their 
contribution to the general working-class movement, in its 
economic, social and political manifestations. 
Fýq 
Pre-war unionism began a 'new phase' of working-class 
consolousnessl notably extending the principle of collective 
organi7ntion as a basis for action* This laid the ground- 
work for the subsequent postwar transformation of unionism 
in its scope$ scale and tactical style. It also led to a 
re-evaluation by employers of the need to meet worker 
aspirations* Colketive Icervant' action broke the 
psychological and structural dependence of workers on 
employers In the Industrial sectorg at least In terms of the 
character of this relationship. Settler colonialism was thus 
confronted with broadly based working-class action that was 
able to overcome the isolation of labour and the social 
control that continued to typify production structures In 
plantation agriculture and domestic pmployment. This pan- 
ethnic collectivization of Interests oun workers created new 
bases for further organization. Most Importantlyq semi- 
skilled and unskilled unions had begun to obtain a foothold 
Ing and limited control of, the decision-malting apparatus 
of the production structure. This was a slow process that 
had required sustained worker and union pressure to force 
employers and the State to yield and give concessions as 
Strike Inquiry Commissions transformed Into Labour Boards 
and eventually* for some workers$ Into fully-fledged (but 
still circumscribed) barEnining Instruments under the ICA, 
The institutionalization of wage-setting machinery meant 
the breaking in PPrt of the employer monopoly on wage deter- 
minationp even thouGh this process remained far from complete. 
The exprelse of labour's power established a basis for 
9ý 
Intervention In the system and resulted In the development 
of additional threats to employer Interestso The Institu- 
tionalization of unionism permitted the entrenchment of a 
protective instrument of working-class welfareq a not 
Insignificant achievement in the climate of repression 
during the period under review, 
Independent strike actiong despite the existence of a 
growing Industrial reserve army of unemployedl helped to 
raise levels of welfare. The orEnni7ntlonal base for 
working-class action had, In partg been laidg even though 
It was of variable quality, Unions developed the 
capability to survive beyond the lifespan of Individuals 
and thereby represented serious alternatives and contra- 
dictions to the system Itself* The demonstration effects 
of union formation were not unimportant, and worker groups 
organized on a variety of levels and to a varying degree of 
formality, The unions also provided the basis for the 
articulation of an alternative Ideology - though this was 
not true for all unions and unionists, Unions were In a 
unique position In Rhodesian society and ln-ý one which 
allowed them to 'explain the situation' tog and raise the 
political consciousness of$ large numbers of workers* This 
did not mean revolutionary change overnight# but it was 
Important In providing a nucleus of leadership relatively 
Independent of the predelictions of the educated eliteg many 
of whom were readily co-opted into the system, 
Unions oontributed meaningfully to the nationalist parties 
and Indeed were largely part of the same social Movement,, 1 -- 
'(24L V (ý 
The unions were consistent allies In the confrontation with 
the Statep despite their differences over tactics. 
'Politicisation' occurred through union organizationss from 
National Presidential level downwards. The unions remained 
committed in opposition to minority economic and political 
control and posed a challenge to the State and employer 
Interests. Significantlys action enabled a weakeningg 
though not an eliminationg of the stronghold of paternalismg 
even though union sponsored mutual-aidl welfare and social 
security benefits were relatively small* Unions therefore 
offered workers alternatives to reliance and dependence on 
paternalist good-will. 
African unions offered a challenge to 'traditional' 
labour monopolies held amongst the white labour aristocracy 
and contributed to black occupational and wage advance In 
the lindustriaV complex'. The exercise of some African 
working-class influence within some white-dominated Imulti- 
racial' unions also pressured skilled union leaders into 
responding In part on behalf of semi-skilled and to a lesser 
extent unskilled workers. Co-option in these Instances did 
not mean total abandonment of class action as the 1964 
I-lankie Strike and subsequent actions taken by workers In the 
mirAnG industry. show. 
The unions were Instrumental In securing important 
leconomistic9 objectives for members and non-members alike - 
-a higher 'floor-price' for unskilled labours better 
conditionst reduced hours of workq improved leave and health 
provisionsp the Introduction of gratuities and the 
I 
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transformation of these benefits Into pensions over timee 
The unions themselves trained leadership cadres and some 
demonstrated an ability to become independent of foreign aid. 
These gains enabled labour to become more involved ing with 
a greater ability subsequently to control, not only the sale 
but the regulation of labour-power once It had been sold* 
2. PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCERS AND THE URBAN UNDERCLASSES 
The urban-industrial economy included producers and 
social classes other than those directly incorporated Into 
capitalist production in the 'industrial complex'* Many 
Africans on the margin of urban society, not employed as 
wage-labourersq or only casually immersed In formal wage- 
relationsg were Involved in petty production of commodities 
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and services. This production structure was an essential 
component of the social formation and a necessaryg but 
subordinate mode In the peripheral capitalist economic 
system. In this section the class structure of this complex 
element and Its primary relationship to the chaaP labour 
system are identified. It Is shown that there were 
differentiated soolo-economic strata involved in this non- 
capitalist mode of productiong many of which were dependent 
upon the requirements of the settler-colonial system of cheap 
labour reproduction and the Imperatives of socio-economic 
stability In urban areas imposed by the States Barber. - 
Arrighiq and Loney have seriously neglected these aspects of 
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the Rhodesian economic system* 
5*11/S- 
The historical origins of the urban petty producer class 
and various marginal social strata In the urban-industrial 
economy lay In capitalist penetration of the pre-colonial 
social formationg the divorce of some of the population from 
control over means of production, and the disintegration of 
rural handicraft Industries. Africans In Southern Rhodesia 
had developed a long tradition of domestic craft production, 
This was a subordinate mode of production that was 
functionally Integrated with the requirement of the 
Itraditionall social formation. The development of capitalist 
commodity productions the creation of the migrant labour 
systemg urbanizationg and rural impoverishmentg all created 
socio-economic pressures which led to a fast growing con- 
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centration of petty producers In the towns* The Chief 
Native Commissioner# for Instances recorded that from 1930-38 
the numbers of Africans in 'independent trades' rose from 
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864 to 3,545- ByJ945 this number exceeded 595009 and 
by 1957 it was just over 109000o Smaller concentrations 
were found around and within the mining and plantation 
compounds and on the bordering fringes of reserves and 
perl-urban areasq as well as at marketing places and centers 
of population concentration In the rural areas (eeg, 
administrative complexes,, villagesq tourist centers and 
even along the well-travelled routes on the road and rail 
systems)* The size of this class appears to have continued 
to expand up to 19749 despite control exercised over It 
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through the State apparatus, Indeedq It continued to be 
functional and essential for the creation and reproduction 
0? 
of cheap labour-power because it was harnessed to provide 
from within its ranks for the needs of producers In the 
'industrial complex'. 
The nature of the social and economic control exercised 
over petty producers appears to have contained two contra- 
dictory tendencies* On the one hands certain policies were 
designed to reinforce structural trendag so tending to 
loonservelthe petty commodity mode of production* The pro- 
duetion of certain goods and services consumed by the urban 
poor was 'left' to petty producers because this would have 
been unprofitable for foreign and local capital. Petty 
producers were able to produce those commodities at low-cost 
and thereby reduce the costs of subsistence of the African 
working class. This was made possible largely as a result 
of an $extra-cheap' labour policy being followed by these 
enterprisesp long hours of trading in order to sell a high 
volume of commodities at low profit so as to obtain basic 
subsistencep a high degree of 'self-exploitation' in the 
extensive use of family labour in commodity productiong and 
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State assistance to producers and traders, 
On the other handq capitalist enterprises and the 
State were interested In controlling the development of petty 
produetiong channelling it in selected directionsq and 
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applying legislative and administrative controls over it. 
This tendency led towards the 'dissolution' of the petty 
producer class. This dual process created complexity In 
the stratification associated with petty enterprise In the 
urban economy and fostered illegal trading and employment 
SP 
as producers resisted State impositions. It also increased 
the rate of pr9letarianizationg as petty producers were 
progressively Integrated Into wage-relationsg both 
temporarily and permanently* The Native Regitration Act 
(1936). following on previous Ordinances In 19019 1902 and 
19189 tightened up the Pass Laws controlling African entry 
Into urban areas by requiring that all entrants possess 
'passes'* Although the rationalization behind the Act was 
to *rid the towns of thieves' (something which could easily 
have been done under other legislationg as Macgregor 
correctly notes)g its real purpose was to control the Influx 
of tsurplus' labour (thereby avoiding political unrest and 
strain on housing and public services) and to restrict that 
part of the petty producer and trading class which competed 
against established monopolistic producers and commercial 
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capital (both white and Asian owned)* Subsequent 
amendments to urban areas legislation (under the Vagrancy 
Laws of the 1960's and 1970's) followed along similar lines# 
although in addition they were directed at controlling 
unionists and politic'el organizersq especially those who had 
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not been employed in acceptable occupational categories* 
The dissolution effect of State policy orr petty 
production not only served the Interests of Industrial and 
commercial capital, but also those of high-income ratepayers 
and property owners who were thereby able to avoid bearing 
higher costs for African hous Ing and urban social services. 
The disintegration of the petty commodity mode Of productiong 
as a result of Influx control through 'Pass Laws 19 housing legi- 
9) 
slation and licensing controls was also functional to low- 
wage primary Industriesq especially plantation producersq 
who regularly sought to overcome their Ilabour shortage$ 
problems by drawing upon the non-employed pool of urban 
workseekersq petty craftsmen and *squatters** Stability In 
the system of settler colonialism required that employer 
Interests be met in both plantation and Industrial production, 
The loonservation-dissolutiont mechanism of discretion= 
control over petty production (with strict legislation and 
lax application) functioned towards this end* Essentially 
these controls were instruments of class regulationg not 
only In that they served the Interests of capitalg but also 
Insofar as their applicationg affecting poorer petty 
producers most seriouslyg yet aiding othereg was unequal In 
Its impact upon Africans, The dissolution effect upon petty 
production was thus a. -component of the process leading 
towards the creation of the African working class* 
Restraints on petty production functioned as class constraints 
and not simple Oraoial barrierst Consistent with this 
Interpretation Is the fact that 9S1tupa9 and Vagrancy Laws 
passed in 1972 were technically applicable to all Africans 
(except exempted classes and groupsg like owners and 
lessees of Purchase Area farms and farmworkers and mineworkers 
when on their employer's property)9 but were only applied 
de facto to those marginalized groupsg outside of $formal' 
jobs and legal aecommodationg and not engaged in the 
$illegal' or 'illegitimate I production and trading of 
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commodities and services, In this senseq the Vagrancy 
$fL 
Aet was non-raetalo However this is a very different 
interpretation of the 'non-raelall nature of the Act when 
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compared to that of government spokesmen, 
Petty producers# whether legal or 'illegitimate'# 
'traditional' or 'modern' artisansp contracted as sub- 
contractors or self-employed# all providing cheap mass 
commodities and services# offered a means for capitalist 
producers to reduce the costs of labour and the subsistence 
wage required as the employer's contribution to the costs 
of labour's reproduction, Thus petty producers functioned 
In the service of capitalist accumulation. The Obidding 
down' of the prices in these informal market exchanges (by 
competitiong atomistic markets and 'haggling' in price- 
setting)# contrasted with the monopolistic price-setting 
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mechanisms of capitalist producers, The structural 
I differences between the two reflected the general subordina- 
tion of petty producers and one of the operating elements of 
the mechanism of 'internal unequal exchange#* As a 
consequenceg accumulation by petty producers In general was 
restrained and operated under conditions of desperation. 
Howeverg some producers were able to make the transition to 
small-scale capitalist productions often through the establish- 
ment of monopolies. Typically in such casesq wage 
relationships Permeated the production arrangements, non- 
familial labour-power was more extensively utilized and 
lexploAted' (in the technical sense of providing surplus 
value over and above the socially necessary costs of 
subsistence) and 'extra-economict forms of control over' 
M 
labour (especially patron-client forms of paternalism and 
political regulation) helped cement the low-wage worker to 
the contraot of employment, 
Other petty produoersq for instance those engaged in 
production for own consumptiong realized only 'use-values' 
which provided all or most of their means of subsistence. 
They did not experience regular or extensive exchange 
relationships, These strata provided a unique andq from 
the capitalist's perspeotiveg eostless 'reserve army of 
labourlp both 'on-tap' In the urban-industrial economy and 
suitable to meet the short-term cyclical needs of employers, 
One means used to provide the proletarianization of these 
groups was the exercise of State monopoly over raw materials 
(e. g. products from municipal dumps used for recycling). 
Another was State action against squatter settlements. 
This had the effect of re-integrating squatters into the 
wage-labour system by undermining the basis of their produe- 
tiong and thereby their subsistenceg especially where based 
on the internal exchanges endogenous to the squatter 
settlements themselves. 
Squatter policy in urban Rhodesia was crucial to 
the continued success of the labour system# to social 
control in the urban areas, and to control over petty produc. 
tion and the lumpen-proletariat, Official policy thus 
sought periodically, but regularlyg to eradicate squatter 
settlementso The 'discovery' of squatters typically led to 
a decision to remove shanties and thus effectively demolish 
the settlement* In Marehs 19701 there were found to be 
5511 
200 squatters residing in shanties along the Makabusi River 
In Sallsburyp some of whom had been living on the site for 
4 years. 
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By Septembers after the Loeal Government 
Association had protested at their presence# and calls had 
been made by a City Councillor asking for 'immediate steps.... 
to abate the nuisance19 as well as Council approval of 029500 
for its Healthq Housing and African Administration Committee 
to perform the task$ the demolition was completed* Around 
this time# many families were evicted as a result of further 
demolitions* The development of new squatter settlements on 
the came sites brought a much quicker response and the 
original squatters were forced to build elsewhereq only to 
have their shacks again hacked down and burnt, By the early 
197018 the Salisbury City Council had developed a very 
definite anti-squatter policy and In 1972 It was announced 
that the 550 families who had occupied 'Old Bricks* (Hararl) 
were also to be evicted* A bye-law was passed to $streamline 
demolitionsIg but action was delayede Within a year the 
squatter populatian had risen to 59000, Residents regarded 
the area as 'home$ and many babies had been born within 
the squatter community, Many squatters had Jobst a large 
number In 'informal trades',, Councillors condemned the 
squatters an $a. nuisance to themselves and the community'. 
In March$ 1972 they were all evicted on the grounds that they 
represented a fire# health and political hazard* Attempts 
were made to push evicted persons back into the reserves and 
prevent them from taking up *illegal lodging' within the 
townships* Offers of alternative accommodation were made 
I_rr ) zli 
to the squatters before the firing of the settlements, but 
nothing was Implemented. The Council insisted that they 
'return to their homelands'. Most of the squatters 
Interviewed at the time recorded their desire to stay In 
Salisbury - in their jobs or In pursuit of their trades. 
Only 200 took advantage of the free travel facilities offered 
to rural areas, mostly women and children. Another 105 took 
up an offer of farm employment made by a plantation labour 
recruiter* Within a few months more squatter camps emerged 
elsewhere In Salisbury and a similar cycle of control and 
eviction ensued* 
A note here on the general policy towards urban housing 
for Africans will help to explain why the demolition of 
squatter settlements had a number of effects apart from those 
already mentioned, One was to Increase the demand for 
'illegal' accommodation and lodging with the effect that 
home-owners# or more typicallyl lessors$ were able to charge 
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high rents for lodgings, Demand considerations also 
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enalled the State to raise rentals, Illegal lodging was 
tolerated# up to a point, by the public authorities since it 
was functional in the process of minimizing the costs of 
reproduction of labour borne by employers, Such a policy 
was consistent with the general urban policy on housing 
finance for Africans, Chronic shortages of accommodation 
were allowed* 
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Financing policies were discriminatory. 
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Employers refused to bear higher oosts In the provision of 295 
housing, Attempts were made to accommodate workers In 
adjaoent reserve areas (e. g. Siki Tribal Trust Land near 
Salisbury) on the South African 'Border Areas' pattern. Few 
6-5-4 
Industrial and commercial employers were keen to establish 
'tied housing99 and much of the housing providedg at high 
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rentals# was of poor quality. Without the toleration of 
'illegaV lodgingg particularly in Salisbury where there 
developed a huge and growing housing Obaeklogl and few home 
ownership schemes existed# the non-wage costs associated 
with urban employment in respect of accommodation (provided 
either by local or central government funds) would have risen 
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considerably* Overcrowding was a_ cheaper policy -for 
income taxpayers and richg local ratepayerst the two groups 
298 
who controlled the central and local State bureaucracies. 
The social and economie costs associated with the policy - 
crimeg prostitutiong juvenile delinqueneyg and sanitation 
problems - were borne by the voteless and politically 
Inconsequential 'urban poor16 The provision of special 
services insulated the African urban bourgeoisie from the 
general problem of overcrowding and slum conditions* 
A major benefit accruing to employers was the fact that 
a portion of the working class were enabled# legally or 
otherwiseq to become Opetty rentlerstg supplementing their 
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low wages by Incomes from letting, lion-wage sources of 
income helped reduce pressure for wage claims and provide 
300 
families with a more adequate level of subsistence. 
Furthermore$ labour stabilization was provided# on the cheap, 
without substantial modification to wage structures. Howeverg 
this method of 'urban systemOs maintenance* contained 
potentially de-stabilizing imbalances. Periodic legal and 
police action was Instituted against 'illegal" lodgersq thus 
YYI 
acting as a barrier to 'excessive' entry into the urban- 
industrial economy from rural areas, Harassment of 
residents was another control exercised upon urban residents, 
many of whom were forced# by economic circumstances and 
kinship obligations, to take In lodgers. 
The sooio-eoonomie characteristies of squatters 
highlighted the inadequacy of urban facilities for the African 
urban work force. A Salisbury City Council (Department of 
African Administration) survey of the case histories of 132 
squatters in 1973 provides an insight relevant to this 
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issuee Most squatters were not on the waiting-list for 
accommodations although fully 20 percent would clearly have 
qualif iedo This was a reflection upon the strict qualifl- 
cations that were needed for eligibility (a formal jobp a 
registered marriage certifioatel and evidence of having 
worked in Salisbury for 12 years without a break longer than 
6 months) as well as the deterring length of the list 
(169000 persons in 1973) which had been growing after the 
1950tso There were many non-squatters similarly not 
registered on the list, Nearly all squatters had worked 
In Salisbury for over 3 yearal some as long as 25-30 yearaq 
and the average was 12 years. Very few had been absent from 
Salisbury for a period exceeding 6 months. Most were born 
in Malawig Mocambique or the rural areas. Some did not 
qualify for the waiting list because they did not have 
marriage certificates or they had not had their marriages 
registered (in the ease of those married under *traditional' 
law). 
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Others were singlep divorced or were casual 
557F 
labourers with inadequate funds for rentals* Only a few 
lacked the knowledge that registration was necessary to 
obtain accommodation,, Many of the squatters had their 
children with them in Salisbury. A large number had 
previously been legal or *illegal' lodgers. These lodgings 
had been vacated for a number of reasons: loss of Job (the 
most common); being a single quarterg the arrival of a wife 
had necessitated movingl as a result of eviction by the 
authorities; Inability to afford the rentals; and eviction 
by the landlord for failure to pay rent. Most interviewees 
noted that at one time or another their lodgings had been 
the object of a police raid. Many had had their shanty 
dwellings burnt or broken downg often repeatedly. A large 
number were 'illegal* traders and very few had licences to 
trades In many eases the function of the family In the 
urban area was to protect the settlement site and any 
property thereon whilst the head of household engaged In 
empl'oyment or petty production, Many had been to prison 
and some were Invalids. All the squatters were on the look 
out for a secure wage-paying job In the hope that it might 
lead to housing benefits, Basic trades and skillsq used in 
petty production$ were learnt from others#, often with 
lapprentioeshipt fees being attached to the passing on of 
skillse All were very concerned about their children's 
future and feared the police and civil authorities who, It was 
oomplainedg ignored their requests* 
There was In existence a sizeable and growing class of 
unemployed persons In the urban economy. This class 
55-7 
expanded as squatter evictions from plantations forced small 
peasant producers off the land (from the 1940's up to the 
1970's)9 as the Land Husbandry Act was appliedg as the 
fdrop-outs' and twastagelfrom the educational system 
inereasedg as the demolition of urban squatter settlements 
undermined the position of Independent petty producers and 
as population growth (in the over 15 age bracket) exceeded 
the supply of urban-industrial jobs, Despite this trend# 
the Secretary of Labour claimed In 1972 that there only 
existed a low degree of 'frictionaV unemployment in 
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Rhodeslas The claim was severely criticized by Hawkins 
who found serious fault with the way in which both concepts 30 
and statistics had been used to reach this conclusion* 
In a subsequent analysis, it was found that the evidence 
supported the argument that unemployment grew rapidly after 
305 
the late 195018# Yet the State continued to claim that 
no African unemployment existed In Rhodesia: 'He (the 
Afrioan) is not a desUtuteg unemployed man - suoh a person 
does not exist in Rhodesia and I defy any6ne to demonstrate 
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it., The justification for this claim was that 'the 
Africanesehas always got the tribal system to fall back on 
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,,, ohis reserves and'his social structure's Social 
scientists easily found and were quick to point out basic 
flaws In this convenient argument. One random sample of 
all males over 17 years living in Hararl township (589000 
in total) showed that more than half had lived in town f or 
more than 20 years# 23 percent for 10-15 years and 25 percent 
for less than 10 years* Another survey showed that 42 
5LO 
percent of the urban population were burn and reared in town 
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or arrived before the age of 15 with their parents. More 
than 30 percent had not visited 'their' village for 10 years 
or more* These demographic perspectives -illustrate the 
fa, et that not all urban workers were rurally rooted and 
even if they had beeng the fact of urban unemployment could 
not be so conveniently brushed aside. In 1968, for instanceg 
the Director of African Administration reported to the City 
Council that at least 4,000 Africans in Salisbury were 
currently seeking work. 
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One third of these persons were 
living *illegally' in European areas and 81 percent were born 
in Rhodesia., The unemployment problem among school-leavers 
became more acute In the 19601s. 
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Many othersq engaged 
in low income petty productiong were more Interested in 
secure wage emPloymentg as Davies' study on Hartley has 
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showne . 
Not all Petty producersq howeverg were forced to 
consider low-wage jobs (in plantationst mines and domestic 
households)* Petty production often provided an income well 
in excessq in terms of earnings and opportunity eostp of 
the remuneration in alternative wage jobs outside the 
$industrial complext. For this reason offers of farm 
employment attracted very little responseq except In the case 
of the most marginal strataq while advertized offers of urban 
employment attracted many applicants, 
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The only serious State initiative taken to ameliorate 
local unemployment in-, ý urban areas was the policy applied 
in the form of the Foreign Migratory Labour Control Act and 
government exhortations to employers to take On Rhodesian 
5-gi 
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Africans before hiring foreign workers. The unemployed 
In the urban areas were allowed to subsist within limits, 
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This was functional to the creating of. a 'reserve army of 
unemployed' labourers ready to take casual labour at the 
factory gate on terms largely determined by employersq but 
usually at the minimum level set by Industrial Councils or 
Boards, The costs of subsistence of this classq when not 
covered by periodic employmentg were met by relativesq the 
drawing on own resourceaq begging and borrowingg circulation 
between casual day labour and petty productiong or 'illegal' 
enterprise. The urban unemployed were thus an Integral part 
of the cheap labour system. Their dire socio-economic 
position and 'Job hunger' enabled them to act as a counter- 
pressure to wage claims from organized workers or from those 
unorganized workers who staged wild-cat strikes In support 
of higher wages. Employers could always entertain a high 
level of dismissal and labour turnover as they had Immediate 
access to a large pool of 'surplus labourl. Consequentlyq 
employers strongly resisted moves to provide unemployment 
Insurance for Africans, In 1962 the Select Committee on 
unemployment benefits unanimously recommended an unemployment 
Insurance scheme which the State considered Introducing in 
1963 with U, N. financial assistance, 
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The Committee had 
been set up by the United Federal Party government prior to 
the Rhodesian Front coming to power. The scheme was aimed 
solely at selected Industrial workers and only those earning 
below 4Clp5OO annually, It excluded farm labourerss domestic 
worke'rsq casual workers and permanent civil servants, since 
5-ý I 
It was to be both compulsory and *non-raelall, it would have 
affected 2489000 workers In the *industrial complex'. The 
State would have met administrative costs and workers and 
management would have contributed I percent of wagestD the 
fund, '-, 'There would however have been employer safeguards. 
Loss of benefits would have followed: the voluntary resigning 
from employmentp discharge for 'misconduct'. loss of employ- 
cent caused by a labour disputeg and refusal of $suitable 
employment'. This applied for a maximum, of 13 weeks 
bonefit'annually. Under these conditionog few Africans 
from amongst those within such a scheme could have expected 
to benefit. , Employers were hostile to the scheme. They 
feared it would 'encourage unemployment1v be expensiveg 
underwrite a 'welfare state' concept that was antinimous to 
capitalism in Rhodesias and lead to greater difficulty In 
controlling African workers under the low wage systems In 
the eventq despite support for the scheme from the T*U*C. 9 
African unions and labour confederations# the Bill was 
withdrawn and never reached the Statute book, 
I 
Many petty producersq squatters and *unemployed' personsg 
were not engaged In legal enterprise. The fact that 
'illegal' occupations flourished was due not only to the 
difficulty of enforcement of regulations designed to protect 
monopolistic producers (in the case of *illegal' beer brewing 
and 'pirate tail' operators, for Instance)g but also the 
result of the need to allow discretionary breach of the law, 
These flourishing, lillegall enterprises provided subsistence 
for many'self-employed persons and wage workersq as well'as 
maintained a supply of cheap commodities and services to 
meet the needs of the urban poor. Shebeen operations - 
which often Involved brewingg the re-sale of opaque beers 
and ! European' liqueurs# as well as the provision of 
entertainment and foodstuffs - were often the target of 
aministrative control, In 1944-45 the British South Africa 
Pollee clamped down extensively on these producers in order 
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to protect monopolistic suppliers. This action provided 
a great deal of protest from 9hebeen ownersp their employees 
and customers* , 
Commercial firms (e, g. bottle stores) which 
were engaged In supplying these outletsp also developed a 
stronger interest In their continued viability* Over the 
postwar period State action against dhebeens was regularly 
Institutedg ,,. though not wholly effective* 
Their market 
tended to become teontrolledlo but not eradicated* Rural 
Counellss which were responsible for the taxing of beer 
sales In-rural areas,, sought means to control 'illegal' 
brewing, as well as deliveries of opaque beer to rural areas 
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Inwhich an African beer levy was payable. Part of the 
net'oUtcome was that shebeens came to be utilized primarily 
318 
by the better paid workers and social groups* Shebeen 
operators were therefore able to charge high prices and make 
reasonably high net profits. 
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Pirate taxis served a broader spectrum of consumers, 
Like shebeenng they arose out of the shortage of supply in 
public transportg unemploymentt the opportunAty for 
accumulation through 'illegality'% monopoly within the petty 
service sector (very few urban Africans owned motor vehicles) 
5ýq 
and monopoly control outside (e. g. 9 the Rhodesian omnibus 
Company In the case of bus transport)* In Bulawayo the 
pirate taxi Industry was given Impetus because of high 
prices charged by the monopoly supplier of public transport, 
Pirate taxi operatorss some of whom controlled relatively 
large firmst and employed a number of drivers# organized 
themselves Into the Tshova Association (dissolved voluntarily 
In 1974), ' In 1972 these operators staged a one-day strikeg 
organized by a group which Included officials from the 
A, T, U., Cog In order to demonstrate that transport services In 
the city could not function without them. Many more workers 
than usual had to. walk to work. In Sallsburyq conflict 
developed between pirate operators (some of whom used 
European'owned cars) and legalized monopolistic African taxi 
operators* Not even fuel rationing and strict State control 
over Its allocation failed to thwart the expansion of the 
Opirate taxi' Industry. As was the case with 'Illegal* 
lodgIngs9 the provision of these Illegal services was 
functional to the socio-economic system, In additiong It 
provided, one means for petty accumulation by aspirant 
Africadentrepreneursq come of whom were able to establish 
large commercial enterprises from the surpluses obtained 
during their one time $illegal* taxi operations* 
Not all 'illegaV traders and producers were part of 
the lumpen-Droletartatq however$ at least not In terms of the 
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classical definition applied to this class, ManY persons 
In the urban economy obtained their livelihood In the 
following occupations: beggars# some of whom were blind or 
J% 
crippledg while others were fraudulentj petty thieves, 
often young juveniles at various stages of delinquencyq 
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many of whom were orphans; protection racketeers who 
acted as 'landlords* in the case of squatter settlements 
and others who practised extortion upon legal residents In 
the townships; confidence tricksters and embezzlers 
Invol ved. in various ploys to obtain fundeq a group which 
was particularly visible on pay day; prostitutes serving 
local whitesp foreign clientele and affluent Africans; 
Idaggal producers# 'merchants' and dealers who traded in 
drugs grown In rural areas and imported locally grown produce 
to sellAn urban areas at prices well above costs of 
production (to whitess Colouredsq and Africans)t gambleral 
and money lenders who charged high rates of Interest for 
short-term loans. Some persons in petty production and In 
Iformall employment combined their full-time occupation with 
those activities. For Instaneel panel-beaterap upholsterers 
and oar washers who operated In car parks were banned from 
these areas by the Salisbury City Council because of 
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numerous'complaints of theft, Some domestic workersq 
operating In sanitary lanesp Oklas' on the private property 
of employers and the seclusion of white suburbsp also 
engaged in some of these activities* In their ease, a 
major pressure was the need to supplement low wagesq as 
opposed to those who were simply self employed as a means to 
obtain basic subsistence. 
State control over this complex urban production system 
functioned through a number of instruments and Intermediarlest- 
6t ý 
not all of which were wholly co-ordinated. However, they 
operated to reproduce both tendencies of conservation and 
dissolution which marked the relationships of petty producers 
to the State* Licensing controls over hawkers and vendors, 
forinstanceg were subject to a host of legal statutesq Council 
323 
bye-laws and administrative conventions. These licences 
yielded a marginal sum of Income to urban local authorities 
(e. seq %1s518 or 1-5 percent of the total revenue of the 
Issuing department In Bulawayo in 1973). They thus functioned 
not as a source of revenue but as a means of control over 
petty producersl providing the legal backing to prosecutions 
designed to control petty production or proletarianize 
traders by fining or evicting tbemq under Vagrancy Lawsq from 
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urban areas, At the name titeg the bye-laws did not 
attempt to license all producers. 
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Exemptions In certain 
forms of hawking were allowed In Sallsburyq for Instance, in the 
case of, 1- persons who sold manure or 
firewood (most urban 
African households had no electricity), persons who sold 
publications 'sponsored' by the governmentq persons who made 
commodities themselves In their own home (this allowed some 
wage-earners to supplement their low wages since only those 
In employment had their own home)q persons who sold or 
solicited goods to or from persons who were tdealers' therein 
and who bought to sell again (thereby enabling commercial 
enterprises to employ hawkers and to take advantage of low 
cost purchases supplied through hawkers). Persons without 
exemption, the bulk of petty producers and hawkersq had to 
pay 040.00 annually In licensing fees. 
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Where the 
L7 
applicant had restricted his vending to a special list of 
wares (the manufactured commodities of local enterprises) the 
licence was only 06.00 annually. Even licensed hawking was 
restricted by zone of operation to exclude the central 
business district and was largely restricted to 'certain 
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places on the outskirts of Salisbury'. Special stalls 
were provided for a fee In most municipal townships. Some 
authorities applied a quota system to their licensing 
arrangements# esso Que Que Rural Council limited the number 
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of hawkers' licences to 10 and street vendors$ to 1. 
Most producers did not possess licencesq howevere Fines 
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were Imposed on many offenders. Health regulations were 
also periodically enforced to regulate petty trades The 
Imposition of control took the form of routine checks as well 
as special drives to eliminate $illegal' trading* 
All of the Internal bureaucratic rules and policies 
(from squatter demolition bye-laws to hawking regulations) 
functioned under the overall influx control legislation 
administered through the Vagrancy Amendment Act (1972)9 
Iteelf based on the 1960 law, and the African (Registration 
and Identification) Amendment Act (1972)9 the so-called 
'Situpa Law'. These two measures were Introduced to Intensify 
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the influx controls applicable In urban areas, The 
Vagrancy Law operated under the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and applied to municipal areasq rural council areasq African 
townships In 'European areas' and rural villages and 
'business centres' (in terms of the Land Tenure Act (1969) 
Section 46). It intensified controls on-. urban residences# 
e-1 41 D bo 
and thereby on petty production, by widening the legal 
definition of *vagrant' under the Act. Up until 1972 the 
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'Pass laws' had been regarded as only 60 percent effective* 
The following persons at this time were redefined as 
vagrants: (a) beggars, (b) persons found within urban 
areas who were unable to show that they had employment or 
visible and sufficient means of subsistence, (c) persons 
who made use of lodgings# verandahaq outhouses# sheds or un- 
occupied buildings# vehicleng parksq gardensq yardeg open 
trenchesq and drains without the owners permission (provided 
the permission was legally available to obtain)q (d) persons 
who were 'idle' or *disorderly' (e. g. persons who were unable 
to show that they had been living on 'honest means' and had 
alsettled way' of living)l (e) persons who offered or 
professed to tell fortunes#or used any subtle craft or means 
or deviceg by palmistry or otherwiseq or played at any game 
of chance to cheat# deceive or impose upon any persong and 
(f) any person who$ wholly or in partq lived on the earnings 
of prostitution or other criminal acts. These provisions 
were framed so as to apply to most social classes associated 
with petty production, Under the Act 'vagrants' faced a 
period of Imprisonment up to 12 months or an endorsement out 
of, or prohibition from enterings the urban areas for up to 
2 years. For local Africans this meant a forced dependence 
on the reserves or wage-labour on farms or mines, For 
foreign Africans It meant a choice between farm and mine 
labourg on the one handp or repatriation., 
97 1 
The Act was designed to serve a variety of Interests 
functional to the reproduction of the cheap labour system 
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and was thus soundly condemned by African unions. it 
gave, as the Minister of Internal Affairs arguedg potter to 
the authorities to Iremove. **Undesirable elements from... 333 
towns and cities'* It was# he declaredt an influx 
control measure and a means of allowing 'responsible' Africans 
'to differentiate' themselves from the criminal elementq the 
334 
loaferg the man living off his witsO. it also allowed 
for the State to apply effectively (in conjunotion with the 
ISItupa. Law') the Closed Labour Areas Order and so 'remove 
the r6latively large number of foreign Africans employed In 
the urban areas'* 
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This measure recognized the urban 
unemployment problem and saw the opportunity simultaneously 
to help to meet the primary Industry #labour shortage' by 
the application of urban influx controls. In the 
Minister's words: *the Act, by supplying an effective means 
of ldentifioationp can facilitate any other measures for 
Influx control. *.. Let us not be foolish about such a 
thing like thisoo*what Is there objectionable about Influx 
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control. ' Againg as with other urban legislation,, It 
applied technically to all Africans (even from 12 years of age 
in some areas)9 requiring them to hold appropriate documents9 
though Was only directed In practice at a particular clnss 
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of Africans, The Act was strongly supported by 
plantation Interests andg Indeedq prior to Its Introduction 
the R, trF, U, had played an Important role In calling for such 
a scheme of Ilabour directiont to divert labour supplies to 
ro 
white rural arease Later In 19739 under the African (Urban 
Areas) Accommodation and Registration (Employment Bureaux) 
Regulations, the Minister was given power to gazette 
regulations which made It compulsoryfor all 'Job seekerslq 
I, e, those not already In formal capitalist employmentg to 
register at employment bureaux, 
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By the end of 1974 these 
regulations had not yet been gazetteds as negotiations were 
still underway for Local Authorities to operate the bureaux. 
once Introduceds howeverg all Africans who were required by 
law to carry Registration Certificates would have to be 
endorsed by the bureaux. Workseekers would be given a 
period of no less than 15 days to obtain work* Failure to 
comply would render the offender liable to three months 
prison with hard labours or a 950 fine. 
COICLUSIOU 
Changes in the postwar economic base and the development 
of a dominant Industrial capitalist mode of production had 
a marked effect on labour mobilization policiesq State 
economic policiesq Institutional structures and mechanisms 
of discrimination In Industrial labour markets, These 
structural changes brought about the emergence of a 
substantial African Industrial working class composed of 
various strata and located in a diverse set of production 
arrangements* The development of a class of urban petty 
producers and other social strata were essential to this 
proletarianization process. The industrial proletarianiza- 
tion. processq which the dominant classes createdl shaped and 
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reproducedg therefore embodied certain characteristics which 
distinguish It from other forms of African proletarianization 
In the domestic household systems plantation production and, 
to a lesser extents In the mining Industry, 
The basis for accumulation associated with Industrial 
proletarianizationg however# did not differ essentiAlly 
from capital accumulation under other production structures* 
It was similarly based on policies of 'primitive accumulationt 
and the mobilization and utilization of cheap labour-powere 
Black workers were fully proletarianized In the tindustrial 
complex' and most workers had to retain a rural dependence, 
A complex class structure resulted. The heterogeneity of 
the African industrial working class was further ddvaneed 
by the articulation between petty production and capitalist 
production so that the requirements of the cheap labour 
system included tendencies of both conservation and 
dissolution embodied In State policy towards the African 
urban-industrial underclasses. State and employer policies 
were designed to ensure that the costs of labour's reproducýL 
tion, were as low as possible. 
African wages were not set at a uniform level* Quite 
the opposite Position pertained and deliberate wage and 
social stratification was induced. Inequalities In wage 
payments crew over the postwar period* The dissolution of 
the peasant mode of production constrained the capacity of 
rural producers to meet the shortfall between wages and the 
minimum necessary costs of subsistence. Higher wages were 
required to offset 'subsidies' upon which Industrial producers 
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were 'traditionally" dependent. Hence the subsistence wage 
paid by employers - which In the past had been geared to the 
requirements of the short-term single adult labourer - had 
to be adjustod to meet a higher portion of the costa of 
subsistence of the labourer's household. At the same timeg 
industrial producers rationalized productiom Industries 
became more capital-intensive and mechanization was 
extensively Introduced. The labour requirements of producers 
changed* Semi-a%illed operatives became more essentialg and 
thus more working-class households had to be 'stabilized* 
wtthin the urban-industrial economy, This too required a 
change In waee and employment policies* It led to higher 
average wages as well an greater socio-eeonomic stratification 
and thus some workers received wages closer to the full costs 
of labour's reproduction, Occupational changes also led to 
more African workers becoming less Immediately replaceable 
in productione This tendency operated alongside the 
development of African unionism in the 'industrial complex, 
to help raise the wage level. Howevers unionism and working- 
class action was uneven in impact and one consequence was 
that wage stratification was maintained and eve4 In a few 
Instancesp Increased. Specific controls were developed to 
limit the power and development of African unionism and ensure 
rapid accumulation, Unions were prevented from creating 
sufficient pressures to effect a revision in wage structures 
to the extent that all workers would receive adequate means 
of subsistence from the sale of labour-power to employers, 
As a result, a high degree of rural dependency had to be 
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maintained and the Tribal Trust Lands continued to act as an 
'accommodation mechanism' or Ilabour colonies' for 
employersin the 'industrial complex'. 
The development of a class of petty producers and 
other social strata apparently on the fringe of urban societyg 
provided another essential means whereby employers were able 
to cheapen the costs of reproduction of wage-labour. 
Extensive social controls were needed to regulate this class 
formation process to the advantage of employersg monopolistic 
producers$ affluent ratepayers and local authorities In the 
'industrial complex'* 
The control of urban-industrial expansion required the 
Intervention of the State to regulate class confliett provide 
social stability under the low wages system and ensure rapid 
accumulation and , control over politicalp economic and social 
challenges to the settler-colonial system. 
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CHAPTER 
AFRICAN MIVEWOMMRS AND CLASS COTYLICT 
IN THE MINIM INDUSTRY 
The capitalist mining industry of Rhodesia was an 
important component of the 'industrial complex'. Howeverg 
the proletarianization of African mineworkers was Influenced 
by conditions that differentiated it from other forms of 
labour mobilization typical of the urban-industrial economy* 
The features of proletarianization unique to this industry 
were promoted by the pattern of accumulation and the specific 
requirements of production, These characteristics were 
reflected in Institutional arrangements, labour legislation 
and unionization processes* Labour mobilization under 
mining production differed too from domestic and plantation 
production$ the other non-industrial sectors* The State 
recognized these differences In Its designing of labour 
policies. 
In the postwar period# the essential and defining 
structural features of capitalist mining development were: 
the Increasing dominance of foreign monopolistic capital In 
production; the diminishing of the role played by the 
national bourgeoisie and local small scale capital In the 
IndustrYt a continuation of a high level of dependence 
on cheap foreign African labour-power In production despite 
State Initiatives to localize the employment structure; 
the continued domination over African workers In the Industry 
not only by the power of capital and the Stateg but also by 
a monopoly of the legal collective bargaining process for 
African workers being exercised by the artisanal and 
bureaucratic strata of the labour aristocracy (with the 
explicit assistance of the State and foreign capital)l the 
constrained development of a semi-skilled class of African 
mineworkers; the structural malformation of African 
unionization and the qonsequent relative impoverishment of 
the African labouring classes* 
This Chapter will identify these featuresp especially 
with regard to those which haveinflueneed conditions of 
mining employment, A discussion of modern changes In the 
production structure and the political economy of the 'mining 
complex' In settler-oolonial Southern Rhodesia Is necessary 
for this Inquiry* 
PRODUCTIOTT AND LABOUR RELATIONS 
Firstlyq the Industry's relative contribution to gross 
domestic product fell (and continued to do so) after 1924. 
At that time.. 'Mining contributed 93,13 million to national 
income# three times more than manufacturing and nearly 30 
percent of total output, By 1943 its share was only 26 
percent and In 1954 it stood at 8.6 percent* By 1972 
mining contributed less than 6 percent of G, D*P, However 
the volume and value of output had grown enormously in the 
Interim* From 1924-42 the value of output (in current 
prices) doubled and it had done so again by 1954 when it 
stood at $29 million* Output rcEeisteadily to $38-0 million 
In 1964 and then rose 230 percent In the fOMDwing 9 years 
to a level of 090,3 million (1973), The volume index itself 
rose 196 percent durirg the 1964-73 period, 
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Secondlyg the Internal strueture of produetion In the 
Industry was radically changed. Gold production - essentially 
based on local capital and small workings - declined In 
relative and absolute significance. In 1935 the total number 
2 
of gold minos was 19750, The peak in production was reached 
during 1941 and by 1962 there were less than 200 goldmines In 
3 
operation* The mining Industry thus grew Increasingly large- 
scale in character and less labour-intensivee The balance 
of economic power within the Industry. became Increasingly 
concentrated within the grasp of foreign monopolistic capital 
(based In South Africa# Britain and the United : States)* 
International capital*s growing dominance In production 
led to Increasing mechanization* The now techniques of 
production consequently facilitated a change in the pattern 
of demand for labouro Firstlyv the capital-intensification 
process 'repelled' labour, Thus up to 1937 the number of 
Africans In employment grew rapidly and reached the level of 
4 
go. 6oo, By 1963 there were only 40,900 African workera 
in the industry. Substantial and sudden post-Federal 
expansion pushed the African labour force UP to 549500 In 
19739 despite continued capital intensification and mechant- 
zatione Secondlyq employers adopted a different pattern 
of (African) labour utilization* Changed production 
conditions required the development of a class of semi-skilled 
African workers and# because of a growing manpower 'shortageg 
the absorption of a small number of Africans into skilled 
grades* Semi-skilled labour therefore had to be 'attracted' 
5 
and retained within the industry. The Industry-specific 
Tý7 
nature of many of these necessary skills meant that producers 
had to play a major part In the reconstitution of the labour 
structure, Labour stabilization and higher wages resulted, 
These initiatives brought employers into greater conflict 
with the labour aristocracy of the industryg especially at 
the artisanal level where the Asnociated Mineworkers Union 
(A*M9W*U9)q which was controlled by skilled and certified 
production workeral resisted attempts at rationalizing 
I 
production so as to maintain their privileges and security 
of employment* 
The 'repulsion-attraotion' process concentrated the 
power over African mineworkers In the hands of large producers 
who continudA, to follow a labour policy dependent on a cheap 
foreign African proletariat. This policy was adhered to In 
order to maximize capital accumulation under conditions In 
which 
' 
equally_. eheaD local labour supplies were In short 
supply$ The mining industry was traditionally dependent 
upon a large foreign African labour force, 
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In 1936 
nearly 60,000 of the industry's 84gOOO African wage-labourers 
were 'aliens'. Most of theie workers came from neighbouring 
peasant communities outside Rhodesia in Nyasaland and 
nocambique and had arrived In the Southern Rhodesian *mining 
complex" after the Depression of the 1930'se Thetr inflow 
facilitated a out In real wages at this time, 
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Many stayed 
on in mining employment despitb the very low wages* In 
1969 there were still 239947 foreign workers employed In 
mining produetiong nearly 50 percent of all African 
8 
mineworkers, The Frrklual reduction in the dependence of 
foreign controlled mines on f oreign workers was aided by a 
process which a33owed employers to release f oreign workers 
slowly as cheap supplies of local labour were made available, 
Large-scale foreign producers were eventually, able to 
steadily oontrol the oomposition of the Industry0s labour 
forceo In 19389 30 out of 920 mines employed more than 300 9 
African workers; by 1945 the total number of producers 
had f allen to 656 of which 33 employed more than 300 African 
workers* In 1962 there were still 33 mines employing more 
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than 300 Africans out of a total of only 344 producers. 
These toP 33 employers aeeounted for 28,000 of the industryls 
40,7? 2 workers at this time* All evidence Indicates that 
thl, s structural trend continued after 1963- 
The tendency towards monopsonistio concentration Is 
emphasized when It Is realized that of the 292 Ismallworker' 
mines in production in 1962,116 employed between I and 9 
employees (African and European) and 181 mines employed less 
than 25 persons* The labour policies and strategies of 
foreign monopoly capital thus came to determine the 
conditions of the African working class in the 'mining 
complex's even though they were Influenced by the policies 
of the State and the socio-economio and politicalinterests 
of two Important classes of the national bourgeoisie In 
the settler-colonial system - the labour aristocracy and 
the smallworkers. 
The roots of growing foreign monopolY control lay In 
the Depression and the gradual demise of smallworker capital 12 
after the 19301ae By 19? 4 the control exerted over the 
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mining cector by foreign capital was substantial, Of those 
mines falling under Part II of the Mineworkers' Agreement 
(that sector of the Industry subject to collective bargaining)g 
at least 27 out of 49 mining enterprises were directly 
Identifiable as being owned and controlled by foreign 
corporations. 
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These were also the largest mines In the 
economy and accounted for approximately 50 percent of all 
mineworkers employed In 1974. All the mining companies 
quoted on the Rhodesian Stock Exchange in 1972g except for 
one very small holding (Divide Chrome)s were foreign 
14 
controlled. These corporations h6. d an assessed share 
capital value of 0139 million, a value 60 percent greater 
than the value of the shareholdings of quoted donestic- 
controlled manufacturing Industries and 35 percent of the 
market-value of all quoted share capital in the Industrial 
15 
sector* The distribution of shareholdings in quoted 
16 
companies was also highly concentrated* Furthermorej 
foreign capital controlled the most profitable areas of 
production* In 1963 foreign controlled mining companies 
accounted for 80 percent of all gross operating profits in 
17 
the mining sector, About 40 percent of these companies 
,,, were 'located* In South Africa and the bulk of the remainder 
were British based# In 1963 alone these enterprises accounted 
for 85 percent 
' 
of gross fixed capital formation in the mining 
Industry (65 percent of it in South African based companies), 
The extensive dominance of foreign capital In the Industry 
was significant In determining labour policies* 
6T6 
The managerial class In foreign enterprises were 
essentially trans-national in characterg though a number of 
prominent individubls liked to stress the opposite and built 
up local reputations as 'Rhodesian citizens', Whilst always 
emphasizing the need for Rhodesia to maintain its dependence 
on foreign 'assistance* (ioe*e foreign monopoly capital and 
the prevailing division of labour In the International 
economy)p mining executives attempted to stress the local 
character of their corporations, They were keen too to 
develop some local participation in the ownership of mining 
enterprises within clearly defined limits which would not 
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Infringe foreisn majority shareholder interests. This 
was a calculated strategy on the part of International 
capital to make their control appear to be #truly Rhodesian' 
and so meet various socio-political objections to *imperial 
control' that were the hallmark of an ascendant populist-cum- 
nationalist sentiment characterizing later (especially post- 
UDI) settler colonialism. At the same time sound economic 
logic underpinned the 'localizing* philosophy of foreign 
monopoly capitnlo The statement of a former Vice-Chairman 
of the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines and a Chairman of Rio Tinto 
(Rhodesia)# a British controlled companyq epitomizes the 
pecuniary Interest Involved heret 'it should not be neceasary 
for a mining company which (is) rpcognived as Rhodesian to 
have to obtain exchange control permission to borrow money 
19 
in Rhodesia** This clarifies the position, International 
corporations wished to avoid restrictions which constrained 
the level of *gearing up' of capital and thereby the rate of 
571 
profit for shareholders in foreign cOuntriesg by the 
rfflgulation of access to local sources of loan finance from 
the Reserve Bank* The four conditions proposed by Rio- 
Tinto to provide a 'workable definition of when a foreign 
company becomes RhodesianOg however strict their applioationg 
would have failed to alter the balance of control between 
domestic and external shareholders in the policies of the 
20 
corporation. 
The control of foreign capital at the level of ownership 
of productive capacity was reinforced by a steady increase 
In influence at the organizational level# in the National 
Industrial Council (N, I, C*) and over local capital in the 
Industry* After 19599 the date from which the Rhodesian 
Mining Federation (the representative of smallworker Interests 
at the oollective bargaining table) was not represented on 
the N*I*C*g foreign corporate interests dominated the 
Chamber of Industries and thus its negotiating strategy 
with labourp as well as mining capital's relationship with 
the Statee 
The domination of large-scale and foreign capital In 
the Industry was reflected in the membership and constitution 
of the Chamber of kliness the organizational center of the 
managerial system in the mining Industry* The constitution 
under which mining companies operated from 1960-70 explicitly 
recognized ths oligopolistic natureq so supporting large 
producer Interests* A 1970 amendment reinforced this control 
when it Incorporated a principle giving the cOmpanieseeewh1oh 
have the largest stake In the industryq the largest say in 
5W7 
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the determination of the policy of the Chamber'. 
Effectively% toog foreign producers obtained an entrenched 
majority on the Executive Committee of the Chamberg which 
alloued this 'fraction' of capital to dominate the 
proacedings of the Chamber and also the policy of mining 
employers because only the Chamber (af ter 1959) had legal 
rights to negotiate on behalf of all mining employers subject 
22 
to N, I*C. regulations, 
Foreign capital did not function In isolation from local 
smallworker capitnIq and smalluorkers were not disorganized 
even though the Rhodesian Mining Federationt Ito principle 
23 
Institutiong was subordinate to the Chamber of 111neso 
However, their organizational energies were fragmented. In 
1966, for instancep there were seven active smallworker 
associations and In the same year an African Mining Associa- 
tion was formed to encoureZe smnll-sedl-e African capitalism 
In the Industry, However# the latter organization failed 
the following year and was not revived* at least not by 1975- 
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The weakness of emallworker capital In relation to foreign 
capital was not based simply on Ito small sizeo it lay 
also in the distribution of local capital across a broad 
spectrum of types of mineral production* The result was 
that in each sector the individual local producers were 
particularly weak, In 1962,1 for Instancep 184 out of the 
existing 332 smallworkers were occupied with gold production, 
The balance produced 20 other different commodities, The 
total value of output by these producers amounted to 05.3 
million# a small sum when set against the $50*2 million 
e-rz op., 
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produced by the Industry In the same year* The political 
significance of this olassg however# exceeded that 
Indicated by its quantitative contribution to outpute Many 
of these producers enjoyed connexions with plantation 
productiong small-scale manufacturing and commercial enter- 
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prisess as well as with Influential political parties. 
There was also the socio-economic significance of the 
effect upon white employment. The 89500 employees of 
smallworkers In 1962 Included 322 European employees# an 
average of just over one per enterprise, 
Tte, structure of capital in the industry had an 
important bearing on the balanee of power existing between 
capital and labour, This affected producer relations with 
27 
the States The State regularly consulted mining 
employers before proposing changes to labour legislation 
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and other legal enactments that affected profits* In 
doing so it attempted to represent the Interests of capital 
insofar as they were consistent with the reproduction of the 
sottler-colonial system, In particular, the State sought 
to meet the need of forbign and local capital for cheap 
labour-powerg the different forms of which required a close 
liaison batween the two parties to ensure that adequate 
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r, upplies of this commodity were made available* 
The relations between capital and African labour for the 
latter part of the period under review can be highlighted by 
a consideration of profit/wage relationships in the mining 
Industry from 1965-72. During this time groEs operating 
profits (G. OoPs) were both high and Increasing, During 
5-5ý 
these 7 years G*O, Po rose 50 percentq from $25#1 million to 
$37.8 million, 
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By 1970 the value of G. O*P* had reached a 
level of $32*2 million, As a portion of gross outputq 
GoO. oP* increased from 48.1 percent to 50,1 percent In 
the 19? 1_7Z period and in other years was more In the 44-52 
percent ranCes By contrast African wages (for all classes 
of labour) fell consistently as a portion of gross output 
after 19689 when the proportion was 19.67 percentq to 14-76. 
percent in 19? 2. At the same time the numbers of African 
workers increased by 14 percent to a level of 549000 In 
1973, The Industry therefore had a marked ability to 
finance sross fixed capital formation from G*O. P* In 1970 
the pereentage of the former- to the latter was 54.6 percent,, 
In 1971 it was 70ý9 peroent and In 1972 it dropped to 46.8 
percente There was only one year (1965) In which the 
Industx7-1z gToss fIxed Investment level exceeded GO, P. 
Thece aggregate figures are Imperfeet in their 
reflection of the shifts In the Industry's class relationships. 
They present merely an overall statistical impression, The 
stratification found within the African mineworker class must 
be examined since it whs around this differentiation that 
considerable class conflict developed* 
WAGE PATTERNS AND STRATIFICATION MIONIGST AFRICAN I-IIIMWOMEIIS 
There is no doubt that the average wages of Afrlean 
mineworkers in 1901 were higher In real terms than they were 
in the mid-1940's* In 1901 the Chief Native Commissioner 
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noted that underground labourers were paid 501- to 601- 
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taonthly and surface workers 25/- to 40/- per tonth. 
'Special' (semi-skilled) workers received from 75/- to SO/- 
In cash wages* In 1904 it was reported that about two- 
thirds of all African miners were paid an average cash wage 
of 501- per month, These relatively high wage payments9 
arising from the fact that peasants had adequate access to 
alternative means of subsistenceg can be contrasted with the 
1939 and 1949 (current price) monthlyaverage cash wage for 
African mineworkers of 26/6d and 30/6d respectively. 
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On 
some mines (eege mica and tin mines) the average monthly 
cash wage In 1946 was 22/6d* 
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Howeverg the recovery from 
the 1930's Depression during the Post-1936 period. led to 
a general rise In both cash wages and earnings. A greater 
degree of working-dass stratification resulted as the 
composition of the African labour force changed and the 
unionization of African workers proceeded apaoe# albeit In 
a calf ormed manner* 
up to 1960 African wages were fixed without reference 
to either collective bargaining or negotiated minimum wage 
policies* The Native Labour Boards Act (1947) did not 
apply initially to mining enterprisesv although a Labour 
Board was set up for the mining Industry in 1954 on which 
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the AMWU were represented, Bargains struck between 
African workers and management were done on an Indl, ýIdual 
enterprise basis and were governed by the Masters and 
Servants Act until a Labour Board was established* 
Eventually In 1959 the Industrial Conciliation Act was 
514 
amended to Incorporate the mining Industry, It gave African 
mineworkers the right to bargaining collectively* The 
Oforceal of the market thus predominated In the setting of 
wages during the early period, At this timeq howeverg the 
State's foreign Ifree flow' labour policy was crucial to 
ensure adequate labour supplies to meet labour demand at 
a low price* Underdevelopment of the local peasant economyg 
@squatter* evietionsg the Land Husbandry Act (1951)t and 
other rural policiesq together with urban influx controlq 
helped ensure a steady supplement of cheap local labour to 
producers* Nonethelessq the mining industry (especially 
smallworkers) faced *shortages' of unskilled surface and 
underground workers* A high level of demand for base 
minerals'during the war, and local labour supply scarcities 
resulting from competition for labour supplies from 
secondary Industry (for semi-skilled workers) and plantation 
produoers'(for unskilled and especially foreign workers)q 
gave -,, 
Impetus to mine employers to raise wages, 
The Ilabour shortage' arose for a number of reasons* 
Having out I cash wages by UP to 30 percent (from 31/- to 21/- 
monthly) between 1931 and 19359 and not having restored 
the_current price Value of the 1931 wage by 19459 producers 
found It difficult to attract even foreign workereg 
especially as the price of basic commodities had risen 
rapidly during this period* Smallworkersq 'poor employers' 
and remote mines set away from the main 'migrant' labour 
routes were hardest hit. The military requirements of 
foreign territories in 1942 and 1943 further affected 
SF7 
'traditional' cheap labour supplies from outside Rhodesia, 
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The State made a concession to mining producers by diverting 
some of the conscripted labour force away from food produe- 
tion. towards base mineral production* Gold producersq 
howeverg-were given no relief, South African mines on the 
Band were offering higher wages and acted as a magnet for 
Rhodesian and foreign workers In the mining Industry who 
would $work their way south' from mine to mine eventually 
to 'desert* from the gold mining complex In the Gwanda 
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region so as to cross the border Into South Africa* 
Concern at this state of affairs, which led to the 
policing of the Limpopo border# as well as to employer 
pressure on the Statep resulted in the establishment of the 
Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission (R*NL,, S@C*) In 
1946e., The R. N. L*S. Co did not actually function In 1946, 
howeverg and a general Ilabour shortage$ was experienced 
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In all parts of the mining industry, Employers had no 
alternati ve but to alter basic rates of payq particularly In 
the labouring grades. Large-scale monopolistic produoersq 
who had accumulated large surpluses during the war# were In 
a good position to make this adjustment. Smallworkersq 
es pecially'ln gold mining# where commodity prices were fixed 
at the 1935 levelg were less well placed. Many experienced 
severe Ilabour shortages' andp under pressure of rising 
costop were forced to leave the industry. The effect of 
thic, chronle crisis In smallworking production was to 
'release' supplies of labour for other mining employers, 
Throughout the late 1940's the shortage grew. As large 
N 
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producers expanded their planto labour demand Increasedg 
wages roseq and labour was bid away from smallworkers. The 
R#N, L . aSeCe were unable to meet all demands placed upon them 
at this stage. 
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Many mines had to curtail production* 
Higher labour costa and the general 'shortage$ thereof 
combined to induce further mechanization. This was not a 
strategy that smallworkere could follow easily with their 
limited, financial resources. Even R. K., L,, S., C, supplied 
contractees were regarded as 'too expensive' by this class 
of producersq eepecially as the Commission raised Its 
cap . Itation fees between 1947 and 1953 to raise revenues to 39 
meetAts mounting deficits on contract labour operations, 
marginal gold unions were severely affected tooo The rising 
costa of"rations' and housing made matters difficult for 
settler-colonial capital which was heavily concentrated In 
the. ". fixed-price seotorl of the mineral export market, 
I)espite the-'shedding' of labour in the industry after 1945, 
the mining lndustryýcontlnued to remain relatively uncom- 
petitive, in the domestic market for unskilled laboUre As 
a result shortages were experienced on many mines up to the 
earlY 1950'sq exceptt howeverg where wages had risen and/or 
mechanization had reduced the need for dependence on unskilled 
labour supplies# 
Wages did not only Increase to rectify the low wage 
structure after a long period of Imbalanceg but were also 
deliberately adjustedg by some employersq as a response to 
seneraIAfrioan working-class militancy. Low wages, 
inflation and social unrest In general# made employers acutely 
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aware of their vulnerability to unionizatton and strike 
action. Memories of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' 
Union, which threatened to penetrate the Insulated compounds 40 
In the late 1920ts and 1930'st were still strong. In 
1947 there was 'considerable unrest ... In various districts 
and small strikes ... occurred due to inability to obtain maize 41 
meal at various times'. The findings of the Commission of 
Inquiry Into the 1945 Railway Strike caused 'a certain amount 
of trouble' In various districts as worker consciousness of 
the correlation between collective mobilization and higher 
42 
wages became more widespread, The effects of the 1948 
General Strike were far reaching in their Implications. 
Contract workeraq recruited Into the 'mining complex' by 
large employers such as Anglo American's Wankle Collieries, 
brought a high 'desertion' rate and agitation to the 
compounds, In many mines there were strong links forged 
between the African working class In Southern Rhodesia and 
that of Northern Rhodesia where organization and unionization 
amongst the labouring classes was further advancedl largez 
scale strike action having previously been resorted to In 43 
1940. The management of some multinationalsq operating 
In both spheres of Central Africaq saw an advantage In 
maintaining the initiative and pre-emptingg co-opting or 
even thwarting collective mobilization. These employers set 
the lead for others In. 'Southern Rhodesia. The success of 
their strategy Is evidenceid by the comparative strength to 
which African unionism developed in Northern Rhodesia as 
Opposed to Southern Rhodesia. 
N 
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These socio-economie forces created a wage structure 
very different from that prevailing during the pre- 
Depression period. From 1932-37 average monthly wages fell 
by up to 25 percent for Hammer OBoyslq Surface workersq 
Trimmers and Lashers. At the beginning of the war the 
44 
monthly cash rate for these grades was 22/7d. By the end 
of the war the 1932 levels had only just been restored (in 
current prices)* In the following five yearn# howeverg 
average wages for Hammer 'boys' rose from 33/3d to 68/3d and 
for surface workers from 38/8d to 60/11d. In some sectors 
of the Industryt eog. coal mining (dominated by large-scale 
foreign eapital)q wage rates were well above average. By I 
1953 coal workers received cash wages nearly 55 percent higher 
than gold miners and employees In the mica Industry. 
Between 19499 the year in which the urban Labour Regulations 
became effeotiveg and 1953 average monthly wages rose more 
than 50 percent. 
The same processes - mechanization, unskilled labour 
shortagesq strike action (in 1954 at Wankle for example) and 
semi-skilled labour stabilization - operated in the first 
5 years of prosperity during Federation to push wages up. 
By 195B average earnings had risen to 017.7 monthly. 
In 1960 the legal position on African wage determination 
was changed by the State, The A. MoW. U. obtained #rights' 
to negotiate on behalf of all workers In the labouring and 
semi-skilled gradeso Minimum wage legislation was 
Introduced$ but African workers were not given effective 
power to control or direct the bargaining process, Claims 
-- ----- - ----- 
submitted on behalf of labourers were submitted to the N, I. C* 
by the A, M. W, U. 9 Itself controlleds under Section 47 of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, by the *skilled workers'q 
ioes Grade I members of the uniong an artisanal class 
comprising a tiny fraction of potential members and all 
mineworkerso The State and employers agreed to the non- 
democratic union taking over the collective bargaining rights 
of the labouring and semi-skilled classes, 
The experience of A. M, W. U. wage *bargaining' Illustrates 
how the union was used to further the Interests of the 
labour aristocracy and how African labourers received no 
effective protection as a result of the A, M*W. Us's activities 
on the N. I. C. In 1961, the date of Inauguration of an 
agreement to cover African workers (the agreement previous to 
thisg valid for 2 years as of 1959s pertained to non-Africans), 
the underground and surface workers were, protected by 
minimum rates of 22 cents and 20 cents (excluding rations) 
per 8-hour shift, 
45 
Juvenile surface workers were entitled 
to 10 cents per shift. By 1974 the respective minimum rates 
were 26 cents and 24 cents (Juvenile workers 12 cents). By 
contrastv Grade A minimum rates hdd Improved from 508 cents 
to 700 cents per shift during the 1961-70 period. The 
African consumer price Index Increased by 3 percent per 
46 
annum, on average from 1962-74. Thus In real terms the 
minimum wages of underground and surface workers fell by 
17.4 percent and 15.6 percent respectively. Neither State 
minimum wages nor union action In itself can account for the 
actual rising earnings of African workers from 1959-73. 
-- -- -, N 
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Indeedg If anything# the A. M, W, U, to policy would appearg at 
least at the MIX, level, to have had an adverse effect 
upon Ilabouring members'. 
Despite AoMoWoUo Ineffectivenessq average African 
earnings (all grades) rose steadily after 1959 when the level 
47 
was 020*3 per month (constant 1964 prices). By 1973 
teal earnings (including eashq Orations' and hn Imputed 
valuation for housing) had risen more than 30 percent to 
$26.9 monthly (constant 1964 prices). However, to appreciate 
the causes behind the changing average wage levelq It Is 
important to Identify more closely the stratification that 
took place as a result of the development of a relatively 
large semi-skilled class of African mineworkerse 
In 1961 sea-skilled workers (e. g, drivers, qualified 
assistantsq gangleadersq drillers and artisans* assistants) 
48 
received minimum rates per shift of between 3/6d and 6/6de 
Their minimum rates were between Ij and 2 times those of 
surface andu underground workers* By 1974 the rates per 
shift for semi-skilled operatives were set at between $1*00 
and 01,50 for most types of work, but reached as high as 
49 
$2,00 and X3*00 for certain tasks (e. g. drivers of hoists)* 
These B grade employees numbered Is994 in 1970. Another 
larger stratum of semi-skilled African workers (89980) 
received minimum rates In the region of 00-50 to $0-75 per 
shift (mostly assistants to semi-skilled operatives and 
skilled/A grade workers), In the case of operativesq 
minimum rates were between 4 and 12 times as high as those 
for unskiLed labourerst although the bulk of semi-skilled 
workers were paid 2-3 times more than labourers. 
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Much of the increase In. average African wages was there- 
fore the result of this stratification, To what extent this 
has been the case can be demonstrated by data from N*I*C, 
50 
records regarding the numbers of workers In each grade. 
In 1961 semi-skilled workers (operatives and assistants) were 
classified as Grade 2 workers, There numbered 4,356 who 
were under the Mineworkers Agreement at this time (approximately 
13 percent of the total number covered by the Agreement)* 
Grade 3 workers (labourers) numbered 289184. By 1974 their 
numbers had dropped to 24,104 (61 percent of all mineworkers 
In the Agreement)o Howeverg the numbers of Grade 2 
operatives had Increased and there were 29207 in this 
category and another 11,840 Grade 2 assistantsp who together 
accounted for more than 35 percent of all African mineworkers 
covered by the Agreement. The rest were Grade A skilled 
artisanso 
This pattern was also reflected in the case of Staff 
Employees, who were covered by a separate Agreement -, negotiated 
by the Mine Officers and Salaried Staff Association (MOSs, A, ) 
The number of Africans who fell under the higher wage 
provisions of these occupational groups also grew. Their 
wages were substantially higher than those of the labouring 
classes and they rose-faster, 
In 1973 there were 169460 African workers in Mining and 
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Quarrying who were paid a monthly cash wage In excess of $3o, 
This left 389010 who were paid less than $30 In cash monthly. 
Nearly 46 percent of all workers received cash wages of less 
than 020 monthly and 6001o (mostly outside Part 11 of the 
"A 
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Aq,; reement and employed by smallworkers) received cash wages 
of less than $10 monthly, This compares markedly with the 
position that prevailed In 1961 when only 829 out of 479493 
African workers In Mining and Quarrying were paid a cash wage 
of more than $30 monthly (1961 prices)* 
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Fully 55 percent 
of all African workers at this time received cash wages of 
less than $10 monthly, 
Despite the general upward trend in average African 
mine wages from 1959-749 the process of development clearly 
led to a differentiatione Most workers In the labouring 
grades (many of them foreign workers) continued to receive 
very low wages and almost no protection from the A. M. W. Ue 
In the form of adequate minimum wages. The minimum rates 
for labourers In the 1970 Agreement (which still prevailed 
in Februaryq 1975) enabled underground and surface workers 
to earn (in a 26 shift month) a cash wage of $6.76 and 06*24 
respectively. After allowing for 'rations' (valued by the 
Chamber of Mines at $7.02 monthly) the labourer's minimum 
rate of remuneration was less than that considered necessary 
53 
to cover the costs of subsistence for a single workere 
Some mines paid slightly above the minimum rate and provided 
better $rations$ or supplements which reduced the costs of 
subsistence that workers had to finance themselves* Others 
did not* It Is not difficult to see why,, thereforeq 'extra- 
economic$ forms of control were required In the mining 
compounds to keep workers 'adjusted' to the cheap labour 
system and why throughout the postwar period large and 
periodic 'wildcat' strikes developed into violent struggles* 
1ý 
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The rising trend in average wages for African mineworkers 
and the pattern of wage stratification In the postwar period 
thus reflected changes that occurred in the production 
requirements of an increasingly monopolistic industry, 
Concentration in the production process led to the squeezing 
out of small producers and local capital. The State had to 
accommodate this trend by providing less for the Interests of 
the national bourgeoisie and catering more for the require= 
ments of foreign capital, In turng mechanization led to 
the development of a class of semi-skilled African operatives 
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and higher wages In order to increase productivity* Labour 
stabilization took place as the turnover of labour In the 
higher grades was reduced. Most workers in the labouring 
classesq howeverg remained caught in the low wage syndrome 
of the pasto By the 1970's the extent of peasant under- 
development was far advanced in the local economy, This, 
enabled minimum wages to be kept at a low levelq a policy 
deliberately propagated by the A, M, W, U, g and backed by the 55 
strong resistance of the Chamber of Mines to changes 
Workers employed by small producers were denied even these 
low levels of wage protection, 'Labour shortages' in this 
sector did not lead to substantial wage revisions as 
smallworkers faced severe profitability constraints and the 
African Labour Regulations Act operated to reduce the 
incidence of competitive bidding amongst employers, 
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The 
bulk of African workersp Including many In the semi-skilled 
gradesq did not receive wages enabling them to meet the costs 
of reproduction of their labour for employers. As a result 
IN, 
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of these wage policies based on primitive accumulation, 
many workers had to retain homesteads In the rural areas 
and seek income supplementation from non-employment sources. 
The low-wage system was also associated with continued foreign 
migrant proletarianizationg poor conditions of employment 
and *extra-eeonomial forms of control In order that rapid 
accumulation could take plF-ce under a settler-colonial 
system of peripheral capitalism, 
FOREIGN AFRICAN WORKERS AND CHEAP HIM LABOUR SUPPLIES 
One essential element in the strategy of capital to keep 
wages low and below the cost of reproduction of labour was 
the continued maintenance of a high level of dependence on 
foreign labour supplies. The dependence originated from 
the earliest period of capitalist mining In Rhodesia* In 
the postwar period mine owners lobbied the Stateg with other 
producersp to set up the R, N, L, S, C, After 1947 the Industry 
employed forel. gn contracted labourg a practice which ceased 
only in the early 1960's by which time a surplus of cheap 
local labour was available, Throughout the period employers 
hired 'free flow0foreign migrant labour as low wages for the 
labouring classes meant that the Industry had to remain 
dependent on foreign 'free flowt workerag even though the 
numbirs of unskilled African workers entering Rhodesia 
diminished after the tNew Economic Policyt of the Post-1958 
period* 
IN, 
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State controls over foreign labour were resisted by the 
Chamber of Mines In order to ensure the minimization of labour 
costs', The Foreign Labour Employment Tax of 1961 did not 
receive the approval of mine ownerag who applied for 
exemption from the targ though It only applied to non-Federal 
Africans (at a rate of r. 1 per month), 
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As a result of the 
objections raised against It, It was withdrawn after only 
one year of application. The introduction of the 'Closed 
Labour areas' policy at the same time, upon the Implementation 
of which the Chamber,,. of Mines was consulted# did not have a 
disadvantageous effect upon the supply of cheap labour to 
mines since its principal aim was to exclude certain foreign 
workers from urban employment. The Chamber raised no 
objection to this element of State foreign labour policy as 
it was not designed to hamper the Industry's 'engagement of 
special classes of labourl. 
58 
However It did continue to 
resist other pressures from the State on Its foreign labour 
policy* 
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By 1965 the Industry was still 60 percent 
dependent on foreign African workers# 20 percent of whom 
came from outside the ex-Federal territories of Malawi and 6o 
Zambia* Mining employment policy had changed by this 
stage In order to accommodate gradually the need to cope with 
rising domestic unemployment without jeopardizing cheap 
labour supplies, A number of large mines adopted a policy 
giving preference to Rhodesian applicants when recruiting, 
This was made easier by the larger number of Rhodesian 
Africans who were offering their labour to employers at 
rates which previously would not have attracted workers 
S-rl, 3 
locally* The squeeze on the peasant economy was having 
effect and with the growing African unemployment crisisq 
after the establishment of a Committee to look into Farm 
and Mine Labour In 1969 by the Ministry of Labour# the State 
applied further pressures on mining employers to change their 61 
foreign labour employment policy, The Chamber of Mines 
was asked 'to encourage Its members to increase the indigenous 
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content of their labour force'. Many mine owners resisted 
the pressure and kept to their previous policy* They argued 
that they foould not support any proposal that mines be 
asked to activity reduce the foreign content of their labour 
forces by discharging existing employees'. Foreign workers 
(many of whom had been on the mines 10 years or more) were 
indispensible to the low cost production system In many 
large mineog espeolally as a large proportion of the foreign 
African labour force belonged to the low paid labouring 
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class* 
By 1969 the mining industry was still recruiting only 
half Its labour force looally* It had kept toAts policy 
of allowing only 'natural wastage' to affect the foreign/local 
African content of its labour force* This policy continued 
up to 1974* At the end of that year an Important set of 
events occurred In Southern Africa - Malawi's withdrawal of 
contract labour supplies from South Africal the de-colonization 
of Mooambique under a socialist governzentp large strikes on 
South African gold mineal the development of collusion between 
the contract labour-supplyingg peripheral-States to Southern,,, 
Africa# and an accentuation of the socio-economic and political 
! 5ýq 
64 
7 
crisis of settler colonialism in Rhodesia. Under these 
circumstances the South African government arranged (through 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) for Rhodesia to 
become a supplier of African contract labour to South Africa. 
An Agreement was signed and up to 50*000 one-year contractees 
were to be made available from amongst workers who# at least 
In the year before contractq had not worked In the Rhodesian 
mining Industry, The decision was made without consulting 
the Chamber of Mines, Mine employers objected strongly to 
the State Initiative since it could potentially jeopardize 
their supply of cheap labour. By early 19759 howeverg the 
precise effect and ramifications of the State's new turn In 
African labour policy had not yet been made clearg except 
insofar as It reflected the peripheralization of the 
Rhodesian economy* 
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYIIE14T AND 1EXTRA-ECONOMIC' CONTROLS 
The conditions of employment for African mineworkers 
reflected the wage stratification patterns and were related 
to produetion requirements* For employers to maximize 
profits and reduce labour costs$ African workers - especially 
in the labouring grades . had to experience austere conditions 
of employment* Many of these conditions were designed to 
ensure a high degree of social control by employers$ 
allowing them to exercise discretionary power over the large 
non-wage element of earnings (35 percent of earnings was paid 
in kind In 197I)e 
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Payments in kind accrued to workers- 
gw 
through various $extra-wage' relationships with employers 
so 'tying' low wage workers to mining employment. 
Various non-wage benefitag which accrued directly to 
workersp and over which management had no controlq were 
minimized as far as was compatible with minimum statutory or 
socio-economic requirements. These weret pension benefitog 
sick leave provisions and accident and death benefits* 
Prior to 1959 there were no statutorY provisions made 
for gratuities orý-pensions for African mineworkers and few 
employers provided these benefits, Smallworkers In 
particular almost wholly avoided these labour costs since 
they were exempted from Part II of the Mineworkers Agreement* 
The first Agreement covering African workers (1961-63) 
provided for semi-skilled and unskilled labourers to receive 
statutory gratuity benefits of either one of two kinds. 
Workers who had been 'continuously employed' with the same 
employer (or different mines under the control of the same 
head office) for more than 10 yearsq but less than 20 yearss 
were entitled to a minimum gratuity of iel for each completed 
year of continuous service if the service of employment was 
terminated on the grounds of physical or mental Incapacity 
(provided Ill health was not due to the worker's own wilful 
negleotj fault or carelessness). This meant that workers 
in Grades 2 and 3 who wished to retire before 1981 received 
no entitlement ot a gratuity and those who were forced to 
leave their jobs for medical reasons could only expect a 
statutory provision equivalent to 2 shillings for each month 
of continuous service* In order to promote labour 
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stabilization the second part of the scheme granted statutory 
gratuities to all workers who wished to retire once they had 
completed 20 years continuous service and provided they could, 
upon proof of a medical certificateg demonstrate that they 
were either mentally or physically incapacitated or were 
older than 50 years of age* Entitlementta retirement 
with a gratuity was thus only made possible after 20 years 
of work and then only If the worker had begun employment 
after 29 years of age* To qualify for a gratuityg If work 
had begun at (say) 17 years of age (service as a juvenile 
- below 17 years - was not counted)v the worker would have 
had to complete 33 years of continuous service, The 
provisions (L25 gratuity for 20 years service and L70 for 
35 years employment) were of only marginal benefit to 
retiring employees and were primarily geared to the promotion 
of labour stabilization. Redundancy payments$ eg, upon 
closure of the mineg were designed- to be of minimal cost to 
employers (here employees of 15-20 years standing were to be 
given a "gratuity of Z1 for each year of continuous employment), 
The 1970 provisions (whioh-applied throughout 1974) 
were an Improvement upon the 1961 arrangements - as they were 
in other Industries - but not much so, All workers who had 
completed 10 years of continuous service received a $20 
minimum gratuity (a provision Introduced In 1964)* The rate 
for 20 years work rose to $80 (only a slight Improvement, In 
real terms after adjustment for Inflation since 1961) and the 
35 year award was $490, In the case of persons over 50 
years of age the gratuity was to be increased by 20 percentq 
ý62- 
or $2 for each completed year of service whichever was the 
greater* The same arrangements were made for workers 
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receiving less than $30 monthly under the Staff Agreement, 
Asjja other industriesq benefits were forced to rise to meet 
the growing demand that employers bear a higher portion of 
the costs of post-employment subsistence consumption, 
Benefits and pensions for semi-skilled workers were 67 
better than those paid to the labouring classes* This 
reflected the degree of difficulty employers had In 
attracting and replacing these workers In production under 
conditions of expansions the need to provide for permanent 
labour stabilization outside of the reservesq and the greater 
bargaining power of the semi-skilled grades in the A*M*W*Uo 
From-1959.68 these workers (Grades B and C) were excluded# 
like labourersq from the Mining Industry Pension Fund by the 
stipulation that only workers who received more than 060 
fell-under the provisions of the Fund* Before 1959 Africans 
were not ellgible for the Fund Agreement negotiated by the 
AeMeWsUo and M*O, S*S*Ao with the Chamber of Mines In 1952, 
The'llhodeslan Mines Benefit Fundq negotiated at the NI, C, I, 
was Introduced to cope with the needs of the upper stratum 
of the African mineworker class who earned between 030 and 
060 per month (lee, $1*20 to $2.35 per shift). The Benefit 
Fund, thus catered specifically for semi-skilled operatives 
and staff and deliberately excluded lower paid assistants 
and labourerse At the outset onlY 1,600 members were 
incorporated In the Fund, By 1974 there were 29500 members* 
The benefits to members exceeded those PreVioUsly provided- 
IIN 
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under the old gratuities system* Provision was made for 
upward class mobility so that once workers' earnings exceeded 
960 monthly they became eligible for the MIX, Pension Fund, 
In the case of accident or death the provisions of the 
68 
Workments Compensation Act applied, The Act was Onon- 
raoiall after 19599 but the practical application of Its 
provisions had the effect of gearing benefits to the 
inequalitarian wage structure, This was disadvantageous 
for the lower strata of the working class and in the case of 
the mining industry the effect was to reduce the costs of 
compensation paid by the State (but funded by employers under 
Section 87)9 especially In the cese of serious accidents 
which were most prevalent amongst the labouring classeso 
The deathp disease and accident rate among African 
workers In Rhodesian mines was Otraditionally. 'textremely high 69 
even though it fell later from its high pre-war levels. 
In 19301p for examples the death rate per mille from disease 
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was 15*15 and from accidents 2.16. The resultant death 
rate per mille for disease and accident was thus 17,31 for 
Africans as against 7.36 for European workers, At this 
time 69 percent of all African workers experienced some kind 
of disease and 28 percent were prey to accident In each year. 
These levels remained high whilst Orations' remained 
j3parseq labour was plentiful$ wage oosts were lowq and there 
i was little employer or State Incentive to invest in hospital 
faollitlese It was only with the rise in wage rates after 
193B that conditions changed markedly. By 1946 the death 
rate per mills for disease and accident was down to 8.52 per 
N 
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annum though the African accident rate was still much higher 
than that of whites* By 1974 the fatality rate was even 
lower largely due to improved medication* higher wagesq and 
the decline in the relative Importance of the labouring class 
as mechanization was extended. Mining was still hazardous 
for African workeraq howeverg as demonstrated by the Wankie 
disaster of 19729 In which over 400 Africans lost their 
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lives* Indeed, as regards medical facilitiesq mines 
took considerably greater measures to ensure the health of 
their labour force as many more workers became semi-skilled 
and not easily replaceable In production at short notice* 
The tpoolt of casual day labour or unemployed workers that 
was found In the vicinity of most large mines usually 
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consisted of unskilled labourers. The provision of health 
facilities was conditional upon employment and mine clinics 
operated for mine employees (and theirfamilies in order to 
encourage labour stabilization)o This provisiong as with 
education provided through the employer-controlled mine 
school systemq created 'non-wage' ties of dependence between 
workers and the mining enterprise and enabled lextra-eeonomiel 
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forms of social control to be applied by management, 
Paternalist labour policies were central to the employer 
strategy of keeping workers *tied' within the confines of a 
cheap labour systems Such a system provided a greater 
degree of social control over labour than would have been 
possible under a system of pure wage-relations. In the 
,, 1930's and 19401sj for Instancelp employers widely advertised- 
their paternalist benefits for labour In Journals such as 
665 
the Bantu Mirror In order to demonstrate the superior quality 
of mine life as compared to those conditions which pertained 
on farms and in South Africa, The Cam and Motor mine In 
1938 claimed that Its 29250 workers were all 'happy'q 
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comfortably housed and well-fed. The Globe and Phoenix 
laid stress on Its schoolos sports facilities# Native Welfare 
Societyq and the opportunity for juveniles (between 8.12 
years) to engage In Ilightworkt for I/. to 51- monthly 
(including foods uniforms and blankets). No Sunday work 
took-place on the mine which boasted its own 'hospital's 
its own 'African leaders' and 200 married housing units for 
Its 1000 male workers* Wankle Collieriesq with a population 
of 79387 Africansq (1,090 females and 19719 children)s 
emphasized that one meal daily was given in addition to the 
#ration' scale# that leave was available when applied forg 
and that most workers were granted small gardens to till In 
order to supplement wages. On the Galka, Mines workers were 
even given mealle seeds for their plots* On the Sherwood 
Star Mine# workers were allowed to wash and fish In the 
nearby river and it was mentioned specifically that no 
restrictions were placed on where workers should purchase 
their commodities, The Rhodesian Chrome Minesp aware that 
the combination of low wages and the taquelleti system (mine 
store credit) was disliked by workers (because debt 'tied' 
workers to the mine)g advertised the fact that credit given 
at the mine store could not be marked on the worker's 
tiaketo Similarlyg the Wanderer Mine promised not to deduct 
store debts from the pay packet* NearlY all mines provided 
beer hnlls for recreation and simultaneously enforced severe 
rectrictions on the 'illegal' patty production of local 
brewso 
These and other long standing practices continued to 
prevail in mining compounds. Koyoq for Instanceg has 
written on the conditions at Shabanle Mine in the 196099 and 
has shown how paternalism was functional to the low wage 
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system and social control, Housins was #tied' to continued 
employment on the mine even though in some cases the 'African 
mine compound homes were just a small degree better than**. 
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traditional mud huts', Houses supplied by mines were 
typically 'bareq dark and, uglylgwithout lightingg washing 
facilities or furnishings* Often they were built by 
workers themselvese 
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Tenure was related to the job and 
loss of employment meant not only loss of subsistence but 
Immediate loss of accommodation for the worker and his 
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family* Similar provisions applied In respect of school 
education for the children of mineworkdrs. The semi-skilled 
grades often obtained slightly better conditionsg privileges 
and fringe benefits, Inside the compound* the authority 
of mine management remained dominant and9 through compound 
policemen-and policewomen# substantial control was exercised 
79 
over the daily lives of workers* 
Some of the extremely rigorous controls that characterized 
the pre-war compound systems In Rhodesia were relaxed or 
removed'as the needs of different classes of worker had to 
be acoommodatedp higher wages for the semi-skilled grades 
reduced the need for an austere regime over all workerss 
k\ 
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fewer contract workers were employed* and the existence of 
widespread unemploycent In Rhodesiag as well as In neighbouring 
territoriess effected the formation of a 'captive labour 80 
force', Paternalist labour policies remained at the core 
of mine labour practiceag howeverg even though the Chamber of 
hinen acknowledged thatq under pressure from the State and 
$the advanced African'# the phasing out of paternalism was 81 
linavitablolo Even sog retention of the system was still 
necessary to regulate the unskilled labouring classes and 
provide 'extra-economics forms of control over 'illegaV 
labour organizationg OwIldcatt strikersp and frustrated 
low-wago workers. The $ticket system$ was done away with 
by all but the smallest mines or the most $unprogressive' 
employern* Social welfare departments became *Africanizedl 
on a number of mines, Economic rentals were charged for 
housing In certain oases (after first raising wages and 
enauring satisfactory provisions for the termination of 
leases) and thOrations' vystamg a source of conflict with 
nearly all African workers from before the warg was convertedg 
by ooze larger minesp into a system whereby workers could 
elect to take stipulated cash payments in lipul, These 
conditions did not apply on all mines and even where they 
applied# social control over workers by manngerent was not 
dispensed with* 
Employer Insistence on the 'rational system was deeply 
resented by African workers. It not Only made workers and 
their rammes dependent on management ror foodq but also 
enabled many mines to lower labour costs by discriminating 
w 
In 'rational allocations against married workers, Prior to 
the 1961 Agreement all decisions In respect of 'rational were 
made at the employerts discretion, Most employers followed 
'traditional' practice and organized their 'rational policy 
an the basis of the 1911 Mining Rations Scale (as regulated 
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In Government Notice No* 350 of 1911),, Most gsVe 
'rational but did so uniformly to *single' and 'married 
workers (with or without dependents), As the need for labour 
atabilization Increasedgeore employers provided double Orations' 
for married workers, 
When the 1961 Agreement was negotiated by the AsM*W*Uq 
the 1911 coalo wasinsertedg virtually verbatim# Into the 
Agreemento These 'rational Included 1j lbs* of mealle meal 
dailyg 2 lb3o or beans per week, 2j lbs. of meat weekly, 
2 lbse or fresh vegetables weekly and I lb, of shelled 
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peanut* per weeks EmPloyern could apply under Section 39 
of the Hinins Bealth and Sanitation Regulations (1949) for 
permission to pay daily paid employees an allowance of not 
less than L2*10*0 per month In lieu of 'rations*. The 1964 
Agreement added 3j ozo of salt to the soaleg provided greater 
flexibility for employera by allowing them to provide 
alternative types or food as Orations* and ensured that all 
night-shift workers were given one pint of hot soupq coffee, 
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cocoa or ten*' The A*M*W*U*Os confrontation with mine 
ownern at the Industrial Court in 1963 also changed the 
Oration' cyntem by entrerehing the right Of wives of Category 
Dp C and D daily paid workers to receive some Orations', The 
solution proposed by the Court in an effort to reach a 
I 
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compromise between the Chamber of Mines and the A, X, W, UO was 
eventually Incorporated In to the Agreement, It placed 
an obligation upon emPloyers to provide one half the normal 
rationlecale (not actual rations provided) or the equivalent 
theretog for the worke* wife It the wife was living with 
the permission of the employer on mine property* The 
result did not In Itself lead to substantial changes since 
many wives could not stay with their husbands (because wages 
were too low or housing supply did not permitit) and 
employers were able to control the proportion of workers 
legally permitted to have dependents with them In the 
compounde 
'Rationsf thus remained a central issue in the conflict 
between management and worker (as In the case of the 1964 
Wanklo strike) and also a nexus around which workers could 
vent grievances and mobilize others against management 
policies in general, By 1972 nearly 209000 of the 509000 
African workers In the Industryl mostly In the labouring 
MO gradesq were still ItiedO to the Irationt? syste - Workers 
objected to the Orations' system because they believed that 
management were maintaining the system at their expense# 
Joe* by reducing labour costs through the provision of I 
inferior and bony meat# badly ground mealle meal and 
85 
polluted vegetables* The A. M*W*Uo President agreed with 
the widespread complaints coming from mineworkem Despite 
thle the Anglo American Corporations one of the largest 
employerss continued to provide all its workers with 'rational'' 
in 1972 (except at Wankie Colliery where major strikes had 
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resulted in the incorporation of the cash equivalent In the 
wage)* One reason why employers retained the system was 
the fact that many large mining capital Interests had large 
investments in plantation production and were able to use 
the cheap commodities produced in this sector to finance the 
costs of Orations' subsistence for mineworkerse A high 
level of exploitation of farmworkers thus enabled the cheap 
labour system to be especially efficient* 
BY 1970 the value of the Orations' scale was assessed 
at 06.00 monthly for 'single' workers, (20 percent above the 
1961 level in current prices)* It remained so valued even 
In 1973 after the Agreement had been extended. In real 
terms (adjusting for Inflation of 34 percent in African food 
prices frota 1961-73) this meant that those workers who chose 
cash in lieu of rations were# as a recultq worse off in 
86 
1974, This is perhaps one reason why many employers chose 
to adopt the 'progressive' policy of switching the payments 
system onto a cash basis, It also indicates the way in 
which the Orations' valuation procedure was used# through 
A#H*W*Uo neglectq to renegotiate the value of the Scale and 
so reduce the impact of the 1963 IndustrI41 Court decision 
on labour costs. The valuation of the 'rations' scale at 
27 cents -per shiftlin 
the 1974-75 wage re-negotiations 
(agreed upon by the A. M. W. U. and the Chamber of Mines) only 
just restored the value of the 1961 cash equivalent of MOO 
(1961 prices)* This was because the revised monthly value 
of the Orations$ scale (assuming a 26 shift month)q of 07902g-- 
only Just met a 40 percent food price Increase recordedln' 
the African consumer Price Index, 
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The other aspect of the 'rational scale that attracted 
worker objection was the Inadequacy of the minimum 'rational 
in meeting basic subsistence food requirements, The 1975 
negotiated Orations' valueg for instancep converted to a 
daily equivalent of 23*3 centss was only Just adequate to 
cover the minimum subsistence food requirements of a single 
adult man of 22*3 cents (January 1974 prices) as estimated 
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by the authors of the 1974 Poverty Datum Line Report* 
r. inimum food requirements for all other sizes of 'household' 
unitq i*eo for most workers# were far greater than this and 
came nowhere near being met by the 1963 Industrial Court 
rulinge 
The Orations' system was extended to $Staff employees" 
tool, but with certain significant differences In applimation, 
variations which reflected the differentiation within the 
African working class. Technically staff employees were 
entitled to 'rations' determined by the 'rations' scale in 
the Mineworkerd Agreement* Howeverg almost universally# 
Staff employees wero able to choose cash in lieu of 'rations'. 
Here-the valuation of $rations' for Staff employees was 
(inexplicably) set at a far higher level (30 cents daily in 
1968) than that of mineworkerse 
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This 'privilege* was 
functional in the system of class division and social control 
in the compound* The staff workers who benefited were 
compound polloeq welfare workers# cashiersq security guards, 
firomens clerical staffq health employees and supervisors - 
workers who formed a bureaucratic elite within the compound 
class structure and who were necessary for Maintenance of-the 
compound's system of social control, 
In this systems manipulation of the class structure was 
also necessary* A oertain amount of patty eommodity produe- 
tiong especially when practised by wives alonel was 
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encouraged by management, eego handicrafts. Nearly all 
mines encouraged some form of food production In mine 
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villageso A bureaucratic class of gangleadersp compound 
police and functionaries# however# enabled management to 
control 'Illecalt activitiesq prostitutiongbeer-brewingg 
dagga, sellings Iloafers*9 asitationg petty theftý and to 
contain the coolo-economic problems associated with the 
#pool# Of unemployed and casual labourers that most mines 
permitted to exiate inside or within the vicinity of the 
compounds These petty bureaucrats were specifically trained 
to meet the requirements of mine Ownerep especially the 
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large-scale producers. ý 
'Extra-eoonomlof controls were essential toog for State 
and employer control of collective worker mobilizationg African 
trade unionisa and strike action* organized African trade 
unions experienced great difficulty in successfully pene- 
trating the mining compoundse The nascent unionism that the 
I-C-Us attempted to foster In the compounds In the 1920's 
and 1930's was successfully thwarted by State and management 
policies. After the first major postwar strike (at Wankle 
in 1954) the larger mining employers Instituted a Works 
committee system within their company organizations (often 
built around a Village Elder system with a great stress on 
ethniolty) in order to co-opt., -worker pressures for change 
Into the oheap labour system, The Committeess-begun in the 
early 1950's. functioned up to 1960 when they were superseded 
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by the A, 11, W, U, On some mines where the A. M*W*U. had not 
formed branchesq or where management had operated the 
Committeesq theY remained operative until as late as 1970- 
The Committees were a basis for African recruitment into the 
A, M*W*U* after 19599 when with great assistance from the 
Chamber of Mines the (later) 'multi-racial* union sought to 
extend its membership to include Africansp especially In 
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the semi-skilled grades* The 11#0. S*S*A, received similar 
support from management* The change In the Industrial 
Conciliation Act In 1959 thus left African labourers little 
better offq Insofar as unionization was concerned# than before. 
Indeed$ in having their 'rights' In the collective bargaining 
procedure usurped by a wholly undemocratic union which was 
controlled by an alliance between the artisanal labour 
aristocracy and a dependent class of semi-skilled workersq 
the labpuring classes were dominated by both capital and 
embourgeolsed labour. 
Ideological controls were utilized by management to 
divert working-class agitation into acceptable channels* 
Elders* Committeess ethnic associations* welfare bodlesq and 
even religious organizations were given substantial aid In 
their activities In the compound, The management also 
encouraged ethnic and linguistic divisions In the compound 
system which# under the Influence of settler-oolonial ideology, 
95 
tended to have ethnic groups housed together* The fostering 
of 'tribalism' helped divert attention away from the common , 
classýpositlon of all workers In relation to capital, 
0 
Management ciultivated acceptable 'stereotypes' for workers to 
emulate* For exampleg in the late 19601s, the management- 
sponsored BlUlta Minerals Newsletter carried a number of 
profiles of 'Personalities of the MonthIq laying great stress 
on the need for workers to 'hold their Jobs'. work for 10 
years at leastv avoid disputes# maintain #traditional' 
customsq cooperate with supervicorsq behave wellp always be 
disciplineds work hard and avoid becoming $a rolling stone$, 
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The underlying message In such exhortations was clear and 
geared to the productivity requirements of the producers and 
the social controls needed under the low wage system if 
production was to proceed smoothly, 
None of these social controls could stop 'illegal' 
strikesp howevers and in the event of these erupting# 
management Itself was powerless* They relied on the State 
not only to make strike action 'illegal' In the first 
instance# but also to deal with strikers after the event* 
The management had a second prop after 1959 - the A. M*W*Uo 
The class charactercf this union Isclearly exemplified in the 
attitude of Its officials to African strikers and its boast 
that it had never called a strike In the history of the 
unione The unionts Incapacity for actiong *responsible# 
conservativismo, collusion with management and the State In 
thwarting stirikersq and Internal compositiong made It 
unattractive to moGt African workersp particularly amongst 
the labouring class* These aspects of the A. H. W*U. can be 
illustrated from a consideration of Its role In the social 
control dppliq5d' during the two most important Postwar strikes 
'H 
In the Rhodesian mining lndustryg both at Wankie Collieriesp 
in 1964 and 1974, 
The 1964 Wankle strike lasted 1_0 days. It Involved a 
vast majority of the 49500 African workers at the minep 
2000 of whom were from Northern Rhodesia and were closely 
associated with the United National Independence Party 
(U. N#I. Po)g the newly appointed African ruling party during 
the first phase of Zambian de-colonization, The strikers 
were joined by 500 'unemployed' persons who were allowed to 
reside around the mine (being given one free meal daily) as 
a *pool$ of casual day labour. The strike began over 
enforced Orations* and the absence of an option to take cash 
in lieu. Most of the semi-skilled workers came out on 
strikee The strike was oontroMed by the police and local 
reservists (as was an earlier strike at Arcturus Mine In 
Januaryt 1964)* The A*MWU, President (Mr H*B. Bloomfield) 
arrived at Wankle to talk to the workers$ even though the 
AoM, W, Us had officially condemned the strike as IlMegallt 
had disclaimed any liability or connection with its andp in 
any events could claim less than 7 percent of the African 
workers at the mine as members, The management and the 
State decided to call In the A, M. W. U. 'to restore order and 
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working conditionsIt A*M*W*U. officials (both white and 
black - the latter from the semi-skilled and staff grades) 
attempted to pacify the workers by asking that they return 
to work pending an Investigation of the quality of 'rational 
providedo The meeting at which the A. M, W. U, officials 
addressed the workers broke up In disorder, Further meetings 
4 
6 
ý1ý 
also ended In rejection by the workers of the AoMeWsUe's 
presence and suggestions* Riots ensued which were put 
down by the police* The A*M, WoUo condoned strike breaking 
and assisted uith the supply of manpower, -, 'to keep production 
goinst a policy for which they were resolutely oondemned 
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by the Southern Rhodesian African Trade Union Congress* 
In the ends cash Jn ligu was provided and the value of rations 
was raised by 40 percent to Z3*10*0 per month for single 
personse A year laters In recalling what was described as 
'an unpleasant little Incident's the A. 11, WoU* President 
summed up the unionle role: 'I fear and shudder to think 
what the final outcome would have been If no trade union 
had been available as a mediator In this strike* It Is 
good to note that the Wankie Management acknowledge the 
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services rendered by this Association's This evaluation 
was consistont with the A, 11., W. U*Os non-democratic character 
in aoting not on behalf of the workerss but as an Instrument 
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of the management and the State* 
A parallel Incident was the 1974 Wankle strike over a 
wage dispute* Again, mo6t of the labouringetlasses came out 
on strike and were joined before long by the domestic and 
essential services staff In the Colliery township, As In 
19649 all white miners and a number of semi-skilled black 
workers did not participate. The A, M. W. Ws officials 
arrived on the third day of the six-day strike after police 
actiong shooting and arrests had failed to restrain the 
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strikers* A*IIeW*Uo meetings with workers-, were extremely 
rowdy, * Ultimatelyg after a small 10 cents per shift offerg 
W 
the strikers returned to work, once again the A. M*W*Uo 
President claimed to have helped to bring the strike to an 
102 
early endq much to the appreciation of management. 
Other mining strikes (e., go at Shabanl In 1972) were 
dealt with in a similar manner, The Chamber of Mines and 
mine management (as well as the AelloWoU. ) typically regarded 
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African strikes as 'politically motivated$* This 
provided an Ideological justification for the extensive use 
of police and violence in controlling strikes and for 
resisting worker demandso At no stage did the AoMeWoUs 
take up the case of African strikersq even where nearly all 
workers on the mine were behind the protest* The Instance 
of A, M*WoUe alliance with management and the State during 
strikes tras only one area In which the union adversely 
affected African labour Interests. An Important reason 
behind the poor soolo-coonomic condition of mineworkers In 
Rhodesia lies In the nature and policy of the A. H*W*Uo 
THE Asli*W, Us AM THE LABOUR ARISTOCRACY 
The labour aristocracy In the mining Industry consisted 
of two major parties: the artisanalg skilled and certified 
production workerag organized into the controlling hierarchy 
of the, AM, W, Uel and the bureaucratic# supervisory and 
managerial class of employees represented by the control2ing 
elements in the M90,, S4, S*A, Both these groups had some 
African members* Fevertheless semi-skilled African workers 
in both the A*M*W*Uo and M*O*S*S*A. formed a subordinate - 
element amongst these socio-economic classes that dominated 
the formal trade union structures in the mining Industry. 
The class composition of these unions had Important Implica- 
tions for both the African labouring and semi-skilled classes 
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of workers* 
The roots of the labour aristocracy's control of the 
trade union apparatus pre-date the last war, As Phimister 
has explained# 'completely divorced from ownership of the 
means of production and with only their labour to sellq white 
miners were fully proletarianized earlier than the bulk of 
African mineworkeralo 
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They collaborated with management 
from the earliest years of production despite the fact that 
their struggle to organize skilled workers resulted In union 
formation (in the Rhodesia Mine and General Workers* 
Association) in 1919, An employer offensive agains the 
uniong disunity amongst white workers in generalq and 
diffi cult economic oircýxmstances led to Its demise In 1923, 
This situation continued until the formation of the A. Ir,. 'W#Uo 
in 1938- This wasfbstered by the high demand for skilled 
labour In expansionary conditions following the Depression# 
the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act which cave collective 
bargaining'rights to all organized white workersq the 
formation of a'brýnch of the South African Mineworkers' 
Union In Que_Que In 19379 and the political power of the 
labour representatives In the House of Assembly. In November, 
1938, the State accepted the A, M*W*U* as having proprietary 
negotiating rights for the Colony, Branches of the A, M, W, U, * 
were established quickly on all major mines. The conservative 
" 
nature of the union was apparent from the outset: 'concern 
over (African competition) led to the Involvement of the 
Associated Mine Workers In the 1941 division of the Rhodesia 
Labour Party Into two antagonistic groups - the"non-racial" 
Sout hern Rhodesia Labour Party and the "exelusivcm white 
socialist Labour Party to which the mineworkers' union 
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pledged support$* 
After this distinctive de-radicalization of white 
working-class Politiesq white unionists through their unions 
and the Trades and Labour Council (which eventually became 
the Trade Union Congress)q drifted increasingly towards the 
'right wing' of white politics In Rhodesia, By the 1970's 
they held a political position approximated by the conservative 
elements In the Rhodesian Front and smaller fringe parties on 
Its right flankq such as the Republican Alliance'* As a 
class they became steadily embourpeolsed, by postwar economic 
transformations and maintained an insecure position which 
relied upon cooperating In a restrained conflict with capital$ 
dependence on the State for statutory protectionss and 
careful Intra-union control of the challenges from the 
semi-skilled and unskilled African working class* The demise 
of the smallworker tended to heighten this insecurity since 
the class mobility that existed in earlier times (between 
self-employment on a smallworking and taking wage-employment) 
was restricted by monopolization In the Industry and the more 
acute difficulties facing smallworker production In the 19701s 
as compared with the 19301s. This contributed to the 
strength of the A*M#W. U. whiehg unlike many African unIonsq,,, -- 
. 
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did not depend on international aid, and recognition f or,. support. 
The internal composition of the A. H, W. U, partly accounted I 
for Its conservativismg non-democratic character and 
monopolization by the labour aristocracy. up to 1959 only 
whites were members of the union# all on an equal membership 
footing, The 1959 Industria. 1 Conciliation Act explicitly 
recognized legalized means whereby skilled workers could 
co-opt semi-skilled and unskilled workers Into their member- 
shipg but In such a way as not to impair the control of the 
skilled workers over the union's affairs. Section 47 of 
the Act safeguarded this effective control by providing for 
different grades/classes of member and for the G3=de I 
members to have a determining vote In appointing the union's 
executive* Union constitutions had to be approved by the 
Minister and by law had to ensure that the skilled grades 
effectively controlled the union. The question of a simple 
majority of members voting for an executive did ; not arise 
since each Grade (10 11 and III) elected its own specified 
number of executive metabers and did not vote for any others* 
Grade I members were given a majority of the seats on the 
executive so electing thel members to the prominent positions 
of General Secretary and President* and thereby controlling 
union polleyo 
Annual Congressesg where union policy was formulated an 
passedg viere similarly loaded In favour of the labour 
aristocracy* In 1973, for Instanoeq there were 15 Africans, 
representing workers in Grades II and 119 out of 54 delegates 
to the Annual Congress# even though the A, 11, W, U, membership 
(1974) comprised only 19000 Grade I members (Out Of an eligible 
21 
1.424) and Grades 11 and III members numbered 4,422 (out of 
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an eligible A194), The large majority of National 
Executive Council membersq including the President and all 
major posts in the uniong were held by Grade I members, The 
majority# themselves drawn from Grades II and 1119 were In 
fact surface and underground labourers (2,600 out of a total 
union membership of 5,414)l yet their claims were not 
prominent in A. M*W*U. affairs. At the A*G#M* In 19739 for 
instaneet the waees of labourers were not even discussed 
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nor any resolution related thereto considered. 
The occupational structure of the Grade I membership 
reflected the artisanal dominance In the union* Most of 
these members were fitters and turners, carpentersq weldersp 
bollermakerog mechaniosq electricianss bricklayersi 
machinists and driMers. The remainder- were shift super- 
visors and clerical staff. In most of these tradesi the 
threat of fragmentation and fear of a widespread certification 
of skills through an expansion In the apprenticeship system 
were behind worker conservativism and Insecurity* Grade II 
members were dominated by semi-sAlled workers employed as 
'Boss BoysIg clerksp lorry driverss hoist driversq gang 
leadersp mill assistantsl plant operators and artisan's 
assistants* These employees were in a position to gain 
from 'African advancement' schemes# Tragmentation! of skilled 
workq and Inroads Into the mining bureaucracy, but only 
provided'that the wage claims of labourers did not receive 
preferenoe* 
22- - 
Union membership was concentrated on less than a dozen 
large mines, In 1968 nearly 90 pereent of all union 
members were employed on 9 mines out of 62 to which Part II 
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of the Agreement applied, On 38 mines there were no 
formal branches or members, The remainder of the mines 
had a handful of members even though on some of these the 
work force was large, The degree of unionization amongst 
workers correlated directly-' with the level of skill. Higher 
skilled workers were effectively unionized and vice versa, 
A perverse union structure thus helped thwart the movement 
of the labouring classes towards democratic unionism. 
The alliance between the labour aristocracy and the 
settler-colonial Statep with the complicity of foreign 
capital (which dominated the Chamber of Mines and its 
negotiating strategy at N. I, C. level)j combined with the 
Internal conditions of the A. M*W. U. to produce highly 
beneficial socio-eeonomic conditions for skilled workers 
In the mining Industry. 
The minimum wage rates and conditions of employment for 
Grade I workers Improved tremendously after the first Agree- 
ment in 1941. This Agreement was not applleable to mining 
enterprLges which produced an average gross output of less 
than L900 per mensem (i. e. most smallworkers). This 
provision satisfied white minersg the Rhodesian Mining 
Federation (which represented small workers)q and monopoly 
capitale Under the Agreementp skilled certified artisans 
were. given a basic rate of 25/- per shift and semi-skilled 
workers received between 17/6d and 22/6d (e, ge assistanto, and 
I 
0 
hoist drivers respectively). Overtime rates were also 
included, The Agreement was re-negotiated In 1943,19441, 
19469 1948 and throughout the 19509G at two-year Intervals 
until by 19591, in the last Agreement struck before the 
Industrial Conciliation Acts the certificated journeymen 
In the Industry were entitled to a minimum shift rate of 
50/9d* Subsequent negotiations revised these rates further 
and by 1970 the minimum was 07-00 per shift. These gains 
were In marked contrast to the stagnation in respect of 
minimum rates of pay for labourers. The 1974-75 negotiations 
were, oreanized by the A*? I*W. Uo to widen further the gap 
between skilled/unskilled and skilled/semi-skilled workers, 
Certified journeymen were to be raised to $12*00 per shift 
whilst most Grade II members were to receive a 50 cents to 
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90 cents rise* Labourers' rates, as requested by the 
A. m. w. u., ' were to be set at a total of 40 cents per shifts 
a level which represented only a 30 percent improvement on 
the level at which the minimum rates had been set 14 years 
earlien 
Earnings moved steadily upwards after the Agreement was 
first negotiated* During the period In whiCh the A*M*W*Uo 
was responsible for African wageaq the earnings of skilled 
workers rose especially sharply* In 19589 average European 
earnings In the mining industry were %29822 (which would 
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have included M. 0, S, SeA. members). By 1973 the average 
earnings were the highest of all European employees ($5,335), 
In 15 years an 85 percent Increase had been achieved. The 
waselbill*'aocruing to these workers had risen 125 percent, 
andq although they represented less than 5 percent of all 
mineworkeras their wage payments accounted for 45 percent of 
all wages paid in the Industry In 1973# By 1964 Grade I 
workers$ rates had also become 'Inflation-proofeW as a 
cost-of-living allowance applied to all but female earnings, 
Other Important benefits of contract resulted from the 
skilled workers' strong bargaining position through the 
A, M*W*Uo: pensions and children's allowancevgfor exampleo 
Unlike labourers, skilled employees were not 
disadvantaged by the tendency of foreign capital to dominate 
the Industry and pursue oligopsonistic labour policies* 
The high degree of union organization amongst members of 
the labour aristocracy provided a substantial lever in their 
conflicts with mine owners. The price that capital had to 
pay for a high degree of exploitation of African mineworkers 
was the burden of supporting a necessary class of aristocratic 
workers* In the settler-colonial context they were a vital 
soolo-economic force for the maintenance of a highly 
t 114 profitable system of peripheral capitalism. 
CLASS9 RACE AND THE STATE 
, 
The union formation process In the mining Industry 
refleeted the class relations of various workers to the 
production v7stem* As production requirements changedg so 
class divisions and their racial manifestations were 
transformed* The State played a significant mediating role 
in this adjustment process by designing labour legislation -- 
to allow for the management of the class structure In favour 
I 
of the dominant classes. 
Up to the 1950's there was little need for the State to 
concede to African mineworker pressure for all workers to 
be given collective bargaining rights. The compound systems 
together with social control provided by the State# was 
sufficient to contain African working-class action# except 
in the instances of a few large strikes. Howeverg the State 
was under substantial pressure to meet the demands of 
organized African labour - especially through the postwar 
confederations of labour (the Reformed Industrial and 
Co=ercial Workerst Unions the Southern Rhodesian Trade Union 
Congress and the Confederation of African Labour) and African 
nationalist pressure on settler-colonial exclusivism, and 
legal discrimination through the Youth Leagues the African 
National Congress and the more broadly based National Demo- 
cratie Party,. 
The State's strategy aimed at containing these pressures 
was to make the Industrial Conciliation Act 'non-raoiallg 
but at thesame time to restrict its applicatiom As far 
as minins was concerned It was acceptable to both foreign 
capital and the A*M. W, U. that African workers be co-opted 
within the legalized trade union system under the aegis of the 
established unions. Indeedt the A. M, W, U, had altered Its 
constitution in 1954 in order to make membership Into Its 
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ranks 'non-racial'., The adoption of the principle of 
vertical unionlom In the Act allowed the A, M, W*U, to dominate 
the wholeAndustry In conjunction with the M, O, S, S, A*s the 
T 
reprecentative of monthly paid employeen which had been 
reslatered in 1947. 
Both the artisanal and bureaucratic/professional union 
built the subsequent recruitment of members around the 
pre-existing Works Committee structures whose membership 
tended to be comprised of the conservative and semi-skilled 
side of the African labour movement in the compouneLs* In 
". as this task they wem* sisted by mineowners who were equally 
desirous of containing any prospective union development 
amon, Sst African workers, Indeedl even after the Act9 the 
Committees continued to function# not in competition with 
the A*M*W*U* and the M*O*S, S*A*s but In order to continue 
$to train and accustom African mine workers to the recognized 
procedure and conduct of round table negotiations between 116 
labour and management?, The A*MeW*U* quickly and easily 
shed Its purely racial image and was encouraged to do so by 
the Chambor of Unes* Although limited by lawg the composi. 
tion of the National Executive Council was changed to Include 
African members as representatives of different classes of 
workere The African Executive membersq as well as branch 
officialas subsequently played an Important part In the 
union* 
Grade II semi-skilled members were able to utilize 
successfully the union In pursuit of their own Interests. 
Evidenee'of their relative strength was reflected for 
instance in the A. 11, W*U, wage claim submitted to the Industrial 
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Tribunal in 1975, The B class workers' claims stood at 
02950 to %5-74 per shift and C class claims were 01.07 to 
$2.29* The labouring grades (class D) were to receive only 
a fraetion of these amounts. The success of the A*M*W#U, 
controlling hierarchy in 'managing' the union was approved 
by mine manaZement whieh regularly expressed the approval 
at the $multi-raoiall union arrangements that existed In the 
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Industry* 
The class structure of the A, M, W, U, was reflected too 
in State sanctioned arrangements for contributions to the 
N,, I, C4, g a statutoTy body ., 'funded by both employers and various 
classes ofurorker. Prior to 1959 only white mineworkers 
were under obligation to finance the MIX. from the labour 
cl4e even though there uore a few non-white union members 
at, this time. - Subsequently a differentiated lev7 was 
Imposed. ' In 1961 skilled workers paid 2/- monthly and semi. 
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skilled workers paid 3d monthly, Unskilled labourers 
did not have to bear'any charge* Howeverg by 1964 levies 
of 2d monthly were introduced and placed on the labouring 
clcxses, 'Semi-ekilled workers continued to pay the same 
amount and the skilled worker contribution rose to 2/6d* 
In 19709 after decimalizations the levies on remi-skilled and 
unskilled workers wero effective raised by theý process of 
conversion from the sterling to the dollar system, In 
effectp thin levy cystem shifted a disproportionate burden 
in the finanelils of the N*I*C, on to the labouring classes, 
an they stood to gain the least from It, In 19729 for 
Instance# the levy system brought In %850 monthly from all 
employees covered by the IT. I. C. 9 more than half of which 
came from labourere while only 12 percent came from skilled 
workers, 
120 
The internal membership finanoing system again refleoted 
the class structure of the A*M, W, U, Skilled workers paid 
more than semi-skilled workers and the unskilled workerst 
dues were set at the lowest level* However, since the 
union was not able to obtain 'open shop' provisionsg whereby 
all workers (even non-members) would contribute to the union 
(the management rejected this demand In 1960), It had to 
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rely on recruitment to ensure revenues. Given the 
A*M*W*Uols Inclinations and past performanceg It was natural 
that skilled and semi-skilled workers would be the principal 
financiers of the union. In crises, like the 1963 Industrial 
Court action brought by the A, MW, U,, against the Chamber of 
Mincs (which cost $109000)9 the A, II, W, U, arranged to draw 
a special lovy from skilled workerns although it was alco 
able to obtain $10000 from the Miners# International 
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Federation., The higher dues for skilled memberstqere 
thus necessary where these workers dominated the union and 
recolved'the major benefits from its continued existence. 
The Aellel-IoUe f ailed In 1961 to get the Chamber of Mines to 
agree to the 'closed shop' principle in respect of Grade I 
workers alone (skilled journeymen). 
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This attempt to 
unionize all skilled workers followed on the failure to shift 
the union't; financial burden Increasingly on to the non-skilled 
employees and was also designed to bolster the degree of 
protection provided for the artleanal class through Its 
control over the A, M*W, U, The additional protection# howevers 
proved to be unnecessary since the State continued to Insist 
upon the retention of section 47 of the Industrial Conciliation 
Aot throughout the 1960-? 5 period. 
The security and monopoly position of the artisanal 
class In the AsM., W, Ue rested firmly on the State, The 
politics of this class were truly conservative and were 
rooted In, the Populist elements of white electoral politics, 
a group from which the Rhodesian Front emerged to take over 
government In 1962. Ministers were sympathetic to the 
A*M*W*U*Os case for protection of skilled workers* They 
regularly attended their Annual Congresses and there were 
close associations with the union stretching back to 1940 when 
an ex-trade unionist (Mr JoW, Keller) was Minister of Labour 
and-previously had been one of the early organizers In the 
124 
R. M. GoW*A. 9 the, A*1, ', voW*U*'s predecessor before the Depressionj 
Union power# as opposed to foreign capitall represented 
artisanal bargaining power to a large extent In conditions 
where skilled workers and capital were In close mutual 
interdependence under, the cettler-colonial systems despite 
the-conflicts that marked the shifting boundaries of 
domination of the-former by the latter, 
CLASS ALLIANCESt CAPITAL A1,11D THE LABOUR ARISTOCRACY 
The class alliances between capital and the labour 
aristocracy were not without their antagonistic aspects* 
Howeverp these conflicts were not of major Importance to 
either group as they were overshadowed by the contradictions 
between caPital'and labour In general and between settler. 
colonialism and the needs of the African underclasses 
dependent on, the capitalist 'mining complex'. 
ý3o 
The labour aristocracy had to maintain two sets of 
alliances within the settler-colonial s7stem - one with 
foreign monopolistic capital and another with local small- 
worker capital. Economic transformations In the postwar 
period made the former more critical than the latter, 
Tho A, 11*WeU# policy towards large-scale capital was 
calculatedly hostile* Skilled workers were acutely 
conscious of their elmns conflict with capital especially 
over the threatening issue of 'African advancement', 
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However, this conflict was restrained and conducted within 
the terms of the statiles suo. The union esohewed extra-legal 
action In the form of strikes or extra-parliamentary 
mobilizationo The social relations of union members with 
management were not marked by violenceg except for 
occasional outbursts of verbal abuse and tempers a situation 
In stark contrast'to, the actions taken by black miners 
during strikes* The AeMeW. U. elected to challenge the 
Chamber of Mines at both NoI. C. and Industrial Court level 
In the knowledge that it could rely on some State assistance 
to back Its claims* The 1963 Court confrontation9which 
Ia.. sted 28 dayss Illustrates this point, Even though the 
Court reached a compromise between the A*HoW. U, and the 
Chamber over the definition of semi-skilled work and over 
enforcement of the 'rate-for-the-jobl and 'no-job- 
fragmentation' principles (the main Issues In dispute)s the 
union ultimately, rejected the Court's decision and was able 
to obtain a further compromise from the Chamber# the 
results of which were embodied In the new trade Agreement'- 
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of 1964. 
, 
An Important part of management strategy dominating 
the alliance with the labour aristocracy has been its policy 
of Isolating artisanal workers In the A. 14, WU. from the 
bureauoratict, supervisory and professional employees In the 
ý127 ý- H*O, S*SsAo The publication of separate agreements in 
1968 cemented this division* In addition to dividing skilled 
work ers In this mannerg the separate Agreement struck with 
the Jj, 0,, S*S*Ae (which after ', 1959 Incorporated African monthly 
paid employees) had the effect of dividing the semi-skilled 
classes between two competing unions, The opportunity to 
play one union off against another Increased as- the Chamber 
of 11.1nes became the sole employer representative at the 
N, I, C, confronting a widely disparate grouping of worker 
representatives. ' 
, 
The M,, O, S*SAo was a creation of the postwar period* 
It too began as a 'European' union since at the ttme of 
inception the occupational categories for which It was 
registered were white-dominated. As stratification 
proceeded within the African working class$ more Africans 
(after 1559) were absorbed Into the Y,, O*S*SsA* The union's 
membership drive was assisted by management, Africans were 
quickly rained to the M*O. S, S. A, ls Natlonnl Exceutive and 
the Association appointed the first African to the N. I. C. In 
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1961, Relationships between the Chamber of Mines and the 
H, o, s, S*Ao were more cordial than those between mine owners 
and the A. H. W. U. j OsPecially after the fractUre in 
M*O*S, S*A*/A*MoWoUo relations following the 1963 A-M. W. U. 
conf 
I rontation, with the Chamber, 
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The M-0-S-S. A. did not 
represent more workers or have more members than the A, M, W*Uo 
at any time and It sought to Identify more olosely with 
management in later yearsg thereby breaking the unified 
front that had usually been presented to the Chamber of 
I'Aines at N, I,, C, level. IV- too was monopolized by the upper 
grade workers (those whose minitaum rates were In excess of 
$120 monthly) whol including non-memberst numbered 19556 
throughout. the Industry In 1974,130 The size of the semi. 
skilled grades (940-0120) which it represented was also 
largo (19809) and it had bargaining rights for only a small 
number (19435) of-lower grade members (compound polleeg 
cashiers$ welfare workerstsecurity guardsg telephone 
operators and laboratory assistants). The N, O@S4, S*Ae was 
thus composed of different class Interests. As with the 
A*H*W*Uop the 11*I, C* levy on the lower skilled grades was 
smaller perindividual than on the higher grades (3 cents 
for those earning below 040 as opposed to 25 cents for those 
getting above 0120 and 7 cents for intermediate grades) and 
the control of the Association was kept in the hands of the 
labour aristocracy. so too# like the A. N. W. U*9 the 
11,0, S. S. A, claimed to be 'non-raoiall and the General 
SeerfatarY engaged In an argument with the A. Y,, W, U, In 1963 
over which union had been the first In the Industry to 
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beeome coo 
The conflict between the A, M*W*Uo and the M*O, S, S, A,, 
reflecting some of the class divisions in white society, 
atemmed from the breaking of the A*M*WsU#/M*OoSoS*A* 'Pact' 
by 1-1*0*SoSoAo In 19639 an arrangement established in 1948* 
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A. H. W. U. officials always regarded the M, O*S*S*As as a body 
amongst whoso ranks and executives were 'the future 
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Nana, gement of Mincsq even If they (were) not that already*, 
This ambiguity of the FI, O*S, S*A*Is role complicated the 
A. M. W. U. 's alliance with them$ especially during attempts by 
the latter to confront the Chamber of Mines over crucial 
issues such as job fragmentation. The tPaot'q which Implied 
an arranZement to give reciprocal support In the event of 
controversy %ilth the Chamber of Mineaq was broken, wheng at 
the time of the 1963 decision by the A, M, W, U, to enter into 
arbitration proceedIngsq the M. 0*S*S*A- refused to back the 
A*M*W*Uols case. The N, O, S. S, Ao wished to see the issue 
settled at the N*I*Co level# as did the Chamber of Mines* 
It oven proposed -0, itself as a mediator in the disputes This 
. would havoinvolved. serious compromise for the artisanal 
class of the A*M*W*Ut- In the eventq the Issue went not to 
Arbitration but to Court since the tj*OqSjS*A* Executive would 
not agree to the former procedures This was because it 
would have Involved the sharing of costs under the 'Pact' 
and would also have vitally affected the M#O*S*S*Aota 
relation to management. - In anticipation of 14,0, S,, SA,, ts 
dissociation from the *Paot'g-the A*M*W*Uo'released them 
of liability*- The H*O*S, SOA, compromise with the Chamber 
of ranos in 1963 clearly differentiated Its hierarchy from 
the controlling groups in the A, M, W, U, ' The ex-nost 
rationalization of the rupture In the ranks of the labour 
aristooracys-offered by the A*M*W*Uot, was that it clarified 
issues and allowed,, -Iiach Organization to be masters of th I eir 
own'affairsle 
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The labour aristooracy9s alliance with smallworker 
capital was maintained during this period, In 1941 the 
A#M*W*U. accepted restrictions on the application of its 
Agreement to exclude most smallworker enterprises* Howevergit 
threatened action to have these employers Included under 
the Agreement mounted in the 19601sq especially after the 
Rhodesian Mining Federation was absorbed Into the Chamber 
of Mines and the A, M*W, U, had to find additional bargaining 
weapons against management in Its conflict over Job . 
classification In the skilled/semi-skilled Sradese Thus by 
1963 the A*X*WoU* were calling for (at least) an Industrial 
Board to be established on small mines exempted from Part II 
of the FlineworkersItZreements partly as a result of pressure 
from skilled and comi-skilled workers/members on these mines 
(8,000 to 10#000 workers In 1965) and partly to ensure 
stability In labour utilization practices across the whole 
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ranee of employers In-the Industry, The issue was 
subject to dispute and taken to the Industrial Court bn 
1963, The Court ruled that mines employing less than 150 
persons would remain exempt from the Agreement. The Chamber 
expressed Its great relief that the 'goose was spared' and 
that 85 percent of all Rhodesian mines which fell Into this 
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category could continue as before. Although dominated 
by monopoly capitalg the Chamber was not willingg at this 
stages to ditch the smaller enterprises which together (under 
Smallworkers' Associations) formed an Important element In 
the employer class and possessed a certain amount of political 
leverage* In additiong many small enterprises were owned by 
.", -\, -N, , 
large-scale capital and would have been adversely affected 
137 
by change In the N, I, C, regulations, 
The conflict with smallworker (or more strictlyg 
'exempted') capital became more acute as time passed and 
the basis for exempting smallworker mines was altered to 
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favour capital. The A*M. W*Uo were nonetheless very 
aoco=odating at the N. I,, C* after 1945 In accepting all but 
one submission for exemption from Part II of the Agreement 139 
(a mine that had 670 employees at the time). They did 
not press the State to establish an Industrial Board for 
the rhole Industry in 1963 after the Agreement with the 
Chamber lapsed as a result of an unsettled dispute at the 
IT. Ib. z. Such an actiong the union claimedg also 'spared' 
smallworkers from regulation* The mechanization of 
production.; meant that some mines did not need to employ as 
many as 150 workers and to produce a high level of output* 
Their low level of employment put them outside the scope of 
Part II of the Agreement* This motivated the A*M*W*U* to 
call for a chanZe in MIeCe regulations In order to protect 
skilled workers - against lexal fragmentation In enterprises 140 
outside the union's control, 
The IIoOoSo3*Ao has likewise been in alliance with 
smnllworker capitals but even more so than the A, M, W, U, 
whose members stood to lose more from privately set 
contractual arrangements. Thus the minimum regulated 
conditions under the M. O*S. S. As/Chamber Agreement (1968-72)9 
for Instances were not applicable for those enterprises where 
the numbers of skilled workers (artisanal and bureaucratic) 
1-3 c 
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were less than three* The basis of exclusion changed 
marginally in 1971* This provision effectively left the 
M,, O*S*S*A*ts lower paid workers unprotected while higher 
skilled workers were better able to bargain individually for 
good conditions of employment* Also the M, O, S, S*A. 's closer 
alliance with management meant that the subject of small- 
worker exclusion was not a major problem for the labour 
aristocracy in the Association, This because It was In the 
artisanal and production tasks that the threat of fragmenta- 
tion was greatest, The M. O. S. S, Wa members In the upper 
grades were not faced with the same threat as were those In 
the A*M*W*Uo As a consequence the rift between the M*O*S*S, As 
and the -A. M*W#U. widened. 
In 1971 the A*M*W*U*/Chamber Agreement expired and was 
not replaced* A short term lease given It by both sidess 
providing for an extension for 6 morthat f ailed to allow 
enough time for an Agreement, Then principal dispute was 
over 'restrictive practices' adopted by the A, M. W, U. restating 
the insistance of mine managements that journeymen operate 
in dual occupational roles wherever possible In order to 
alleviate the manpower shortage that became acute In a 
climate of ex ansion of output and restrictions on apprentice- R2 
ship supply* The M. O*S. S*A* kept, out of the dispute but 
taoitly supported the Chamber. Peanwhile the A. M. W. U. 
stepped up the number of disputes against the Chamber and 
even threatened strike actiong a veiled challenge that was 
dropped with the acceptance of a 'truce$ whereby the union 
would not force Its members to refuse to take on work outel , de 
6 ý? 
their trade in exchange for which management would not call 
upon union members, to take on work which they had not done 
before. This 'truce' was to remain until a now Agreement 
had been negotiated, The conflict between the two partlesp 
howeverp became more accentuated by the skilled manpower 
shortage that developed after 1969.143 The State's 
Investigation into the exact nature and extent of the 
manpower shortage in 1972 was partly aimed at re-establishing 
amicable relations between the conflicting parties In the 
ruling-elass coalition. At the same time the Chamber took 
the initiative to increase the supply of skilled workersg 
especially Journeymen and apprenticesq along with other 
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employerssparti cularlythe Association of Rhodesian Industries. 
- -- 1,11 1, 
ByI9739 howeverg the union was also preparing initiatives, 
It declared its withdrawal from the 1971 'truce'# an 
informal arrangement which nonethelessg as the Chamber warned 
in its 1973 Annual Reportq was enforceable by law. The 
A. M, W. U. thus-tnformed'the Chamber that it considered itself 
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free to take 'whatever action it considered necessary'* 
Until early 1975 the union had done nothing further than to 
force the dispute to ; an Industrial Tribunalg the results of 
which would have a binding effect on both parties. 
The class conflicts between capital and the labour 
aristocracy were thus complicated but essentially Inon- 
antagonistiolo An alliance of mutual interdependence 
tYpIfied the sooio-economic relations between the various 
'fractions' of capital on the one hand and the various dominant 
elements constituting the labour aristocracy on the other. 
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These complex and dynamic alliances were however more 
Intricate than suggested by the simple notion of the tdeall 
struck between Ocapital and white workers' that Arrighl and 
Loney describe as the root of ruling class dominance In the 
political economy, Furthermoreq the particular complexion 
and method of dominance by capital was Influential for labour 
mobilization policies In the Industry and significantly 
affected African workers. 
CONCLUSION 
Tho proletarianization of African mineworkers in 
Rhodesia was a socio-economic process that-exhibited certain 
unique features. Essentiallyg'however, the domination over 
labour in the Industry was rooted In the complex Inter- 
relations between foreign capitals the labour aristocracy 
and the State., * This domination provided the means for a 
high degree of employer social control over labour and also 
a profitable framework under the settler-oolontal system 
r for the continuation of ; policies of 'primitive accumulation', 
Not all African workers were subject to the same forms of 
exploitationg however. - Stratification amongst the African 
liorking claso'on the mines was further advanced than In the 
plantation production system., The special features of labour 
mobilization In the compound system and a high level of worker 
dependence on the individual employer differentiated the class 
formation process In the mining industrye' African unionism 
was malformed as a consequence of the particular conditions,, ' 
ýc 3) 
that prevailed historically in the mining production system. 
The conditions fort and patterns oft union formation and 
working-class mobilization differed from the situation that 
was typical In the rest of the *Industrial complex% 
